Death penalty question

[Rau]

This is a curious statement. I didn’t know that you could choose one evil over another? What evils do you mean? The Pope has said that life imprisonment is a death penalty and should be eliminated. Is that what you meant by choosing a greater evil?

We speak of two alternative acts, both with good in the first two fonts, but with a different mix of good and bad in the consequences (3rd font). If the balance in the 3rd font is evil, the act is immoral. If the balance in the 3rd font is good, the act is moral. If two acts have the same goods in the 3rd font, but one has a greater evil than another, one ought choose the one with the lesser evil. The death of a person resulting from an act is always a “negative” (bad outcome) in the 3rd font, to be weighed against the goods in the 3rd font. Of course, we only get to this point after determining fonts 1 and 2 are good.

 

[Tomdstone]

The Pope has said that life imprisonment is a death penalty and should be eliminated.

Does that mean a Catholic on a jury is committing a mortal sin if she votes for life imprisonment?

 

[Rau]

Does that mean a Catholic on a jury is committing a mortal sin if she votes for life imprisonment?

No.

 

[LongingSoul]

There is judgment involved in deciding what consequences are likely but there is no sin involved in misjudging. Of course it is prudential. The decision of what act to take is based on assumptions about the consequences the act will produce. If two people reach opposite conclusions and act according to their best judgment there is no moral distinction between their actions.

Agree. Enders basic point of divergence from Catholic philosophy is demonstrated in asserting that two people both making ‘prudential judgements’ ie. the Catholic Church and Ender… can be equally right. That is a wholly secular atheistic premise.

The Church describes the virtue of prudence as…

Prudence makes it possible to make decisions that are consistent, and to make them with realism and a sense of responsibility for the consequences of one’s action. The rather widespread opinion that equates prudence with shrewdness, with utilitarian calculations, with diffidence or with timidity or indecision, is far from the correct understanding of this virtue. It is a characteristic of practical reason and offers assistance in deciding with wisdom and courage the course of action that should be followed, becoming the measure of the other virtues. Prudence affirms the good as a duty and shows in what manner the person should accomplish it[1146]. In the final analysis, it is a virtue that requires the mature exercise of thought and responsibility in an objective understanding of a specific situation and in making decisions according to a correct will[1147].- Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church 548

Prudence ‘is a characteristic of practical reason and offers assistance in deciding with wisdom and courage…’. It ‘affirms the good as a duty and shows in what manner the person should accomplish it.’

So ‘prudence’ assumes that the good is knowable through practical reason and can find an accord with the practical reasoning of others.

When the Church, the guardian and teacher on faith and morals, makes a judgement on something consolidated by the communion of the Pope with the Cardinals and Bishops conferences of the world… acknowledging openly that the movement originating with the people of world is good and just… that’s genuine prudence at work. It’s very secular to try and claim that ‘prudential judgement’ can be claimed by any Tom, Dick or Harry, with equal validity and that if Tom and Dick have opposite judgements… that both are right and bear no responsibility for any injustice that occurs.

 

[Ender]

I do not judge the morality of an act solely by its consequences - that would be wrong. All 3 fonts of morality need to be examined. If font 1 (Intention) and font 2 (moral object) are good [which we assume here] then the morality hangs on font 3. Font 3 is to be evaluated on the basis of a balance - in respect of consequences, on the balance of consequences. It is not unusual for font 3 to exhibit goods and evils. If the balance is good, the act is moral, if it is evil, the act is evil.

We agree about fonts 1 and 2, just not about 3. First, font 3 is about all of the circumstances surrounding the act, not just the consequences, and the circumstances are secondary and do not change the moral nature of the act, regardless of whether the consequences are good or bad.Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; (CCC 1754)

The Popes argue (strenuously) that the balance of consequences [in the present age] favours bloodless means. One can say that is a prudential judgement.

This assuredly is true.

If the balance truly finds more good in bloodless means (and the actor ‘sees’ this), then morally, one ought to choose the bloodless means. This step is not prudential.

It should be obvious that one cannot know the consequences of an act prior to committing it. We make an assumption about how something will turn out, but we do not know, and disagreements about the probable consequences are valid. Clearly I have an obligation to do what I think is right, but I am under no obligation to agree with someone else’s opinion about what that is. The choice is entirely prudential; there is no moral aspect to it.

Ender

 

[Ender]

The bolded statement above really says no more than “capital punishment” is not intrinsically evil - which we know. Because it is not intrinsically evil (and assuming a good intention) the “defensibility” of an act of capital punishment hangs entirely on the “circumstances” (includes consequences). The Popes do argue that in the present age, most contemplated acts of capital punishment cannot be justified morally. From ccc2267:"If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person. "

You cannot logically say both that capital punishment is not intrinsically evil and that it cannot be justified morally. If the latter is true, the former is false. You are taking the prudential judgment of the popes too far and trying to turn a practical objection into a moral condemnation. The advisability of using capital punishment is choice based on a perception of the probable outcome. That is not a moral choice because there is no moral question involved.

Ender

 

[Rau]

We agree about fonts 1 and 2, just not about 3. First, font 3 is about all of the circumstances surrounding the act, not just the consequences, and the circumstances are secondary and do not change the moral nature of the act, regardless of whether the consequences are good or bad.Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; (CCC 1754)

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.

We must consider circumstances in choosing among alternative acts.

I hesitate to refer to Conte, but in this material he is correct:
ronconte.wordpress.com/2010/12/04/ethics-101-the-three-fonts-of-morality/

 

[Ender]

So ‘prudence’ assumes that the good is knowable through practical reason and can find an accord with the practical reasoning of others.

That this is an absurdity can be confirmed by talking to any parent, who will admit to agonizing about making the right choices for their children. They will assure you that the good is absolutely not knowable. Prudence can offer you nothing more than the assurance your choice will be reasonable; it cannot assure you your choice will work out for the best.

Ender

 

[Ender]

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.

We must consider circumstances in choosing among alternative acts.

Of course we must; that wasn’t the point. The point is that the outcome cannot be known ahead of time, and if my act is not immoral (font 1) and my intentions are for the best (font 2) then my act is moral regardless of how it turns out. This is what the church teaches; I am saying nothing more than was written in the catechism.Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves.
Your assertion that the consequences can determine the moral nature of an act is in error.

Ender

 

[LongingSoul]

That this is an absurdity can be confirmed by talking to any parent, who will admit to agonizing about making the right choices for their children. They will assure you that the good is absolutely not knowable. Prudence can offer you nothing more than the assurance your choice will be reasonable; it cannot assure you your choice will work out for the best.

Ender

You are conflating prudential judgement with personal preference or opinion and they are apples and oranges. We are discussing a situation where a consequence has to be very strictly purposeful in regard to the common good in order for it to be justified by positive results for the community because the basic consequence is the death of a human being. That’s not the same as making benign choices without harmful consequences. When it comes to a parent choosing punishment for their children, there have been increasing restrictions on the degree of physical harm a parent can inflict. That is due to the growing awareness of the dignity of the child. In 1915 it would not be unusual to see a child with bruises and welt marks as a result of corporal punishment. Today, the Department of Childrens Services would be on your doorstep if you make this choice of punishment. The biblical defense ‘spare the rod, spoil the child’, is weighed very much with the rights and dignity of the child due to the moral progress we have made concerning children.

Prudence is a virtue ‘characteristic of practical reason’ and that presumes a mature and informed conscience that can be appreciated by all those who strive for godliness.

 

[Rau]

Of course we must; that wasn’t the point. The point is that the outcome cannot be known ahead of time, and if my act is not immoral (font 1) and my intentions are for the best (font 2) then my act is moral regardless of how it turns out. This is what the church teaches; I am saying nothing more than was written in the catechism.Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves.
Your assertion that the consequences can determine the moral nature of an act is in error.

Ender

It is easier for me to refer you to written material as I am using a phone to type:
ronconte.wordpress.com/2015/01/08/reasonably-anticipated-consequences-can-make-an-act-immoral/

It should be clear that scts producing more evil than good are to be avoided. However, the point we were discussing was not necessarily with s balance of evil in the consequences, but how to choose between acts with the same goods but differing evils in the consequences. On what basis would one choose the path with additional evil?

The only consequences relevant for the 3rd font are those which are reasonably anticipated.

 

[Rau]

…Your assertion that the consequences can determine the moral nature of an act is in error.

Would it be moral for a pregnant woman to treat some minor medical condition with a drug known to be dangerous to the unborn child? Of course not. The Consequences matter and have determined the morality of the act.

Note that circumstances cannot cause a bad act to become “ok”. But they can render an otherwise ok act bad.

 

[Tomdstone]

Note that circumstances cannot cause a bad act to become “ok”. .

Disagree.
There is a commandment Thou shalt not kill. But if you are a soldier in war defending your country, those circumstances could render some types of killing “ok”. Similarly, there is a commandment Honor thy father and thy mother. So it is wrong to dishonor them under most circumstances. But if your father and mother were criminals and were about to commit a terrible crime harming innocent people, under those circumstances the bad act of dishonoring them by reporting them to the police, could become “ok”. And there is a commandment Thou shalt not steal. So it is bad to steal. But if you and your family are starving to death and are dying of thirst, if you stole a cup of water and a slice of bread from a rich multibillionaire in order to keep your family alive, the circumstances would cause the bad act of stealing to become “ok”…

 

[Rau]

Disagree.
There is a commandment Thou shalt not kill. But if you are a soldier in war defending your country, those circumstances could render some types of killing “ok”. Similarly, there is a commandment Honor thy father and thy mother. So it is wrong to dishonor them under most circumstances. But if your father and mother were criminals and were about to commit a terrible crime harming innocent people, under those circumstances the bad act of dishonoring them by reporting them to the police, could become “ok”. And there is a commandment Thou shalt not steal. So it is bad to steal. But if you and your family are starving to death and are dying of thirst, if you stole a cup of water and a slice of bread from a rich multibillionaire in order to keep your family alive, the circumstances would cause the bad act of stealing to become “ok”…

Self defence and defence of others are not bad acts Tom. A bad act, in the context of my prior post has a bad moral object or a bad Intention. Circumstances will not remediate such an Act. Your error is mis-characterizing the moral object of certain real-works acts. They are not bad.

 

[Tomdstone]

Your error is mis-characterizing the moral object of certain real-works acts. They are not bad.

The act of stealing is not bad?

 

[Rau]

The act of stealing is not bad?

That’s the wrong question, since we both know and agree on the answer.

The question is - what is “stealing”? Often, the definition of an act in terms of morality is not the same as its secular or legal definition. Stealing is intrinsically evil, but if the act is not properly defined as stealing, then it may be moral, even if it is certainly stealing under a mere legal or secular definition. In such cases, the act is called expropriation, not stealing.

For example, if you and your family are starving, and a wealthy person nearby has an excess of food, then it may be moral for you to take what you need from them, without harming them, without depriving them of any necessities, so that you and your family can survive. This would be stealing under any legal or secular definition. But the Church teaches that the goods of this world belong first to God, and that these goods are intended by God for the good of all. And so, in certain cases, an act of **taking the necessities of life from someone who has an excess **is not defined as stealing in moral terms, and may be morally permissible.

There are many analogues to this. For example, killing an assailant is not necessarily murder, though the physical act (wielding the knife, pulling the trigger) may be identical in both cases.

In judging the morality of external acts, we must be careful to properly define the act in terms of morality, and not in terms of a secular or legal definition.

And also here is what the Church teaches in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

2452 The goods of creation are destined for the entire human race. The right to private property does not abolish the universal destination of goods.

2403 The right to private property, acquired or received in a just way, does not do away with the original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind. The universal destination of goods remains primordial, even if the promotion of the common good requires respect for the right to private property and its exercise.

Here is how theft is defined by the Church in the Catechism…

2453 The seventh commandment forbids theft. Theft is the usurpation of another’s goods against the reasonable will of the owner.

and here is the clincher for you from the Catechism

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a7.htm

I suggest we leave it there lest the thread wander off-track.

 

[Rau]

Ender, you quoted the Catechism earlier, thusly:

*Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves.*This does not mean that Circumstances don’t affect morality. The example I gave you above demonstrates that adequately I think. It means that the Circumstances don’t alter the “moral species” of the act. As per Veritatis Splendor:

*“The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.” *
First , it should be noted that the Pope is speaking in a context where he is at pains to point out that intrinsically evil acts can’t be made good by virtue of intentions / circumstances. Second, note that the moral species of an intrinsically evil act is what makes it irredeemably immoral. The moral species may condemn an act as immoral, but it cannot guarantee it as morally good.

Not surprisingly, the remainder of the sentence, from which you quoted partially, will serve to make the meaning of the first part clearer:

*Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. *

The underlined portion gets to the heart of the meaning of the reference to “moral quality”. This is the same point made by the Pope in VS. In this respect, Circumstances are not different than Intentions - they can’t change the moral species.

As the Catechism also says, Circumstances do also contribute in a secondary way to “rating” the morality / immorality of an act:

*They [Circumstances] contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). *

 

[Tomdstone]

That’s the wrong question, since we both know and agree on the answer.

The question is - what is “stealing”? Often, the definition of an act in terms of morality is not the same as its secular or legal definition. Stealing is intrinsically evil, but if the act is not properly defined as stealing, then it may be moral, even if it is certainly stealing under a mere legal or secular definition. In such cases, the act is called expropriation, not stealing.

For example, if you and your family are starving, and a wealthy person nearby has an excess of food, then it may be moral for you to take what you need from them, without harming them, without depriving them of any necessities, so that you and your family can survive. This would be stealing under any legal or secular definition. But the Church teaches that the goods of this world belong first to God, and that these goods are intended by God for the good of all. And so, in certain cases, an act of **taking the necessities of life from someone who has an excess **is not defined as stealing in moral terms, and may be morally permissible.

There are many analogues to this. For example, killing an assailant is not necessarily murder, though the physical act (wielding the knife, pulling the trigger) may be identical in both cases.

In judging the morality of external acts, we must be careful to properly define the act in terms of morality, and not in terms of a secular or legal definition.

And also here is what the Church teaches in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

2452 The goods of creation are destined for the entire human race. The right to private property does not abolish the universal destination of goods.

2403 The right to private property, acquired or received in a just way, does not do away with the original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind. The universal destination of goods remains primordial, even if the promotion of the common good requires respect for the right to private property and its exercise.

Here is how theft is defined by the Church in the Catechism…

2453 The seventh commandment forbids theft. Theft is the usurpation of another’s goods against the reasonable will of the owner.

and here is the clincher for you from the Catechism

2408 The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner. There is no theft if consent can be presumed or if refusal is contrary to reason and the universal destination of goods. This is the case in obvious and urgent necessity when the only way to provide for immediate, essential needs (food, shelter, clothing . . .) is to put at one’s disposal and use the property of others.

vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a7.htm

I suggest we leave it there lest the thread wander off-track.

Actually, stealing, killing people and dishonoring your parents are all bad. However, the circumstances can make these bad things “ok”.

 

[Rau]

Actually, stealing, killing people and dishonoring your parents are all bad. However, the circumstances can make these bad things “ok”.

Yes they are, but Circumstances cannot change the moral species of an act.

As we have discovered in the past Tom, you draw on your own special brand of moral Theology, and are quite unwilling to think through and understand the Catholic principles.

 

[Ender]

You are conflating prudential judgement with personal preference or opinion and they are apples and oranges.

No, I’m not. I am talking about decision making. We make choices based on the consequences we anticipate will result from them, but we cannot know those consequences ahead of time and our choices do not always turn out like we hope. The only point I’m making here is that, contrary to Rau’s assertion, a harmful outcome does not make an action immoral. This is true of all choices and all outcomes, whether I am on a jury deciding whether or not to vote for the death penalty or a parent deciding whether my son is old enough to cross the road by himself.

One cannot make serious decisions without due consideration and caution, but making a prudent decision is no guarantee that it is the right decision, and there is no sin involved if it turns out badly.

Ender