Could artificial intelligence be granted a soul?

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen

(Continued from above.)

Even if you do not fully embrace what I say above, you can see that this is a different way of determining the truth of reality from having to “empirically verify” each future instance. The epistemological method you describe does correctly describe the method of natural science, and while that is ONE valid mode of knowledge, it is not the only way we can know things. The method I describe (perhaps somewhat ineptly at the moment) above is a completely distinct, properly metaphysical method, which uses the intellect to determine reality without having to empirically verify the resulting conclusion, namely: that every future novel event will require a cause. It is important to grasp, not only the fact that I cannot possibly empirically verify the future universality of such a claim, but that my certitude arises from an intellective analysis of being itself, prescinding from any particular content of sense experience. This is the sort of analysis that your epistemological method appear to miss entirely. And it is why this method, which is NOT the method of natural science, can be used to discover the need for the existence of immaterial causes and even God Himself as sole adequate causes for what begins in our knowledge as observable phenomena.

Metaphysical certitude can be achieved without having to empirically verify the conclusion of the intellective process which produces it. And, what is concluded is anything but a “mere speculative hypothesis,” it is apodictic certitude about reality itself achieved by proper use of the intellect employing metaphysical principles immediately self-evident in terms of being itself.

To be continued….

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

I confess I am running into time difficulties keeping up with this thread.

Thank you for taking the time and expaining you ideas. I know that to compose a post of this complexity usually takes several hours. I read your essay, and wait for the contiunation as your time permits. I will not go into detail until I see the rest, but I have a few short remarks.
Dr. Bonnette:

But philosophy works a different way, a way you appear not to recognize. We begin with observable phenomena. (Aristotle and St. Thomas concur that all knowledge begins in sensation.) But then, using proper metaphysical principles, we can arrive at certitudes that do NOT have to be “empirically verified,” but are most certainly NOT mere hypotheses!

Here is one difficulty. Where do those metaphysical principles come from? Are they simply a deus ex machina, being imprinted onto our minds by some immaterial entity? If (another big IF here) that is what you assert, then you already presuppose an immaterial entity, the existence of which you ultimately wish to demonstrate. And that would be, of course, a logical error.
Dr. Bonnette:

Because there are two ways of knowing, not just one. Not all knowledge is sense knowledge, nor does it consist merely of patterns of electro-neural brain activity as you appear to suppose. We also have intellective knowledge which is of an entirely different sort.

I must point out that is in just a hypothesis. You have to prove or demonstrate that “intellective knowledge” is somehow different and independent from the electro-chemical activity of the brain. Since this is another conclusion you wish to establish, you cannot presuppose its existence.
Dr. Bonnette:

Contrary to your assumption that a metaphysical law, such as causality, is based merely on countless repetitions of past experiences, Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy would say that we know that every effect requires a cause because the intellect grasps its object in terms of being – being, whose concept is formed the very first time we apprehend any object employing our intellect.

This seems to confirm my suspicion that you assert some “inborn” or “objectively existing” intellect, which does not rely on sensory (name removed by moderator)ut or verification, rather simply exists independent of the mind. And that is just another hypothesis.

Furthermore, your phrase “the very first time we apprehend any object employing our intellect” is nebulous and vague: “whose” intellect are you talking about? A caveman most probably did not have a mind sophisticated enough to grasp such a complicated idea that “something cannot come from nothing”.

Anyhow, these are just preliminary remarks, but I think they are important.

If I may make a suggestion: when you wish to quote something your discussion partner says, you can use the “quote” and “/quote” HTML tags, and that will make the quoted text more visible. The two words “quote” and “/quote” must be enclosed in “” and “]” square bracket pairs, both of them. So their usage would be {quote}quoted text{/quote}, where the curly braces “{” and “}” have to be substituted by “” and “]” square brackets.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Here is one difficulty. Where do those metaphysical principles come from? Are they simply a deus ex machina, being imprinted onto our minds by some immaterial entity? If (another big IF here) that is what you assert, then you already presuppose an immaterial entity, the existence of which you ultimately wish to demonstrate. And that would be, of course, a logical error.

as i’ve noted before, mathematical truths are not subject to empirical verification - it is not only that they do not require such support, but many of them are actually incapable of it.

neither is your own assumption “all propositions must be capable of being empirically verified” itself capable of being empirically verified.

the a posteriori reasoning of the natural sciences attempts to reduce the possible to the actual; the (broadly speaking) a priori methodology of the formal sciences (e.g. math, logic, metaphysics, etc.) attempts to reduce the possible to the necessary. while empirical evidence is obviously critical for determining what there actually is in the world, no such evidence is probative for concluding what has to be in the world.

two kinds of knowledge, two kinds of knowledge acquisition.

the perennial problem is understanding not only how some truths can be necessary, but how a contingent being could grasp those truths…

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

as i’ve noted before, mathematical truths are not subject to empirical verification - it is not only that they do not require such support, but many of them are actually incapable of it.

Yes, but the exact sciences are axiomatically defined, and the axioms are in a sense “arbitrary”, all they have to be is free of internal contradictions. They are nothing, but elaborate mental constructs or complicated “games”. If one is satisfied with this, there is no problem. If, however, the results of those sciences are to be applied to physical reality, then they must satisfy one more criterion: their results cannot be contradicted by observation or verification.

As you say: the propositions of mathematics are not subject to empirical verification, however, their applications - if any - are. If the verification fails, and the logic of the deductive chain is correct, then we can say that the axioms used (while internally consistent) do not reflect a valid tool to investigate reality, even though they are still fine as an abstract mind-game.

A good example would be the game of chess. Its rules are arbitrary, it has no practical use, its rules are not subject to empirical verification.
john doran:

neither is your own assumption “all propositions must be capable of being empirically verified” itself capable of being empirically verified.

Empiricists do not say that: they only say that propositions which purportedly reflect the attributes of reality must be subject to empirical verification. Therefore there is no self-referential contradiction.

The difficulty in Dr. Bonnette’s position is that he wishes to establish that the materialist propositions about reality are incapable of explaining some aspect of reality, and he wishes to use only rational arguments starting from observation, without referring to faith as an epistemological tool.

The difficulty stems from the fact that starting from the observation of physical reality, and employing only rational arguments he must be able to show that some aspects of the physical reality require to step beyond this physical reality.

So he must prove that physical reality in insufficent unto itself and moreover he must use tools coming from physical reality to show its own inadequate nature. That is really a tall order. I am eagerly waiting the next installment.

The concept of “immaterial entities” should be the end result of such demonstration, therefore it cannot be presupposed. That is all I wanted to say. If you have time and are inclined to join the “fray”, I will be delighted.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen:

(concluding reply to your post #199)

You write: “Your differentiation of “living” and “non-living” entities is an arbitrary differentiation, a convenience. If you wish to argue along those lines, you must use biological means and draw a precise line what makes a being “alive”. Metaphysical first principles simply will not do - that would be what I called empty speculation. Once you can do that (which is highly improbable, since even biologists cannot reach a consensus), then you must prove that living substances have some immaterial attributes to them. And that is impossible, in my opinion.”

From my immediately prior posts you will properly expect that my reply is that this is NOT a problem to be resolved within the science of biology itself. While biology provides the data for the philosopher to examine, the philosopher applies the criteria of the distinction between “self-perfective” and “not self-perfective” of a “whole” to determine what is alive or not. Note that this applies both the principle of non-contradiction (taken from “being”), plus the arguments over what constitutes “substantial unity”, which in turn, entails the concept and defense of supra-atomic entities being “wholes,” in more than the sense of an “accidental” pattern. I do not mean to argue this matter here, but simply intend to show how and why the philosopher does not rely on the biologist to determine the matter of life, except in terms of providing the empirical data upon which the philosophical judgment is rendered.

You write: “That is not what I meant. Statements are meaningless if they operate on undefined and undefinable states of affairs. Time and causality are not defined outside the universe, the directions "east, “west” and “north” are not defined at the North Pole. The concept of “side” is not defined on a Moebius strip. Moreover, these attributes cannot be defined and that makes any utterance about them meaningless, not simply a lack of verification.”

My reply: I cannot critique what you meant, but the early 20th Century Logical Positivists held that “a statement is meaningful if and only if its terms are either directly or indirectly sense verifiable.” You may be able to define a term referring to an immaterial object, say God or soul, but if it itself was not sense verifiable, the statement in which it appeared was deemed to be meaningless. I had written that the Vienna Circle held, “Statements are meaningless if you cannot empirically verify their terms.” That is what they held and that is what I meant. Clearly, you are also correct in insisting that undefinable terms would render a statement meaningless, but that is not what I said.

You write: “Another question about “universal concepts”: do you mean “abstract concepts”?” All intellectual concepts are universal precisely because they abstract from particular matter. Thus “abstraction” from matter makes them “universal.”

Finally, you ask, “and how do you plan to substantiate that “living” entities have some “immaterial attribute” to them? “ I have already argued in prior posts that intellective activities are immaterial, thus the intellective soul of man would be strictly immaterial (spiritual). That would be sufficient to establish that we are working in a world with immaterial dimensions which your materialist worldview fails to grasp. That merely vegetative or sentient souls are also “immaterial” is more difficult to see for most people, but flows from the fact that souls are not physical things themselves, but simply the substantial forms of living things, merely principles of beings, and not complete physical beings themselves.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen,

Thank you for your suggestion about the quotes. I will try to follow them if I can figure them out. As for my time for replies, I am usually lucky if I can find fifteen minute interludes to address this thread. That is part of the reason my last reply was in three segments! None of this is your fault, but simply reflects my own time constaints. This is not how I like to do philosophy, since, if you read my books and articles, you will see a much “tighter” form of exposition. But such is the modern dilemma!

You write:

Here is one difficulty. Where do those metaphysical principles come from? Are they simply a deus ex machina, being imprinted onto our minds by some immaterial entity? If (another big IF here) that is what you assert, then you already presuppose an immaterial entity, the existence of which you ultimately wish to demonstrate. And that would be, of course, a logical error.

I presuppose nothing. This is simply how the mind works. The immateriality of the intellect is a conclusion of reasoning about its proper activities, not a presupposition. Because we form universal concepts, reason, judge, etc., and because examination of these activities reveals they exhibit properties not capable of extension in space, we can infer that they are produced by an immaterial intellective faculty, which, in turn, must belong to a spiritual soul. This answers your next point as well (which is not cited here).

You cite me:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr. Bonnette
Contrary to your assumption that a metaphysical law, such as causality, is based merely on countless repetitions of past experiences, Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy would say that we know that every effect requires a cause because the intellect grasps its object in terms of being – being, whose concept is formed the very first time we apprehend any object employing our intellect.

To which you reply:

This seems to confirm my suspicion that you assert some “inborn” or “objectively existing” intellect, which does not rely on sensory (name removed by moderator)ut or verification, rather simply exists independent of the mind. And that is just another hypothesis.

Indeed, the intellect is “inborn” in the sense that it is a property of the human intellective soul. But I do not presuppose it as a mere hypothesis. Rather, this is a conclusion of a lengthy philosophical analysis which proceeds from observing how we form concepts from sense experience. Aristotle always begins with sense experience, and then reasons to necessary conclusions based upon what is entailed in that sense experience AND our intellective response to that sense data. That is, from such sense data, we form universal concepts (e.g., from seeing a cow, we form the concept “mammal’), and from the properties of the concept, we realize that no concrete physical instance of a mammal would contain the non-concrete universality of the concept. From realizing that the concept cannot itself be physical, we realize that the intellective act which forms it must not be physical, which, in turn tells us that the intellective faculty that produces the act must not be physical, and this, in turn, tells us that the soul that has such a faculty must not be physical. You may argue against each step of this analysis, but I am just trying to show you how this process takes place without engaging in presuppositions about mere hypotheses.

You write:

Furthermore, your phrase “the very first time we apprehend any object employing our intellect” is nebulous and vague: “whose” intellect are you talking about? A caveman most probably did not have a mind sophisticated enough to grasp such a complicated idea that “something cannot come from nothing”.

Again, I do not assume, but argue to, an intellect. I am talking about EVERY person’s intellect, and we all have them. As for the “caveman,” we do not know what he may or may not have done directly because we were not there to ask him! Our conjectures about what he would or could have done are based upon inferences drawn from our present knowledge of human intellective activity and what that would imply for other human beings, including the putative “cavemen.”

Now to see if my attempts at better quoting worked! I can see that it worked somewhat, but the reader will have to carefully sort out who said what. No time to edit this further. Sorry.

 

[Hitetlen]

I am sure you will read my posts above directed to you and john doran, which present some of my objections.
Dr. Bonnette:

While biology provides the data for the philosopher to examine, the philosopher applies the criteria of the distinction between “self-perfective” and “not self-perfective” of a “whole” to determine what is alive or not.

I can point out a few problems. If you wish to circumvent the biological problems by defining “life” in a different fashion, that is acceptable - in principle. You posit a different definition, based on the biological reality, and attempt to generalize it without being bogged down in particulars. No problem with this, as I said, in principle. You wish to find the invariants, in complete harmony with the scientific approach.

My first objection is based upon the facts that your definition is too vague to be of much use. Notably: a snowflake or a crystal are “self-perfecting” phenomena, both use external “food” - water molecules (in the case of a snowflake) or atoms (in the case of some crystals) - to “perfect” or grow or even “repair” themselves. In your definiton they are both alive, they exhibit the one and only attribute you associate with life.

The other objection is about the phrase “self-perfecting”, which indicates that “life” is teleological in nature. Life has no external aim (telos) which is needed for its existence.

If you wish to use an abstract definition of life, here is one: a living organism actively attempts to maintain its homeostasis in changing conditions. That is true for all life-forms, both simple and complex. Simple life forms will try avoid unfavorable circumstances, more active life forms will actively attempt to modify their environments to suit their needs.

Even this definition cannot “prove” that a rock is not alive. A rock may be alive, but it has a long life span. One second of the rock’s life equals our whole life-span of 70-some years. To disprove it we must use empirical tools and show that its internal structure is too simple to be “alive”. But that would need biological means you wish to avoid. So the rock IS alive according to your definition.
Dr. Bonnette:

I had written that the Vienna Circle held, “Statements are meaningless if you cannot empirically verify their terms.” That is what they held and that is what I meant.

I responded to this objection in my post to john doran, but I will repeat it here: not all propositions are subject to empirical verification, only those which attempt to say something about reality. Mathematical propositions are not subject to this criterion, nor are propositions of any of the abstract sciences. With this caveat we avoid the self-referential contradiction which would be subject to a proposition as you quoted.
Dr. Bonnette:

You write: “Another question about “universal concepts”: do you mean “abstract concepts”?”

Sometimes these technical terms can be misleading and frustrating. The word “universal” strongly implies that these concepts are valid for everyone who is able to conceptualize abstract thoughts. That is simply not true, for example members of some “primitive” tribes are unable to conceptualize “past” or “future”, for them these concepts simply do not exist. I would prefer to use the phrase “abstract concepts” to avoid such possible misunderstanding.
Dr. Bonnette:

Finally, you ask, “and how do you plan to substantiate that “living” entities have some “immaterial attribute” to them? “ I have already argued in prior posts that intellective activities are immaterial, thus the intellective soul of man would be strictly immaterial (spiritual).

Yes, you argued, but that is far from sufficent. If you wish to establish that the hypothesis of “immaterial intellect” or “soul” should be even contemplated (not to mention accepted) you must prove that the mind, the electro-chemical product of the brain is insufficient to explain our powers of conceptualization. Moreover, you have to do that by starting from an empirical standpoint, and using reason as your tool, without referring to faith as an epistemological tool.
Dr. Bonnette:

That would be sufficient to establish that we are working in a world with immaterial dimensions which your materialist worldview fails to grasp.

Only if you could establish that your hypothesis of “immaterial intellect” is valid - that is it conforms with reality. Without a demonstration or proof the question does not even arise.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Yes, but the exact sciences are axiomatically defined, and the axioms are in a sense “arbitrary”, all they have to be is free of internal contradictions.

physical sciences are “axiomatically defined” also - every human epistemic enterprise begins with assumptions that are themselves simply stipulated. i’m not sure what you think you’re getting at here.

the propositions of both the natural and the formal sciences are true or false, which means that they do or do not correspond to the way things are…
Hitleten:

They are nothing, but elaborate mental constructs or complicated “games”. If one is satisfied with this, there is no problem. If, however, the results of those sciences are to be applied to physical reality, then they must satisfy one more criterion: their results cannot be contradicted by observation or verification.

again - as you say about formal sciences, “propositions of natural science cannot be contradicted by experience” is an axiom. how is this importantly different from the axioms of the formal sciences?

Hitetlen:

As you say: the propositions of mathematics are not subject to empirical verification, however, their applications - if any - are. If the verification fails, and the logic of the deductive chain is correct, then we can say that the axioms used (while internally consistent) do not reflect a valid tool to investigate reality, even though they are still fine as an abstract mind-game.

the use of math to describe the physical world is physics; the elaboration of mathematical truths to describe the mathematical world is called math. the only way i can know whether my physics is correct is by experimentation; but i can know whether my math is good without ever once conducting an experiment.

i don’t see how what you’re saying in any way contradicts what i’ve said.

Hitetlen:

Empiricists do not say that: they only say that propositions which purportedly reflect the attributes of reality must be subject to empirical verification. Therefore there is no self-referential contradiction.

well, unless you think that the proposition “propositions describing reality must be subject to empirical verification” is itself not a proposition describing reality, then there most definitely is a self-referential problem.

that is, presumably you believe that it is an attribute of reality that propositions describing that reality must be capable of empirical verification; which means, obviously, that the proposition used to decribe that aspect of reality must be capable of empirical verification. and it’s not.
Hitleten:

The difficulty in Dr. Bonnette’s position is that he wishes to establish that the materialist propositions about reality are incapable of explaining some aspect of reality, and he wishes to use only rational arguments starting from observation, without referring to faith as an epistemological tool.

The difficulty stems from the fact that starting from the observation of physical reality, and employing only rational arguments he must be able to show that some aspects of the physical reality require to step beyond this physical reality.

i don’t think this is exactly right: dr. bonnette is attempting to show that adherence to epistemological principles like “propositions about reality must be capable of empirical verification” is either self-defeating or arbitrary; either way, they are unhelpful.

i don’t know what you mean when you say something like “he must be able to show that some aspects of the physical reality require to step beyond this physical reality”, but it seems to me that all he is trying to do is demonstrate that your reasons for rejecting arguments the conclusions of which involve postulating non-empirically verifiable entities, are flawed.

Hitetlen:

So he must prove that physical reality in insufficent unto itself and moreover he must use tools coming from physical reality to show its own inadequate nature. That is really a tall order. I am eagerly waiting the next installment.

an entirely contingent universe is incapable of grounding belief in necessary truths; belief in the necessity of certain propositions (e.g. that 1+1=2 and cannot fail nor could not have failed to do so) is among our most deeply held convictions; ergo, an entirely contingent universe is inadequate as a description of the way we fundamentally perceive our universe to be.

that’s always been the main argument for abstract objects, an argument that, incidentally, famous atheists (like bertrand russell) have also used to ground their belief in the existence of such things.

 

[Hitetlen]

Unfortunately I have to get back to work, so only a quick and short reply for now:
john doran:

well, unless you think that the proposition “propositions describing reality must be subject to empirical verification” is itself not a proposition describing reality, then there most definitely is a self-referential problem.

But it is not. It is a proposition about epistemology, about the ways and means we gather knowledge about the world. If you prefer, it is a meta-epistemological utterance.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

But it is not. It is a proposition about epistemology, about the ways and means we gather knowledge about the world. If you prefer, it is a meta-epistemological utterance.

what do you mean by “the world” here? do you mean something different than “reality” in your original formulation of the principle? what did you mean by **that **word?

not that it matters: epistemology is a part of “reality” or “the world”, so you can’t avoid the self-reference by means of simple fiat like this.

look, the proposition “propositions describing reality/the world must be subject to empirical verification” is either a statement about all propositions, or a statement about only some of them.

if the former, then it is self-referentially falsified. but if the latter, then while it may or may not avoid self-defeat, it also fails to exclude from the sphere of legitimate knowledge precisely the kinds of propositions you are attempting to use it to exclude - namely propositions about non-empirically verifiable phenomena.

that is to say, if you limit the set of propositions to which your putative principle applies, then there are going to be an infinite number of propositions to which the principle does ***not ***apply, and which are none the worse for it: namely, the set of propositions about non-empirical entities, like abstract objects. which means, in turn, that you can’t use the former principle to invalidate the latter propositions.

but that is as may be. what do you think is wrong with propositions about non-empirical phenomena? are they meaningless? simply unknowable? what?

if you think they’re meaningless, why? is it because you think they fail of reference? and if so, why do you think that?

if unknowable, why are they unknowable? it can’t be just that knowledge can only be had of empirical phenomena, since we have knowledge of all kinds of non-empirical things (like your “meta-epistemological” principle)…

it seems to me that (as is so often the case) it’s hard to make progress because there is a whole constellation of tacit assumptions and discursions being made here…

 

[Ani_Ibi]

I accidentally came across this thread during a search. I thought some of the philosopher types might enjoy reviving the discussion.

 

[john_doran]

wow. i remember this one…a bit of a blow-out.

 

[freesoulhope]

I accidentally came across this thread during a search. I thought some of the philosopher types might enjoy reviving the discussion.

I remember this thread; especailly Hiterlen. Doctor bonette was a writer on the subject. I wish you was here when the thread was at its height.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

wow. i remember this one…a bit of a blow-out.

We could revive it. There are new folks now. We haven’t discussed artificial intelligence lately and I think it would be a great discussion. What say? Game?

Sheesh! Every time I look around my reading list gets longer. I wish there were more philosophy posters. Then we could just post on certain threads and let the others go. But I sort of feel responsible for helping get enough solid philosophy threads to justify a Philosophy Forum in the mods’ eyes.

I have the Chesterton article on Aquinas on one screen. And a B-0-meson article on another.

:crying: :crying: :crying: :crying: :crying:

 

[freesoulhope]

We could revive it. There are new folks now. We haven’t discussed artificial intelligence lately and I think it would be a great discussion. What say? Game?

I think we can program things to display an apperance of inteligence; however lets talk about what we can consider to be an artificail inteligence; and then we can figure out if such a thing is possible. For instance, would a machine with the thinking power of an ape be considered inteligent? Taking in to consideration that are most powerful computor cannot even compete with the brain power of an ant yet.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

I think we can program things to display an apperance of inteligence; however lets talk about what we can consider to be an artificail inteligence;

We’ll probably take a pit stop at intelligence somewhere along the line. I suspect the Aquinas guys might have something to say about consciousness and being, though. (That’s why I posted the thread on God’s personality. Bwa-ha-ha!) Let’s give them a chance to get home from work, eat dinner, and escape into the den.

 

[cpayne]

We’ll probably take a pit stop at intelligence somewhere along the line. I suspect the Aquinas guys might have something to say about consciousness and being, though. (That’s why I posted the thread on God’s personality. Bwa-ha-ha!) Let’s give them a chance to get home from work, eat dinner, and escape into the den.

Sort of funny–I came home from work, posted something on the God’s personality thread, and came over here. “The Aquinas guys.” We also have a secret handshake.

 

[cor]

Some computer software undoubtedly merely simulates intelligence, but what of the relatively new kinds of artificial intelligence – artificial neural networks which may exist as software on traditional computers or on special neural network hardware? If these eventually end up having a neural network structure that mirrors or corresponds with the structure of the human brain, then they might be suitable matter to which a soul could be united. OTOH they could end up being electronic zombies.

 

[Spiffs]

Let’s look at this from a different approach …

We now have the ability to create artificial limbs, artificial heart, etc.

No one would argue that someone with an artificial leg wasn’t human and didn’t have a soul. What about two artificial legs? What about two artificial legs and two artificial arms? What about in addition to the artificial limbs, the person also has an artificial heart? Again, I don’t think that we would say that the person wasn’t human and lacked a soul.

Eventually, it will be possible to replace just about every part of a person’s body with an artificial part. Suppose we get to the point where the ENTIRE body is replaced with artificial parts. Does that entity still have a soul? Why or why not? And if “not”, then at what point does the person lose the soul?

I imagine they would lose their soul when their body died from being replaced by incompatible artificial parts!

 

[edwest2]

The answer is no. Artificial Intelligence of a sort is possible, but if it can be made aware of itself it will know that it is artificial and not alive as human beings are alive. God would know that as well, and this thing did not come from God but is only an emulation device.

God bless,
Ed