Cosmological Argument

[ngill09]

I don’t think that’s entirely accurate. Craig asserts he has a strong metaphysical claim for P(1) because based upon our observation of the universe the possibility of the contrary lacks support.

P(1): Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

The primary argument is that the contrary assertion “a thing may begin to exist without a cause” has no empirical support in our universe. We do of course see things come into existence that have a cause from preexisting matter everyday, and speculatively observe quantum phenomena (virtual particles) come into existence with certain necessary casual conditions (vacuum state).

Craig’s question becomes: why is it that only the beginning of the universe doesn’t have a cause? Or, why is it that we don’t observe other uncaused events? And these are difficult questions to answer, especially for scientists who are in the business of investigating causes to explain the nature of the universe.

My answer to “Why is it that only the beginning of the universe doesn’t have a cause” is similar to his answer to “Why is it that only God doesn’t have a cause?”

Is there a scale of things that compares to the beginning of the universe? More to the point, Craig certainly doesn’t claim to rely upon intuition when describing the attributes of the Uncaused Cause. He presents arguments as to why it can’t be explained by the physical laws of our universe and why it must be a personal cause. Although I understand you may find his arguments to be based on intuition, he doesn’t claim they are. In any case, many forms of the Cosmological Argument don’t attempt to assign attributes to the Uncaused Cause; preferring instead to come to a purely philosophical definition of God.

Simply put, I think it inappropriate to use the term “God” to describe the uncaused cause of our universe, since the properties of such a thing would be completely beyond our understanding and intuition. Moreover, I think it’s inappropriate to use a term used in reference to the mythical beings conceived by the minds of primitive men in reference to some inconceivable thing.

 

[tdgesq]

My answer to “Why is it that only the beginning of the universe doesn’t have a cause” is similar to his answer to “Why is it that only God doesn’t have a cause?”

No, it isn’t similar. We are only dealing with P(1) here that “everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.” Nobody is even beginning to talk about God yet. Not Craig. Not me. You criticized this premise because you claimed it was based solely on a “metaphysical intuition.” I pointed out that this isn’t correct. It is also based upon the lack of any contrary empirical evidence, and why it would be that the existence of the universe is the only event where this occurs.

More puzzling though, theists don’t assert that God did “begin to exist.” So P(1) couldn’t have any applicability here. Are you sure you’ve studied Craig’s arguments?

Simply put, I think it inappropriate to use the term “God” to describe the uncaused cause of our universe, since the properties of such a thing would be completely beyond our understanding and intuition.

Is this seriously going to become a debate about the “appropriateness” of labels? I expected something more from a dedicated opponent of Craig’s. If calling the cause of the universe “Nog” instead of God makes you feel better, go ahead use that term.

Moreover, I think it’s inappropriate to use a term used in reference to the mythical beings conceived by the minds of primitive men in reference to some inconceivable thing.

So are Deists also primitive men? Like Thomas Jefferson, Einstein, Aristotle and Max Planck. lol.

 

[belorg]

There are many different cosmological arguments and they all have their own problems.
The main problem for the Kalam Cosmologiocal Argument, at least Carigs version, is not premise 1, nor premise 2. The problem is defining what the cause of the universe exactly is.
Craig claims it is a personal being because because if the cause were impersonal, the effect should be co-eternal with the cause, so we should not obsreve a beginning universe in that case.
But actually, it is the other way round. What is needed is not a personal cause, but an indeterminiistic cause. If there is an indeterministic cause, it is possibke for the cause not to coincide with the effect.
The problem is that it is impossible for an a-temporal personal entity to act as an indeterministic cause, especially when this personal entity is also omniscient and, according to Craig has decided from eternity to create a universe (with a beginning).
According to Craig a personal agent can act freely without causal constraints, that means that this person can decide to create a universe (and time) and at the same instant ‘enter time’.
But Craig forgets that, on his view, the personal agent has already laid causal constarints upon himself from the moment he decided to create, that is, from eternity. So the only way for such a person act as an indeterministic cause is if the decision to create possibly does not lead to the act of creation. But libertarian free wil does not entail that the effect of a decision must be undetermined, but that the decision itself must be undetermined. Otherwise, it would be possible for a person to decide not to do anything wrong, while he ends up doing the wrong thing. And it must be possible for an omnipotynt being to fail to do something.
So, to summarize. If we accept Craig’s first two premsies, the conclusion of the argument is necssarily “The cause is NOT God”.

 

[Love4All]

I’ve got a Bachelor’s in Mathematics, so I know all about infinity.

Thank you for a SERIOUS belly laugh!!!

 

[Love4All]

My answer to “Why is it that only the beginning of the universe doesn’t have a cause” is similar to his answer to “Why is it that only God doesn’t have a cause?”

The beginning of the universe, as usually defined, is not the kind of a thing that could possibly have no cause. God, as usually defined, is not the kind of a thing that could possibly have a cause.

So it is partly due to the divergence in meaning in our terms, “God,” and “universe,” that we say God caused the universe, and not vice versa.

Simply put, I think it inappropriate to use the term “God” to describe the uncaused cause of our universe, since the properties of such a thing would be completely beyond our understanding and intuition.

And the properties of God are likewise completely beyond our “understanding and intuition,” so it seems entirely appropriate, given the considerations so far.

I put scare quotes around “understanding and intuition” because I have grave doubts that you are using those terms correctly. But I am able to use your gist, at any rate.

Moreover, I think it’s inappropriate to use a term used in reference to the mythical beings conceived by the minds of primitive men in reference to some inconceivable thing.

Which primitive men are contributing to this discussion? How did they get computers, and how are they time traveling?

The term, “God,” is in use today, and unless you are referring to your opponents as “primitive men,” your assessment of the term is out of left field. It may be fashionably vogue among atheist snobs to use “God” to refer exclusively to “philosophical errors of others, never me,” but that isn’t the way we use it here. You are not in your atheist clubhouse, you are on a Catholic Forum. The term, “God,” has an accepted meaning.

 

[Love4All]

The Cosmological Argument . . . depends on the phenomenon of Creation Ex Nihilo, which has never been observed and is arguably incoherent.

Show this, please. Thanks.

 

[hicetnunc]

The problem with the cosmological argument, in my estimation, is that it relies far too heavily on intuition to describe what the “Uncaused Cause” is. Especially since at that scale of things, we’ve found that intuition is completely useless.

Thanks for your reply ngill.

I’m not sure what you mean by “we’ve found that intuition is completely useless.” Who is the “we” you are referring to? A great many philosophers (Kant, Leibniz, Buber, Popper, Polanyi, Giussani, just to name a very few) have discussed the importance of intution in the theory of knowledge. Analytic philosophy considers the role of intution as being very important in testing truth-claims.

But that said, the cosmological argument in no way fits into the category of “intuition” which, broadly speaking is a theory of unmediated or immediate knowledge or belief. A deductive argument by its very definition is not a claim of unmediated knowledge or belief, but attempts–whether you agree with it or not–to establish its premises through an appeal to reason. For example, the cosmological argument of Aquinas is often expressed in terms of a categorical (and sometimes hypothetical) syllogism, that is, premises which move between minor and major premises, arriving at a demonstration. This wouldn’t fit the description of intuition.

I think the way to debate the cosmological argument is on the merits of its premises which must either be materially/formally sound or not. If you wish, however, to demonstrate that the argument relies on intuition, perhaps you could first define intuition and then show how the argument does fall into this category?

Hope this makes sense. Thanks again for the very interesting post.

 

[tdgesq]

The main problem for the Kalam Cosmologiocal Argument, at least Carigs version, is not premise 1, nor premise 2. The problem is defining what the cause of the universe exactly is.

That’s basically the same conclusion that Antony Flew came to upon his conversion from atheism to deism. While he eventually accepted the conclusion that the universe has a cause of its existence (and that it must be an uncaused cause), he categorically rejected Craig’s argument that it is personal. I also disagree with some of Craig’s analysis in this regard, although I still think there are good arguments for the conclusion.

 

[shoe]

My answer to “Why is it that only the beginning of the universe doesn’t have a cause” is similar to his answer to “Why is it that only God doesn’t have a cause?”

If the universe is not from everlasting, it needs a cause; but if the universe has no beginning, then it does not need a cause for its beginning. Similarly, if God has no beginning, than He doesn’t need a cause either.

But the universe had a beginning, (first and second laws of thermodynamics); but, unlike the universe, God did not have a beginning. Therefore, God did not have a cause.

Therefore, we have the choice between “In the beginning, God” created the universe or “In the beginning, nothing” did. But if nothing was in the beginning, then nothing would still be. On the other hand, if something exists now, then something has always existed; and the Bible calls this Being that has always existed “God.”

 

[belorg]

That’s basically the same conclusion that Antony Flew came to upon his conversion from atheism to deism. While he eventually accepted the conclusion that the universe has a cause of its existence (and that it must be an uncaused cause), he categorically rejected Craig’s argument that it is personal. I also disagree with some of Craig’s analysis in this regard, although I still think there are good arguments for the conclusion.

It’s realy very simple. if the first two premises of The KCA are correct, the first uncaused cause cannot possible be personal.

 

[sw85]

An athiest will say the cosmological argument will violate its own premise.

The cosmological argument states everything in the universe is contingent on something else: planet earth, you, me, a cloud. They don’t esplain within themselves their own existence. Finally we must come to God, an eternal, infinite being to explain the existence of these phenomona.

Now the athiest will say that putting God in the picture just takes it one step further. Like, how does God explain His own existence? God is no longer a first cause. How do I refute that?

Do you guys understand what I mean? Sorry if I’m coming off as unclear.

It doesn’t say “everything is contingent on something.” It says that everything which is contingent, by definition, is contingent on something. If the thing on which X is contingent is also contingent, then X-1 must be contingent on something too, and if the thing which X-1 is contingent on is also contingent, then X-2 must also be contingent, and so on. This chain continues until you reach a thing which is not contingent and from which everything else derives its contingency. Since this thing is not contingent it doesn’t require explanation. It is the explanation.

It’s like having a stack of papers. If you have a stack of papers there has to be a single sheet at the bottom which is unstacked, and on which all others are stacked. If you don’t have that, you can’t have a stack. Stacks only exist because of them.

 

[tdgesq]

It’s realy very simple. if the first two premises of The KCA are correct, the first uncaused cause cannot possible be personal.

Uh …hum. Let’s reiterate:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

There isn’t anything contained in premise 1 or 2 that gives any indication of whether the cause of the universe is personal or not. So no, it really isn’t that simple.

 

[belorg]

Uh …hum. Let’s reiterate:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

There isn’t anything contained in premise 1 or 2 that gives any indication of whether the cause of the universe is personal or not. So no, it really isn’t that simple.

I explained why in post 23

 

[thecone137]

Doesn’t the cosmological arguement presuppose the law of causality?

If so, could we get to an uncaused cause without it?

 

[Phil_Marinus]

This is way over the top of my head… interesting reading though !

 

[tdgesq]

I explained why in post 23

sigh No, you didn’t. You explained why you believe Craig’s argument that the uncaused cause is personal is wrong and actually leads to the opposite conclusion. Try again.

 

[tdgesq]

Doesn’t the cosmological arguement presuppose the law of causality?

I don’t thing so, because presuppositions generally don’t require reasons; yet there are very strong reasons to believe in causality

If so, could we get to an uncaused cause without it?

Not really, because there couldn’t be any uncaused “cause” to speak of without first recognizing that there is such a thing as causality.

 

[belorg]

sigh No, you didn’t. You explained why you believe Craig’s argument that the uncaused cause is personal is wrong and actually leads to the opposite conclusion. Try again.

No, I explained why a personal cause leads to the opposite conclusion. Not just that Craig’s argument for a personal acause is wrong. Any argument for a personal cause, combined with the KCA; leads to the opposite conclusion.

 

[hicetnunc]

But Craig forgets that, on his view, the personal agent has already laid causal constarints upon himself from the moment he decided to create, that is, from eternity. So the only way for such a person act as an indeterministic cause is if the decision to create possibly does not lead to the act of creation. But libertarian free wil does not entail that the effect of a decision must be undetermined, but that the decision itself must be undetermined. Otherwise, it would be possible for a person to decide not to do anything wrong, while he ends up doing the wrong thing. And it must be possible for an omnipotynt being to fail to do something.
So, to summarize. If we accept Craig’s first two premsies, the conclusion of the argument is necssarily “The cause is NOT God”.

Hi belorg;

Thanks for your contribution and interesting argument. I have a couple of observations, if I may…

First, I think you raise a good point about the difficulty of the notion of ‘personal God’ in Craig’s argument. I heard him here in London last year debate this point with Stephen Law. He’s also attempted to defend the notion of a personal cause in his debate with Wes Morriston. Morriston has argued (and, if I’m not mistaken, what you are agreeing with—please correct me if I’ve misunderstood you) that God’s will is of the kind of state/state causation in which one state brings about another state or else an event/event cause. Craig calls event/event causation one which is equal to one event causing another event, like a stone shattering a window. If God is eternal, and his will is eternal, then the universe should likewise be eternal, or else he is not eternal in order to correspond to an event/event causal model.

Craig’s reply is that there are different types of causation which Weston does not take into account in his argument. But Craig argues for a state/event cause (a timeless cause freely causing something in time). He does this by drawing a distinction between God’s will, and God’s action. God can will something without doing it. God could, for example, will that someone be saved who ultimately is not saved. Thomas Aquinas also explains the difference between God’s antecedent will and his consequent will, a distinction which Morriston does not make room for in his argument. God can will one thing, and allow another happen. In the context of the Craig’s Kalam argument, this would mean that the existence of the universe in fact necessitates a personal agent cause of the universe because if there was no personal agent, either the universe would have had to exist always or never. I think Craig would argue against your assertion that a personal God must also be indeterminate by drawing this distinction between will and act—or between antecedent and consequent will.

If you are interested, I would be happy to tease this distinction out more…I am aware I’ve just galloped over it, but I didn’t want to bore you with too many points all at once.

Personally, I prefer Aquinas’ cosmological argument because it is simpler and distinguishes the arguments for an Unmoved Mover from the argument for Personality. I also think there is this distinction in Craig too, although it may not seem as clear.

 

[belorg]

Hi belorg;

Thanks for your contribution and interesting argument. I have a couple of observations, if I may…

First, I think you raise a good point about the difficulty of the notion of ‘personal God’ in Craig’s argument. I heard him here in London last year debate this point with Stephen Law. He’s also attempted to defend the notion of a personal cause in his debate with Wes Morriston. Morriston has argued (and, if I’m not mistaken, what you are agreeing with—please correct me if I’ve misunderstood you) that God’s will is of the kind of state/state causation in which one state brings about another state or else an event/event cause. Craig calls event/event causation one which is equal to one event causing another event, like a stone shattering a window. If God is eternal, and his will is eternal, then the universe should likewise be eternal, or else he is not eternal in order to correspond to an event/event causal model.

Craig’s reply is that there are different types of causation which Weston does not take into account in his argument. But Craig argues for a state/event cause (a timeless cause freely causing something in time). He does this by drawing a distinction between God’s will, and God’s action. God can will something without doing it. God could, for example, will that someone be saved who ultimately is not saved. Thomas Aquinas also explains the difference between God’s antecedent will and his consequent will, a distinction which Morriston does not make room for in his argument. God can will one thing, and allow another happen. In the context of the Craig’s Kalam argument, this would mean that the existence of the universe in fact necessitates a personal agent cause of the universe because if there was no personal agent, either the universe would have had to exist always or never. I think Craig would argue against your assertion that a personal God must also be indeterminate by drawing this distinction between will and act—or between antecedent and consequent will.

If you are interested, I would be happy to tease this distinction out more…I am aware I’ve just galloped over it, but I didn’t want to bore you with too many points all at once.

Personally, I prefer Aquinas’ cosmological argument because it is simpler and distinguishes the arguments for an Unmoved Mover from the argument for Personality. I also think there is this distinction in Craig too, although it may not seem as clear.

Hi, hicetnunc

I really would enjoy finally discussing this.Most of the time, people just ignore this.
I(s true that this is basically Wes Morriston’s argument, but I made it independently of him.
Regardless who made it, I think it is pretty water tight.
But maybe, before I reply, you should ‘tease this distinction out more’. That way you can make sure I completely understand the distiction so that I can avoid attacking straw men.