Could artificial intelligence be granted a soul?

[Huiou_Theou]

Since he never specified which meaning he meant, I understood the second one. I don’t think that his version is the common usage today. Maybe he was just obfuscating the “matter” as a “good” philosopher should. God forbid that they would use an everyday word, if a long convoluted sentence can make their meaning more difficult to decipher.

But, be as it may, his meaning of this word is incorrect, no matter which one he intended.

As to the correctness of whichever meaning, I will leave that to Dr. Bonnet.

But, contextually, I think he specified quite well which meanining was required. Substantial is of exactly the same vintage as accidental, and not only that – but St. Thomas Aquinas was mentioned in my exchange with him as an extra hint.
(Aristotole and Plato are implied by that too)

But, by your own standard – your unrepentant “definition” of evil seems to indicate that you are interested in emulating a particular kind of philosopher yourself – a sophist or perhaps a rhetoritician. So why do you complain about Dr. Bonnet? The ad-hominems are laughable.

You aren’t now going to try and tell me that obfuscation is REALLY what a good philosopher does are you?

Oh, and on a Catholic formum, I notice ‘God’ being invoked sarcastically by an atheist? I can understand not knowing which definition was meant but the rest is counter-productive.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

Dear Spyder1jcd

You write well for being fourteen, and I encourage you to pursue the deepest understanding of our Catholic faith. You will be well rewarded as long as intellectual pride does not lead you to doubt that the wisdom revealed by God in His Church is the surest guide to truth. Others will mock this concept, but only to their own folly.

The questions you raise were dealt with in some of my earlier comments on this thread, I think – so you might get some help by rereading them. When I talked about God giving a soul to man requiring a “creative act,” I did not mean a creative act like an abstract painting, but an actual act of creation out of nothing of the spiritual soul requiring the infinite power of God Himself.

Anything a machine does is simply the product of “creative” programming, even when machines are programmed to “learn” from their environment and thereby to “create” new algorithms.

Something can be informed with a spiritual intellective soul, but only in properly disposed matter, namely, the matter of the human organism (as the only natural instance we know at present). An organism is deemed “sentient” because it has sense powers. No machine can have a soul for the simple reason that machines are composites of many substantial parts, each having its own nature, whereas a natural ensouled organism is but one substantial entity, whose nature is through and through the same. That is to say, every part of a man is human and shares in human nature. For example, our feet, hands, heart, and lungs actually share the same human nature and are activated by the human substantial form, or soul. This confuses people used to looking into biology books and seeing pictures of hands and hearts like they were things in themselves, but the truth is that they are merely parts of wholes, not wholes themselves. The human being is a whole, and every part of that whole shares human nature.

I hope some of this helps.

Dr. Bonnette

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen:

You write: “If there is anything that is neither matter, nor the part of our mind (abstract concepts), that “entity” cannot be detected by any means - in principle. I don’t see any use for this concept, but maybe you do.” My reply: You assume again that the only means of “detection” is empirical verification. The philosophical method employs pure reason applied to experiential evidence to infer the existence of non-material entities, such as the spiritual soul and God. You don’t concede the force of the arguments, but that does not make you right. Note that in arguing to the existence of a physical force, say, gravity, we argue from observable behavior of macroscopic entities, such as a rock falling, to the existence of a non-observable cause which we call “gravity.” Is gravity physical? We presume it is. The metaphysician argues from observable effects, such as sensible motion, to the existence of a non-observable cause, God, which he infers is also non-material. Is it possible that the presumption that all causes must be physical in nature simply the bias of a materialist philosophy?

You write: “We have to conclude that either this immaterial substance is theoretically impossible to detect by our senses or any instrument we may fashion, and in this case it cannot interact with our physical existence; or it can interact with our physical existence, and in this case it can be detected at the point of the interface. There is no third option. Which one will it be?”

There IS a third option. You cannot detect the soul because it is immaterial, not extended in space. Still, it does not interact with physical objects like one substance acting on another distinct substance. That was Descartes error when he conceived mind and body as two distinct entities joined at the pineal gland. The superiority of the Aristotelian-Thomistic solution is that hylemorphism explains that a single living substance is composite, not of distinct things or substances, but of distinct metaphysical principles, substantial form and primary matter. Neither are things in themselves, but the two principles together form a single organic substance which does have extension in space. Hence, the direction of that form, or soul, affects the actions of the physical substance (cow, man, etc.) while remaining undetectable to experimental observation.

You write: “I am not a Positivist….” You could have fooled me! Do you not insist that the only way we can know realities is by the methods of natural science? That describes the epistemological position of a positivist and what I thought you were saying. If I read you wrong, then what other methods do you employ? Are they philosophical? What philosophy? I do not refer to abstract imaginary systems, but those real applications of thought that deal with the real world.

I had written: “In fact, philosophical psychology reasons to the existence of the soul because things above the atomic level exhibit substantial unity, not merely the accidental unity of function.”
You replied: “The word “accidental” is incorrect. There is nothing accidental about homeostasis. The molecules consist of atoms, but not accidently, or randomly, they follow the strict rules of atomic bonds.” There is a misunderstanding here which may be my fault. I should have explained that in Aristotelian philosophy, the term “accidental” usually refers to the “accidental” order, not to accidents like occur in traffic! “Accident” in this technical sense is opposed to “substance.” Substance is what exists in itself and distinct from anything else, whereas an accident inheres in a substance, is a mere quality of a substance. Hence, “accidental” unity means a unity of distinct substances, or not a single substance. That is to say, the unity obtains from a mere quality of unified function existing between two or more discrete substances. For example, a machine is a group of distinct parts that happen to be designed to function together as if they were one thing, but they really are not.

You write: “Furthermore, the distinction between living and unliving organisms is an arbitrary one. There is higher level of complexity in those organisms we call “living”, they react to complex stimuli with complex responses, but that is all. There is no minimum level of complexity of living materials.” My reply is that the division may appear to emerge from the properties of simpler units, but immanent activity – self-perfective activity – manifests life, since such activity is arises only when a thing, like a cow, is ONE substance and thus the parts serve the good of the whole which is not merely “accidentally” united. We return to the debate over whether substances actually exist above the atomic level. My answer to this was given in posting number 170 above, paragraph five.

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

You assume again that the only means of “detection” is empirical verification.

What else? If I put my hand into a fire, and I feel pain, there is no question about this empirical verification. No amount of abstract reasoning can deny physical facts.
Dr. Bonnette:

The philosophical method employs pure reason applied to experiential evidence to infer the existence of non-material entities, such as the spiritual soul and God.

Is there anything else which is a “non-material” entity?
Dr. Bonnette:

Note that in arguing to the existence of a physical force, say, gravity, we argue from observable behavior of macroscopic entities, such as a rock falling, to the existence of a non-observable cause which we call “gravity.” Is gravity physical? We presume it is.

There is no reason to presume it. It is physical.
Dr. Bonnette:

The metaphysician argues from observable effects, such as sensible motion, to the existence of a non-observable cause, God, which he infers is also non-material.

There is a huge difference. To infer from physical observation something else that is also physical is reasonable. To draw inference from something physical to something non-physical is theology. You mention motion, which is a physical phenomenon. Motion can be explained via physical causes, force affecting a body (for example gravity). There is no need to presume something non-physical.
Dr. Bonnette:

Is it possible that the presumption that all causes must be physical in nature simply the bias of a materialist philosophy?

Since every physical attribute can be explained with physical causes, that is enough. No need to go any further.
Dr. Bonnette:

There IS a third option. You cannot detect the soul because it is immaterial, not extended in space. Still, it does not interact with physical objects like one substance acting on another distinct substance.

It does not matter if this interaction is different from one physical object acting on another physical object. If there is any interaction, there is an interface between the non-physical and the physical. In this case the physical part changes, and this change could be detected.
Dr. Bonnette:

The superiority of the Aristotelian-Thomistic solution is that hylemorphism explains that a single living substance is composite, not of distinct things or substances, but of distinct metaphysical principles, substantial form and primary matter.

I tried to investigate the concept of hylemorphism, but did not get any substantial answer. Matter is physical, its form is physical. If we draw a circle on a rubber sheet, and distort the sheet, we can get an ellipsoid, or an amorphous shape, depending on the direction of the pulling.
Dr. Bonnette:

Neither are things in themselves, but the two principles together form a single organic substance which does have extension in space. Hence, the direction of that form, or soul, affects the actions of the physical substance (cow, man, etc.) while remaining undetectable to experimental observation.

Of course they are. Matter is a “thing”, its “form” is a “thing”, or an abstract shape. To call this form a “soul” does not add anything to the observation. The form or shape of graphite is a hexagon, the form or shape of a diamond is an octahedron. Same six carbon atoms, different shape, different attributes. Where is the need for a soul here?
Dr. Bonnette:

For example, a machine is a group of distinct parts that happen to be designed to function together as if they were one thing, but they really are not.

Of course the machine is “one thing”. If you remove a part, it may or may not work - depending on the function.

If you remove the paint from a car, it will still work. If you cut off the horn from a cow, it will still perform its “task”. If you remove the engine from the car, it will cease to function. if you remove the lung from a cow, it will die. If you replace the engine of the car, it will work again. If you transplant a new lung into the cow, it will provide milk again (after recuperating). The similarity is not “accidental”, it is “substantial”.

Organic beings need more care when substituting parts than unorganic ones. A car can be switched off, and then back on again without suffering an detrimental effects. A frog can be placed into liquid nitrogen and then thawed out again, and it will keep on hopping around.

The difference between living and non-living material is arbitrarily defined. Some biologists define viruses as “alive”, others define it as a crystalline object. Which ones are “right”? Both of them.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Hiteteln,
My understanding of substance, as a word, is a way of categorizing by propert(y/ies) of some kind measured under certain conditions.
Substance is how you know something actually is what you say it is.
In chemistry, all atoms having a given, particular property, are called a substance – and in particular an elemental substance.
But the word is more general than that.

I can say, you I know you were yourself seven years ago even though all your atoms have changed (I am allowing your opinion that it happens, though I do not know if you are correct or not). So measured over your earthly life, there is a substance which allows me to determine you. And there is another (possibly with some overlap) substance which is human. etc.

hylemorphism, can be applied in to physical phenomina very well.
I noticed this website, which I understand fairly well:
hylemorphism
When you talk about “pattern” or “form”, these appear to be possible determining factors of “substance”, as noted on the web page. Perhaps this will help the conversation a bit?

 

[richbansha]

Just a little something that whirls in my head from time to time:

REV 20:15 Anyone whose name was not found written in the Book of Life was thrown into the pool of fire.

I don’t dare pretend to understand this book, but maybe the Evangelicals have this all wrong. What if this passage means that the Book of Life is a list of God’s creations that he gave a soul. Those not in the book are artificial life not created by God and not blessed with a soul?

I don’t hold this to be true, but I have heard more bizzarre things from the Protestant crazies.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen (re posting #179):

You write: “1) Consider the planaria, an amazing little creature. Since it is alive, you assume that it has something like a “soul”, a substantial unity. Now grab a knife, and cut this little bugger in half. You will get two entities, both of which will regrow all of their missing organs, and live on happily ever after. There will be two of them. Did your slice of the knife split its “soul” in half? And then these “half-souls” regrew their missing parts? Or did one of the halfs (which one?) “inherit” the full original “soul”, and the other one grabbed a “soul” from nowhere?”

My reply: The planarium has a single soul while it is one planarium. Physical division is a mode of reproduction in which the division of matter results in the production of a new substantial form, or soul, for one of the halves of the worm. It is no different than asexual reproduction of an amoeba, wherein the extension of matter allows for division of quantity resulting in the eduction of a new substantial form, or soul. Which planarium or amoeba is the “original” one? That is a problem for natural scientists, perhaps, but philosophically it suffices to know one remains alive and the other is beginning a new life with a new soul.

You write; “2) Consider us, humans, the “crowns of creation”. You assume that we have this substantial unity, parts working for some common good. Srtange, that this substantial unity would die very quickly if it lost all those millions of symbiotic bacteria in its digestive system, which allow us to break down our food and survive. Are those bacteria included in this substantial unity, governed by a common “soul”? Or do they have their little “mini-souls”?”

My reply: Again, a simple problem. The bacteria all have their own individual souls, while the human being has his own single intellective spiritual soul. The organisms, both man and bacteria, live in happy symbiotic harmony.

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

The planarium has a single soul while it is one planarium. Physical division is a mode of reproduction in which the division of matter results in the production of a new substantial form, or soul, for one of the halves of the worm. It is no different than asexual reproduction of an amoeba, wherein the extension of matter allows for division of quantity resulting in the eduction of a new substantial form, or soul. Which planarium or amoeba is the “original” one? That is a problem for natural scientists, perhaps, but philosophically it suffices to know one remains alive and the other is beginning a new life with a new soul.

A remark: the word “planaria” looks like a grammatically plural word, but actually it is a singular noun for this creature. (There is no such word as “planarium” in the dictionary.) Still the application of the knife is not a natural way of reproduction for this being, unlike the amoeba or other single cell organisms. It survives such an invasive procedure through its physical capabilities of regeneration.

To assert that it is sufficient to say that one of them maintains the original “soul” and the particulars are only important to the natural scientists looks like an evasion, I am afraid.

Natural scientists are simply not interested in “souls”, for them this question is irrelevant. It is you who maintains that the “soul” is preserved in one of them and a new one is “created” by the knife. Therefore the question is pertinent, how does the soul get “glued” to one half, and not the other one? (Is this a random process?) Where does the alleged new “soul” come from? And of course, the final question: if the “soul” is immaterial, how can the slice of the knife “create” one? Seems like that the “soul” is not THAT immaterial after all, if a simple slice of a knife can “create” it.

And another question: if you chop this poor little creature into many small pieces, not all will survive the procedure. Some will, others will not. It sure looks like that some purely material reasons are responsible for the survival of some, those which have enough genetic material and food to recreate their missing organs. So the “soul” (if there is any) is dependent on the material underpinning, and as such it is not independent of the “dirt” of matter.
Dr. Bonnette:

Again, a simple problem. The bacteria all have their own individual souls, while the human being has his own single intellective spiritual soul. The organisms, both man and bacteria, live in happy symbiotic harmony.

This answer circumvents the question: humans simply cannot survive without those bacteria, therefore our bodily integrity and “soul” are maintained through this symbiosis. Your definition of the “soul” said that it is the maintaining force, to allow the functioning as a living organism, as a substantial whole.

Well this “substantial whole” is insufficient for survival on its own right, without the substantial help from the bacteria. Therefore your distinction of human “soul” and millions of bacterial “souls” looks incorrect - biologically speaking of course. The bacteria and the human form one organism - metaphysically speaking - none can survive without the other.

Therefore the definition of the “soul” is now in question. What is the sunstantial unity if those bacteria supply the ways and means of sheer survival for the human beings.

 

[Hitetlen]

Huiou Theou:

I can say, you I know you were yourself seven years ago even though all your atoms have changed (I am allowing your opinion that it happens, though I do not know if you are correct or not).

The number of “seven years” is just a phrase, not necessarily precise. The fact is of course that during the consumption of food and excreting the waste, we do replace our atoms, or building material.
Huiou Theou:

So measured over your earthly life, there is a substance which allows me to determine you. And there is another (possibly with some overlap) substance which is human. etc.

Yes, ideed, that is absolutely correct. There is the pattern of our mind, which survives the changing atoms that form the “hardware”, if you will. Interestingly, our current pattern is quite different from what it used to be when we were just young kids. There are some invariants however, and those are the features which define our special characteristics and differentiate between very similar humans, even identical twins.
Huiou Theou:

I noticed this website, which I understand fairly well:

When you talk about “pattern” or “form”, these appear to be possible determining factors of “substance”, as noted on the web page. Perhaps this will help the conversation a bit?

Yes, thank you for pointing it out, I found it myself. Strange that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not even list this particular school under this name.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Dr. Bonnet,

It is no different than asexual reproduction of an amoeba, wherein the extension of matter allows for division of quantity resulting in the eduction of a new substantial form, or soul. Which planarium or amoeba is the “original” one? That is a problem for natural scientists, perhaps, but philosophically it suffices to know one remains alive and the other is beginning a new life with a new soul.

You do not sound as if you mean to say this is a formal necessity, but a simple solution to the proposed problem.
Since, it is possible to say that one planaria has a ‘new’ soul,
is it not possible to say that both have new souls? and that the old soul dies? Or is there a logical problem with that?

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen,

It appears “Hitetlen” means “The Believer” in Hungarian. How does that fit in with the position of atheistic materialism that you defend using a positivistic methodology which claims to use solely the purely rational approach of natural science to solve all problems?

It is clear that you still are trying to conceive all things in terms of purely physical interactions, and even when you mention “forms,” you are talking about what I call “accidental” forms. The real issue is that materialism grasps only a part of the universe of being, and misses such obvious facts as the substantial unity of things above the atomic level. Thus you must violate the most basic elements of common sense in order to suggest that cabbages and cows, fish and men, are not really things in their own right, merely the product of chemical interaction of trillions of atoms. In fact, every substantial form is immaterial, since it is not a physical thing by itself, but rather a principle of material beings. Your continuous “looking” for them to be physically detectible is an absurd exercise, since you expect non-material entities to exhibit physical properties. When an organism moves, its motion is “detectible,” but the substantial form that unifies and animates its motion will never be “detectible.” We REASON to its existence, not look for it with a microscope or scale or meter of some sort.

Since Plato’s time, philosophers have argued to the spiritual nature of the human soul based on its knowledge of immaterial things. Universal concepts are such products of mind and escape the “conditions of matter” for reasons I have expressed earlier. Material things like cows and even abstract paintings always exhibit particular shapes, colors, and have sensible qualities that can be imagined. But universal concepts cannot even be imagined and lack all sensible qualities. That is why you can imagine “a man” or “a triangle,’ but not triangularity or humanity. The proofs for God’s existence begin with observation of things in the physical world, but argue that the physical world does not explain itself and that is why we are forced to posit a First Cause, Uncaused which alone provides an adequate foundation for this world.

The naturalist position since Hume’s time has been to insist that the natural world explains itself and has no need for a transcendent Cause. Any proof for God’s existence operates precisely by demonstrating that what appears as adequate “self-explanation” does not really work. Simply proclaiming that physical causes can do the job does not penetrate the inadequacy of such explanations. For example, we all know that motion can be “explained” by inertia or gravity. But merely describing inertia as “a body in motion tends to stay in motion” fails to explain WHY and HOW this phenomenon is possible. That is why Newton himself in his Optics insists that some other principle than inertia must operate to put objects into motion and KEEP them in motion. A priori ruling out of transcendental explanations more reveals intellectual bias than openness to discovery of full explanations for physical phenomena. Of course, natural scientists do not as such entertain transcendental causes, but just because philosophers do engage in such rational pursuits is not a legitimate reason to dismiss their enquiries as “religious philosophy” and “theology.” When we start from a revealed premise, such accusations may have some basis, but not as long as the discussion is purely rational and based on common human experience as a starting point.

What your “philosophy” also fails to encompass is the dimension of human existence as moral beings with free will and inalienable rights, dignity, and equality before man and God. I note you “squirming” to explain how all humans are equal before the law, when it would seem that evolution would produce variants leading to some “men” being superior to others. While you struggle to avoid the political incorrectness of racism, the mentor of evolution, Charles Darwin, did not shy away from the logical implications of his materialistic evolutionary theory. Darwin insisted that human females and Negroes were inferior to White British males on the evolutionary scale! Indeed, this same materialistic evolutionary stance was violently embraced by mass murderer Heinrich Himmler and other Nazis of the Third Reich – all this based on the claims of “natural science.” What use are “substantial forms” here? Precisely because every human being shares the same substantial nature as a result of having the same type of rational form, it is natural philosophy that saves humanity from the racist theories so often seen as the logical fruit of evolutionary science. Indeed, our Founding Fathers held that these unalienable rights come from our Creator, the very God your philosophy ignores and denies.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Huiou Theou:

You write: "Since, it is possible to say that one planaria has a ‘new’ soul,
is it not possible to say that both have new souls? and that the old soul dies?”

My reply: Correct. It appears so in principle. Perhaps, some scientific evidence will emerge, though, suggesting one or the other solution is preferable.

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

It appears “Hitetlen” means “The Believer” in Hungarian. How does that fit in with the position of atheistic materialism that you defend using a positivistic methodology which claims to use solely the purely rational approach of natural science to solve all problems?

No, it means UN-believer. Since I am Hungarian by birth, and Hungarian is my mother tongue, you can safely believe me, I will not mislead you. The suffix of “-tlen” means “without”.

Instead of arguing your post point by point, I will just summarize an overview of how I understand of your epistemology. If I am mistaken, you can correct me any time.

You seem to contend that simply by making observations about the real world (reality) and creating a logically non-contradictory model of this reality allows you (the philosopher) to arrive at a correct knowledge of reality. Important distinction: not a “possibly correct hypothesis” about reality: but a “correct knowledge” of reality.

All your posts where you mention empirical verification with some disdain, where you speak of “pure reason” as a necessary and sufficient methodology indicate this attitude. If I am mistaken, you can indicate it at your leisure. In the following part I will continue as if you gave your consent to this analysis.

Obviously, the method of abstract reasoning which follows the observation of reality is the one and only tool to use to form hypotheses about reailty. The hypothesis thus formed must withstand the scrutiny of reason. The first requirement is that the hypothesis must be without internal contradictions. This is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion. Even if we have a logically built hypothesis, it is just pure speculation up until this point. No matter which part of reality you wish to analyze, there are many, logically non-contradictory hypotheses that can be formed about it. I hope you see that this is obvious.

Which one of these different hypotheses is correct cannot be decided on a pure reasoning basis - since all of them are internally consistent and all of them purport to explain some feature of reality. To choose which hypothesis reflects reality best, we must use empirical verification. You cannot use the tool to both set up a hypothesis and use the same to tool to verify it. That would be absurd: a circular analysis. Reality can be experienced only through our senses, not sitting in a dark room and “hypothesizing” about it.

If empirical verification is impossible, the hypothesis remains an empty speculation, not worthy of the price of a piece of paper it could be written upon.

If (and this is a big IF) this is the correct summary of your epistemology, then we cannot even get closer in this discussion, because your epistemology boils down to a set of empty speculations about reality.

Please let me know if my analysis is correct.

Going a step forward: if you wish to critique the materialistic approach, you must show that some valid feature of reality cannot be adquately explained by it. It is not acceptable to posit some imaginary feature (soul) and then complain that materialism is unable to explain it.

I don’t care what Aristotele, Plato, Newton, Aquinas or whoever else states that there is a “substantial unity” different from “accidental unity” - to use your terminology. There is “unity”, period. If materialism would be unable to explain the molecules or higher composed entities, so be it. But I will nor accept an imaginary attribute for which there is no materialistic explanation.

Some final questions: is there a need for a “soul” to explain why six carbon atoms may form a graphite or a diamond? Is there a need for a “soul” to explain why a water molecule consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxigen atom? Why do you think that the notion of atomic bonds is insufficient?

Science is content to find out that on the closest electron-sphere there can be up to two electrons; on the next closest electron sphere there can be up to six electrons, etc. No scientist is going to ask “why” are these limits of “2” or “6” in place. Or “what” forbids the electrons to “gang up” and have three of them on the closest electron sphere. Or “who” decided that these numbers are “appropriate”.

These questions are meaningless. Just like asking “what happened” before the universe? Or “what caused” the universe? Or “what is to the north from the North Pole”? Or what is on the “reverse side” of a Moebius strip? None of these questions are meaningful to a scientist or a philosopher. Also please give me some examples of “universal concepts”.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

Just for the record, “hylemorphism” is the technical name for the “matter-form” doctrine initially proposed by Aristotle. It operates at two levels: (1) substance (matter) and accidental forms, e.g., man is a substance and his color an accident, and (2) primary matter and substantial form, which are the intrinsic metaphysical principles which constitute the essence of substances (above). The term, “substance,” most closely corresponds to the meaning in English of the word, “thing.” It means that which exists in itself and distinct from other things, e.g., a planaria, a horse, a man, an angel, God – as opposed to “accidents,” which inhere in and qualify substances, e.g., color, shape, number, size, relation, position, time, place, etc.

Hylemorphism is a central tenet of Aristotle’s philosophy, a philosophy perfected by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD). This Aristotelian-Thomistic “synthesis” became the philosophy preferred and recommended by the Catholic Church and is the intellectual vehicle in terms of which its theological doctrines are primarily understood. For example, in the Eucharist, the Church teaches that the bread and wine undergo what is called “transubstantiation,” meaning that while the accidents (accidental forms) of the bread and wine remain, their very substance becomes the body and blood, soul and divinity of Jesus Christ, Himself.

 

[Spyder1jcd]

Dr. Bonnette:

Dear Spyder1jcd

You write well for being fourteen, and I encourage you to pursue the deepest understanding of our Catholic faith. You will be well rewarded as long as intellectual pride does not lead you to doubt that the wisdom revealed by God in His Church is the surest guide to truth. Others will mock this concept, but only to their own folly.

The questions you raise were dealt with in some of my earlier comments on this thread, I think – so you might get some help by rereading them. When I talked about God giving a soul to man requiring a “creative act,” I did not mean a creative act like an abstract painting, but an actual act of creation out of nothing of the spiritual soul requiring the infinite power of God Himself.

Anything a machine does is simply the product of “creative” programming, even when machines are programmed to “learn” from their environment and thereby to “create” new algorithms.

Something can be informed with a spiritual intellective soul, but only in properly disposed matter, namely, the matter of the human organism (as the only natural instance we know at present). An organism is deemed “sentient” because it has sense powers. No machine can have a soul for the simple reason that machines are composites of many substantial parts, each having its own nature, whereas a natural ensouled organism is but one substantial entity, whose nature is through and through the same. That is to say, every part of a man is human and shares in human nature. For example, our feet, hands, heart, and lungs actually share the same human nature and are activated by the human substantial form, or soul. This confuses people used to looking into biology books and seeing pictures of hands and hearts like they were things in themselves, but the truth is that they are merely parts of wholes, not wholes themselves. The human being is a whole, and every part of that whole shares human nature.

I hope some of this helps.

Dr. Bonnette

You say that every part of the human body is not a whole, but a part of a whole. Does this idea apply to the soul as well? This would imply that the soul is not independent of the body. If it is not, how do you explain out-of-body experiences? I apply this term not only to things such as near-death experiences and the like, but even simpler things. The lapse of concious life during sleep and fainting, for instance. These things abstract a man from his bodily prescence even while awake, yet it continues to survive. In near-death experiences, and even possibly during comas, the soul can actually leave the body, and both continue to live. The body, of course, cannot perform normal function, but the heart still beats. And then, after death, the soul lives on. How can it, if it is not a whole? If you severed a hand from a body, the hand does not resume normal function. Yet, the rest of the body does. When the soul is taken from the body, the body does not resume normal function. Why? Because the soul is, as you say, what activates the lesser components of the human form. But then doesn’t that mean that the soul is something of a battery? Doesn’t that make it the human equivalent of electricity coursing through a device? Even after the device, such as a lamp, fails to function, the electricity continues to exist. Electricity is a separate influence that powers the device just as the soul gives life to the body. Therefore, isn’t the soul an independent entity, a separate component? And aren’t the other body parts essentially separate components without it?

You also say, “No machine can have a soul for the simple reason that machines are composites of many substantial parts, each having its own nature, whereas a natural ensouled organism is but one substantial entity, whose nature is through and through the same.” Just what exactly makes the substantial entity “through and through the same”? Is it the soul? Doesn’t that, too, imply that the soul is a separate entity and a whole? And with or without the soul, every part of the human body has an “alternate function.” Skin, for example, can serve as a source of food for an organism. Blood can provide nourishment as well. Don’t these alternate functions imply that each part has its own nature? Conversely, if one were to take a part from a machine, such as the central processing unit, the part could serve an alternate fuction. But it is not serving its intended function, just as if human blood were used for nourishment. While the blood’s intended function is to carry out processes such as filtering wastes and carrying oxygen, it is being used for an alternate function, meaning it does have a separate nature.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen,

Thank you for your “summary of epistemology” post. I concur that this is a more efficient method of proceeding than eternal point by point rebuttals.

You write: “You seem to contend that simply by making observations about the real world (reality) and creating a logically non-contradictory model of this reality allows you (the philosopher) to arrive at a correct knowledge of reality. Important distinction: not a “possibly correct hypothesis” about reality: but a “correct knowledge” of reality.”

Not so. Creating a logically non-contradictory model of the world would prove nothing. Any thesis about the world must be non-contradictory or it is nonsense, of course. But to prove a thesis, or to arrive at a conclusion, it is necessary to arrive at a scientific understanding of the truth. We must know that something is true, why it must be true, and why it cannot be otherwise.

From what you write above, I can understand, and sympathize, with what you appear to suspect of my claims about the soul. It must sound to you like a logically consistent hypothesis which is accepted as real, but which has no irrefutable proof to support it.

You write: “Which one of these different hypotheses is correct cannot be decided on a pure reasoning basis - since all of them are internally consistent and all of them purport to explain some feature of reality. To choose which hypothesis reflects reality best, we must use empirical verification. You cannot use the tool to both set up a hypothesis and use the same to tool to verify it. That would be absurd: a circular analysis. Reality can be experienced only through our senses, not sitting in a dark room and “hypothesizing” about it.”

Here I need to make some corrections. It is misleading to think that the Aristotelian-Thomistic method begins with hypotheses in much the same fashion as natural science. Let me assure you that we concur with you in insisting that all knowledge begins in sense experience (at least in this life). Using metaphysical first principles, sense experience forms the basis for demonstration. But rational analysis of what we observe with our senses can lead to judgments that affirm realities which themselves cannot be observed with our senses. In that sense, not all judgments are subject to empirical verification, but they are subject to rational verification through demonstration.

You write: “If empirical verification is impossible, the hypothesis remains an empty speculation, not worthy of the price of a piece of paper it could be written upon.” If you mean that after demonstration of the existence of an immaterial soul is done, we must then find some way to empirically verify its existence, I demur. Observational means will never reveal the presence of a soul, but reason absolutely demonstrates that it exists and acts.

You write: “…if you wish to critique the materialistic approach, you must show that some valid feature of reality cannot be adquately explained by it.” I concur. That is the point of demonstrations that non-material entities, such as the soul, universal concepts, or God, exist. The existence of a non-material entity requires what is termed a “negative judgment of separation.” These judgments affirm the existence of some reality, but simultaneously deny that that reality possesses material existence. To see the need for such a judgment, it is necessary to actually understand a demonstration which leads to such a conclusion. As you must realize, full demonstrations of this type appear in scholarly journals in articles some 20 – 40 or more pages in length. The classical proofs for God’s existence appear in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s “God, His Existence, and Nature,” vol. 1 (B. Herder Book Co.: 1934) and runs 392 pages, with some 3/4ths devoted to defending the metaphysical first principles of non-contradiction, sufficient reason, causality, and finality – before presenting formally St. Thomas’ famous Five Ways.

Too long. Continued next posting.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen (continued):

You write: “….is there a need for a “soul” to explain why six carbon atoms may form a graphite or a diamond? Is there a need for a “soul” to explain why a water molecule consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxigen atom? Why do you think that the notion of atomic bonds is insufficient?” Non-living substantial unities do not have souls, but they do have substantial forms – assuming they are a single being. I can understand why you might argue that below life’s level all combinations of atoms or sub-atomic particles are merely accidental unities. But, IF I am correct about the substantial forms causing substantial unity in living things, then an argument by analogy would likely apply to non-living things. Although you elsewhere claim that “unity” is all that matters, the distinction between substantial and accidental unity is critical, since it determines the manner in which a thing is “one.”

Discussing electron spheres on atoms, you write: “No scientist is going to ask “why” are these limits of “2” or “6”” Perhaps, but a philosopher ought to ask. You say, “These questions are meaningless. Just like asking … “what caused” the universe?” That is a perfect example of Vienna Circle thinking. Statements are meaningless if you cannot empirically verify their terms. Since God cannot be empirically verified, statements about Him are meaningless. Since we CAN demonstrate God’s existence by the methods I describe above, it is manifest that empirical verification has been overstated as a universal method.

Examples of universal concepts would be every word we utter that has meaning, since the intellect forms the universal concept by abstracting the form from individual matter. Thus, “pig,” “man,” “word,” “meaning,” and countless other understanding of natures by the mind are universal concepts.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Spyder1jcd

You write incisively for your claimed age. Are you sure you are not 41 instead of 14?

You write, “You say that every part of the human body is not a whole, but a part of a whole. Does this idea apply to the soul as well? This would imply that the soul is not independent of the body.”

The soul is not a part, like a physical subsection of the whole. It is the form of the whole, a substantial form that unites with primary matter to form the actually existing organism. Thus the soul animates the entire body by being its form. Distinguish here between the spiritual soul and the merely immaterial soul below man. The spiritual soul has its own operations which transcend matter, such as intellective and volitional acts. Thus it can be independent of matter. But the sentient soul depends on matter for its being and its operations.

Near death experiences and loss of consciousness are not actual death. Death is the actual separation of the soul from the body. Because the soul is immaterial, it may perform functions not limited to the body in rare instances while alive.

You write: “Electricity is a separate influence that powers the device just as the soul gives life to the body. Therefore, isn’t the soul an independent entity, a separate component? And aren’t the other body parts essentially separate components without it?” No analogy is perfect, but this one is pretty good. Without the soul to animate them, the other body parts cease to be “components” at all.

You write: “Just what exactly makes the substantial entity “through and through the same”? Is it the soul? Doesn’t that, too, imply that the soul is a separate entity and a whole?” Yes, the soul makes the entire body share in the same nature. But that does not make it a separate entity, unless it is a spiritual soul and until death. Man’s spiritual soul is not a whole, separate from the body, until death.

Taking the part from the whole, say removing a kidney from a donor, not only may change its function, but makes it cease to share in the nature of the donor organism. It undergoes a substantial change. Oddly, there is no such thing as a kidney. When it is a kidney, it is not a thing, but a part of a thing (substance). When it becomes a “thing” in its own right by being removed from the organism, it ceases to be a kidney because a kidney is a part of a thing, not a thing. Do not be confused by function, since nature is not determined by function alone, but by whether the organ is still a real part of a substantial whole whose nature determines its nature. Thus, my hand’s nature is NOT “hand,” but HUMAN, since it shares in my human nature as long as it is part of my living whole. Should it be severed, it would cease to be a hand because a hand is a part of a whole, and it is no longer such a part.

 

[Hitetlen]

We may get somewhat closer in mutual understanding, which is most gratifying. I will reflect on a few points.
Dr. Bonnette:

But to prove a thesis, or to arrive at a conclusion, it is necessary to arrive at a scientific understanding of the truth. We must know that something is true, why it must be true, and why it cannot be otherwise.

The first question is: what do you mean by “truth”? If you mean conformity to reality, we are in agreement. A true statement describes reality.
Dr. Bonnette:

Here I need to make some corrections. It is misleading to think that the Aristotelian-Thomistic method begins with hypotheses in much the same fashion as natural science.

Please elaborate on this one. To say that there is some immaterial substance - is a hypothesis.
Dr. Bonnette:

Using metaphysical first principles, sense experience forms the basis for demonstration. But rational analysis of what we observe with our senses can lead to judgments that affirm realities which themselves cannot be observed with our senses. In that sense, not all judgments are subject to empirical verification, but they are subject to rational verification through demonstration.

But what is a “demonstration” if it is not the same as verification? You cannot demonstrate the validity of a hypothesis by reducing it to another hypothesis. Somewhere during the process you must reduce it something observable and thus verifyable.
Dr. Bonnette:

If you mean that after demonstration of the existence of an immaterial soul is done, we must then find some way to empirically verify its existence, I demur. Observational means will never reveal the presence of a soul, but reason absolutely demonstrates that it exists and acts.

Again, you use the word “demonstrate” - as an epistemological method. I need a description or explanation of what you mean by this word and how does it form a valid epistemological method.
Dr. Bonnette:

Non-living substantial unities do not have souls, but they do have substantial forms – assuming they are a single being.

Now we can disagree in earnest. Your differentiation of “living” and “non-living” entities is an arbitrary differentiation, a convenience. If you wish to argue along those lines, you must use biological means and draw a precise line what makes a being “alive”. Metaphysical first principles simply will not do - that would be what I called empty speculation. Once you can do that (which is highly improbable, since even biologists cannot reach a consensus), then you must prove that living substances have some immaterial attributes to them. And that is impossible, in my opinion.
Dr. Bonnette:

That is a perfect example of Vienna Circle thinking. Statements are meaningless if you cannot empirically verify their terms.

That is not what I meant. Statements are meaningless if they operate on undefined and undefinable states of affairs. Time and causality are not defined outside the universe, the directions "east, “west” and “north” are not defined at the North Pole. The concept of “side” is not defined on a Moebius strip. Moreover, these attributes cannot be defined and that makes any utterance about them meaningless, not simply a lack of verification.

Another question about “universal concepts”: do you mean “abstract concepts”?

A few remarks concerning your post on hylemorphism. I agree that the matter-form dichotomy and the substantial-accidental differentiation are good starting points. The seeking for invariants is the quintessential scientific method. Just what constitutes substantial vs. accidental is where the “battle will be fought”.

Summary: what do you mean by “truth”, what is a “demonstration”, how do you plan to substantiate that “living” vs. “non-living” entities is a valid biological distinction, and how do you plan to substantiate that “living” entities have some “immaterial attribute” to them?

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen:

I confess I am running into time difficulties keeping up with this thread.

Yes, truth is the conformity of mind to being.

You write: “But what is a “demonstration” if it is not the same as verification? You cannot demonstrate the validity of a hypothesis by reducing it to another hypothesis. Somewhere during the process you must reduce it something observable and thus verifyable.”

You said earlier that you were not a positivist, but you appear to employ the methodology of positivism. That is, because you appear to claim that all valid knowledge must be verified using the methods of natural science. Your epistemological methodology conforms to that of natural science. Propose hypotheses and then verify them by empirical testing and observation. That is fine – for natural science. But philosophy works a different way, a way you appear not to recognize. We begin with observable phenomena. (Aristotle and St. Thomas concur that all knowledge begins in sensation.) But then, using proper metaphysical principles, we can arrive at certitudes that do NOT have to be “empirically verified,” but are most certainly NOT mere hypotheses! Example? In its simplest form, consider we feel an explosion and look down and find a hand missing! We would observe this event as a sensible phenomenon. Simultaneously, we would employ the metaphysical principle of causality to conclude that something must have caused this event. We would not know the nature of the unseen cause. For that matter we could not even be sure that the cause was physical, even though the effect produced was physical. But we would be sure that something caused this effect and that the cause was sufficient to produce this effect.

Now you are likely thinking, “But this is obvious and proves nothing.” Billions of prior experiences have empirically verified this sort of application of “causality.” How does this in any way invalidate empirical verification? My answer is that I recall you saying earlier that, perhaps, sometime in the future we might find that this “law” would prove no longer valid in some case or cases. That is the problem with relying on repetition of prior experience to validate a “law” of experience. You should know that particulars can never produce a universal, no matter how many billions of them you have. The future just might prove different. But to the metaphysician, such is simply not possible at all. All future events MUST conform to the universal law of causality, that every effect must have a cause (which, incidentally, must also be proportionate to and simultaneous with its effect). How do I know that? Because there are two ways of knowing, not just one. Not all knowledge is sense knowledge, nor does it consist merely of patterns of electro-neural brain activity as you appear to suppose. We also have intellective knowledge which is of an entirely different sort. But to return to the epistemological method applied here:

Contrary to your assumption that a metaphysical law, such as causality, is based merely on countless repetitions of past experiences, Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy would say that we know that every effect requires a cause because the intellect grasps its object in terms of being – being, whose concept is formed the very first time we apprehend any object employing our intellect. And once the intellect conceives being, it becomes connaturally aware that non-being cannot produce being, since there is nothing there to produce it. Being cannot come from non-being. Hence, any explosion or sudden loss of a hand constitutes a new state of being which did not exist in the instant previous to the explosion. Since being cannot come from non-being, it must come from some other being which “causes” it. Please note that our universal certitude about this here arises, not from how many times we see this happen and suppose a cause, but from the mind’s understanding of being itself. This occurs not because we are dealing with explosions or hands, but because we are grasping these entities in terms of their “being,” and hence the law applied is already understood in such universal terms that it must apply to all existing phenomena, past, present, or future. That is why we never REALLY believe that some future event will occur without any cause, even if we claim we do.

(Too long, continued below.)