Demanding Evidence

[Syntax]

thats what bertrand russel said about it 70 years ago.

im not sure why the “new atheists” think that it has changed.

That’s right. I forgot about that. I think Wittgenstein said something similar.

I feel like the purpose of many people’s posts is to advance a certain web-structure of ideology instead of critically thinking about particular arguments. This is evident when they make small assumptions in numerously different fields and allow the consequences of these assumptions to converge on one conclusion. And they take that as having demonstrated a very narrow particular thesis which requires much more thought than the person is willing to give it. Reading most of these responses is more like reading the back-cover of a book than a collective series of well-demonstrated arguments that are essential for understanding the big picture. We have to start with the small and narrow to make sense of the big-picture; instead, I see people using the big-picture to make sense of the small. For example, if the verification/falsibity criterion of meaning and existence is absurd to start, just as we’ve demonstrated, the assumption upon which people build their entire edifice comes crashing down.
It’s really frustrating for an analytic philosopher like myself in the style of Russell, Carnap, Hempel, and Frege to filter through those posts which fail to employ detailed precision, focus, and critical thinking on the narrow sub-topics which are consistently glossed over.

 

[Leela]

“Knowledge comes from sense-experience” **is not **self-refuting.
“Knowledge only comes from sense-experience” is self-refuting.

You must notice that the latter pretends to be a knowledge claim itself, namely about the *only *source of knowledge. So it is strictly excluding the possibility of non-experiential knowledge. But how can this claim be consistently applied to non-experiential situations when it itself says that knowledge only comes from experience? It can’t restrict the domain of knowledge to experiential situations while simultaneously being a claim about non-experiential situations.

First of all, I should say that the sort of empiricism I personally subscribe to is not the “sense data” empiricism but the radical empiricism of James. So I don’t know what “non-experiential situations” could be like. If something is not at least a potential experience, then it is not a situation. So for me, “non-experiential situations” is meaningless term.

Asserting that (1.) “knowledge only comes from experience” is true is different from asserting that (2.) “I know that knowledge comes from experience” is true. The first statement has no inherent contradiction that I can see. You seem to be taking issue with the second assertion, and I think I understand your objection. If knowledge is justified true belief, then (1.) may indeed be true but it cannot be justified so we can’t claim 2.

However, we don’t need to verify it for it to be justified. If we have no good reason to think that it is not true, then holding it is to hold a justified belief.

Also, thanks for making the case that WPS kept refusing to provide for us. He seemed to think that if he kept making the same assertion in different colors the argument that he kept refusing to make would occur to us on our own. He could really use an interpreter, and I’m glad you were willing to step in.

I already addressed this specific example. As I recall, I think then you said that we needed to stick to numbers.

**A priori **

knowledge. E.g., mathematics, geometry, ethics, philosophy.

If we didn’t experience such things, there would be no reason to talk about them and no way to talk about them.

 

[Leela]

I feel like the purpose of many people’s posts is to advance a certain web-structure of ideology instead of critically thinking about particular arguments. This is evident when they make small assumptions in numerously different fields and allow the consequences of these assumptions to converge on one conclusion.

Wasn’t it your own Aquinas who said, whenever you reach a contradiction, make a distinction? That dictum shows just how easy it is to create a self-consistent philosophical system. They are a dime a dozen. You seem to be concerned with find the one true philosophical system. Whatever criteria you use to compare the available options, it seems that self-consistency can’t be one of them.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

Here’s what’s even more humorous:

The claim might just be true. The problem is that no one can consistently claim that it is. Nor can anyone know it. So it is an absurd belief to boot.

I’m beginning to suspect that you may be a brain in a vat. Are you?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

That’s right. I forgot about that. I think Wittgenstein said something similar.

I feel like the purpose of many people’s posts is to advance a certain web-structure of ideology instead of critically thinking about particular arguments. This is evident when they make small assumptions in numerously different fields and allow the consequences of these assumptions to converge on one conclusion. And they take that as having demonstrated a very narrow particular thesis which requires much more thought than the person is willing to give it. Reading most of these responses is more like reading the back-cover of a book than a collective series of well-demonstrated arguments that are essential for understanding the big picture. We have to start with the small and narrow to make sense of the big-picture; instead, I see people using the big-picture to make sense of the small.

youre right. we arent practicing ivory tower philosophy. this is the rough and tumble. it is a fight for the hearts and souls of men. its not perfect, but i find a certain satisfaction that the marketplace of ideas is alive and well. from that struggle we develop not the truths of philosophers, but the truths of the common man, things that men need to know to think critically, and arrive at a conclusion most beneficial to his soul.

For example, if the verification/falsibity criterion of meaning and existence is absurd to start, just as we’ve demonstrated, the assumption upon which people build their entire edifice comes crashing down.

which is why i am so adamant on the subject. the people who post here are largely vested in their beliefs. they would rather accept a logical contradiction than lose their cherished belief. we arent likely to change their minds in the short term. but the people who watch, the lurkers, other posters, and fellow theists arent stupid. they are aware of the import of the demonstration. so if even 1 person sees these words, and as a consequence is armed against the facile arguments of disbelief. then i am quite happy to spend time doing this.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Also, thanks for making the case that WPS kept refusing to provide for us. He seemed to think that if he kept making the same assertion in different colors the argument that he kept refusing to make would occur to us on our own. He could really use an interpreter, and I’m glad you were willing to step in.

i did not make an assertion, i demonstrated a logical contradiction. several times. it simply never struck you as a logical contradiction, much less as to the import of that contradiction, though it is not a new idea at all.

lets not lay the blame for that at my feet.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Wasn’t it your own Aquinas who said, whenever you reach a contradiction, make a distinction? That dictum shows just how easy it is to create a self-consistent philosophical system. They are a dime a dozen. You seem to be concerned with find the one true philosophical system. Whatever criteria you use to compare the available options, it seems that self-consistency can’t be one of them.

Best,
Leela

well, now that you have seen the inconsistency of your argument, whaddaya think?

 

[Leela]

i did not make an assertion, i demonstrated a logical contradiction. several times. it simply never struck you as a logical contradiction, much less as to the import of that contradiction, though it is not a new idea at all.

lets not lay the blame for that at my feet.

As I said to Syntax, it isn’t a logical contradiction unless you also hold that the only way to justify a claim is through verification/falsifiability.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I’m beginning to suspect that you may be a brain in a vat. Are you?

was the famous atheist, bertrand russell? he had the same thing to say about empiricism.

 

[Leela]

was the famous atheist, bertrand russell? he had the same thing to say about empiricism.

Was what who? WPS, it is just impossible to figure out what you are ever trying to say. Maybe Syntax can translate again.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

As I said to Syntax, it isn’t a logical contradiction unless you also hold that the only way to justify a claim is through verification/falsifiability.

then please tell me how else might an atheistic materialist might verify a claim? im pretty sure the standard is empirical evidence.

are you not an atheist materialist? if not then on what grounds do you deny the existence of G-d?

we can start with Coplestons heirarchical causality.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Was what who? WPS, it is just impossible to figure out what you are ever trying to say. Maybe Syntax can translate again.

well, if you cant beat them, say that you dont understand them.

bertrand russell, a very famous atheist of the early twentieth century had the same thing to say about empiricism, that Syntax said.

you dont seem to like what he said about the absurdity of empiricism. yet a famous atheist, bertrand russel, said the same thing.

even i would take russells word in this case.

 

[Syntax]

First of all, I should say that the sort of empiricism I personally subscribe to is not the “sense data” empiricism but the radical empiricism of James. So I don’t know what “non-experiential situations” could be like. If something is not at least a potential experience, then it is not a situation. So for me, “non-experiential situations” is meaningless term.

Asserting that (1.) “knowledge only comes from experience” is true is different from asserting that (2.) “I know that knowledge comes from experience” is true. The first statement has no inherent contradiction that I can see. You seem to be taking issue with the second assertion, and I think I understand your objection. If knowledge is justified true belief, then (1.) may indeed be true but it cannot be justified so we can’t claim 2.

However, we don’t need to verify it for it to be justified. If we have no good reason to think that it is not true, then holding it is to hold a justified belief.

There you go again, defining terms to suit your own purposes. We were all explicitly talking about sense-experience, not the colloquial “inner personal experience” you are referring to. Our argument still holds.

Further, you missed the point of the argument. The demonstration wasn’t merely that the claim “Knowledge only comes from sense-experience” had no justification (though that’s the result), but even more, that it is self-undermining. It is not merely claiming that knowledge comes from sense-experience, but also that no knowledge comes from non-sensory experience–that’s the purpose of the “only” restriction it mentions. But here’s where it is self-underming: the *claim **itself ***is an explicitly non-sensory claim, namely about non-sensory knowledge. So it can’t be said to be true since the very content of its claim is that no non-sensory knowledge is possible! So it can’t even hold as a basic belief upon which to rest other beliefs since the belief itself is absurd. So not only does one lack justification for believing it, even further, the claim itself is self-undermining.

I already addressed this specific example. As I recall, I think then you said that we needed to stick to numbers.

You can insist all you want, Leela, that when I say “Jeff is a bachelor” I am actually saying “Jeff is a bacehlor like other men, so bachelor is a relation.”

But in virtue of the obvious differences in meaning of the two statements, I’ll just disagree: When I say “Jeff is a bachelor” I mean precisely what I say that I mean, namely, Jeff is a bachelor. You can contradict what I am claiming I mean when I utter the predication all you want, but I really don’t believe you have a priviledged access to my own intentions that I don’t. So your view is *prima facie *absurd, especially without an argument to support it. .

If we didn’t experience such things, there would be no reason to talk about them and no way to talk about them.

duh.

 

[Touchstone]

Sed contra, take the example the novel experience of space travel. The Soviet Cosmonaut Gagarin sees the arc of the Earth in space and states: “I see no god”. The crew of Apollo 8 read from Genesis as they watch the Earth rise over the lunar horizon. On 20 July 1969, Buzz Aldrin receives communion on the surface of the moon. Later he writes: In the one-sixth gravity of the moon, the wine slowly curled and gracefully came up the side of the cup. Then I read the Scripture, I am the vine, you are the branches. Whosoever abides in me will bring forth much fruit. Same sense data- different interpretations.

The point is, our inductive use of sense data is interpretive and depends on the horizon upon which we are standing, our historical situation. For the hard-bitten empiricist to say: “I have no tradition, I merely take my stand here on the basis of my sense data” is already to place himself within a tradition- one that denies the fact that we are always working from a set of conventions.

I think that criticism is right as far as it goes, but I think you must be shooting at someone else. Empiricism, incorporating reason and critical analysis, is very much a tradition, a kind of ongoing research program, and so it does have the kinds of strictures an interpretive dispositions you are talking about.

The interpretation, on empiricism, of “I am the vine, you are the branches” – assuming you mean to suggest the ‘sensation of God’ or some such, fails precisely because of the methodology of empiricism – the tradition I think you supposed was lacking or was being denied. The empiricist also notes the conflict between Gagarin and Aldrin’s (accepting for the moment that Aldrin’s claim was of some numinous nature, here) interpretation. By way of resolution, the model excels in predicting and explaining these reports by understanding that no shared or objective phenomena was at work in Aldrin’s case – Gagarin sipping from that same wine glass does NOT have the same numinous experience.

However, if asked, Aldrin agrees with Gagarin – no God is to be seen from there, any more than from down here. Empiricism coalesces around the shared, the consensus, the consilient, as a heuristic of finding models that perform. And it’s demonstrably successful in that regard. It looks askance at variances like the numinous moment of Aldrin vs. the nothing-like-that of Gagarin, seeking additional factors or dynamics that can help explain, via empirical (name removed by moderator)ut, the differences observed.

In any case, the claim is NOT that sense-data is self-interpreting, or tradition free. Empiricism needs (nor wants) to make either claim. It is both an interpretive framework and an intellectual tradition. The interpretation of new experiences is analyzed in the light of past experiences, and the performative models produced from them. In this is “more grounded” than, say, a “Catholic interpretive grid” in that it not only declares and owns its interpretive paradigm, but can point to the successful models that ground the method and principles of analysis.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

I am not sure why it is not immediately apparent to everyone. We are not throwing out empiricism at all. We are just throwing out the dogmatism fueling logically inconsistent claims. “Knowledge only comes from sense-experience” has a similar air of paradox like the following self-referential sentence.

I think the confusion is you are complaining about an a priori claim you suppose empiricists (here or elsewhere) make, versus an a posteriori conclusion.

If I say, in the beginning: “(A) Knowledge only comes from sense-experience”, I think that’s problematic, although not clearly so (depending on how broadly one defines ‘sense-experience’), but in any case, worthy of objection or resistance.

But if I say, “(B) Looking back over all the available evidence I see, the only claims and propositions that happen to qualify as ‘knowledge’ stem from empirical analysis”, I’m not offering a metaphysical constraint like (A).

I hear you protesting against (A), and understand and have some sympathy for that objection, but I’m offering something more like (B). If Leela is offering (A), I’m inclined to read that as a claim resting on a tautology – by definition, perhaps, knowledge only comes through experience, because we call ‘experience’ anything which can produce the state-change of knowledge.

However, I think there might be a little bit of a difference with respect to the claim that “Knowledge only comes from sense-experience.” Since the claim is also about** non**-experiential situations, if it is true, then what it says is false. And if what it says is false, then it is just plain false. So there is not really any paradox at all. It is just plain false. Lol.

I think Leela said this, but I want to point out that ‘non-experiential situations’ appears to be a contradiction of terms, rather than false. Not even wrong, just meaningless.

-TS

 

[1holycatholic]

Wasn’t it your own Aquinas who said, whenever you reach a contradiction, make a distinction?

Was it? Do you have a source?

 

[Syntax]

you are complaining about an a priori claim you suppose empiricists (here or elsewhere) make, versus an a posteriori conclusion.

That’s correct.

If I say, in the beginning: “(A) Knowledge only comes from sense-experience”, I think that’s problematic, although not clearly so (depending on how broadly one defines ‘sense-experience’), but in any case, worthy of objection or resistance.

But if I say, “(B) Looking back over all the available evidence I see, the only claims and propositions that happen to qualify as ‘knowledge’ stem from empirical analysis”, I’m not offering a metaphysical constraint like (A).

I hear you protesting against (A), and understand and have some sympathy for that objection, but I’m offering something more like (B). If Leela is offering (A), I’m inclined to read that as a claim resting on a tautology – by definition, perhaps, knowledge only comes through experience, because we call ‘experience’ anything which can produce the state-change of knowledge.

I understand your distinction, but (B) is false, unless you think logical and mathematical truths are contingent a posteriori.

Further, I don’t know what you mean by “empirical analysis.” Analysis in any form is purely a logical enterpise consisting of the categorical deconstruction from wholes to parts, grouping similarities together, and finding pattens with the use of inference rules and quantification.

I think Leela said this, but I want to point out that ‘non-experiential situations’ appears to be a contradiction of terms, rather than false. Not even wrong, just meaningless.

I understand the both of you want to expand “experience” to include non-sensory experience–and people talk this way colloquially. But what’s the point? For sake of precision and clarity in our discussions, we will have to maintain the original distinction between sensory and non-sensory since emprical experience only presents a wealth of a posteriori contingencies, whereas logical truths are necessary a priori. So I don’t sympathize with this move at all.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

If I say, in the beginning: "(A) Knowledge only

 

[Syntax]

Wasn’t it your own Aquinas who said, whenever you reach a contradiction, make a distinction? That dictum shows just how easy it is to create a self-consistent philosophical system. They are a dime a dozen. You seem to be concerned with find the one true philosophical system. Whatever criteria you use to compare the available options, it seems that self-consistency can’t be one of them.

That’s right, self-consistency is poor guide in evaluating an entire system. That’s why we have to question each assumption within the system. For instance, your own assumption that all properties are relations might support other beliefs you hold, but it alone is not even a properly basic belief for which you can provide any justification for believing at all. I can see why you so stubbornly hold this dubious belief because it is central to the rest of your edifice. But it is not even logically or semantically consistent or meaningful. You invent your own private meaning of “relation” that no one else understands, and you won’t even articulate its syntactic structure for us. Consequently, you lack any justification for your re-definitions and your attempts to communicate fail miserably.

 

[Touchstone]

I understand your distinction, but (B) is false, unless you think logical and mathematical truths are contingent a posteriori.

Sure. Statements are contingent on minds. Truths – especially analytic truths – are dependent on minds. No definitions without minds, right?

If you think that “2+2=4” is a statement about the world, I again will point out confusion between maps and territories.

Further, I don’t know what you mean by “empirical analysis.” Analysis in any form is purely a logical enterpise consisting of the categorical deconstruction from wholes to parts, grouping similarities together, and finding pattens with the use of inference rules and quantification.

Analysis based on what’s observed. Empiricism is not simply observation. Reasoning gets applied to form the analystic basis for models that perform (or don’t perform).

I understand the both of you want to expand “experience” to include non-sensory experience–and people talk this way colloquially. But what’s the point?

I shouldn’t even pretend to speak for Leela, so I will say just for myself that “non-sensory experience” is a “square circle” term. It’s internally conflicted. Sense is that “that which yields experience”, and “experience is that which we gain through our senses”. That’s what I meant about Leela’s possible (A) claim, based on the tautology of sense and experience.

The point of that would be utility in classification. We use “senses” as a semantic bucket in which to point to those streams of signals, symbols or stimuli that affect our cognition. If we discovered some new human faculty to detect a newly discovered form of radiation, that would be a “sixth sense”. We wouldn’t exclude it because it wasn’t part of the “classic senses”. It’s a sense because it provides novel (name removed by moderator)ut to the brain, (name removed by moderator)ut the brain can process in some way, and possible act on.

That’s right in line with my understanding of Leela’s (and my) tautology. There is a point in such usage – it carries valuable semantic freight.

For sake of precision and clarity in our discussions, we will have to maintain the original distinction between sensory and non-sensory since emprical experience only presents a wealth of a posteriori contingencies, whereas logical truths are necessary a priori. So I don’t sympathize with this move at all.

No logical truths are necessary a priori, so far as I’m aware. That does not mean logical principles are not actual, taking stock of our senses and experiences. Manifestly, some logical principles obtain – that which enables effective communication in a post like this, for example. But that a transcendental dependency, but that should not be mistaken for a necessary truth, metaphysically.

The universe might have been otherwise, for all we know, or might not have been at all. We do not have, and cannot have, any means of qualifying such a necessity *a priori. *Being actual does not entail necessity across all (logically) possible worlds.

I light of that, I think that distinction isn’t needed, the special pleading for the necessity of logical truths. It’s necessary in a transcendental sense that sufficient logical properties obtain such that we can communicate, etc., but it might have been otherwise for all we know. That’s important, as the criterion for a logically necessary truth – must obtain in all possible worlds – reduces the set of such necessities to tautologies, trivially true statements which are incoherent or contradictory if negated. In some logically possible world, no intelligibility, or even any context for logic, would exist.

See Quine’s dismissal of the analytic/sythetic distinction based on the “unempirical article of faith” that is this commitment to a priori necessities.

-TS