Cooperation with evil - nuclear weapons

[MPat]

The 2 bombs ended the war in the least amount of time, with the least costs in lives, of any alternative. Unless we had surrendered to them.

A very interesting point.

For yes, unconditional surrender of Americans was also an alternative. And yes, given the criteria you listed (ending the war quickly with least causalities) it looks far superior to any other alternative.

So, how comes you do not seem to take this alternative seriously? Perhaps there are more objectives than the ones you listed?

For that matter, it is not so certain that it was just “2 bombs” that ended the war. There was also Soviet attack in Manchuria.

Which is what Americans requested.

Yet, was it not possible to achieve something somewhat similar with forces of Nationalist China? Hopefully, getting them to the point where they would have won Chinese Civil War as well? You see, it is not so certain that all deaths connected to Communist victory in that war are not to be added to the causalities caused by the bombs themselves…

Oh, well, that’s the common problem with consequentialism - it requires omniscience.

Indeed we talked about unconditional surrender. It appears just once, in the Potsdam Declaration, and refers to surrender of the Japanese military to the Allies. It also implied that the Japanese would no more be allowed to set conditions for ending the war than had the Germans. In both cases, there would be no repetition of the negotiated peace of WWI. That had not worked out well. German and Japan were going to be restructured, into more suitable citizens of the world. That worked out quite well.

Um, there was no “negotiated peace” after WW1. The negotiations were between Allies only, Germany was presented with the resulting treaty without being allowed to negotiate.

Also, I referred to the things like “Morgenthau Plan”. Trying to impoverish defeated countries. Things which eventually had to be cancelled anyway.

Things which seem to indicate wish for revenge (not for justice, as they soon proved to be contrary to reason).

 

[GKMotley]

I thought that point would appeal to you.

Or, not having reacted to Pearl Harbor at all would have reduced casualties even more significantly.

The objective was to end the war, in the shortest time frame, with the fewest casualties, while not losing the war, or surrendering ourselves, and to do so in a manner which would permit the restructuring of the militaristic/fascistic nature of Japan and Germany, permanently. Worked just fine, as of today… That it would not have been your approach is of no interest to me. It was not of interest to anyone of significance, at the time.

The role of the Soviets in the Japanese surrender is a contentious one. The general consensus is that the military was more impressed by it, since they were facing them in Manchuko/China, and eventually the Kuriles and Sakhalin. The ruling polity, the Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi, in control of whether the country surrendered or not, were more devastated by the bombs, since they negated the intent of the Anami clique to raise the butchers bill, through the Ketsugo defense plan, to the point that an invasion would have been too costly for the Allies to conduct. This is roughly Frank’s position in his magisterial DOWNFALL: THE END OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE EMPIRE. If this was correct, an invasion would have not occurred, the strategic bombing of the 2nd tier of Japanese cities (roughly a target population of 5.5 million, not specifically addressed by the strategic bombing of the 6 major cities starting in March 1945,) plus the other campaigns previously mentioned, would have, added to the other casualties in the theater, exceeded those of the bombs. Which, together, approximated the total of two or so months of the war outside the Home Islands.

Bombs= cheaper in blood. The casualties from the Soviet attacks in Operation Storm (which lasted for 3 weeks or so past the surrender of the Japanese, 15 August, to allow the Soviets to get their boots where they wanted them) was in the range of 140,000. Which suggests the magnitude of the cost of an invasion. And are roughly the initial casualties of the two bombs. Point: whether from an invasion, and/or the body count from outside the Home Islands (to include Manchuko, China and Korea) two planes/two bombs/no more war is the best way to go. And so we did. If you really want to continue your advocacy of US surrender, please do so. I’ll not reply, but I would guess it will make an impact on other readers.

The Chinese resistance and the civil war is not one of my major areas of reading, outside of Burma, Stilwell and Slim. I doubt anything we might have done would have permitted the Kuomintang to prevail.

But the cease fire was not a surrender, it was an armistice. And that would not be duplicated.

The Morgenthau Plan was idiocy, on paper. One always can trust Stimson over Roosevelt. Reality prevailed.

To review the bidding. Your opinion of the morality of the actions we took in this are of no interest to me. Your opinion of my opinions are whatever they may be, likewise of no interest to me.

What did happen and why does interest me. And continues to do so.

 

[edwest211]

Simple. My neighboring tribe develops a spear. They attack my tribe with men with many spears. My tribe has no spears, only some knives and hand axes. We are all killed, or enslaved or mostly killed and partly enslaved.

In 1994, two tribes, the Hutu and Tutsi, starting killing each other. The death toll ranges from a half million to a million. Aside from some police forces, the tribes involved had no firearms. If one side had firearms, it would have lessened the slaughter.

“Genocidal killings began the following day. Soldiers, police, and militia quickly executed key Tutsi and moderate Hutu military and political leaders who could have assumed control in the ensuing power vacuum. Checkpoints and barricades were erected to screen all holders of the national ID card of Rwanda (which contained ethnic classification information introduced by the Belgian colonial government in 1933) in order to systematically identify and kill Tutsi. These forces recruited and pressured Hutu civilians to arm themselves with machetes, clubs, blunt objects, and other weapons to rape, maim, and kill their Tutsi neighbors and to destroy or steal their property.”

In the case of Japan, the use of the atomic bombs was totally unnecessary. In Europe, shortly before the capitulation, the Allies were conducting thousand bomber raids. The real problem with Japan and an American invasion, was the Russians. If we didn’t get there first, "our ally last month who stopped being our ally after the war in Europe was over, " would have taken Japan and we couldn’t have that. No way.

So, during the Cold War till today, both sides must be matched - weapon for weapon, including nuclear. The “good guys” would never use them first, only the “bad guys,” including terrorists and mentally unstable Heads of State. It’s sad, but true. Our tribe does not not want to attack other tribes but we will bomb them day and night, send in drones and use other non-nuclear weapons to beat them down. The reasons used include: threat to an Ally, threat to our interests, maintaining regional stability, and a few others.

 

[MPat]

If you really want to continue your advocacy of US surrender, please do so. I’ll not reply, but I would guess it will make an impact on other readers.

Um, you do understand that I am not advocating surrender of USA?

I am pointing out that, while it is an absurd alternative, it still is an alternative. And your philosophy has to deal with it.

The objective was to end the war, in the shortest time frame, with the fewest casualties, while not losing the war, or surrendering ourselves, and to do so in a manner which would permit the restructuring of the militaristic/fascistic nature of Japan and Germany, permanently.

Very good, after those additions you did manage to put unconditional surrender of victors of of the question.

So, now, how important is each of those parts? For example, is ending the war quickly important? If the war could be won slowly but totally and with low causalities, would it be better or worse?

The casualties from the Soviet attacks in Operation Storm (which lasted for 3 weeks or so past the surrender of the Japanese, 15 August, to allow the Soviets to get their boots where they wanted them) was in the range of 140,000. Which suggests the magnitude of the cost of an invasion.

I guess Eastern front is not your hobby, or such number would have looked very low - especially for the Soviets…

For that matter, where did you get “140,000”? For example, Маньчжурская наступательная операция : Министерство обороны Российской Федерации gives the Soviet losses (“unrecoverable”) as 12,031, Japanese - as 700,000 (but including 640,000 of prisoners of war; which leaves about 60,000 killed). Г.Ф.Кривошеев (под редакцией). Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил gives the same number for the Soviet side (and less than 100 for Mongolians).

The Chinese resistance and the civil war is not one of my major areas of reading, outside of Burma, Stilwell and Slim. I doubt anything we might have done would have permitted the Kuomintang to prevail.

Unfortunately, “I doubt” is not enough. Your philosophy demands that you would know that. If you do not actually know all consequences of the alternatives, how can you choose by them? Then we can just do what the Church tells us and leave the consequences to God.

The Morgenthau Plan was idiocy, on paper. One always can trust Stimson over Roosevelt. Reality prevailed.

And Japanese could be expected to wait with surrendering until reality actually did prevail.

Your opinion of the morality of the actions we took in this are of no interest to me. Your opinion of my opinions are whatever they may be, likewise of no interest to me.

What did happen and why does interest me. And continues to do so.

You do know this thread is in “Moral theology” subforum, not in “Military history” one?

 

[GKMotley]

The use of the bombs was only necessary to ensure that the Japanese did not continue the war through any invasion and its concomitant bloodbath, and end the conflict forthwith, permitting a restructuring of the kokutai. And to ensure the Soviets did not continue their empire building, in the manner in which they were proceeding in Eastern Europe. Not allowing an extension of the Iron Curtain into the Japanese Home Islands was a fine idea. Ending the war with minimum casualties was another.

 

[GKMotley]

I am relieved to hear that you are not advocating it. Relying on fairy dust and unicorn urine is another alternative, equally absurd.

Of course unconditional surrender was a necessary part of the equation. Though your sentence seems to be slightly askew.

If the war could be ended, with those conditions, with low casualties, and the same outcome, no problem. But slowly was not a political, nor a manpower supportable possibility for the US. We were likely unable even to provide adequate numbers for DOWNFALL (Giangreco/HELL TO PAY, passim, and chap. 9 in particular… We could have continued the strategic bombing, which we, in fact did, between Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender. Casualties for those 6 days were in the 12+K range.

The Eastern front is not my particular sandbox, but no one imagines the Russians would measure the butchers bill, to achieve their strategic aims.What they do reveal would be the delta to the monthly total in theater, invasion not being considered, until the eventual surrender.The figures came from an online paper, and are reflected in the Wiki article on Operation Storm. The Russian and Japanese claims as to losses are not in agreement, anywhere I have seen them. The prisoner totals are not included. If I have read them in one of my relevant books (and I might have) I’d cite that. I take it you can read the Russian sources in your links, which puts you miles ahead of me, in that respect.

The reality lay in the Potsdam Declaration, and it’s subsequent clarification, as the Japanese knew. The Morgenthau plan was not under consideration for the Japanese. Rebuilding their country as a barrier against Soviet expansion was, not retribution of that sort. Which led to a few unfortunate decisions along the way.

No, the decision of how best to end the war, considering the direct desiderata, does not suggest a need to consider all possible outcomes not then foreseeable. Else we should never had suggested, off hand, the division of Korea at the 38th parallel, as a sop to the Soviets. One acts on the conditions at hand, with the data available, based on the relevant experiences.

Yep, as to the location of the thread. I’ve been asked that before. On the older site I would regularly make it clear that I don’t engage in discussions on judging the morality of the use of those weapons, as may be taught by the Magisterium ((in the CCC, in Gaudium et Spes), etc. Nor do I try to argue RCs out of adherence to such teachings. All RCs should affirm the Church’s teachings, at the relevant level of theological certitude. I long ago, after many years of studying the relevant history, made a decision that killing fewer people is preferable to killing more people. I don’t compare my moral take to that of others, though mine often appears in my posts. But I do correct historical inaccuracies/ supply historical facts, or suggest where they might be found or engage when “:and anyway” assertions contra to what I’ve read over the years, occur. It’s why I say that I’m not interested in your opinion on morality of the bombs, nor on your opinion of my opinion. Just the history. Your moral assessment is your own.

 

[MonteRCMS]

Poster GKMotley suggested he could post the titles of some of the useful books on the subject of the war with Japan … and that is a useful offer and I hope he eventually does post those titles.

I offer one title: “Operation Snow” by John Koster. It is about how a Soviet mole in FDR’s White House triggered Pearl Harbor.

Koster’s wife is Japanese and he had access to Japanese sources.

 

[MonteRCMS]

I also ask whether the word “nuclear” automatically makes a weapon immoral and evil.

Or is the argument that large numbers of civilian deaths renders something immoral and evil. In which case, non-nuclear tactics have caused many more civilian deaths by far.

By about 1960, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had figured out how to build very small nuclear weapons. Only big enough to dig a crater.

There are also nuclear weapons with no radioactive fallout. They cause some sort of ElectroMagnetic Pulse.

So, since the discussion title talks about “evil”, we need to ask what you are talking about.

If anyone really wants to read and learn what “nuclear” is really all about, then I strongly suggest getting Ed Hiserodt’s book, “Underexposed -What If Radiation Is Actually GOOD for You?”

[On Amazon one of the negative comments about the book is from a competing author.]

 

[MonteRCMS]

Keep in mind also that today, the city of Hiroshima is in a LOT better shape than Detroit.

 

[StarMapp]

There’s another paragraph in canon law, forget the number, that says that in war a nation cannot commit “evils and disorders” greater than the enemy. This implies that if the maximum e&d that is available to a nation in the world is nuclear weapons, then it is permissible for a nation to have it in order to mount an offense that is effective.

Of course this rule has a practical purpose that dates to oriental rules of war, in that one should have a “stick at least has large as the enemy’s”, or the modernized “speak softly and carry a big stick”. NK has the right to nuclear arms which explains it’s rush to DIY “big stick making”.

A reality emerges that some stick holders no longer bow to threats by others, but would probably respond better to diplomacy. Here we have learned that nations who have developed the habit of the use of threat for persuasion,(perhaps due to the fact that at one time it was the only nation that carried the biggest stick) can no longer depend on this method. It now realizes that the speaking softly part, is way out of practice.

 

[GKMotley]

In that instance I was offering titles on Japanese atrocities, rather than the war itself. I posted such a list before.

Koster doesn’t make his case, IMO.

Books. On bombs, recommended, more or less:

Richard Frank/DOWNFALL. Best single book on understanding what went on. Essential.

Robert James Maddox/WEAPONS FOR VICTORY: THE HIROSHIMA DECISION. One of the primary anti-revisionist scholars

Robert James Maddox (ed.) HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM. A collection of anti-revisionist scholars take on the myths.

Robert Newman/TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT. An excellent, crisply written treatment of eight questions often seen in discussions like this, by a scholar who really doesn’t like nuclear weapons, generally.

Robert P. Newman/ENOLA GAY AND THE COURT OF HISTORY. Newman does it again.

Barrett Tillman/WHIRLWIND: THE AIR WAR AGAINST JAPAN 1942-1945. A good account of the overall air war by a good scholar of the Pacific theater.

Thomas Allen & Norman Polmar/CODENAME DOWNFALL. Not as detailed as Frank, but good.

The Pacific War Research Society/JAPAN"S LONGEST DAY. Japanese scholars’ account of the last 24 hours before the Emperor’s surrender broadcast. A good insight into the minds of the ruling military clique.

D.M Giangreco/HELL TO PAY:OPERATION DOWNFALL AND THE INVASION OF JAPAN, 1945-1947. Good analysis of the Japanese and American preparations for the invasions and how they might have played out over two years, by a primary anti-revisionist historian.

George Feifer/TENNOZAN:THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA AND THE ATOMIC BOMB. A massive, gut-wrenching account of the battle for Okinawa, first of the Home Islands invaded, and what it directly foretold, on a small scale, of what a full scale invasion would be. The very name of the book, referring to a decisive battle (a critical concept to understand, in the Japanese mind), is related to what the Japanese planned against DOWNFALL, and illustrated, in miniature, on Okinawa. A hard book to read. Reprinted as THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA: THE BLOOD AND THE BOMB.

Michael Kort (ed.)/THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO HIROSHIMA AND THE BOMB. Excellent (and surprisingly so) overview of the primary questions raised in the subject area, Strong on original documents.

Jim Smith & Malcolm McConnell/THE LAST MISSION. An unexpectedly good account of the last days, the concept of the kokutai, and last B-29 raid of all, part of the post-Nagasaki continuation of the conventional bombing, to keep the Japanese minds focused on reality. A blending of two sources: the memoirs of a crewman on that last raid, and a good account of the overall picture, as stated, on how it came about.

Fr. Wilson Miscamble/THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION. A RC priest/historian covers the titular point. His FROM ROOSEVELT TO TRUMAN: POTSDAM, HIROSHIMA, AND THE COLD WAR does the same, ranges afar, usefully.

Thomas Coffey/IMPERIAL TRAGEDY. Older book,with some good insight into the rigged gozen kaigan that ended with the Emperor directing the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration conditions, ending the war.

That’s enough, for a start.

 

[GKMotley]

N.B. The above was truncated to fit in the confines of this board’s limits. 500+ excised characters/spaces said I’d give titles on atrocities, or theater in general, or bad books on the bombs, if desired. And other pearls of wisdom. And I will

 

[MPat]

The figures came from an online paper, and are reflected in the Wiki article on Operation Storm.

In Soviet invasion of Manchuria - Wikipedia the infobox shows 11,033 killed for Soviets, 72 killed for Mongolia, 21,389 killed for Japan. Perhaps you added some other numbers to get 140,000? For those numbers only add up to less than 25,000…

If you want to find those numbers to be close to about 200,000 killed by nuclear bombs, or perhaps half a million killed in all bombings, I’m afraid that it will be hard…

I long ago, after many years of studying the relevant history, made a decision that killing fewer people is preferable to killing more people

Very interesting. Are there any qualifications for this principle? For, if it is to be applied as you stated it here, we find out that giving death penalty to German and Japanese war criminals was wrong - and that seems to be rather unexpected, given what else you said here.

Perhaps it would be worth to clarify what counts as “killing” and what counts as “people”?

On the older site I would regularly make it clear that I don’t engage in discussions on judging the morality of the use of those weapons, as may be taught by the Magisterium ((in the CCC, in Gaudium et Spes), etc.

That it would not have been your approach is of no interest to me. It was not of interest to anyone of significance, at the time.

The Chinese resistance and the civil war is not one of my major areas of reading, outside of Burma, Stilwell and Slim.

So, let’s see… You are not interested in speculation about alternative history, morality as such… Is there anything left? Just comparing the number of people killed in nuclear bombing with number of people that would have died during the invasion, as estimated by American military at the time (taking the highest estimate)? Well sure, the first number is lower - I don’t see anyone claiming otherwise.

I was pointing out that such highly limited comparison does not justify saying sweeping things like “The nuclear weapons used in World War Two save millions of lives.”. In that case you’d better analyse more than two alternatives.

 

[edwest211]

It’s important to point out that high-ranking US military officials expressed their disapproval shortly after the bombs were dropped, to the American public at the time. The Russians and Japanese had fought in 1939, but the Japanese were defeated and a neutrality pact was signed, meaning Russia would stay out of the Pacific War. On August 9, 1945, the Russians launched a surprise attack called Operation August Storm with 1.6 million men. And they got within 30 miles of Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido. The Japanese defenders in the East were doing badly.

It’s also important to point out the high level of secrecy regarding atomic bombs. Even those in the US military who were part of the planned attack did not fully understand what atomic bombs would do. They were treated as very large (in terms of explosive damage) tactical weapons. Yes, Japanese citizens, in or out of uniform, were ready to die for their country even if it meant hand to hand combat and using sharpened bamboo poles/spears. A booklet was issued to the general population that showed the best way to kill the enemy using improvised weapons.

“It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was taught not to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

• Admiral William D. Leahy
  Former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

That is just one example. So, the argument does not factor in the Russians. Top American officials, and in London, knew that the Russians would attack Japan within 3 months of the capitulation of German forces in Europe. And they had the men to do it. But even though a lot more Russian blood was spilled on the Eastern Front, this time - for whatever reason - we would not allow them to spill more blood.

So, I argue, in agreement with a number of those in the US military leadership at the time, that we did not have to invade or use the atomic bombs. What was the rush? The Russians would have done the dirty work and the Japanese Army had so many bloodthirsty and suicidal troops anyway, why not let Russia take Japan and we would sail away?

By the way:

We had excellent aerial reconnaissance photos of all military targets in Japan. However, part of the reason for the fire bombing was because Japanese homes were given small machines to help produce bombs. Photos of these machines exist.

 

[GKMotley]

According to memory, the Wiki article give the Russian figures for the Japanese deaths as around 87K. The figures I have seen for that estimate have always been around 80-92K. As you know, no estimates of this sort are more than that - estimates.

It might have been David Glantz’ article that I am recalling. Maybe.

Again, the total, which I accept as being close enough for government work, of around 90k+ as the casualty list from Op. Storm over 3 weeks or so, is used as only one thing: a marker for the delta over the longstanding month toll across the theater, of around 200K a month. It suggests, in a context not including a ketsugo defense, on the Home Islands, a doubling of the casualty rate. From there, the situation gets more dire.

Of course not. Adding the death penalties to the death total, after bombs end war is less than the total, under all other alternatives, not counting use of unicorn urine.

In fact, even if, in the Japanese case, the A class war criminals had faced a more strict legal process, bombs still win. Fewer deaths

Au contraire. Alternate history is one of my favorite fictional genres. in SF or strictly in military fiction. Looking at around 25 books such-like, on the shelf right over there, including 2 of an academic bent: Ferguson/VIRTUAL HISTORY:ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS and ROSENFELD/THE WORLD THAT HITLER NEVER MADE. Last title in this area I read, about 2 weeks ago, was Benford & Greenburg (eds.)/HITLER VICTORIOUS (a consummation devoutly not to be desired). Last one I bought,as a Christmas present to my own self, last week:WHAT IFS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, edited by the late Robert Cowley, a noted writer in the field. So, no, as to the general question.

The concentrated study of what was, why, what could be, what couldn’t and what it would mean started for me in 1994. It grew out of couple of things, including my beginning to collect WWII titles, around 1957. Those 23 years of concentrated study, on the , I dunno, at least the 150+ books on the Bombs are Best bookcase over there, leads to an informed conclusion: The bombs provided the quickest end to the conflict, with the lowest butcher’s bill, of any feasible alternative scenario, excluding unicorns and fairies.

 

[GKMotley]

Ed, you’re a caution. Years of getting smacked around on this, on every point, and still you persist.

Let’s just go with the last point, since it’s almost correct. Yes, there were machine tools incorporated into a lot of Japanese homes, which, in turn were often located in proximity to manufacturing plants. But piece work was dispersed, thusly, to increase production and perhaps increase survivability. And yes, there are photos. I’ve seen them. And LeMay mentions them; It’s fairly common knowledge. But then you go and say “produce bombs”. No. To assist in military production generally, in all possible areas.

I’ll try to do a para by para comment, most of which I’ve done for you before (maybe I did the photos of the small machine tools for you, long ago. I did it for someone), later. Now I’m off to smoke a pipe.

Hoping you have a joyous Christmas season…

 

[edwest211]

The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan. Stalin Did.

Have 70 years of nuclear policy been based on a lie?

foreignpolicy.com

 

[GKMotley]

Yeah, that’s one of the sites I have bookmarked under this topic. It’s not a bad (i.e. not completely wrong) bit of musing but it has a few deadly errors, for its insinuations.

The account of the meeting of the Supreme Council for the Conduct of the War, on 9 Aug, was the first to address the impact of the Hiroshima bomb, and the Emperor was in attendance. And, as noted the Japanese were well aware of what weapon had done it; Nishina, the head of the Army Bomb project, was among the group sent to Hiroshima, 6 Aug, to investigate what had occurred. Before his plane landed, from the air, he decreed it was a nuclear device, confirmed it when he landed and reported back to Tokyo. Which lead to the gozen kaigen starting 1130 PM 9 Aug. This was the rigged meeting.

The meeting was occasioned by the circumstances both of the Hiroshima bomb, and the roughly 12 hour old fact of the Soviet attacks. It was slanted to allow an unprecedented occurrence; a direct appeal to the Emperor (present) to resolve the situation: surrender or continue. The Emperor, primed before hand, made his decision. The Voice of the Crane decreed for acceptance of the Potsdam requirements.

The Nagasaki bomb, following immediately after the conclusion of the gozen kaigan, effectively ended the war factions active resistance. Anami, as the chief war hawk, did not completely back off his position, of a conditional surrender, at most, but the 2nd bomb did make him go …nuclear., declaring “They may have a hundred of these things”. We didn’t, of course, but it was nice for them to think so.

As you should be aware, historical truth is rarely reductionist. While the weights of the bombs, and the Soviet attacks in Manchuko/China were both in the scale, the Russian impact was portentous of the future, but definitive as to any remaining hope of using them in a negotiated peace, as Togo had hoped. So, yes, both the Soviets 12 hour presence in the war, and weights of the bombs were factors. Had the Soviets not entered, and the 3rd bomb available had been used, the Japanese resistance would likely have crumbled. In his Imperial Rescript, 15 Aug, the Emperor made no mention of the Soviets, but did stress the cruel weapons we had used.

Anami, in particular, was crushed by the 2nd bomb. He had laid his hope on the pending zengen sakusen, the decisive battle (crucial to an understanding of the Japanese at the time) which the impending invasion (DOWNFALL) would bring about. The resulting blood bath, the gyokusai/shattering of the jewels, would, in his view, bring the Allies to a negotiation table, for his 4 conditions to be reached. The economy of the atomic bomb, in doing in one raid, with one plane, what the accustomed strategic bombing could do with 800 plus planes (the largest we mounted), over a couple of days, ended that dream. One plane. One bomb. One city. Where ever, when ever we wanted. As long (as far as was known) as we wanted. No need for an invasion. No shattering of the jewels. Just death.

Good reading on the 9 Aug gozen kaigan: Smith & McConnell/THE LAST MISSION, chap. 5, “A Rain of Ruin”, , Coffey/IMPERIAL TRAGEDY, Part 11, “August 1945”.

 

[MPat]

According to memory, the Wiki article give the Russian figures for the Japanese deaths as around 87K. The figures I have seen for that estimate have always been around 80-92K. As you know, no estimates of this sort are more than that - estimates.

OK, let’s take the maximal of the claims you give - 92,000. 92,000 + 11,000 = 103,000. Still significantly less than 140,000. They might be estimates, but they should still add up.

And “according to memory” is not nearly good enough. I gave you the link. It is not so hard to click on it and check, instead of giving half-remembered-half-made-up numbers.

The concentrated study of what was, why, what could be, what couldn’t and what it would mean started for me in 1994. It grew out of couple of things, including my beginning to collect WWII titles, around 1957. Those 23 years of concentrated study, on the , I dunno, at least the 150+ books on the Bombs are Best bookcase over there, leads to an informed conclusion: The bombs provided the quickest end to the conflict, with the lowest butcher’s bill, of any feasible alternative scenario, excluding unicorns and fairies.

Yes, it is clear that you think you’re an expert on this subject. And maybe you are. But perhaps you should consider demonstrating that not by bragging, but by using the numbers that at least are not “half remembered”?

And your final claim about “the quickest way” is not very interesting, given that we already know that many qualifications have been left out.

Of course not. Adding the death penalties to the death total, after bombs end war is less than the total, under all other alternatives, not counting use of unicorn urine.

In fact, even if, in the Japanese case, the A class war criminals had faced a more strict legal process, bombs still win. Fewer deaths

Perhaps you should consider using the “quote” feature? It is not so easy to find out what exactly you are responding to, and it looks like you would have benefited from seeing what you respond to as well.

After all, I have asked for clarification of your position on death penalty on Japanese and German war criminals as a separate, “philosophical”, matter. You said you think one should kill as few people, as possible, but in that case letting those war criminals go would have clearly resulted in killing less people (and at that time bombs have been dropped long ago - sunk costs are sunk costs). Does that means that you are against those executions?

 

[GKMotley]

Curiously, we’re using the same site. Recall that I recall an article that listed the deaths at around 95K, more or less. And these were from Soviet sources. Wounded not included. Looking at that site I saw that Soviet figures for Soviet dead was 11,033. Which was the 12K approximation I recalled from memory. It also lists the Soviet claims for Japanese deaths as 83,735. Which was the 85K I recalled, ditto. And the article stated Russian figures were more accurate. Which I had no problem accepting.

The Wiki lists figures for wounded, which the original article didn’t. But I am not adverse to them, The 20K even figure for Japanese wounded, per Japan, is obviously a best estimate, and nothing else I had read made that look unlikely. Though a wounded number that so closely comports with a killed number is likely a tad suspicious. But what the heck, I added it in and the Soviet wounded, per the Soviets, 24,125.Total: 138,893 casualties, using the Soviet total = my 140,000 approximation. Using the Japanese death totals:76,547. I had a preference for the Russian figures because whoever wrote that article did, and it was persuasive. So, I use them. The point remains that I don’t really care if the 140,000 approximation was more accurate or the 76.5K was. Either is a delta indicating an addition to the average on-going casualty total, monthly, which the literature lists, variously, as as low as 125K and as high as 300,000. Since these are all estimates, I usually say the monthly total was between 200K and 250K, variable. You hadn’t noticed the Soviet figure, at the bottom?

Compared to the author of even the poorer books on the subject that I have read, I am no way an expert. Compared to most of the folk I deal with on line, I look a little better. Well, I might be more of an expert that Mr. …Tanaka, I think his name was, Not sure I still have that book, but I was better than him.

Remind me which qualifications have been left out. I’ll see if it changes my conclusion.

Nope. What you see is what you get.

One should kill as few people in war, as possible, consistent with the national goals of being in the war in the first place. If all wars cannot be made to cease a particular war should be made to do so as expeditiously as possible, in the constraints of the actual historical context.

Having made the war to cease, one then considers the criminal aspect of the figures involved and their actions/responsibilities/culpabilities (i.e., victors’ justice, per Nuremberg). In the case of Japan, the possible list of class A war criminals were held to a minimum, for political purposes. But adding them in, weighed against the number of deaths not occurring by the continuation of the war still leaves the bombs as the lesser total.

I have no problem with war crimes trials and death penalties, IOW. Which is all the philosophizing I will do.