Could artificial intelligence be granted a soul?

[vern_humphrey]

Hitetlen:

Excellent questions. The Turing test is fundamental in deciding if a “machine” is human or not.

For those who might not have heard of it, the test is a “long enough” conversation with this being, maybe via a telephone. If the answers are not distinguishable from those of a human, then the “being” on the other end of the telephone is human, no matter what material it is made of.

The Turing Test does not decide if a machine is human or not. The Turing Test is a measure of Artificial Intelligence.

(For those who don’t know, the Turing Test involves communicating with someone whom you can’t see and determining if you can tell whether that person is a human or a machine. It isn’t hard to write computer programs that will pass the Turing Test – at least for a while.)

We ought also to ask “What is artificial intelligence?” It is not human intelligence, and isn’t even similar to human intelligence.

Artificial intelligence basically means a computer program that can alter itself based on experience. Imagine a diagnostic program for an automobile mechanic. The program steps through the diagnostic process, and keeps statistical data on the results. Over time the machine learns that it is possible to predict the outcome of the diagnostic process based on the results of the first few steps – so it re-arranges the process to go straight to the defining step based on the results of the first few steps.

 

[freesoulhope]

vern humphrey:

The Turing Test does not decide if a machine is human or not. The Turing Test is a measure of Artificial Intelligence.

(For those who don’t know, the Turing Test involves communicating with someone whom you can’t see and determining if you can tell whether that person is a human or a machine. It isn’t hard to write computer programs that will pass the Turing Test – at least for a while.)

We ought also to ask “What is artificial intelligence?” It is not human intelligence, and isn’t even similar to human intelligence.

Artificial intelligence basically means a computer program that can alter itself based on experience. Imagine a diagnostic program for an automobile mechanic. The program steps through the diagnostic process, and keeps statistical data on the results. Over time the machine learns that it is possible to predict the outcome of the diagnostic process based on the results of the first few steps – so it re-arranges the process to go straight to the defining step based on the results of the first few steps.

Imagine?

 

[vern_humphrey]

freesoulhope:

Imagine?

If I picked a real one, someone would come along and demand I provide the source code. http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon10.gif

 

[Spyder1jcd]

whosebob:

Also, I would like to read your refelctions upon a mystery I mentioned in a previous post within this thread. How is it and why is it that man is the only species on the planet that creates art? From cave men to post-modern men, human persons have spent a great deal of time and effort enagaged in artistic works of all sorts.

Because man is the only species on this planet that has the intelligence and physical capabilities to depict something we see in our minds or in everyday life and has the soul to produce the emotion that the particular piece we want to create triggers.

In short, we’re the only species that can feel strongly enough to create a work of art and can actually have the ability to do it.

Perhaps a better question to ask would be whether or not producing an “emotional” work of art is an indication of the presence of a soul. For instance, if a robot produces a piece that has a sad tone to it (like the paintings from Picasso’s Blue Period), does that indicate that the robot is feeling the emotion of sadness? If so, does that mean it has a soul?

 

[freesoulhope]

If we found a ghost in a machine, we would be presented with a problem, with far reaching implications.

However, if God decided to put a soul in to a machine, we would not know about it unless he told us. So even then, nobody can know for sure where awareness comes from, on a scientific level.

 

[Spyder1jcd]

vern humphrey:

The Turing Test does not decide if a machine is human or not. The Turing Test is a measure of Artificial Intelligence.

(For those who don’t know, the Turing Test involves communicating with someone whom you can’t see and determining if you can tell whether that person is a human or a machine. It isn’t hard to write computer programs that will pass the Turing Test – at least for a while.)

We ought also to ask “What is artificial intelligence?” It is not human intelligence, and isn’t even similar to human intelligence.

Artificial intelligence basically means a computer program that can alter itself based on experience. Imagine a diagnostic program for an automobile mechanic. The program steps through the diagnostic process, and keeps statistical data on the results. Over time the machine learns that it is possible to predict the outcome of the diagnostic process based on the results of the first few steps – so it re-arranges the process to go straight to the defining step based on the results of the first few steps.

Turing himself said that he didn’t see why God could not grant a machine a soul if He so wished.

 

[whosebob]

Hitetlen:

Art is a very interesting subject, indeed. Those caveman created arts are very elaborate and beautiful. They are the expressions of conceputalization, of looking beyond the surface …

JMJ + OBT​

G.K. Chesterton reflected upon this matter in his book The Everlasting Man (may be read freely on-line), published in 1925:

But I have begun this story in the cave, like the cave of the speculations of Plato, because it is a sort of model of the mistake of merely evolutionary introductions and prefaces. It is useless to begin by saying that everything was slow and smooth and a mere matter of development and degree. For in the plain matter like the pictures there is in fact not a trace of any such development or degree. Monkeys did not begin pictures and men finish them; Pithecanthropus did not draw a reindeer badly and Homo Sapiens draw it well. The higher animals did not draw better and better portraits; the dog did not paint better in his best period than in his early bad manner as a jackal; the wild horse was not an Impressionist and the race-horse a Post-Impressionist. All we can say of this notion of reproducing things in shadow or representative shape is that it exists nowhere in nature except in man; and that we cannot even talk about it without treating man as something separate from nature. In other words, every sane sort of history must begin with man as man, a thing standing absolute and alone. How he came there, or indeed how anything else came there, is a thing for theologians and philosophers and scientists and not for historians. But an excellent test case of this isolation and mystery is the matter of the impulse of art. This creature was truly different from all other creatures; because he was a creator as well as a creature. Nothing in that sense could be made in any other image but the image of man. But the truth is so true that, even in the absence of any religious belief, it must be assumed in the form of some moral or metaphysical principle. In the next chapter we shall see how this principle applies to all the historical hypotheses and evolutionary ethics now in fashion; to the origins of tribal government or mythological belief. But the clearest and most convenient example to start with is this popular one of what the cave-man really did in his cave. It means that somehow or other a new thing had appeared in the cavernous night of nature, a mind that is like a mirror. It is like a mirror because it is truly a thing of reflection. It is like a mirror because in it alone all the other shapes can be seen like shining shadows in a vision. Above all, it is like a mirror because it is the only thing of its kind. Other things may resemble it or resemble each other in various ways; other things may excel it or excel each other in various ways; just as in the furniture of a room a table may be round like a mirror or a cupboard may be larger than a mirror. But the mirror is the only thing that can contain them all. Man is the microcosm; man is the measure of all things; man is the image of God. These are the only real lessons to be learnt in the cave, and it is time to leave it for the open road.

In Christ.

IC XC NIKA

 

[vern_humphrey]

Spyder1jcd:

Turing himself said that he didn’t see why God could not grant a machine a soul if He so wished.

Turning, however was hardly a Catholic scholar. So I wouldn’t take that comment as especially meaningful.

Turning also died at the very beginning of the electronic computer age. His vision of “artificial intelligence” was like early experimenters’ view of manned flight – birds flap their wings, so we should flap ours.

Artificial intelligence is nothing like human intelligence, and a long way from what Touring imagined what it would be.

 

[freesoulhope]

God has biological techonology!. Why would he put a ghost in a machine? It ant gonna happen, unless awarness itself, is a material phenomina, as a result of are genetic code, and the acumilation of infomation.

Then us Christians would have to say, that…

  "God was only speaking Symbolically about the soul"

Another compromise in the face of science.

 

[Ghosty]

I think I’m too Thomistic for this question. All I can think of is the idea that the soul is what “informs” a body what to be, and that beyond that we can’t delve too far into where the soul is located in the body. In my Thomistic mind, an A.I. would have a soul if it acted independently, grew, and sought its own personal desires, and its body would be whatever the A.I. controlled directly. It wouldn’t be “human”, though, but rather it would simply have an “A.I.” soul, just as dogs have dog souls, and lillies have lily souls. Whether an A.I. soul would be immortal like ours would remain a mystery without further revelation, however.

In short, I have no problem with the idea of A.I,'s having souls, I just don’t know what kind of soul it would have, or rather what qualities their souls possess.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

If an AI device is some sort of machine, such as an electronic computer, then it is not a single substantial unity, but rather an accidental unity of many composing parts. Since a soul is a unifying life principle that makes a thing a single substance, no material composite entity such as a computer could have a soul.

Moreover, it is a mistake to think of a soul as some sort of spirit conjoined to a body. That is the mistake of Rene Descartes. For him, man is not really one thing, but two – res extensiva or body, and res cogitativa or mind. Having a soul “run” an AI machine would be that sort of Cartesian entity. On the contrary, Aristotle and St. Thomas embrace the hylemorphic doctrine: matter and form, body and soul, constitute correlative metaphysical principles whose unity constitutes a single living organism. One being, two principles. For Descartes, two beings – mind and body. That is why Descartes, ironically, became the Father of modern materialism, since he made the body so distinct from the soul that no one could determine exactly how they were joined, and as science more and more understood the functions of the body, the soul seemed to be less and less essential to anything. That is why atomists see no need for a soul. But the organism is a single entity, body and soul unified into a single existential substantial unity, a being. Form activates and specifies and unifies matter to constitute a single living organism.

Incidentally, since soul is the substantial principle of life, all living things have souls. Man alone has a spiritual soul. Animals have sentient souls and plants have vegitative souls. If you doubt the usage, ask yourself what you find in a zoo. Animals. Zoo is taken from a Greek word meaning life, and animal is taken from the Latin, “anima,” meaning soul. So the zoo is the place where living things are found, the things with souls. Don’t ask me about plants.

Dr. Bonnette

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

While this is not a good forum to explain fully all the reasons why atomism is an inadequate explanation of reality, two objections stand out: (1) atomism fails to explain the existential unity of things above the atomic level, and (2) atomism fails to explain the strictly immaterial activities peculiar to the human intellective soul.

I don’t really know what you mean by “atomist”, I suspect that it is akin to “materialist”. Materialism explains just fine your first objection. It would really go far beyond the scope of this discussion, but suffice it to say that instead of some hazy “animating principle” we have the concept of “pattern” which is an excellent explanation. The properties of atoms do not explain the properties of molecules, because of the emerging attributes. Six carbon atoms can combine themselves in the shape of a hexagon (thus forming graphite) or they may form an octahedron (which results in a diamond). The same 6 atoms, arranged in a different pattern have fundamentally different attributes. As for the “immaterial” activities, I have no idea what you are talking about. If you mean “thoughts”, then you are mistaken. Our thoughts are the electro-chemical interactions of the neurons.
Dr. Bonnette:

If you are an atomist, you literally do not believe in your own existence.

This sounds like a joke. Our “essence” is our individual pattern on neural network.
Dr. Bonnette:

Atomism exists as a philosophy, but, if it is correct, atomists themselves do not exist. Think about it. If you take atomism seriously, nothing above atoms really exists.

Aha. So “atomism” is just a castrated materialism, not to be taken seriously. I don’t think anyone would subscribe to such a simplistic notion, just like no one can truly subscribe to solipsism.
Dr. Bonnette:

Just like shaking hands with your neighbor does not make you one being, so too, one atom donating one or more electrons to the outer orbit of another atom does not make them one thing, a molecule.

Poor chemists, they have no idea about this.

 

[Hitetlen]

vern humphrey:

The Turing Test does not decide if a machine is human or not. The Turing Test is a measure of Artificial Intelligence.

And, pray tell, what is the difference between “artificial” and “real” intelligence? If the results of a long conversation cannot decide if the other party is a machine or not, then we must assume that it has self-awareness. Our self-awareness cannot be put on a “scale” and measured if it is “real” enough. It is the result of the electric impulses in the brain, just like the electric impulses in the machine. There is no difference.

 

[kleary]

The soul is created by God. It is “something” granted to a “thing”.

A robot with AI cannot possibly have a soul because it is a thing created by man.

Only beings created by God have souls.

Ken

 

[Spyder1jcd]

Dr. Bonnette:

If an AI device is some sort of machine, such as an electronic computer, then it is not a single substantial unity, but rather an accidental unity of many composing parts. Since a soul is a unifying life principle that makes a thing a single substance, no material composite entity such as a computer could have a soul.

Moreover, it is a mistake to think of a soul as some sort of spirit conjoined to a body. That is the mistake of Rene Descartes. For him, man is not really one thing, but two – res extensiva or body, and res cogitativa or mind. Having a soul “run” an AI machine would be that sort of Cartesian entity. On the contrary, Aristotle and St. Thomas embrace the hylemorphic doctrine: matter and form, body and soul, constitute correlative metaphysical principles whose unity constitutes a single living organism. One being, two principles. For Descartes, two beings – mind and body. That is why Descartes, ironically, became the Father of modern materialism, since he made the body so distinct from the soul that no one could determine exactly how they were joined, and as science more and more understood the functions of the body, the soul seemed to be less and less essential to anything. That is why atomists see no need for a soul. But the organism is a single entity, body and soul unified into a single existential substantial unity, a being. Form activates and specifies and unifies matter to constitute a single living organism.

Incidentally, since soul is the substantial principle of life, all living things have souls. Man alone has a spiritual soul. Animals have sentient souls and plants have vegitative souls. If you doubt the usage, ask yourself what you find in a zoo. Animals. Zoo is taken from a Greek word meaning life, and animal is taken from the Latin, “anima,” meaning soul. So the zoo is the place where living things are found, the things with souls. Don’t ask me about plants.

Dr. Bonnette

But what exactly constitutes a living thing? So a battery keeps the machine alive instead of a beating heart. So a central processing unit takes the place of a brain. So cogs and wires and metal take the place of muscle and bone. Plants are comprised of different functional systems than those of a human, but they are both still alive. So what about the possiblity of a “mecha” soul?

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Hitetlen:

You correctly read “atomism” as another name for materialism. I use “atomism” simply because many people find it easier to grasp the central insight with this word, since “atoms” are understood as fundamental building blocks for material reality. (The fact they turned out not to be really ultimate need not concern us.) In response to my claim that “atomism fails to explain the existential unity of things above the atomic level,” you write: “Materialism explains just fine your first objection. It would really go far beyond the scope of this discussion, but suffice it to say that instead of some hazy “animating principle” we have the concept of “pattern” which is an excellent explanation.”

The problem with “pattern” is that it is simply what we call an accidental unity, not a substantial one. It is a mere arrangement of parts in a whole whose nature is not the parts, as an engine is an accidental unity of pistons, fuel injectors, wires, etc. The nature of these parts is not “engine,” whereas in a living thing, each and every part shares the same substantial nature, a nature that makes it one thing, not merely a composite of diverse natures. The term, “atomism,” reveals what is really being said by materialism, namely, that the parts retain their essential nature even when in a greater whole because the whole is simply the result of the arrangement of the parts. Hylemorphism and common sense tell us that real things above the atomic level exist and have their own nature which makes them a single substance, not just an arrangement of parts to which we give a convenient name. In short, pigs and men really do exist as things in their own right, not merely as names given to temporarily buffered solutions of atomic complexity. It once took me an entire hour to convince a materialist of my position. He finally admitted he didn’t exist. The disconcerting thing was that he persisted in arguing with me for some time thereafter. It is very difficult to argue with someone who isn’t there.

In response to my second claim that “atomism fails to explain the strictly immaterial activities peculiar to the human intellective soul,” you write: “As for the “immaterial” activities, I have no idea what you are talking about. If you mean “thoughts”, then you are mistaken. Our thoughts are the electro-chemical interactions of the neurons.”

I take you at your word that you have no idea what I am talking about. It is the standard materialist claim that thoughts are merely “electro-chemical interactions of the neurons.” The problem is that all physical reality is limited to determinate space-time coordinates. It is always this particular thing present in this place at this time with these specific physical properties. Abstract thought is quite the opposite. It is universal and prescinds from time and space and particular sensible qualities. Thus, as I said earlier, you can imagine “a man,” but you cannot imagine “humanity,” since “humanity” must apply to every possible human being throughout time, regardless of physical appearance. Particular electro-chemical interactions are just that, “particular.” The universal concept must not be confused with a common image, which is a concrete sensible image similar to other sensible images. Thus the image of a sheep bears sufficient likeness to all actual sheep to serve the predator well. But understanding the nature of sheep as sentient mammals is quite another matter. Similarly, you can imagine “a triangle,” but not “triangularity,” since the former is a particular triangle with this color, this shape, this size, etc. But triangularity must apply to every possible triangle, regardless of size, shape, color, etc. Recall, that triangles come in infinitely varied possible shapes, not all of which can be imagined simultaneously. In understanding the universal concept, the human intellect goes beyond particular physical sensible appearances and reaches to the universal intelligible essence of things, something entirely beyond the reach of “electro-chemical interactions of neurons.” This is analogous to the problem of thinking that words represent “pictures” in our heads. What “picture” do you have for the word, “word?” Or, disintermediation? Or, “the?” It is easy to imagine a horse when you say “horse.” But try to imagine “love” or “justice” or “inequality.” Plato made these points two millennia ago. I say nothing novel here.

I believe my response to your later points is implicit in the above.

Dr. Bonnette

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Spyder1jcd

Living things exhibit nutrition, growth, and reproduction. While one may joke that baby Volkswagons do not grow up into Cadillacs, and that two Cadillacs do not mate to produce a Volkswagon, the key insight is that living things are substantial unities that are self-perfective so as to maintain their own existence, whereas machines are merely accidental unities. In living things, all the parts act to serve the good of the whole. Again, the key insight is that there is a “whole” to be served, whereas the mere accidental unity of a machine is not a true whole, but a composite of substantially discrete parts which do not share the nature of the whole. See my previous posting to Hitetlen.

Dr. Bonnette

 

[whosebob]

Dr. Bonnette:

… the key insight is that there is a “whole” to be served, whereas the mere accidental unity of a machine is not a true whole, but a composite of substantially discrete parts which do not share the nature of the whole. See my previous posting to Hitetlen.

JMJ + OBT​

Thank you, Dr. Bonnette, I know we all really appreciate your generosity in crafting such careful and detailed responses.

Now …

[T]hen the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being. (Gen 2:7 [RSV])

So, what happened here? I mean, Scripture says God formed man from the dust AND then breathed life into his seemingly already formed nostrils. Should it be understood that the initial forming included the soul, in which case the “breath of life” is understood as the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Or did a “a composite of substantially discrete parts” (in this case water and lots of carbon compounds) become by the action of God something more, a substantial unity in the first man-creature?

If the latter, then why could God not choose to invisibly act upon a “a composite of substantially discrete parts” that a man had put together – perhaps an extremely advanced computer of similar physical capabilities as a man’s brain – thus making it into a substantial unity that could truly be understood to “have a soul?”

I’m not asking would He do it, but could He do it? And if so, what do you think would be evidence He had done so, absent a thundering voice from the heavens witnessing to that fact?

In the Hearts of Jesus and Mary.

IC XC NIKA

 

[freesoulhope]

Dr. Bonnette:

Moreover, it is a mistake to think of a soul as some sort of spirit conjoined to a body. That is the mistake of Rene Descartes. For him, man is not really one thing, but two – res extensiva or body, and res cogitativa or mind. Having a soul “run” an AI machine would be that sort of Cartesian entity. On the contrary, Aristotle and St. Thomas embrace the hylemorphic doctrine: matter and form, body and soul, constitute correlative metaphysical principles whose unity constitutes a single living organism. One being, two principles. For Descartes, two beings – mind and body. That is why Descartes, ironically, became the Father of modern materialism, since he made the body so distinct from the soul that no one could determine exactly how they were joined, and as science more and more understood the functions of the body, the soul seemed to be less and less essential to anything. That is why atomists see no need for a soul. But the organism is a single entity, body and soul unified into a single existential substantial unity, a being. Form activates and specifies and unifies matter to constitute a single living organism.

This is very Good, It is true what you say( or at least thats what i feel) it makes sense that bodys and souls are one entity, rather then two. The argument for the existense of a soul, is stronger from this veiw.
A.i. would have a A.i soul, but i doubt that it would be anymore aware then an inteligent animal unless it was given a ton of informaton, but even then, it would not conceive it or be able to think as we do about things and feel(emotion)anything about them.

Is emotion only a trait shared by humans?

 

[Hitetlen]

Dr. Bonnette:

The problem with “pattern” is that it is simply what we call an accidental unity, not a substantial one. It is a mere arrangement of parts in a whole whose nature is not the parts, as an engine is an accidental unity of pistons, fuel injectors, wires, etc.

This is totally irrelevant. I will prove it with one example: “Siamese twins”. Those poor unfortunate ones are really “united” as one functional unit. Do they have one soul, or two? Just think it over, and consider the different types of “joins”, from a small attachment, through the shared cardiovascular system all the way to partially joined brain.
Dr. Bonnette:

It once took me an entire hour to convince a materialist of my position. He finally admitted he didn’t exist.

That must have been a pretty dumb materialist.
Dr. Bonnette:

I take you at your word that you have no idea what I am talking about. It is the standard materialist claim that thoughts are merely “electro-chemical interactions of the neurons.”

Yes, they are, and they can be disturbed by introducing a few molecules of correctly selected chemicals into the brain.
Dr. Bonnette:

The universal concept must not be confused with a common image, which is a concrete sensible image similar to other sensible images.

And what is the difference? How does one “measure” it? Do you know that autistic people cannot imagine an abstract dog? When they hear the word “dog”, they recall all the dogs they have seen during their lifetime. Does that make them less human?
Dr. Bonnette:

Similarly, you can imagine “a triangle,” but not “triangularity,” since the former is a particular triangle with this color, this shape, this size, etc. But triangularity must apply to every possible triangle, regardless of size, shape, color, etc. Recall, that triangles come in infinitely varied possible shapes, not all of which can be imagined simultaneously. In understanding the universal concept, the human intellect goes beyond particular physical sensible appearances and reaches to the universal intelligible essence of things, something entirely beyond the reach of “electro-chemical interactions of neurons.”

Not true. As a mathematician I understand the abstract concepts just fine. You seem to confuse intellectual abstractions and conceptualizations with “visualizing” something. There is no way to visualize a tesseract, but I have no problem of understanding it.
Dr. Bonnette:

This is analogous to the problem of thinking that words represent “pictures” in our heads. What “picture” do you have for the word, “word?” Or, disintermediation? Or, “the?” It is easy to imagine a horse when you say “horse.” But try to imagine “love” or “justice” or “inequality.”

That is a very naive “picture” (pun intended). Words have no meanings in and by themselves, thet gain meaning in the context as understood by the reciever. This is most striking when considering “puns”, when the generally accepted meanings get “twisted” in an astonishing context.
Dr. Bonnette:

Plato made these points two millennia ago. I say nothing novel here.

Yes, he did, and his idea may have been novel back then, but they should not be taken seriously today. Just consider those poor Siamese twins.