Connection between free will and a known future?

[Peter_Plato]

It’s not about mechanics but rather what we accept.

If we accept that every moment of time is “present” to god then we can’t qualify he statement of goodness with; now but not then, or in the future. To make a qualifier of time makes gods experience linier and not outside of time.

I don’t have to know how it is possible that he is everywhere to accept that he is. If we accept that omnipresence means present everywhere the idea of hell as separation from god is meaningless. If he is everywhere there is no place he is not.

Assuming Hell is a spatial place that has a “where” for God to not be.

Omnipresence is only meaningful relative to spatial realities. Okay, so you have, perhaps, shown that Hell has no extensive properties. So?

I am not clear that extensive properties are required as a ground for being “real” or as a condition of existence, generally.

Does existence have a location?

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Assuming Hell is a spatial place that has a “where” for God to not be.

Omnipresence is only meaningful relative to spatial realities. Okay, so you have, perhaps, shown that Hell has no extensive properties. So?

I am not clear that extensive properties are required as a ground for being “real” or as a condition of existence, generally.

Does existence have a location?

Things that exist take up space, be it physical or mental.

The “so” seems to be if hell has no extensive properties how can anything occupy it? No Satan, no devils, no souls. Or is the space they occupy simply mental?

 

[Peter_Plato]

Things that exist take up space, be it physical or mental.

The “so” seems to be if hell has no extensive properties how can anything occupy it? No Satan, no devils, no souls. Or is the space they occupy simply mental?

Do you think God occupies space?

 

[polytropos]

Things that exist take up space, be it physical or mental.

What is mental space?

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Do you think God occupies space?

Jesus certainly did. There would be some sort of indicator of presence. Even if you reduce the concept of omnipresence as that which sustains creation would be an indication of space.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

What is mental space?

That which occupies your thoughts.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Jesus certainly did. There would be some sort of indicator of presence. Even if you reduce the concept of omnipresence as that which sustains creation would be an indication of space.

What do you mean by “reduce the concept of omnipresence?”

I have a concept of a tree that takes up no space, although I presume a physical tree does. I am not sure though because my concept of space is what tells me that any particular tree that I perceive takes up space. So even “space” is a mental construct that allows for the notion of relative location. It is all rather perceptual and conceptual so it is not clear to me what “reducing” a concept would look like.

If space and time form a continuum, it may be that space is rather different than our preconceptions tells us about it. It may be that omnipresence relates to space in very much the way that eternity relates to time. So time may not really be temporal and space may not really be spatial. In other words, “reducing” omnipresence to space may actually have the reality backwards. Space and time may both be phenomenological rather than ontological.

Man may not be the measure of all things and reducing reality to our measuring criteria may be doing reality a disservice.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

What do you mean by “reduce the concept of omnipresence?”

I have a concept of a tree that takes up no space, although I presume a physical tree does. I am not sure though because my concept of space is what tells me that any particular tree that I perceive takes up space. So even “space” is a mental construct that allows for the notion of relative location. It is all rather perceptual and conceptual so it is not clear to me what “reducing” a concept would look like.

If space and time form a continuum, it may be that space is rather different than our preconceptions tells us about it. It may be that omnipresence relates to space in very much the way that eternity relates to time. So time may not really be temporal and space may not really be spatial. In other words, “reducing” omnipresence to space may actually have the reality backwards. Space and time may both be phenomenological rather than ontological.

Man may not be the measure of all things and reducing reality to our measuring criteria may be doing reality a disservice.

It was poor phrasing on my part. What I was striving for was more " focusing on one facet of omnipresence being, that which sustains creation"

Some points though on your thoughts. Even thought takes up physical space in your brain. The interaction of neurons are physical reactions.

If you look at space in the same way as time, viewed from a divine perspective, just as every moment is “now” every place is “here”. It leads to an interesting conclusion, that heaven, hell, Eden, Nod, all of creation is here and now. We are in heaven but just don’t see it.

Luke 17

[21] Neither shall they say: Behold here, or behold there. For lo, the kingdom of God is within you.

 

[inocente]

I don’t see the incompatibility in God knowing what Judas will do freely. God knowing that Judas will do something does not entail that Judas does it because God knows he will. It’s what he will do (freely). God’s omniscience just means that he knows what Judas will use his free will to do, and God’s role as creator means that God will actualize Judas’s free choice. There is no prima facie contradiction with Judas’s free will here; if one wants to argue that this entails a contradiction, then there is philosophical work to do, which has not been done.

Take the bolded sentences. In the second, “it” seems as though it refers to nothing other than what God knows Judas will do. But if what God knows Judas will do is what Judas will do freely, then the argument has no force: God knows what Judas will do freely, and Judas has no choice but to do what he will choose to do freely. The reason he has “no choice” to do what he will do freely is not because he lacks free will, it is just the law of non-contradiction. Judas will choose one thing; the fact that he only chooses one thing is consistent with his choosing that thing freely. (And one only needs consistency here.)

A nice explanation of the doctrine, but it does nothing to counter the problem: if Judas can never choose to do other than what God knows, then Judas does not have free will. Even if Judas writes down alternatives and chooses between them by flipping a coin, he is still a slave to God’s knowledge.

There is much philosophical work. Let’s start with why everything in the universe, including all our innermost thoughts and the motion of every electron, are slaves to God’s knowledge.

If God knows that Adam & Eve, those naive people He just made, won’t follow His instructions, why isn’t He clearer with them? Or does He know that whatever He says, they won’t get the message? Which is it - that He knows He won’t try hard enough, or that He’s aware of His limitations in giving instructions, or aware of having made Adam & Eve imperfect?

Why does God even bother going through the motions if every last thing is so fatalist? Why not just put us in whatever state He knows we’ll end up in anyway?

(Mentioning electrons invoked another set of problems we can get on to - Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the observer effect. For instance, we can’t know where an electron is without affecting it. Nor could God, unless the universe is the Matrix).

 

[tonyrey]

A nice explanation of the doctrine, but it does nothing to counter the problem: if Judas can never choose to do other than what God knows, then Judas does not have free will. Even if Judas writes down alternatives and chooses between them by flipping a coin, he is still a slave to God’s knowledge.

There is much philosophical work. Let’s start with why everything in the universe, including all our innermost thoughts and the motion of every electron, are slaves to God’s knowledge.

If God knows that Adam & Eve, those naive people He just made, won’t follow His instructions, why isn’t He clearer with them? Or does He know that whatever He says, they won’t get the message? Which is it - that He knows He won’t try hard enough, or that He’s aware of His limitations in giving instructions, or aware of having made Adam & Eve imperfect?

Why does God even bother going through the motions if every last thing is so fatalist? Why not just put us in whatever state He knows we’ll end up in anyway?

(Mentioning electrons invoked another set of problems we can get on to - Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the observer effect. For instance, we can’t know where an electron is without affecting it. Nor could God, unless the universe is the Matrix).

A redoubtable refutation of fatalism.

 

[Peter_Plato]

A nice explanation of the doctrine, but it does nothing to counter the problem: if Judas can never choose to do other than what God knows, then Judas does not have free will.

Doesn’t follow. Judas could have free will, determine choices autonomously and choose other than he does. All of which are compatible with God knowing (from eternity) what Judas does. The “causal” determiner is Judas’ will, not God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is ineffectual with regards to what Judas will to do. He is not a slave to God’s knowledge.

Take, for example, a complex machine that churns out widgets from raw material. After studying the machine for weeks and weeks, I have obtained complete knowledge of how the machine works and how it will respond to anything done to it. Merely because I know what the machine will do in every instance does not, in any way, make my knowledge the cause of the machine’s activity. Nor is the machine “a slave” to my knowledge. There are causal mechanisms that are aspects of the machine that have no causal connection with my knowledge or foreknowledge of them. The machine is not a “slave” to my knowledge even though I have complete foreknowledge of what it will do.

If this is true of what is clearly “determined,” then it is also true of what is not. In fact, that is precisely where your logic "hides:” behind the mysterious workings of free will. We do not fully grasp the “mechanism” of free will so your argument seems to have some plausibility.

However, if your argument doesn’t apply to something like a machine that is completely susceptible to “foreknowledge,” why should it apply to human free will?

Foreknowledge is causally inert with regard to the machine just as it is with regard to free will.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It was poor phrasing on my part. What I was striving for was more " focusing on one facet of omnipresence being, that which sustains creation"

Some points though on your thoughts. Even thought takes up physical space in your brain. The interaction of neurons are physical reactions.

If you look at space in the same way as time, viewed from a divine perspective, just as every moment is “now” every place is “here”. It leads to an interesting conclusion, that heaven, hell, Eden, Nod, all of creation is here and now. We are in heaven but just don’t see it.

Here, you miss the point. It is not as if eternity is reducible to our concept of “now,” but rather that “now” itself is infinitely more extensible than we can or do understand. The same with “here.” All places are not reducible to our concept of “here,” but rather “here” is much more extensible than what our limited concept of it leads us to think.

You are concluding precisely the opposite of what my point was.

“All of creation is here and now” is a misappropriation of the idea.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Here, you miss the point. It is not as if eternity is reducible to our concept of “now,” but rather that “now” itself is infinitely more extensible than we can or do understand. The same with “here.” All places are not reducible to our concept of “here,” but rather “here” is much more extensible than what our limited concept of it leads us to think.

You are concluding precisely the opposite of what my point was.

“All of creation is here and now” is a misappropriation of the idea.

I think that’s exactly what I was saying. There is more than we perceive. To god, all is one. Any differences are through the lense of our perspective.

 

[Tom_Baum]

Assuming Hell is a spatial place that has a “where” for God to not be.

Omnipresence is only meaningful relative to spatial realities. Okay, so you have, perhaps, shown that Hell has no extensive properties. So?

I am not clear that extensive properties are required as a ground for being “real” or as a condition of existence, generally.

Does existence have a location?

Why would you think/believe that “Omnipresence” is limited to “spatial realities”?

Kinda like telling God that God’s Omnipresense has limitations and we will let God know just what they are, isn’t it?

If there are any limitations on any of God’s Omnis, it would be God putting a Self-imposed limitation on it, not us.

 

[Tom_Baum]

I suppose it is just part of being human but we sure do try to “tiny” God down to our size.

It’s not like its a new saying but it sure does ring true: ‘God made us in His Image and we have been trying to return the favor ever since’.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Why would you think/believe that “Omnipresence” is limited to “spatial realities”?

Kinda like telling God that God’s Omnipresense has limitations and we will let God know just what they are, isn’t it?

If there are any limitations on any of God’s Omnis, it would be God putting a Self-imposed limitation on it, not us.

This is not what I am saying at all, in fact, just the opposite.

It is our limited understanding of spatial that creates, for us, a skewed view of what omnipresence might be. The spatial “here” may be far more than our senses relay to us about it, so we have little to conclude about omnipresence precisely because we know so little about “here,” which may be far more extensive than we know.

 

[inocente]

A redoubtable refutation of fatalism.

Thanks. You and I rarely agree, so this definitely deserves a . Tuck in.

 

[inocente]

Doesn’t follow. Judas could have free will, determine choices autonomously and choose other than he does. All of which are compatible with God knowing (from eternity) what Judas does. The “causal” determiner is Judas’ will, not God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is ineffectual with regards to what Judas will to do. He is not a slave to God’s knowledge.

Take, for example, a complex machine that churns out widgets from raw material. After studying the machine for weeks and weeks, I have obtained complete knowledge of how the machine works and how it will respond to anything done to it. Merely because I know what the machine will do in every instance does not, in any way, make my knowledge the cause of the machine’s activity. Nor is the machine “a slave” to my knowledge. There are causal mechanisms that are aspects of the machine that have no causal connection with my knowledge or foreknowledge of them. The machine is not a “slave” to my knowledge even though I have complete foreknowledge of what it will do.

If this is true of what is clearly “determined,” then it is also true of what is not. In fact, that is precisely where your logic "hides:” behind the mysterious workings of free will. We do not fully grasp the “mechanism” of free will so your argument seems to have some plausibility.

However, if your argument doesn’t apply to something like a machine that is completely susceptible to “foreknowledge,” why should it apply to human free will?

Foreknowledge is causally inert with regard to the machine just as it is with regard to free will.

Your analogy doesn’t work. You forgot that eventually the machine will stop working, and you can’t know how or when. It might gradually wear out, a part may fail catastrophically, a mouse might get caught in a gearwheel, a tiny fast moving teapot from another galaxy might destroy the machine, and so on. So your first problem is to give a credible explanation of how you could possibly know (and no, calling yourself omnipotent is not an explanation).

But you didn’t tackle the issue of self knowledge in my Adam & Eve scenario. According to the doctrine, God knows everything, so He knows that A&E disobey. He also knows why they disobey (which could be because He made them imperfect, or is expecting too much when they’re still wet behind the ears, or His instructions aren’t clear enough, or whatever). But He can’t change that they disobey or why they disobey, because that would change His knowledge. So this fatalist god cannot be omnipotent. It’s not clear whether he’s even the real god, since his unchanging knowledge must exist unchanging eternally, so he can’t be its author.

 

[tonyrey]

Thanks. You and I rarely agree, so this definitely deserves a . Tuck in.

A happy and holy Christmas! :bible1:

 

[Peter_Plato]

Your analogy doesn’t work. You forgot that eventually the machine will stop working, and you can’t know how or when. It might gradually wear out, a part may fail catastrophically, a mouse might get caught in a gearwheel, a tiny fast moving teapot from another galaxy might destroy the machine, and so on. So your first problem is to give a credible explanation of how you could possibly know (and no, calling yourself omnipotent is not an explanation).

But you didn’t tackle the issue of self knowledge in my Adam & Eve scenario. According to the doctrine, God knows everything, so He knows that A&E disobey. He also knows why they disobey (which could be because He made them imperfect, or is expecting too much when they’re still wet behind the ears, or His instructions aren’t clear enough, or whatever). But He can’t change that they disobey or why they disobey, because that would change His knowledge. So this fatalist god cannot be omnipotent. It’s not clear whether he’s even the real god, since his unchanging knowledge must exist unchanging eternally, so he can’t be its author.

This doesn’t come close to answering the argument. I did not require omniscience [why you claimed omnipotence, I have no idea] for someone to completely explain the how the machine would function. This sufficient knowledge concerning when the machine would break down and the possible causes makes omniscience largely irrelevant.

What you are failing to establish is a logical connection between certain and sufficient knowledge and causation. The point I was making was that even if certain knowledge were theoretically possible, the level of certainty itself is not sufficient to create a causal connection. Suppose the “knower” accurately predicted for 1000 years precisely the output of the machine, would that mean a causal relationship existed between the knower and the machine, until, inexplicably, the knower erred and because they didn’t anticipate the tiny fast moving teapot, the causal relationship suddenly terminated? I doubt it. The knowledge of the causal relationship and the causal network are two very different entities and a causal relationship simply never existed. Knowledge of, even complete knowledge of, does not establish the causal connection and could very well be inert even when that knowledge is absolute. The burden is still on you to show how knowledge can possibly function causally.

Knowing the complete explanation of something is not the same as “being” the explanation of it.