The Compendium of Social Doctrine states that this new opposition to the death penalty is a result of heightened moral awareness.What they are telling us is that they would prefer that capital punishment not be used because they see it as counter productive. They believe it is better for societies not to use it based on the outcomes they foresee and the negative influence they believe it has. Their position is arguably correct, and if it is then the good comes from making a right decision. It does not come from it being a morally superior choice.
Ender
The moral choice is the act producing (other things equal) the greater good.What they are telling us is that they would prefer that capital punishment not be used because they see it as counter productive. They believe it is better for societies not to use it based on the outcomes they foresee and the negative influence they believe it has. Their position is arguably correct, and if it is then the good comes from making a right decision. It does not come from it being a morally superior choice.
Ender
No, this is not accurate. The morality of an act is not determined by its outcome. If I act in a way I think is for the best and it turns out very badly, there is no sin involved. If I take the opposite action, however, believing it will end badly but it turns out for the best, I have in fact sinned. The act that produces the greater good is the better choice but it is not the more moral choice.The moral choice is the act producing (other things equal) the greater good.
Asserting that one believes it is true is not quite the same as demonstrating it to be true. I lean rather more toward this description of modern societies.*Bishop Mark Davies of Shrewsbury has said the disregard for human life in the western world today bears a resemblance to the Aztec practice of human sacrifice.The Compendium of Social Doctrine states that this new opposition to the death penalty is a result of heightened moral awareness.
Ender, I am not arguing proportionalism or consequentialism. If the Intention is good, and the moral object is good then the morality of an act comes down to the “balance of consequences”. Prudentai judgement may be required to gauge the consequences, and their balance.No, this is not accurate. The morality of an act is not determined by its outcome. If I act in a way I think is for the best and it turns out very badly, there is no sin involved. If I take the opposite action, however, believing it will end badly but it turns out for the best, I have in fact sinned. The act that produces the greater good is the better choice but it is not the more moral choice.
Ender
I am not aware that any country has identified 11/9/01 as the worst humanitarian disaster that the Popes had to consider in formulating their position on the death penalty. Can you tell me the name of any country that has done that?I’d be interested to know which third world country you come from that identified 11/9/01 as the worst humanitarian disaster that the Popes had to consider in formulating their position on the death penalty.
Agreed.I was just stating an objective fact which is that non Americans although horrified and shocked by that event, are aware that it is not the only horrible humanitarian tragedy that has happened on the globe.
Agreed.Others have occurred that have not garnered the same media coverage as that.
I disagree with this. If each of us does what we think is best even if your act turns out well and mine turns out badly there is no moral distinction between our acts. How can you say you are not arguing consequentialism if you judge the morality of an act by the consequences it produces?Ender, I am not arguing proportionalism or consequentialism. If the Intention is good, and the moral object is good then the morality of an act comes down to the “balance of consequences”.
There is judgment involved in deciding what consequences are likely but there is no sin involved in misjudging.Prudential judgement may be required to gauge the consequences, and their balance.
Of course it is prudential. The decision of what act to take is based on assumptions about the consequences the act will produce. If two people reach opposite conclusions and act according to their best judgment there is no moral distinction between their actions.The Popes argue (strenuously) that the balance of consequences favours bloodless means. One can say that is a prudential judgement, but if it is in fact the case, then morally, one ought to choose the bloodless means. That last step is not prudential.
We’ve demonstrated again and again that the Church addresses the death penalty within a moral framework. Moral progress traditionally changes laws incrementally like the gradual rejection of slavery and corporal punishment. A greater understanding of mans equality and innate dignity means we now regard those actions as morally indefensible even though we are able to understand how natural law supported them in a different time and place. The Church will eventually address the death penalty with the same clear moral rejection as she now addresses slavery as all Christian countries abandon it. It will clearly be seen as serving another ideology at odds with Christian teaching.I disagree with this. If each of us does what we think is best even if your act turns out well and mine turns out badly there is no moral distinction between our acts. How can you say you are not arguing consequentialism if you judge the morality of an act by the consequences it produces?
There is judgment involved in deciding what consequences are likely but there is no sin involved in misjudging.
Of course it is prudential. The decision of what act to take is based on assumptions about the consequences the act will produce. If two people reach opposite conclusions and act according to their best judgment there is no moral distinction between their actions.
You keep looking for a way to label your (and, clearly, the last few popes’) preference as the moral choice as against the opposite choice, but there is no valid way to make that distinction. Judgments may be accurate or inaccurate but they are not moral or immoral.
Ender
This comment has nothing whatever to do with the point Rau and I were discussing.We’ve demonstrated again and again that the Church addresses the death penalty within a moral framework.
There is nothing morally indefensible about capital punishment, it is not an offense against man’s dignity, and the church does not ban its use.A greater understanding of mans equality and innate dignity means we now regard those actions as morally indefensible even though we are able to understand how natural law supported them in a different time and place.
No, it won’t.*The death penalty is not intrinsically evil. Both Scripture and long Christian tradition acknowledge the legitimacy of capital punishment under certain circumstances. The Church cannot repudiate that without repudiating her own identity. *(Archbishop Chaput)The Church will eventually address the death penalty with the same clear moral rejection as she now addresses slavery as all Christian countries abandon it. It will clearly be seen as serving another ideology at odds with Christian teaching.
May a Catholic on a jury today vote for the death penalty? Or would it be a sin?The Popes argue (strenuously) that the balance of consequences favours bloodless means. One can say that is a prudential judgement, but if it is in fact the case, then morally, one ought to choose the bloodless means. That last step is not prudential.
Yes.May a Catholic on a jury today vote for the death penalty?
No.Or would it be a sin?
Correct, and I’ve said nothing in opposition to that.…If each of us does what we think is best even if your act turns out well and mine turns out badly there is no moral distinction between our acts.
I do not judge the morality of an act solely by its consequences - that would be wrong. All 3 fonts of morality need to be examined. If font 1 (Intention) and font 2 (moral object) are good [which we assume here] then the morality hangs on font 3. Font 3 is to be evaluated on the basis of a balance - in respect of consequences, on the balance of consequences. It is not unusual for font 3 to exhibit goods and evils. If the balance is good, the act is moral, if it is evil, the act is evil.How can you say you are not arguing consequentialism if you judge the morality of an act by the consequences it produces?
Correct.There is judgment involved in deciding what consequences are likely but there is no sin involved in misjudging. Of course it is prudential. The decision of what act to take is based on assumptions about the consequences the act will produce. If two people reach opposite conclusions and act according to their best judgment there is no moral distinction between their actions.
From a practical POV how would that apply to a Catholic sitting on a jury? Would it be a mortal sin to vote in favor of the death penalty if the balance finds more good in bloodless means?If the balance truly finds more good in bloodless means (and the actor ‘sees’ this), then morally, one ought to choose the bloodless means. This step is not prudential.
The bolded statement above really says no more than “capital punishment” is not intrinsically evil - which we know. Because it is not intrinsically evil (and assuming a good intention) the “defensibility” of an act of capital punishment hangs entirely on the “circumstances” (includes consequences). The Popes do argue that in the present age, most contemplated acts of capital punishment cannot be justified morally. From ccc2267:…There is nothing morally indefensible about capital punishment, it is not an offense against man’s dignity, and the church does not ban its use.
To knowingly and deliberately choose the greater evil is wrong. Bartholomew answered a slightly different question above. He too answered correctly.From a practical POV how would that apply to a Catholic sitting on a jury? Would it be a mortal sin to vote in favor of the death penalty if the balance finds more good in bloodless means?
Thank you, Rau. I confess that I hadn’t been expecting an unqualified endorsement from you. I thought your vote would probably go the other way.To knowingly and deliberately choose the greater evil is wrong. Bartholomew answered a slightly different question above. He too answered correctly.
No worries, it is important to note the differences on Tom’s 2 questions. The one you answered imposed far less constraints.Thank you, Rau. I confess that I hadn’t been expecting an unqualified endorsement from you. I thought your vote would probably go the other way.
Kind regards
Bart
You wouldn’t be on the jury to begin with. Before they seat you as juror they ask if you would be able to sentence a person to death if it is a death penalty case. It would be immoral to say you can if you can’t. No it would not be a mortal sin to vote for the death penalty.From a practical POV how would that apply to a Catholic sitting on a jury? Would it be a mortal sin to vote in favor of the death penalty if the balance finds more good in bloodless means?
This is a curious statement. I didn’t know that you could choose one evil over another? What evils do you mean? The Pope has said that life imprisonment is a death penalty and should be eliminated. Is that what you meant by choosing a greater evil?To knowingly and deliberately choose the greater evil is wrong. Bartholomew answered a slightly different question above. He too answered correctly.