Demanding Evidence

[Syntax]

As Harris said in his Atheist Manifesto, “The atheist is merely a person who believes that the…[people] who claim to never doubt the existence of God should be obliged to present evidence for his existence…” In this thread I set out to investigate the question, is there really such a duty?

I’m wondering, out of all the atheists in the world, why do you choose to pay attention to Sam Harris? There’s so many other better-educated and well-respected atheists that deserve your attention than this guy. He has no qualifications, and is criticized widely by intellectuals who aren’t even religious. Chris Hutchinson is the same unqualified mouthpiece for lazy atheists and has been taken to task numerous times by William Lane Craig. Same for Richard Dawkins. There’s many more enlightening and scholarly atheist works out there much more worthy of your attention than the works of Sam Harris, Chris Hutchinson, or Dawkins! All of them are raging mouthpieces allegedly claiming to work on behalf of atheists, but all the respectable atheists I know can’t stand these guys because all of them are embarrassing the true atheist position, not to mention, making complete fools of themselves by their rampant fallacies, misrepresentations, and complete lack of scholarship. They need to keep silent about stuff they don’t really know.

It would be just as repulsive for you to have to listen to Pat Robertson of the 700Club talk about evolution, as it is for me to have to listen to Dawkins, Harris, or Hutchinson talk about the Cosmological or Ontological proof for God’s existence while making a complete mess of it with their misuse of technical philosophical terms, definitions, and articulations. Just as I would suggest ignoring Pat Robertson at all costs because he’s bigoted, opinionated, and distorts religous views so that a similarly-bigoted Atheist like Harris can come along and knock down this straw-man, likewise, I strongly suggest you ignore people like Harris–not merely because I disagree with him–but because he pollutes logical syntax, distorts arguments, and suppresses evidence that is contrary to his views without telling you he is doing it. He’s dishonest, sloppy, and uneducated.

Much well-rounded and articulate atheists include people like Dr. Sinnott-Armstrong, Dr. Schellenberg, Dr. Tooley (who is my own professor). On the theist side try Alvin Plantinga, Craig, or Morriston. Sometimes they can be found on YouTube, but you’re not going to get a good argument from there or find much to begin with. I have access to others sources if you want me to send them to you. Their articles are widely available too through library search engines, and sometimes you can find their articles for free on the internet. All of them are respected in their fields and deserve a good hearing. I recommend ignoring the rest of these demagogues who fail every time they try.

 

[Leela]

Meaning is directly related to value and purpose - which cannot exist in a void.

Spoken like a good pragmatist.
tonyrey;6245925:

What counts as evidence for a belief depends on your scheme of things and you want to achieve.
In other words what you regard as within the realm of possibility. How do you determine that? Not scientifically for sure because science has self-imposed limits. To explain everything in terms of science is to exceed its brief and plunge into nonsense…

Science is concerned with what is but not what ought to be. If you are saying that science can’t be applied to decide what ought to be the criteria for scientific truth, then I agree.

Harris equates rational religious belief with simplistic religious belief. Why does it have to be a question of all or nothing? It is more rational to believe that God works through the laws of nature for the most part rather than by direct volitions. Nothing can be more absurd than the notion that a loving God is directly responsible for an earthquake which maims and kills thousands of people. This is literally anthropomorphism with a vengeance! If Harris’s aim is to relegate religion to irrational, antiquated superstition and bring it into intellectual disrepute this is certainly the way to do it. The very fact that death and destruction are meted out indiscriminately demonstrates that such disasters are the result of pure coincidence. It is inevitable that sooner or later cities unwisely constructed in earthquake zones are going to be destroyed. Belief in Design does not alter the fact that we are at the mercy of blind chance on a violent planet.

As I said, my aim here is to argue against Harris as well.

This is a distortion of the facts. A rational theist believes that God is ultimately

responsible for everything but not that everything is directly willed by God. Tsunamis and hurricanes have the same physical causes that are the necessary conditions for life. An immensely complex system in which there are countless events at every second is bound to lead to undesirable side-effects. We cannot expect to have everything for nothing. Every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage…

As I predicted, Harris is encouraging believers to take refuge in absurdity - or at least obscurity - and undermine their claim to any form of respect from educated persons.

I think Harris is right to argue against the version of religious faith that most people seem to have. The fact that many people are more sophisticated in their thinking does not excuse those same people’s defense of less sophisticated faith. Why not join Harris in such criticism if you agree that such faith is not what it ought to be?

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

Hi All,

Some thoughts follow on how an assertion may be true but not scientfically or historically true. The key seems to be that the truth of myth (and perhaps religious faith as I’d prefer to see it) is the truth of symbolism and the truth of metaphor.

I dug a bit for some quotes that might help to characterize truth of myth or truth of faith as distinct from scientific-historical truth.

Author Tim O’Brien: “A thing may happen and be a total lie; another thing may not happen and be truer than the truth.”

If you agree, can you unpack O’Brien’s claim for me?

Joseph Campbell: “Mythology is not a lie. Mythology is poetry, it is metaphorical. It has been well said that mythology is the penultimate truth — penultimate because the ultimate cannot be put into words. It is beyond words, beyond images. Mythology pitches the mind beyond that rim, to what can be known but not told.”

“Every religion is true one way or another. It is true when understood metaphorically. But when it gets stuck in its own metaphors, interpreting them as facts, then you are in trouble.”

“God is a metaphor for that which trancends all levels of intellectual thought. It’s as simple as that.”

I also tried another route in finding descriptions for truth that is other than scientific-historical truth. I started Reading Paul Tillich’s The Dynamics of Faith. There’s some non-St Paul:

“…scientific truth and the truth of faith do not belong in the same dimension of meaning.”

I’d like to think so too.

Tillich:
“Neither scientific truth nor historical truth can affirm nor negate the truth of faith. The truth of faith can neither affirm nor negate scientific or historical truth.” and “Philosophical truth consists in true concepts concerning the ultimate; the truth of faith consists in true symbols concerning the ultimate.” and “The philosophical implications of the symbols of faith can be developed in many ways, but the truth of faith and the truth of philosophy have no authority over each other.”

That stuff is all gold to me. Recall that my current project is to carve out a space where religious beliefs need not submit to demands for evidence. A concept of faith as Tillich describes it needs not necessarily frustrate the needs of others, so it need not submit to demands of evidence.

But if the truth of faith does actually need to be justified, what sort of criteria could be applied? Tillich actually does offer 2 criteria (I skipped ahead in the book that I’m just getting started on) for the truth of assertions of faith which seem to match up well with Campbell’s notion of the truth of myth. First I should say that Tillich’s whole deal in this book is to unpack his description of faith as having an “ultimate concern.” That’s important. As a hint to what this can mean, for the Communists, the ultimate concern is the state. (Note how such faith fails criterion 2.)

Criterion 1 “Faith has truth in so far as it adequately expresses am ultimate concern.” … “But the life of symbols is limited” … “Symbols which for a certain period, or in a certain place, expressed truth of faith for a certain group now only remind of the faith of the past. They have lost their truth, and it is an open question whether dead symbols can be revived. Probably not for those to whom they have died!”…"…the criterion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive."

Criterion 2: “The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate. In other words, that it is not idolatrous.”…“The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.” (This is why he favors Protestantism over Catholicism. It’s the whole infallibility thing.)

This sounds like some pretty cool stuff to me. If I were going to be religious, this is how I would like to think of faith. But I suspect there is no hope for me in that regard. It’s a criterion 1 problem. The symbols are dead to me.

Okay, now I’d like to offer a concrete example of an assertion that we might think of as being true, but not true in the scientific-historical sense:

Tillich:
“Faith can say that the reality which is manifest in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ has saving power for those who are grasped by it, no matter how much or how little can be traced to the historical figure who is called Jesus of Nazareth.”

Again, this sort of stuff is dead to me. But is it true in some way nevertheless?

Best,
Leela

 

[tonyrey]

I think Harris is right to argue against the version of religious faith that most people seem to have. The fact that many people are more sophisticated in their thinking does not excuse those same people’s defense of less sophisticated faith. Why not join Harris in such criticism if you agree that such faith is not what it ought to be?

How can I when Harris thinks that the fundamentalists who see an earthquake in Haitti as evidence that God is angry about homosexuality or whatever are more rational about their religious beliefs?!

 

[tonyrey]

Okay, now I’d like to offer a concrete example of an assertion that we might think of as being true, but not true in the scientific-historical sense:

Tillich:
“Faith can say that the reality which is manifest in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ has saving power for those who are grasped by it, no matter how much or how little can be traced to the historical figure who is called Jesus of Nazareth.”
Again, this sort of stuff is dead to me. But is it true in some way nevertheless?

It strikes me as a load of nonsense. If Jesus is not the Son of God who loves us to the extent of letting Himself be tortured and crucified to liberate us from blindness, weakness and selfishness how on earth can a false picture have saving power for anyone?

 

[Betterave]

My claim that you are responding to here is simply the modest assertion that “being religious” need not include scientific or historical claims or attempts to control the behavior of others. I haven’t argued that that is what “being religious” ought to always be like. I’ve just said that there may be lots of ways of being religious and that perhaps there are some ways that never interfere with other’s pursuit of happiness and in such cases demands for evidence need not be respected. To disagree with me here (which you seem very intent upon doing) you will need to argue that claiming to be a Christian necessarily includes patterns of behavior that will always frustrate the needs of others. Certainly this claim can include such patterns and perhaps your version of Christianity does include such patterns, but why must all versions of Christianity include such patterns of behavior?

You make it sound like I’m just being fractious, but I sincerely find what you’re saying confused and I’m just trying to point out why and to invite further elucidation of what you have in mind, if that is in fact possible. To answer your question: I know many Christians, I know many non-Christians. All of them have beliefs and none of them have beliefs which are neutral “with respect to frustrating the needs of others.” But my asserting that (and *your *asserting *something *like that, and *anyone’s *asserting *anything *like that) is based on an understanding of (and therefore *beliefs *about) what it is that others need. So do you want to say that a Christian could be a Christian while believing that others do not need Christ? That seems to me implausible, but a consequence of your position as I understand it. Of course, you might point out that some *avowed *Christians might indeed be religiously pluralistic and believe that others do not need Christ. But do you really want to say that they have a right to consider their opinions on the matter to be immune from criticism, or a right to insist without justification that their having such a belief does *not *“frustrate the needs of others”?

(oops, I hope this is still relevant - I see that there are several posts here that I haven’t read yet)

 

[Leela]

It strikes me as a load of nonsense. If Jesus is not the Son of God who loves us to the extent of letting Himself be tortured and crucified to liberate us from blindness, weakness and selfishness how on earth can a false picture have saving power for anyone?

I think that Campbell (see quote below) would say that you are treating myth as scientific truth here. Cambpell says that this is the error that the atheist makes when she sees myth as a lie rather than as the truth of symbol. The error for Campbell is in reading ancient myth through modern scientific sensibilities rather than as the mediators of the sacred–a different sort of truth–that they were intended to be.

I agree with Campbell, but I don’t wish to argue for one view over the other. Since I am not religious I don’t have a dog in that race. For my purposes, I just need to establish that the practice of “being religious” can be as Tillich and Campbell take it to be. And if it is taken to be be as such, it need not frustrate other’s pursuits of happiness, and if not, it need not submit to Sam Harris’s demands for evidence.

Please don’t take me to be asserting a certain way that “being religious” ought to be or really is. As a pragmatist, I don’t take religion to have an essence, so I have no critique of religion en masse to offer.

Best,
Leela

Joseph Campbell: “Mythology is not a lie. Mythology is poetry, it is metaphorical. It has been well said that mythology is the penultimate truth — penultimate because the ultimate cannot be put into words. It is beyond words, beyond images. Mythology pitches the mind beyond that rim, to what can be known but not told.”

 

[Leela]

I’m wondering, out of all the atheists in the world, why do you choose to pay attention to Sam Harris? There’s so many other better-educated and well-respected atheists that deserve your attention than this guy. He has no qualifications, and is criticized widely by intellectuals who aren’t even religious.

Perhaps you missed the point that I am trying to argue against Harris? But I do actually have a lot of respect for him, though I’d rather not get this thread off track by discussing it here.

It would be just as repulsive for you to have to listen to Pat Robertson of the 700Club talk about evolution, as it is for me to have to listen to Dawkins, Harris, or Hutchinson talk about the Cosmological or Ontological proof for God’s existence while making a complete mess of it with their misuse of technical philosophical terms, definitions, and articulations. Just as I would suggest ignoring Pat Robertson at all costs because he’s bigoted, opinionated, and distorts religous views so that a similarly-bigoted Atheist like Harris can come along and knock down this straw-man…

Though you want to argue that Harris is beating up on a straw man, the religion that he is criticizing is the dominant view of faith in this country. You want to say that what he is attacking is not faith as it really is, but it is faith as it really is practiced. Why not join hom in his criticism rather than defending the irrational views of most theists?

Much well-rounded and articulate atheists include people like Dr. Sinnott-Armstrong, Dr. Schellenberg, Dr. Tooley (who is my own professor). On the theist side try Alvin Plantinga, Craig, or Morriston. Sometimes they can be found on YouTube, but you’re not going to get a good argument from there or find much to begin with. I have access to others sources if you want me to send them to you. Their articles are widely available too through library search engines, and sometimes you can find their articles for free on the internet. All of them are respected in their fields and deserve a good hearing. I recommend ignoring the rest of these demagogues who fail every time they try.

Thanks for referring me to these thinkers. Can you point me to any specific receommended reading?

Best,
Leela

 

[tonyrey]

I think that Campbell (see quote below) would say that you are treating myth as scientific truth here. Cambpell says that this is the error that the atheist makes when she sees myth as a lie rather than as the truth of symbol. The error for Campbell is in reading ancient myth through modern scientific sensibilities rather than as the mediators of the sacred–a different sort of truth–that they were intended to be.

I agree with Campbell, but I don’t wish to argue for one view over the other. Since I am not religious I don’t have a dog in that race. For my purposes, I just need to establish that the practice of “being religious” can be as Tillich and Campbell take it to be. And if it is taken to be be as such, it need not frustrate other’s pursuits of happiness, and if not, it need not submit to Sam Harris’s demands for evidence.

Please don’t take me to be asserting a certain way that “being religious” ought to be or really is. As a pragmatist, I don’t take religion to have an essence, so I have no critique of religion en masse to offer.

Best,
Leela

Joseph Campbell: “Mythology is not a lie. Mythology is poetry, it is metaphorical. It has been well said that mythology is the penultimate truth — penultimate because the ultimate cannot be put into words. It is beyond words, beyond images. Mythology pitches the mind beyond that rim, to what can be known but not told.”

As far as I can see it is taking refuge in obscurity and evading the fundamental question of how and why we came to exist…

 

[Leela]

huh???..The following appear to be your reasons for thinking science can’t have truth as one of its aims, all of which are absurd reasons.

(1) Science can’t aim at truth “because we would not be able to aim at it”–but that’s only restating what you just said.

I’m not saying that scientists don’t seek the truth. I’m just saying that in practice such a goal is not useful. How we could aim at it without already knowing what the truth of the matter is. The point is that the way to go about seeking truth in practice is to try to have better and better justification for our beliefs. Justification is the only path we have in our pursuit of truth.

Of course “true” is an adjective. “Truth” as a noun can’t be philosophically or scientifically defined. So what is so novel here about Rorty’s view? Here’s the simplest deflationary theory of “truth” that I can think of which most other philosphers have accepted for hundereds of years now:

“P” is true if and only if P. Done

That’s all we need to know about “Truth” with a capital “T.” Any linguistic, philosophical, or scientific attempts to offer definitions or further explanations of it get convoluted and weird really fast. However, even though this has been the case for all secular attempts to arrive at some understanding of “Truth,”

This is exactly what Rorty would say about truth. Rorty’s break from the classical pragmatists is to say, “truth is truth.” There is no “pragmatic theory of truth” as “warranted assertibility” because such a “theory” is no theory at all. It doesn’t gives way of distinguishing true statements from false ones which is the only reason we would bother to try to have a theory of truth to begin with. James should have recognized that having this sort of “theory of truth” or not is exactly the sort of difference that makes no difference and is therefore no difference at all.

I will nevertheless make one religious statement of identity that holds even above Plato’s: Christ is Truth.

Probably not worth us getting into here.

Yes there is a duty, all beliefs demand evidence.

This may be the major bone of contention for you and my thesis in the OP.

How could beliefs themselves demand evidence?

But you, Rorty, and Harris seem to think that if there is going to be any such demand then it can only be of the scientific or historical kind.

I think this may be what Harris is doing, and what Rorty and I want to criticize hime for.

We don’t demand empirical proof for theorems in mathematics, precisely because there is none. At most we know mathematical formula have successful application to the empirical world, but their truths certainly aren’t grounded in empirical evidence, but are completely independent of it. By the same token, all religious beliefs are under the burden of providing justification for their beliefs, but by no means are these demands for evidence solely restricted to those of scientific and historical kinds evidence. To think otherwise is just assuming that religious beliefs are on par with claims like “the tooth fairy and santa claus exist,” or those of astrological predictions and such. But most religious claims are not. Some are absurd, of course. But the Articles of faith are not.

I agree with most of this. I see no reason why religious assertions can’t have different criteria for truth from scientific assertions. My question then is, what might these criteria be like? I’ve offered Tillich’s suggestions in another post.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

As far as I can see it is taking refuge in obscurity and evading the fundamental question of how and why we came to exist…

I can see how such a take on the truth of myth can seem like evasion of obfuscation for someone who tends to be a literal rather than a literary thinker since I am also that way.

But Campbell would say that the power of a myth lies not in that it actually happened at some particular time in history. Whether or not it ever did is irrelevent. The power of a myth (if it is good one) lies in the truth that it happens ALL the time. It is happening even right now. Myths are not historical fabrications but rather eternal truths–truths that stand appart from affirmations and negations of historicity. It is only through such stories that we any make sense of our experience (and come to have such concerns as historicity).

As I understand Tillich, whether or not Jesus of Nazareth died and came to life as some point in time may be of interest to someone who wants to know about history, but teh question of whether or not such an event occurred or whether or not such a person ever existed is irrelevent to the truth of faith. The truth of faith is not believing that a dead person once came back to life. The truth of faith is beliving that the Risen Christ is your personal salvation right here and now and always.

For Tillich, mistaking the question of historicity with the issue of the truth of faith is a form of idolatry. Recall his Criterion 2: “The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate…The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.” Taking taking the resurrection as historical truth rather than a symbol that conveys the ultimate is a failure to recognize the symbol’s lack of ultimacy.

It’s the “finger pointing to the moon” thing. The danger is always focusing on the finger rather than on that to which the finger points. that to which the finger points, if it is really ultimate, can never really be adequately pointed to.

Best,
Leela

 

[KindredSoul]

I’ve read the first and last pages of the thread, and I would suggest that the problem, so far as I can see, isn’t when Atheists demand evidence in the sense of “Give me a reason to believe that you, the believer, didn’t pull this belief out of your head just like I could make up some random deity right here and now”. That’s a reasonable demand. If someone told me that they believed in a totally indetectable being who demanded my allegiance, I too might wonder why they believe in it. Their reason doesn’t have to convince me personally to agree with them in order to satisfy my question, it merely needs to demonstrate that there is some outside stimulus or circumstance that might lead a person to believe as they do–or, more relevant, believe it is a possibility that they are willing to put faith in–without that person needing to be crazy, delusional, or unthinking. I dare say, most of the major world religions probably pass that test (I don’t know for sure, I’m only intimately familiar with my own), even though I (obviously) only believe in one of those religions.

However, the line crossed all too often by Atheists is that they don’t only want a reason, they demand “irrefutable proof” and insist that unless Theists (Christians in particular) can absolutely prove to them that our Religion is 100% undeniably true, we have no intellectual right or justification to believe in it. In other words, unless we can present some proof that has everybody believing in our religion except those with major mental disabilities, the radical Atheist insists we are intellectually unjustified in believing what we believe. Sometimes, it is hard to notice at first glance that someone who seems to be asking for a reason (soft evidence) is actually demanding irrefutable proof, but one tell-tale sign is when they start asking things like “But couldn’t that mean this instead or couldn’t it have been an elaborate hoax that we just haven’t yet exposed and the identical nature of which just so happens to have never been repeated?” Questions like that are clearly seeking absolute proof and assurance that, no, it did not “mean this instead” and no, it couldn’t “have been an elaborate hoax.” This person doesn’t want to know if my beliefs are reasonable to hold, though they couch it in those terms inaccurately and maddeningly enough. They want to know if my beliefs are undeniable, if there is absolutely no room to disbelieve, whether great or small, and they refuse to see them as even being reasonable until I can prove it so.

The problem with the latter group, besides the fact that they virtually never apply this same standard to themselves (and are almost always ready with some irrelevant “Mine is technically a non-belief” rubbish to defend that double standard), is that they absolutely ignore, as though it were the plague, the issue of a God Who requires/exhorts faith as a virtue. If there is a God Who wants His people to have faith, He most certainly would not leave readily-accessible-on-demand 100% irrefutable, no-other-explanation proof, neither of His existence nor of the True Religion. He simply wouldn’t do it, because where there is irrefutable proof, there is no room for faith. To ask for irrefutable evidence before you believe a religion of faith is true is as to ask for all the fruit to have never been there before you believe a fruit salad is a fruit salad. It’s oxymoronic, yet somehow that is totally missed by many of the foremost aggressive Atheist thinkers. Essentially, they say “You have a justified right to believe in a God who requires faith when He proves Himself and faith is not required.” They fail to see the inconsistency.

So the middle ground here is that I can see why someone would seek soft evidence of a religious belief, as in some reason to believe that a given religious individual or religious group as they exist today hasn’t pulled the religion out of thin air five minutes ago and even has a chance, no matter how microscopically slim you personally may find it, of being correct–in short, a basis for hope and faith. Indeed, I do not shrink back nor grow annoyed with such genuine inquiries, as they have a place in the search for Truth. But even then, if that religious belief holds faith to be a necessary virtue in the grand scheme, as does Catholicism, demanding irrefutable proof, a systematic explanation of why no other “what-if” possibility exists whatsoever, simply defeats the purpose and is like telling someone they cannot believe that black dogs exist until every existing dog is white. A faith-requiring religion, the existence of which I believe an open-minded Atheist would say is technically a possibility no matter how ridiculously slim he or she may think it is, ceases to be a faith-requiring religion when irrefutable proof is available.

Blessings in Christ,
KindredSoul

 

[Leela]

A faith-requiring religion…ceases to be a faith-requiring religion when irrefutable proof is available.

There are many Catholic participants in this forum who believe that we actually do have irrefutable proof for the existence of God as given by Aquinas, but your point about the conflation of notions of evidence and proof is a good one. We don’t generally have irrefutable proof for our beliefs, we just want good reason to believe. This raises the issue of what constitutes “good reasons.” Do you ever present what you see as evidence to a nonbeliever who rejects the evidence as inadmissable? Do you think that believers and nonbelievers have different ideas as what ought to count as evidence for a belief? Specific examples of conversations you’ve had would be appreciated.

Best,
Leela

 

[tonyrey]

I can see how such a take on the truth of myth can seem like evasion or obfuscation for someone who tends to be a literal rather than a literary thinker since I am also that way.

 

[KindredSoul]

Do you think that believers and nonbelievers have different ideas as what ought to count as evidence for a belief? Specific examples of conversations you’ve had would be appreciated.

Best,
Leela

I do believe that oftentimes believers and nonbelievers have different ideas on what counts as evidence, but often it is no more complicated that what I have said previously: The unbeliever (assuming they are a strict Empiricist) believes that only irrefutable proof counts as evidence, while the believer believes that indicators of possibilities and hope can be admitted, at least if the belief in hand is supposed to be faith-based, as in the case of several religions.

I have seen that Atheists ask: “Why are we more lax with the evidence we require for religion than with the evidence we require for everyday beliefs or other events from history?” The answer is that history as a discipline and science as a discipline are enhanced by rigorous skepticism and awaiting tighter evidence. However, every so often something like the Resurrection claims (and equivalents in other religions) alert us to the possibility (no matter how slim a particular individual may find it) that a God exists Who wants us to have faith. If that possibility is a reality (which it could be, as that’s the very meaning of the word “possibility”), rigorous skepticism and demanding proof will only ensure that we never reach the truth, since in the realm of that possibility, God has most probably crafted the world in such a way as that we must need faith. In history and science, demanding proof leads time and again to greater certainty of the truth. If a faith-based religion is true, demanding irrefutable proof of it leads not to an eventual reward of finding out the real truth but only to a dead end and possibly worse, depending on the religion. That is the difference, and it is what such Atheists as these totally miss.

As for specific examples, I give one only because you ask. Let it be known that I am not looking for a debate, which would most probably lead us into an example of exactly what I am talking about…fortunately, I believe you are sincere, and are not interested in taking it into that direction.

Here it is: I believe that the circumstances surrounding Jesus of Nazareth’s death and the claims for His Resurrection certainly indicate that something happened. Whether it was a hoax, a unique gathering of crazy people or people whose emotions moved them to see absolutely extraordinary things that weren’t there (as in, grand hallucinations of dead men being alive and rising to the sky, which the multiple witnesses agreed to have seen with their own eyes and for which claims they were willing to die), profoundly stupid people being willing to die for something they knew to be a lie (since they themselves were supposed to be the witnesses, not merely someone they trusted) and thus for which their deaths would not profit them or anyone else, or whether He really rose from the dead, certainly the circumstances appear to me to be more than “Somebody made it up off the top of their head.” While it is true that these other possibilities exist other than the Resurrection, I personally find it far easier–intellectually speaking, not just as an emotional reaction–to believe that there is a God, and that Jesus’ claims were true as a result of Divinity. I do not believe, regardless of all the Jim Jones types in the world, that we have seen a hoax or strictly natural incident that reaches the identical magnitude and/or circumstance of the Resurrection, so I do not see that we have a true precedent for such a unique and brilliantly convincing (to the witnesses) hoax anymore than we do for men actually rising from the dead. Therefore, His literally raising from the dead appears no more unprecedented, for me, than a convolution of natural circumstances which would produce something totally and 100% on par with the to-do surrounding the claims of His Resurrection. From my vantage point, this is only so extremely hard to believe if one has already decided that there is definitely no God. Another thing to be considered when one smugly says “When’s the last time you saw someone Resurrect from the dead?” is that it was supposed to be a unique event, so this counter is moot. At the very least, though, even for someone who finds one of the other options to be vastly more plausible, I believe these unique circumstances paint a picture of hope that Jesus’ claims were true, and a person who chooses to have faith in that is not unjustified, so long as he does not present his reason for daring to have faith (which I believe is very legitimate) as irrefutable proof so that anyone who disagrees with him is stupid or dishonest.

When presenting the above argument for the reasonability (not irrefutable proof) of my Faith, I have been countered with the “What-if” game I mentioned in my previous post. The other possibilities I mentioned (or whatever other possibility the individual Atheist in question might think up), it has been said, must be absolutely disproven or else it is unreasonable to believe, specifically to have faith, that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. Again, the counter implies that in order to justify believing in this religion, in which God (if the religion is true) wants me to have faith, I must disprove every alternative explanation for the religion’s chief miracle, which would leave the Resurrection as the shining and clear truth and would leave little to no doubt. Needless to say, if I can do that then faith is not necessary, or is at least very barely so, and it loses nearly all importance.

Blessings in Christ,
KindredSoul

 

[Leela]

As for specific examples, I give one only because you ask. Let it be known that I am not looking for a debate, which would most probably lead us into an example of exactly what I am talking about…fortunately, I believe you are sincere, and are not interested in taking it into that direction.

You are correct. I’m not trying to argue what ought to count as evidence here or whether atheism or theism is true. Though I love a good debate, in this thread I am trying to discuss and understand the dynamics of such debates between theists and atheists, so your examples are much appreciated.

Best,
Leela

 

[Syntax]

I’m not saying that scientists don’t seek the truth. I’m just saying that in practice such a goal is not useful. How we could aim at it without already knowing what the truth of the matter is [this is a Socratic question that has little relevance to the main point of your argument]. The point is that the way to go about seeking truth in practice is to try to have better and better justification for our beliefs **[this is true]. **Justification is the only path we have in our pursuit of truth **[this is true]. **

This is exactly what Rorty would say about truth. Rorty’s break from the classical pragmatists is to say, “truth is truth.” There is no “pragmatic theory of truth” as “warranted assertibility” because such a “theory” is no theory at all. It doesn’t gives way of distinguishing true statements from false ones [this is true] which is the only reason we would bother to try to have a theory of truth to begin with [this is false–you are confusing our desire to be epistemically rational with the desire to reach the Truth–they are not one and the same. Contrary to what you want to believe the desire for attaining Truth INFORMS our desire to be Rational, not the other way around. I will explain below.].

I highlighted where I agree and disagree with you. I strongly recommend pulling apart the epistemic, metaphysical, and logical notions which you are conflating together in one loaded statement. You need to refine what you are trying to say. Here is my thesis that I will defend against your claims I think are false above:

The concepts of warrant and justification are epistemically prior to the concept of truth. However, the concept of truth is both **logically and metaphysically prior **to justification and warrant.

So I agree with Rorty on this,

that the concept of “Truth” possesses **no criteria **by which it can function in helping us decide whether or not our beliefs are, in fact, true, because it has no epistemic function whatsoever.

This is right. Truth doesn’t have any epistemic action-guiding criteria independent of what we take to be warranted, or justified belief. This is precisely why belief can be epistemically warranted or justified even though it is still false. So we cannot pursue the truth without the notions of justication and warrant to guide us in this pursuit.

However, even though the concept of truth possesses no epistemic action-guiding criteria, the concept is logically and metaphysically prior to the concepts of warrant and justification, and grounds these very notions. Let me explain:

I cannot make sense of what it means to “justify” my belief unless I also had a deep concern about whether or not ot my justifications were somehow pointing everyone to the truth. Here is a kind of **reductio ad absurdum ** argument to make this clear.

Suppose Truth did **not **exist whatsoever, and that all of us were perfectly aware of this. What would be the point of engaging in social-contextual activities of justifying my beliefs to others? All of our epistemic motivations of justifying our beliefs to others would then be reduced to the practical motivations of winning a game, like winning Chess or Monopoly if we thought the truth didn’t exist at all, and there was no hope of ever attaining it. So the very non-existence of truth–and my awareness of this-- would necessarily render all my social activities of justifying my beliefs to others intrinsically meaningless with respect to the question of whether or not my beliefs were, in fact, true, since my only purpose in engaging in these activities would then be *purely pragmatic *.

But this is simply contrary to the facts of what everyone takes herself/himself to be doing when she/he engages in the activities of justifying her/his belief to others. That I think my beliefs are true, is precisely WHY I try to justify it to others. I don’t merely want to justify my beliefs because I want to win-over my opponent, but also because I think that what I believe is true from the start and that he ought to accept what is true independent of whether or not I believe it.

If you or Rorty are going to assert that the concept of Truth is **not **logically and metaphysically prior to epistemic justification, then you will have to explain why everyone is in **error **about what he or she takes herself or himself to be doing in the realms of public discourse. As far as I can tell, a person’s intentions are not **only **to win an argument, but also to provide reasons for believing what she/he thinks is true. **Knowing the truth **both is and ought to be more important than successfuly convincing someone of what I believe. If it is not, than I might as well think all of my philosophical/scientific researching is no different than one big game of chess. But I don’t think this; I also seek the truth, pure and simple. Therefore, the concpet of Truth is logically and metaphysically prior to my activities of warrant and justification.

I agree with most of this. I see no reason why religious assertions can’t have different criteria for truth from scientific assertions. My question then is, what might these criteria be like? I’ve offered Tillich’s suggestions in another post.

I’ve already said in my post several days ago: 1st person experience and divine sensibility that justifies us in thinking the Articles of faith are true.

 

[Syntax]

There are many Catholic participants in this forum who believe that we actually do have irrefutable proof for the existence of God as given by Aquinas, but your point about the conflation of notions of evidence and proof is a good one. We don’t generally have irrefutable proof for our beliefs, we just want good reason to believe. This raises the issue of what constitutes “good reasons.” Do you ever present what you see as evidence to a nonbeliever who rejects the evidence as inadmissable? Do you think that believers and nonbelievers have different ideas as what ought to count as evidence for a belief? Specific examples of conversations you’ve had would be appreciated.

Since you take the liberty to quote from atheists, I thought I’d take the liberty to quote from a review of Plantinga’s book Warranted Christian Belief The review also mentions Plantinga’s case against Rorty’s pragmatism. I highlighted the main points.

ivpress.com/groothuis/pdf.php/doug/000125.pdf

Warrant is the strongest epistemological authorization for a particular belief. Plantinga writes: “In a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no disfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth” (p. 156). He believes that Christian belief can have warrant when our faculty for sensing the divine—what Calvin called the sensus divinitatis—is functioning properly (through the “internal instigation of the Holy Spirit”) such that we believe in “the great things of the gospel” (Jonathan Edwards) and these truths are “sealed in our hearts” (Calvin) experientially.

Because it can be held as properly basic, “Christian belief can have warrant, and
warrant sufficient for knowledge, **even if I don’t know of and cannot make a good
historical case for the reliability of the biblical writers or for what they teach. . . . On the
model, the warrant for Christian belief doesn’t require that I or anyone else have this kind
of historical information” **(p. 259). When facing objections to Christian belief, Plantinga
often invokes the special status of Christian belief as properly basic in order to deflect
criticisms. If one doesn’t have to play the evidence game, so to speak, one need not be
threatened by some anti-Christian arguments. Plantinga goes further in claiming that if
one’s Christian belief requires outside evidence for God’s existence and the specifics of
Christian orthodoxy, one is at an epistemological disadvantage. In one section—which should prove to be controversial—he argues that the classical method of arguing for
theism and then giving Christian evidences (as exemplified by Richard Swinburne) fails
to be sufficiently probable to be cogent; in other words, warrant cannot be established in
this way. However, if one believes “in the basic way,” the warrant for Christian belief
very likely obtains. Given Christian belief as properly basic, Plantinga also rejects the
model that presents the Christian worldview as a hypothesis or theory to be verified or
falsified by appeals to evidence and argument. Christian belief is more like **memory
beliefs: “Everyone . . . accepts memory beliefs. We all remember such things as what we
had for breakfast, and we never or almost never propose such beliefs as good
explanations of present experience and phenomena. And the same holds for theism and
Christian belief in the suggested [A/C] model” **(p. 330).

Taking Christian belief “in the basic way,” however, does not exempt one from
having to address certain potential “defeaters”—claims or arguments that would render
Christian belief unwarranted or worse. Neither does believing “in the basic way”
necessarily make one a fideist, since Christian belief is taken to be rational (as a properly basic belief), not nonrational or irrational. In the fourth section, therefore, Plantinga considers “Defeaters” of five types: (1) the claims of Freud and Marx that religious belief is merely a projection, (2) the arguments of liberal Scriptural scholarship that deny biblical truth, **(3) the challenge from postmodernism (mainly in the person of Richard Rorty) that the traditional correspondence view of truth itself (required for Christian truthclaims) be rejected, **(4) the accusation that religious pluralism undercuts the unique and final truth of Christianity, and (5) the objections of recent formulations of the problem of evil. Plantinga concludes that none of these arguments defeat warrant for Christian belief as he defines it in the extended A/C model.

 

[Leela]

Since you take the liberty to quote from atheists, I thought I’d take the liberty to quote from a review of Plantinga’s book Warranted Christian Belief The review also mentions Plantinga’s case against Rorty’s pragmatism. I highlighted the main points.

ivpress.com/groothuis/pdf.php/doug/000125.pdf

Warrant is the strongest epistemological authorization for a particular belief. Plantinga writes: “In a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no disfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth” (p. 156). He believes that Christian belief can have warrant when our faculty for sensing the divine—what Calvin called the sensus divinitatis—is functioning properly (through the “internal instigation of the Holy Spirit”) such that we believe in “the great things of the gospel” (Jonathan Edwards) and these truths are “sealed in our hearts” (Calvin) experientially.

Because it can be held as properly basic, “Christian belief can have warrant, and
warrant sufficient for knowledge, **even if I don’t know of and cannot make a good
historical case for the reliability of the biblical writers or for what they teach. . . . On the
model, the warrant for Christian belief doesn’t require that I or anyone else have this kind
of historical information” **(p. 259). When facing objections to Christian belief, Plantinga
often invokes the special status of Christian belief as properly basic in order to deflect
criticisms. If one doesn’t have to play the evidence game, so to speak, one need not be
threatened by some anti-Christian arguments. Plantinga goes further in claiming that if
one’s Christian belief requires outside evidence for God’s existence and the specifics of
Christian orthodoxy, one is at an epistemological disadvantage. In one section—which should prove to be controversial—he argues that the classical method of arguing for
theism and then giving Christian evidences (as exemplified by Richard Swinburne) fails
to be sufficiently probable to be cogent; in other words, warrant cannot be established in
this way. However, if one believes “in the basic way,” the warrant for Christian belief
very likely obtains. Given Christian belief as properly basic, Plantinga also rejects the
model that presents the Christian worldview as a hypothesis or theory to be verified or
falsified by appeals to evidence and argument. Christian belief is more like **memory
beliefs: “Everyone . . . accepts memory beliefs. We all remember such things as what we
had for breakfast, and we never or almost never propose such beliefs as good
explanations of present experience and phenomena. And the same holds for theism and
Christian belief in the suggested [A/C] model” **(p. 330).

Taking Christian belief “in the basic way,” however, does not exempt one from
having to address certain potential “defeaters”—claims or arguments that would render
Christian belief unwarranted or worse. Neither does believing “in the basic way”
necessarily make one a fideist, since Christian belief is taken to be rational (as a properly basic belief), not nonrational or irrational. In the fourth section, therefore, Plantinga considers “Defeaters” of five types: (1) the claims of Freud and Marx that religious belief is merely a projection, (2) the arguments of liberal Scriptural scholarship that deny biblical truth, **(3) the challenge from postmodernism (mainly in the person of Richard Rorty) that the traditional correspondence view of truth itself (required for Christian truthclaims) be rejected, **(4) the accusation that religious pluralism undercuts the unique and final truth of Christianity, and (5) the objections of recent formulations of the problem of evil. Plantinga concludes that none of these arguments defeat warrant for Christian belief as he defines it in the extended A/C model.

Your introductory comments suggested disagreement, but this sounds to me like agreement with what I’ve been saying–that religious beliefs need not get involved in “the evidence game” as the author put it. Can you explain how you think this all relates to our conversation?

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

Hi Syntax,

Originally Posted by Leela
“I see no reason why religious assertions can’t have different criteria for truth from scientific assertions. My question then is, what might these criteria be like? I’ve offered Tillich’s suggestions in another post.”

I’ve already said in my post several days ago: 1st person experience and divine sensibility that justifies us in thinking the Articles of faith are true.

Okay, but I’m not sure what this means. Perhaps you could demonstrate how your criteria apply to an assertion of faith such as Tillich’s:

“Faith can say that the reality which is manifest in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ has saving power for those who are grasped by it, no matter how much or how little can be traced to the historical figure who is called Jesus of Nazareth.”

Do you think that “1st person experience and divine sensibility” should be counted as evidence in justifiying your belief in the truth of such assertions to others?

Also, what do you think of Tillich’s criteria posted previously?

Best,
Leela