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polytropos
Guest
The attitude is understandable, perhaps, in the sense that we can certainly understand why someone might tend to engage more with a discipline that has practical uses. But that it is understandable (ie. subsumable under a cognitive tendency or, if pathological, bias) does not imply that it is reasonable, since truth does not depend on utility. (One of my mathematics professors once remarked that she appreciated that in her job, she gets to spend her days proving theorems that have no practical application.)I think this attitude is entirely understandable given the enormous success of science and the enormous impotence of theology.
Science and theology both purport to be able to discern true statements from false ones. The difference is that the statements science discerns are useful, and make predictions about our everyday experience of the world. They allow the creation of such things as the computer you’re typing on, and the elimination of smallpox. The claims theology discerns, however, are never useful. No one has ever been cured by a theological finding; I can’t use theology to make a device to quickly thaw out my frozen dinner. Theology is fundamentally a study of things that do not make predictions about what we will perceive and experience. As such, there is no reason to take theological claims too seriously.
I find this to be very implausible. 20th century linguistic philosophy has been fairly productive, in my view, and I think it would be tough to say that it has not contributed to our knowledge about the world. (Obviously I think other philosophical subdisciplines have been productive as well, but they are more contentious.) Take Kripke’s insights about the nature of necessities for natural substances. I think there are qualifications and improvements that can be made about his theses, but their insights are valuable, and arguably without something like them, we would not have a proper understanding of some basic scientific findings. But they have consequences of ruling out certain other theories (in this case, mind-brain identity theory)–and those are certainly important insights about the world. (Though that insight is perhaps not new, since of course other arguments against mind-brain identity theory or for some other incompatible theory may have been sound prior to Kripke’s.)Armchair philosophizing is useful and has its place, but it has never taught us anything new and interesting about the world.