I just watched the movie Minority Report the other day. Check it out if you have not seen it. It support the idea that the trueness of foreknowledge is subject to secrecy and that knowing the future presents a new choice. This movie presents the future as possibilities.The problem arises when an agent with free has access to foreknowledge since it could do opposite of what is known and put foreknowledge on jeopardy. In another word, the truness of foreknowledge is subject to secrecy.
Job tried. Was forced to comply though.The problem arises when an agent with free has access to foreknowledge since it could do opposite of what is known and put foreknowledge on jeopardy. In another word, the truness of foreknowledge is subject to secrecy.
It’s not that you should rule out that possibility, it’s that if you allow for the possibility that a person who is told what he will do, will decide to do the oppsite that you run into this problem. And there is no reason to assume it’s not possible. It seems this is entailed by libertarian free will.I don’t see why though, that I should completely rule out the possibility that even if a person is given knowledge of the future and he doubts that he will do that thing, that when the time comes he does choose to do that thing because perhaps the circumstances become known to him.
The problem is that if a person wants to do the opposite of what an omniscient entity foretells him, it is impossible to know the future.The problem is very simple, I agree, and so is the conclusion. It does seem simple to then decide that there must be no free will but I can’t help thinking that the whole idea of it is based around the assumption that the person would at some point want to change his future. I think that if the person really didn’t want to do a particular action(and didn’t) then that wouldn’t be the future that God knows. But I do understand the difficulty that the problem presents for someone trying to believe in God, as the Catholic Church describes him.
It is possible to choose differently; its just that a giant fish will swallow you for three days and bring you back to where you were supposed to be.It’s not that you should rule out that possibility, it’s that if you allow for the possibility that a person who is told what he will do, will decide to do the oppsite that you run into this problem. And there is no reason to assume it’s not possible. It seems this is entailed by libertarian free will.
The problem is that if a person wants to do the opposite of what an omniscient entity foretells him, it is impossible to know the future.
The reason why it wouldn’t be “the future that God knows” is because the person has libertarian free will and that means that up to the choice, the future is open.
That knowing the future presents a choice does not help your case.I just watched the movie Minority Report the other day. Check it out if you have not seen it. It support the idea that the trueness of foreknowledge is subject to secrecy and that knowing the future presents a new choice. This movie presents the future as possibilities.
It would seem that God would foreknow all the repercussions of revealing the open choices and determined ones that the free agent would have access to, so then the information God would reveal to the agent would already account for the agent “doing the opposite” of what was revealed. Omniscience would not, in principle, allow a human agent to do the opposite because God would know and account for that. No “fooling” omniscience would even be theoretically possible.It’s not that you should rule out that possibility, it’s that if you allow for the possibility that a person who is told what he will do, will decide to do the oppsite that you run into this problem. And there is no reason to assume it’s not possible. It seems this is entailed by libertarian free will.
The problem is that if a person wants to do the opposite of what an omniscient entity foretells him, it is impossible to know the future.
The reason why it wouldn’t be “the future that God knows” is because the person has libertarian free will and that means that up to the choice, the future is open.
Let me assure you, Peter, that, were God to tell me that I would have coffee tomorrow, I would drink tea, just to show Him wrong. Now, what exacftly is God going to reveal to me then? That I will drink tea? Well, then I will drink coffee. The point is: there is no way for God or anyone else to know what choice I will make. There is no ‘accounting for that’.It would seem that God would foreknow all the repercussions of revealing the open choices and determined ones that the free agent would have access to, so then the information God would reveal to the agent would already account for the agent “doing the opposite” of what was revealed. Omniscience would not, in principle, allow a human agent to do the opposite because God would know and account for that. No “fooling” omniscience would even be theoretically possible.
You suppose.Let me assure you, Peter, that, were God to tell me that I would have coffee tomorrow, I would drink tea, just to show Him wrong. Now, what exacftly is God going to reveal to me then? That I will drink tea? Well, then I will drink coffee. The point is: there is no way for God or anyone else to know what choice I will make. There is no ‘accounting for that’.
No, Peter, I know that, because it is not logically possible.You suppose.
Peter did what was foretold. He didn’t “want” that outcome but it was the one that happened.34 Jesus said to him, “Amen, I say to you, this very night before the cock crows, you will deny me three times.”
35 Peter said to him, “Even though I should have to die with you, I will not deny you.” And all the disciples spoke likewise.
Does the “anyone else” include you? At which point in advance of acting on the choice would YOU “know” that choice? Is there a point of no return? Do you often act other than your choice just to prove yourself wrong, or to “deke” God out by pretending you are going to choose one option, but, instead, go for the other? How soon before committing to the “deke” do you feign the choice? And how, precisely, would you feign the choice and go for the deke without a choice to feign the choice?Let me assure you, Peter, that, were God to tell me that I would have coffee tomorrow, I would drink tea, just to show Him wrong. Now, what exacftly is God going to reveal to me then? That I will drink tea? Well, then I will drink coffee. The point is: there is no way for God or anyone else to know what choice I will make. There is no ‘accounting for that’.
It’s a moot point. You are going to do what god tells you is your future. We have Peter and Judas as examples. Jesus predicted their behavior and they followed through as predicted. Peter even said that he would take the opposite action. He was powerless against his fate. Jesus even told Judas it would have been better if he wasn’t born. Powerless against he fate.Does the “anyone else” include you? At which point in advance of acting on the choice would YOU “know” that choice? Is there a point of no return? Do you often act other than your choice just to prove yourself wrong, or to “deke” God out by pretending you are going to choose one option, but, instead, go for the other? How soon before committing to the “deke” do you feign the choice? And how, precisely, would you feign the choice and go for the deke without a choice to feign the choice?
Would the fact that you are aware of your choice before acting on it, likewise make the act unfree because you know the outcome prior to it transpiring?
Living in your head must be an adventure, since you don’t even believe there is a God but are quite prepared to play this game of “catch me if you can” on the off chance he does.
Of course, living in my head is no rose garden either, but I know a bogey god does not exist there from whom I must cleverly evade his noticing my choices.
The thing is that God foresees what you will choose tomorrow. If he tells you, you are going to choose to drink tea, it’s the future he sees after he told you. You may not be able to fathom why and might vow you will not do it but the future God sees is the *real *one. You will *choose *to drink tea. God doesn’t lie. That’s just how I feel about it. Omniscience and free will are compatible.Let me assure you, Peter, that, were God to tell me that I would have coffee tomorrow, I would drink tea, just to show Him wrong. Now, what exacftly is God going to reveal to me then? That I will drink tea? Well, then I will drink coffee. The point is: there is no way for God or anyone else to know what choice I will make. There is no ‘accounting for that’.
That is a non sequitur.It’s a moot point. You are going to do what god tells you is your future. We have Peter and Judas as examples. Jesus predicted their behavior and they followed through as predicted. Peter even said that he would take the opposite action. He was powerless against his fate. Jesus even told Judas it would have been better if he wasn’t born. Powerless against he fate.
I recall, on another thread, you arguing that every act arises out of a want on the part of the agent, even God. Yet here you are arguing that need not be the case. Interesting.We do have an example
Peter did what was foretold. He didn’t "want" that outcome but it was the one that happened.
Jesus tells Peter what he will do. Peter Denys that is what he’ll do, even says he’ll die before he lets it happen. He does what was foretold.That is a non sequitur.
It isn’t that God’s knowledge made them powerless to choose otherwise, God’s knowledge merely “acknowledges” the choices that Peter and Judas freely made. The knowledge of anyone does not rescind free will as if one person merely having knowledge is sufficient to override another person’s free choice.
Where is the causal association being shown here and not merely assumed?
Whoa! You’d better take this up with yourself, then because…Jesus tells Peter what he will do. Peter Denys that is what he’ll do, even says he’ll die before he lets it happen. He does what was foretold.
He has prior knowledge and assumed free will to choose another path but he doesn’t he is swept up in his destiny. It wasn’t his will or his choice that prevailed. God’s will was done not Peter’s.
I still don’t see any difference. You are describing self control, which is also another desire manifested. I want ice cream. I know ice cream is bad so I refrain. I desire something other than what my ice cream can offer. I have swapped one desire for another, namely the desire for good health out weighs my desire for ice cream. You haven’t circumvented "want."
Your argument was that humans (and God, in fact) always do what we want, ultimately, and you used that as an argument why even God was not free but compelled to do what his “wants” dictate.
I think there really is a point of no return just before the actual action.Does the “anyone else” include you? At which point in advance of acting on the choice would YOU “know” that choice? Is there a point of no return? Do you often act other than your choice just to prove yourself wrong, or to “deke” God out by pretending you are going to choose one option, but, instead, go for the other? How soon before committing to the “deke” do you feign the choice? And how, precisely, would you feign the choice and go for the deke without a choice to feign the choice?
NoWould the fact that you are aware of your choice before acting on it, likewise make the act unfree because you know the outcome prior to it transpiring?
That’s called a thought experiment, Peter.Living in your head must be an adventure, since you don’t even believe there is a God but are quite prepared to play this game of “catch me if you can” on the off chance he does.
I believe your head is a rose garden, Peter. One in which your wish that God exists is so strong that it ignores all contradictions.Of course, living in my head is no rose garden either, but I know a bogey god does not exist there from whom I must cleverly evade his noticing my choices.
God’s want was larger and backed by the power to make it manifest. Peter still wanted. God still wanted.Whoa! You’d better take this up with yourself, then because…
Your argument was that humans (and God, in fact) always do what we want, ultimately, and you used that as an argument why even God was not free but compelled to do what his “wants” dictate.
Now you are arguing that Peter didn’t choose nor do what he ultimately “wanted” but was compelled by God to do what he did.
Any agent with a will, according to your first post, must act in accordance with their “wants,” but in your second post, Peter (an agent with a will) acted, not according to his own wants, but because he was compelled against his wants.
Can you explain how these two contradictory positions can both be true? Obviously, one is not. Which of the two do you “want” to concede, or are you merely making statements simply to be contrary on both threads?