Demanding Evidence

[Leela]

… Here is a kind of **reductio ad absurdum ** argument to make this clear.

Suppose Truth did **not **exist whatsoever, and that all of us were perfectly aware of this. What would be the point of engaging in social-contextual activities of justifying my beliefs to others? All of our epistemic motivations of justifying our beliefs to others would then be reduced to the practical motivations of winning a game, like winning Chess or Monopoly if we thought the truth didn’t exist at all, and there was no hope of ever attaining it.

I’m not sure what’s with the capital-T in truth as if it were a proper noun. When I say that truth exists all I mean is that certain sentences are true. Must I also think that truth existed before there were any sentences that could be said to have this property?

So the very non-existence of truth–and my awareness of this-- would necessarily render all my social activities of justifying my beliefs to others intrinsically meaningless with respect to the question of whether or not my beliefs were, in fact, true, since my only purpose in engaging in these activities would then be purely pragmatic .

But this is simply contrary to the facts of what everyone takes herself/himself to be doing when she/he engages in the activities of justifying her/his belief to others. That I think my beliefs are true, is precisely WHY I try to justify it to others. I don’t merely want to justify my beliefs because I want to win-over my opponent, but also because I think that what I believe is true from the start and that he ought to accept what is true independent of whether or not I believe it.

Agreed. If I argue with you it is because I think that one of us is actually right and one of us is actually wrong.

If you or Rorty are going to assert that the concept of Truth is **not **logically and metaphysically prior to epistemic justification, then you will have to explain why everyone is in **error **about what he or she takes herself or himself to be doing in the realms of public discourse.

Explaining why others are in error is the practice of justification which we only do as a wrangling over whether we should be saying that a given proposition is true, but I don’t see where a metaphysical entity called Truth needs to be supposed any more than when we say that a firetruck is red we need to imagine a metaphysical entity of Redness existing “out there.” Truth and redness as concepts are two ways of relating words or sentences with other words or sentences.

Best,
Leela

 

[Syntax]

I’m not sure what’s with the capital-T in truth as if it were a proper noun. When I say that truth exists all I mean is that certain sentences are true. Must I also think that truth existed before there were any sentences that could be said to have this property?

Not a sentence, but a proposition expressed by that sentence, yes! Do you think 2+2=4 wasn’t true until language came along and expressed what is said with exactly this notation? That’s aburd. 2+2=4 is always and necessarily true even before human beings expressed it in language. What is true exists independently of human perception and language articulation. The truth of propositions expressed by those sentences are not dependent on the mind–if that were the case, when everyone ceased to exist, true propositions would become false.

Explaining why others are in error is the practice of justification which we only do as a wrangling over whether we should be saying that a given proposition is true, but I don’t see where a metaphysical entity called Truth needs to be supposed any more than when we say that a firetruck is red we need to imagine a metaphysical entity of Redness existing “out there.” Truth and redness as concepts are two ways of relating words or sentences with other words or sentences.

No, I said the **concept **of truth is logically and metaphysically prior to epistemic warrant and grounds all these epistemic activities before they arise. I didn’t suggest there is some “Truth out there” (even though I believe there is). The concept of truth is presupoosed as a necessary condition making epistemic warrant possible. Without the concept of Truth, there is no such thing as the concept of justification. The concept of justification is derivative of the concept of truth, not the other way around. Clearly, you didn’t understand my post.

 

[Syntax]

Hi Syntax,

Originally Posted by Leela
“I see no reason why religious assertions can’t have different criteria for truth from scientific assertions. My question then is, what might these criteria be like? I’ve offered Tillich’s suggestions in another post.”

Okay, but I’m not sure what this means. Perhaps you could demonstrate how your criteria apply to an assertion of faith such as Tillich’s:“Faith can say that the reality which is manifest in the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ has saving power for those who are grasped by it, no matter how much or how little can be traced to the historical figure who is called Jesus of Nazareth.”

Do you think that “1st person experience and divine sensibility” should be counted as evidence in justifiying your belief in the truth of such assertions to others?

You didn’t pay attention to my very first post where I articulated explicitly the uniquely different epistemic situations of the atheist and theist within which they find themselves with respect to the same list of empistemic criteria they both agree on. The question is not whether they agree/disagree on a same set of criteria (because they don’t!!). The question is whether the atheist has the relevant 1st-person spiritual experience (which he doesn’t). So the theist and atheist are **both justified **in believing their competing claims, “God exists” and “God doesn’t exist.” The latter statement, I believe, just happens to be false. What are you not understanding?

Take this example. I once had the occasion to taste “vegemite,” a kind of *hummus *dip originating in Australia that has a very unique taste all of its own. And suppose you have never tasted vegemite (which probably haven’t). I am still justified in believing that I know what the taste of hummus is like, even though you’ve never tasted it. But we still both agree that I am justified in believing I know what the taste of vegemite is like, yes? Just because you’ve lacked the relevent experience doesn’t entail my belief of “I know what vegemite tastes like” is no longer justified. Similarly with statements concerning the articles of faith. I’ve said repeatedly that “Jesus rose from the dead” is not merely a historical proposition requiring **only **historical justification, but is also more than just a historical claim, it is also a spiritual/metaphysical claim whose content is experienced in the 1st-person by the religious person justifying him in the belief that the historical proposition is true. Again, please explain what I am not being clear about. Plantinga, in the passage quoted above, also agrees with me here.

Also, what do you think of Tillich’s criteria posted previously?

What criteria? Would please repeat it? I thought Paul Tillich simply denied there are any epistemic requirements for faith–as you’ve mentioned above.

 

[Syntax]

Your introductory comments suggested disagreement, but this sounds to me like agreement with what I’ve been saying–that religious beliefs need not get involved in *“the evidence game” as the author put it. *Can you explain how you think this all relates to our conversation?

What?? No. He’s clearly speaking of historical/scientific evidence. But there are clearly *other *sources of justification, namely, reason and 1st-person experience. How did you miss that in the passage?

 

[Syntax]

Originally Posted by Syntax:
But this is simply contrary to the facts of what everyone takes herself/himself to be doing when she/he engages in the activities of justifying her/his belief to others. That I think my beliefs are true, is precisely WHY I try to justify it to others. I don’t merely want to justify my beliefs because I want to win-over my opponent, but also because I think that what I believe is true from the start and that he ought to accept what is true independent of whether or not **I **believe it.

Agreed. If I argue with you it is because I think that one of us is actually right and one of us is actually wrong.

You should be concluding: Therefore, the concept of truth is logically prior to the concepts of justification and warrant for which it makes possible these justifying activities point to what is true, for without this prior truth-concept as a ground, our justifying activities towards others is just game-playing.

 

[Touchstone]

Not a sentence, but a proposition expressed by that sentence, yes! Do you think 2+2=4 wasn’t true until language came along and expressed what is said with exactly this notation? That’s aburd.

It’s not absurd, even by your own terminology, below. You understand the concept of “the concept of truth”, (your phrase below), but this refutes your point above about 2+2=4. As a statement, the expression of a concept, it is TRANSCENDENTALLY dependent on language.

No language, no concepts.

Concepts are linguistic products, the set of objects standing in relation to a subject. Language is what the subject, objects, and relationships are reified through.

What’s absurd is the idea that “2+2=4” somehow exists priority to itself as a concept, or an expression of the concept. It’s precisely like telling us that if there were no language, no living things, no nothing extant capable of communicating, we would still be discussing this right now. It’s precisely that absurd.

2+2=4 is always and necessarily true even before human beings expressed it in language.

It’s just trivially true – a tautology. Unless you suppose that tautologies somehow shape reality and conform nature to its semantics, this statement is incoherent upon reaching the “before human beings”. We have reasons to believe that objects existed prior to humans, objects that would become amenable to description and conceptual manipulation through maths and other forms of symbolic calculus. But there’s precisely nothing available that points to math concepts being discrete ontological universals in their own right, or some such. The only way I know that people arrive there is through their own incredulity at their intuitions, the imagination of concepts as immaterial/supernatural/universal.

What is true exists independently of human perception and language articulation.

Well, you have painted yourself in quite a corner with this declaration. If I ask “what is your definition of ‘truth’?” even then you are stuck because even with all the leeway you’d like in terms of definitions, IT’S STILL YOU DOING THE DEFINING, which fundamental discredits your claim, no matter what definition you apply.

The more you try to define it, and make it meaningful, the more false your claim becomes, because it’s only through semantics – the investment of meaning as the freight carried by our language – that ‘truth’ is coherent at all. Reality is what it is, apart from the human mind, so far as we can tell. But ‘truth’ is a product of human minds and language constructs. There is not ONE rendering of ‘truth’ out there that stands as an exception to that, so far as anyone can see.

The truth of propositions expressed by those sentences are not dependent on the mind–if that were the case, when everyone ceased to exist, true propositions would become false.

No, and that shows where the error lies. It’s a false dichotomy. If there never were any humans or living beings and no language and no concepts, ‘truth’, and all language, is simply an non-entity. It’s not false, it’s not even ‘incoherent’ (which is different than false), it’s simply non-existent. To be able to say (or decide, or contemplate, or process in any way) ‘false’, it is TRANSCENDENTALLY NECESSARY that language and the predicates for concepts be in place.

No, I said the **concept **of truth is logically and metaphysically prior to epistemic warrant and grounds all these epistemic activities before they arise.

It isn’t, because it can’t be, at least in the abstract sense. Humans are biological beings that are born with wiring that disposes them to certain concepts of truth innately. A baby doesn’t need to be taught to trust its senses, and build models of the world around it based on (name removed by moderator)uts and effects from it’s thoughts and actions. It’s hardwired into the human. So in that sense, broad epistemic commitments are not chosen later, but part of our “firmware”. But beyond a basic empirical orientation to the world that aids in survival, various renderings of ‘truth’ are the products of our epistemic developments, not the predicate for them.

I didn’t suggest there is some “Truth out there” (even though I believe there is). The concept of truth is presupoosed as a necessary condition making epistemic warrant possible. Without the concept of Truth, there is no such thing as the concept of justification. The concept of justification is derivative of the concept of truth, not the other way around. Clearly, you didn’t understand my post.

Well, you can correct me if I’m wrong (you weren’t responding to me), but I do believe I understand what you are saying, I just am convinced, and convinced in a way that I believe I can defend in detail and at length, that your ideas about truth and concepts are themselves mistaken, widely mistaken.

-Touchstone

 

[Syntax]

It’s not absurd, even by your own terminology, below. You understand the concept of “the concept of truth”, (your phrase below), but this refutes your point above about 2+2=4. As a statement, the expression of a concept, it is TRANSCENDENTALLY dependent on language.

No the proposition is not Transcendentally dependent on any particular language. You’re confusing propositions, concepts, and language in one fell-swoop. You are also conflating the differences between types and tokens throughout your reply. You are also talking about innate versus empirical concepts as if they were the same thing. I strongly suggest getting those distinctions clear before you respond with another lengthy piece. I don’t have time to correct every error you make.

The two linguistic utterances “Schnee ist Weiss” and “Snow is white” express one and the same proposition namely [snow is white]. The proposition would still be true even if there were no German-speakers or English-speakers. And the proposition would still exist even if there were no German-speakers or English-speakers. See my next remark.

No language, no concepts.

The ontological dependency you are implying here is false. Concepts can exist without any particular language, just as the concept of red would still exist in English -speakers’ minds even if there existed no German language-speakers to say “rot.”

No, and that shows where the error lies. It’s a false dichotomy. If there never were any humans or living beings and no language and no concepts, ‘truth’, and all language, is simply an non-entity. It’s not false, it’s not even ‘incoherent’ (which is different than false), it’s simply non-existent. To be able to say (or decide, or contemplate, or process in any way) ‘false’, it is TRANSCENDENTALLY NECESSARY that language and the predicates for concepts be in place.…

The bold-faced piece comes from your assumption that propositions are dependent on language. I’ve already said why this is false. You are confusing token language-utterances and with what those languages express, namely, propositions.

Sounds like you are committing a genetic fallacy here. Just because the use of language-expressions are *necessary conditions *for **us **to be able to express the propostions that we do by means of them, does not entail that these propositions are dependent for ther existence on any particular language or on us. If all German speakers die, the proposition expressed by an English token-utterances still exists, and so does its truth value. Moreover, if this argument holds for German speakers, it also ought to hold for all language speakers, for there is nothing priviledged about English-speakers and their language for being the *one-and-only *ontological ground for the existence of all propositions. So propositions exist independent of any particular language or language-speakers.
Q.E.D

Concepts are linguistic products, the set of objects standing in relation to a subject. Language is what the subject, objects, and relationships are reified through…

Some concepts are linguistic products, but not all of them. Moreover, don’t conflate the relation of ontological dependency with source of origin. Just because the source of an entity’s existence arises in language, does not entail that entity cannot exist independent of that language. You need an argument to support this if you think it does. So far, I haven’t seen any.

What’s absurd is the idea that “2+2=4” somehow exists priority to itself as a concept, or an expression of the concept. It’s precisely like telling us that if there were no language, **no living things, no nothing extant capable of communicating, we would still be discussing this right now. **It’s precisely that absurd.

The bold-faced piece is clearly a contradiction, when did I ever say that? You are saying “If there are no existent human beings they are still discussing things.” I don’t think that’s true. lol.

It’s just trivially true – a tautology. Unless you suppose that tautologies somehow shape reality and conform nature to its semantics, this statement is incoherent upon reaching the “before human beings”.

What is a tautology, your statement above? No, it’s a contradiction.

 

[Syntax]

It isn’t, because it can’t be, at least in the abstract sense. Humans are biological beings that are born with wiring that disposes them to certain concepts of truth innately. A baby doesn’t need to be taught to trust its senses, and build models of the world around it based on (name removed by moderator)uts and effects from it’s thoughts and actions. It’s hardwired into the human. So in that sense, broad epistemic commitments are not chosen later, but part of our “firmware”. But beyond a basic empirical orientation to the world that aids in survival, various renderings of ‘truth’ are the products of our epistemic developments, not the predicate for them…

This is really convoluted, so I’m not really certain what you are trying to say here. You will have to unpack this.

**We have reasons to believe that objects existed prior to humans, objects that would become amenable to description and conceptual manipulation through maths and other forms of symbolic calculus. **

**But there’s precisely nothing available that points to math concepts being discrete ontological universals in their own right, or some such. **The only way I know that people arrive there is through their own incredulity at their intuitions, the imagination of concepts as immaterial/supernatural/universal…

The first bold-faced piece is true.

I think the latter bold-faced piece is false. Question: what entity satsifies the operation 2-squared? Wait, nothing? The operation admits of one and only one very unique answer: 4. It is not satisfied only by 4 apples or 4 oranges, because the operation can be applied to all different kinds of objects. Morever, the equation 2-squared=4 is necessarily true independent of my existence, or anybody else’s for that matter. Are you denying this? If you are, it sounds like metaphysical Idealism to me *par excellence *–the exact thing you are accusing me of doing.

Well, you have painted yourself in quite a corner with this declaration. If I ask “what is your definition of ‘truth’?” even then you are stuck because even with all the leeway you’d like in terms of definitions, IT’S STILL YOU DOING THE DEFINING, which fundamental discredits your claim, no matter what definition you apply…

Lol! whatever. Try defining justice, the good, the beautiful, the number 2. Wait, you can’t? Therefore the concepts are meaningless as you use them? These concepts are used all the time without having explicit definitions. I see nothing problematic here.

The more you try to define it, and make it meaningful, the more false your claim becomes, because it’s only through semantics – the investment of meaning as the freight carried by our language – that ‘truth’ is coherent at all…

I never suggested I was defining Truth in relation to language because I’ve explicitly said elswhere it cannot be so defined (though I do have religious views about the concept which isn’t relevant to our discussion–so let’s leave that part alone.) So at most we can indirectly mention a linguistic deflationary description of it when we say,

“P” is true if and only if P.

Reality is what it is, apart from the human mind, so far as we can tell. But ‘truth’ is a product of human minds and language constructs. There is not ONE rendering of ‘truth’ out there that stands as an exception to that, so far as anyone can see…

The adjective “true” is dependent on human language but the concept of “the Truth” is not. Nor is it an kind of empirical abstraction from the world or from human language practices. Like I’ve said, there’s not much we can say about it, other than offer vague and indirect descriptions of it. But this ought not to bar from taking it as a concept that is innately presupposed in all our linguistic activities and is prior to all experience. For the very concept makes possible the statement: “P” is true if and only if P. I find it odd you keep using the term “transcendental,” because this is precisely what I am saying and Immanuel Kant’s Transcendental project would agree with me…

Well, you can correct me if I’m wrong (you weren’t responding to me), but I do believe I understand what you are saying, I just am convinced, and convinced in a way that I believe I can defend in detail and at length, that your ideas about truth and concepts are themselves mistaken, widely mistaken.

I’ve already shown that your own views are really convoluted. You need to get your use of terms straight. You might find we agree more than you think.

 

[Betterave]

Syntax wrote:

This is true. But is it problematic? An atheist and a religious person, if they are both rational, both agree on what counts as appropriate evidence such as 1st-person experience, empirical data, probability, and reason. The only difference between the atheist and the man of faith is that the the atheist lacks a 1st-person religious/spiritual experience. So with respect to this kind of (lack of) evidence the atheist’s belief that there is no God is a rational belief. What is problematic for the atheist is not so much the private 1st-person experience of the religious person, but rather the alleged authority of others’ own testimony for which he thinks [there] is not a reliable authority–and he is right, especially the more the content of that testimony (Jesus rose from the Dead, e.g.) becomes increasingly unlikely.

I don’t think the atheist you describe can be rational, unless he is very ignorant (as many people are), in which case his ‘rationality’ isn’t worth much. Why? - because he hasn’t been rational about his own epistemic limitations.

Leela wrote:
**Criterion 1 “Faith has truth in so far as it adequately expresses am ultimate concern.” … “But the life of symbols is limited” … “Symbols which for a certain period, or in a certain place, expressed truth of faith for a certain group now only remind of the faith of the past. They have lost their truth, and it is an open question whether dead symbols can be revived. Probably not for those to whom they have died!”…"…the criterion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive." **

“…whether or not it is alive.” As if faith and its symbols were something with a life and death quite independent of the believer. (Surely this is misleading and incompatible with the basic concept of what Christian belief is supposed to be - a free response to the promptings of the living God.)

Criterion 2: “The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate. In other words, that it is not idolatrous.”…“The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.” (This is why he favors Protestantism over Catholicism. It’s the whole infallibility thing.)

Infallibility does not express ultimacy in the sense you suggest. It expresses only an assurance against error in expressing the ultimate; it asserts that it’s symbols of faith will not lead the believer away from what is of ultimate concern (that is very different from failing to recognize its own lack of ultimacy).

This sounds like some pretty cool stuff to me. If I were going to be religious, this is how I would like to think of faith. But I suspect there is no hope for me in that regard. It’s a criterion 1 problem. The symbols are dead to me.

Why are the symbols dead to you? You remind me of William James in “The Will to Believe” - he mentions a list of things that he and his listeners believe without hesitation, then notes his revulsion for Catholic doctrine and ritual (this may have been in Varieties of Religious Experience) - then he notes that he has no reason for his differing attitudes towards the two… and that’s it! He clearly has some very fundamental misunderstandings of Catholic doctrine, just as you do, yet he never questions his right to his prejudices. It’s startling in its honesty, which is admirable, but then you need to ask yourself - is this kind of complacency really justified?

 

[Betterave]

I think this is relevant, so I’ll repost:
I know many Christians, I know many non-Christians. All of them have beliefs and none of them have beliefs which are neutral “with respect to frustrating the needs of others.” But my asserting that (and *your *asserting *something *like that, and *anyone’s *asserting *anything *like that) is based on an understanding of (and therefore *beliefs *about) what it is that others need. So do you want to say that a Christian could be a Christian while believing that others do not need Christ? That seems to me implausible, but a consequence of your position as I understand it. Of course, you might point out that some *avowed *Christians might indeed be religiously pluralistic and believe that others do not need Christ. But do you really want to say that they have a right to consider their opinions on the matter to be immune from criticism, or a right to insist without justification that their having such a belief does *not *“frustrate the needs of others”?

Tillich (or Leela?) can avoid this question by assuming that their notion of need conforms to some absolute standard (not that Leela can easily admit that - she faces Wittgenstein’s problem at the end of the Tractatus) - I suppose they might say that their apprehension of ‘what folks need’ (whatever that is) expresses a living symbol of the timeless phenomenon of ultimate concern, and as such they need not justify themselves to others who might feel that such a project is an attempt to destroy what these others take to be living symbols of the same… But is anyone really going to buy that?

 

[Leela]

You didn’t pay attention to my very first post where I articulated explicitly the uniquely different epistemic situations of the atheist and theist within which they find themselves with respect to the same list of empistemic criteria they both agree on. The question is not whether they agree/disagree on a same set of criteria (because they don’t!!). The question is whether the atheist has the relevant 1st-person spiritual experience (which he doesn’t). So the theist and atheist are **both justified **in believing their competing claims, “God exists” and “God doesn’t exist.” The latter statement, I believe, just happens to be false. What are you not understanding?

I understand that theists claim to have had experiences that justify their faith. I assume you are talking about the sort of mystical experiences that are reported by people all over the world and all through history of all religions and of no religion at all. While I can understand that such experiences may be regarded as justification for belief in God or whatever notion of the divine expected in a given culture, but I don’t understand how such experiences could be viewed as evidence that, say, Jesus was born of a virgin. Presumably theists do not have a first person experience of this event.

I’ve said repeatedly that “Jesus rose from the dead” is not merely a historical proposition requiring **only **historical justification, but is also more than just a historical claim, it is also a spiritual/metaphysical claim whose content is experienced in the 1st-person by the religious person justifying him in the belief that the historical proposition is true. Again, please explain what I am not being clear about. Plantinga, in the passage quoted above, also agrees with me here.

You want to say that this assertion is more than historical, so it need not be justified based on historical criteria. If you want to say that an assertion is true in not just one way, e.g., historical, but also in another way as way, e.g., religious, then it seems to me that this assertions needs to stand up to both sorts of criteria for truth.

What criteria? Would please repeat it? I thought Paul Tillich simply denied there are any epistemic requirements for faith–as you’ve mentioned above.

Criterion 1 “Faith has truth in so far as it adequately expresses an ultimate concern.” … “But the life of symbols is limited” … “Symbols which for a certain period, or in a certain place, expressed truth of faith for a certain group now only remind of the faith of the past. They have lost their truth, and it is an open question whether dead symbols can be revived. Probably not for those to whom they have died!”…"…the criterion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive."

Criterion 2: “The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate. In other words, that it is not idolatrous.”…“The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.”

(It is the second criterion which explains Tillich’s opting for Protestantism over Catholicism.)

 

[Syntax]

I understand that theists claim to have had experiences that justify their faith. I assume you are talking about the sort of mystical experiences that are reported by people all over the world and all through history of all religions and of no religion at all. While I can understand that such experiences may be regarded as justification for belief in God or whatever notion of the divine expected in a given culture, but I don’t understand how such experiences could be viewed as evidence that, say, Jesus was born of a virgin. Presumably theists do not have a first person experience of this event.

See remark below.

You want to say that this assertion is more than historical, so it need not be justified based on historical criteria. If you want to say that an assertion is true in not just one way, e.g., historical, but also in another way as way, e.g., religious, then it seems to me that this assertions needs to stand up to both sorts of criteria for truth.

It does stand up to both kinds, when one brings in considerations like social context, the intentions and characters of Christ’s followers and their testimonies, the consistency of the message in the New Testament, and the final consideration of weighing the probablities of competing hypotheses, all of which suggest Christ and his followers were most likely NOT crazy, egomoniacal, lying cult-founders all too ready to believe lies and deceive everyone else around them which is a predominant characteristic among every other single nasty cult today invented whether by Joseph Smith, B. Young, Koresh, the JW’s, and the Scientologists. Moreover, the very message of Chist as Love in the New Testament, which Christ’s witnesses wrote, would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were liars and deceivers of low-character and moral disposition. So though not “proving” anything about Christ, the evidence does “demand a verdict” as McDowell would say. And the **religous person’s verdict carries more weight than the alternatives hypotheses presented by the non-believer. ** But my intention is not to defend this here. There are plenty of resources on hand you can access.

The problem is that MERE historical evidence is insufficient to establish miraculous claims to convince you or anybody else of its MERE historicity. And that’s where justification is introduced from other sources, 1st-person experience, reason, and lasting tradition. Perhaps you need to research into the figure of Christ himself if you want other types of warrant or justification, because you’re not going to ever be “convinced” by historical argument alone. I wouldn’t be convinced either. And I wasn’t for most years of my life. I used to battle Christians all the time for sport.

Criterion 1 “Faith has truth in so far as it adequately expresses an ultimate concern.” … “But the life of symbols is limited” … “Symbols which for a certain period, or in a certain place, expressed truth of faith for a certain group now only remind of the faith of the past. They have lost their truth, and it is an open question whether dead symbols can be revived. Probably not for those to whom they have died!”…"…the criterion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive."

Boldfaced–By this criterion, then the Catholic faith is true. But Tillich says it’s dead… hahahaha! Right, where’s the evidence for THAT whopper?!! If the symbols are “dead” for Tillich, that’s not MY problem. Sheesh.

Criterion 2: “The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate. In other words, that it is not idolatrous.”…“The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.”

**(It is the second criterion which explains Tillich’s opting for Protestantism over Catholicism.) **

I don’t understand whatsoever how the bold-faced conclusion follow his criterion. Do you mean to say that Tillich thinks Catholicim is idolatrous? whatever. The criterion is vague to begin with anyway–any religion can use it, just as Tillich uses it assert his own nonsense.

 

[Leela]

See remark below.

It does stand up to both kinds, when one brings in considerations like social context, the intentions and characters of Christ’s followers and their testimonies, the consistency of the message in the New Testament, and the final consideration of weighing the probablities of competing hypotheses, all of which suggest Christ and his followers were most likely NOT crazy, egomoniacal, lying cult-founders all too ready to believe lies and deceive everyone else around them which is a predominant characteristic among every other single nasty cult today invented whether by Joseph Smith, B. Young, Koresh, the JW’s, and the Scientologists. Moreover, the very message of Chist as Love in the New Testament, which Christ’s witnesses wrote, would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were liars and deceivers of low-character and moral disposition. So though not “proving” anything about Christ, the evidence does “demand a verdict” as McDowell would say. And the **religous person’s verdict carries more weight than the alternatives hypotheses presented by the non-believer. ** But my intention is not to defend this here. There are plenty of resources on hand you can access.

Certainly no need to defend it here. We disagree about the direction the available historical evidence points, but that is an entirely different discussion. Your point is well made for the purposes of this discussion that the criteria for for evaluating the truth of an assertion that has both spiritual and historical implications are actually higher rather than lower standards because such claims need to satisfy more criteria, yet the atheist is unlikely to recognize this fact because she doesn’t see such assertions as not only meeting historical criteria but also other criteria because these other criteria are not part of the atheists sensibilities.

Boldfaced–By this criterion, then the Catholic faith is true. But Tillich says it’s dead… hahahaha! Right, where’s the evidence for THAT whopper?!! If the symbols are “dead” for Tillich, that’s not MY problem. Sheesh.

The symbols were not dead for Tillich by any means. I pulled out those additional quotes in reference to his 2nd criteria because they explain by own atheism in Tillich’s terms. The symbols of Christianity are dead to me, though certainly not to you or Tillich.

I don’t understand whatsoever how the bold-faced conclusion follow his criterion. Do you mean to say that Tillich thinks Catholicim is idolatrous? whatever. The criterion is vague to begin with anyway–any religion can use it, just as Tillich uses it assert his own nonsense.

It was just a side-note that I thought may be of interest, and a full-disclosure sort of note to say that I grant that Tillich was a protestant rather than a Catholic theologian so what he says about faith may not be the Catholic view (or anyone’s besides his really). As I understand him, he took papal infallibility to be at least potentially idolatrous, but far more problematic to him is the literalist form of belief where myth is not myth but historical fact and symbol is not symbol but God itself. For Tillich, this is idolatry.

Best,
Leela

 

[Touchstone]

No the proposition is not Transcendentally dependent on any particular language.

Nowhere in the posts you are responding to did I make mention of any dependency on a particular language. I do not see particular languages, or distinctions between them at all relevant here, so this strikes me as an odd response from you. A proposition is language, it doesn’t matter what language, even to the extremes of admitting “private languages” (cf. Wittgenstein’s denial). A proposition is sentence asserting the truth or falsehood of some condition. It’s intrinsically language bound. No language, no propositions, and particular languages don’t matter at all in this regard.

You’re confusing propositions, concepts, and language in one fell-swoop. You are also conflating the differences between types and tokens throughout your reply. You are also talking about innate versus empirical concepts as if they were the same thing. I strongly suggest getting those distinctions clear before you respond with another lengthy piece. I don’t have time to correct every error you make.

Maybe just try one, then? I don’t think I’m confused, but would like to know, if so.

The two linguistic utterances “Schnee ist Weiss” and “Snow is white” express one and the same proposition namely [snow is white]. The proposition would still be true even if there were no German-speakers or English-speakers. And the proposition would still exist even if there were no German-speakers or English-speakers. See my next remark.

This is compeletely irrelevant to nature of propsositions themselves. A proposition is a sentence about the truth or falsehood of condition. What particular language it’s rendered in couldn’t be less important. That it is a product of language is absolute critical to a basic understanding here.

The ontological dependency you are implying here is false. Concepts can exist without any particular language, just as the concept of red would still exist in English -speakers’ minds even if there existed no German language-speakers to say “rot.”

Again, this matters not at all, which particular language we are talking about. See above. No language, no concepts. If you have concepts, you have language, and it doesn’t matter if it is German or Swahili or Wittgenstein’s “private language”.

The bold-faced piece comes from your assumption that propositions are dependent on language. I’ve already said why this is false. You are confusing token language-utterances and with what those languages express, namely, propositions.

I think you search my posts here, you will see I’m regularly complaining about people I talk with confusing map with territory. The map is not the territory. I’m quite clear on that. “Truth” is a map-centric concept. Reality is what it is, independent of any minds or any will (objective reality). That’s the ‘territory’. Any statement about the territory is a function of the map, necessarily, just because it is a statement. It’s not an assumption as you suggest above, it’s a predicate. You can’t say anything without making a statement, which is hopefully obvious when put that way. Do you suppose it’s an “assumption” that I must use langauge to express a proposition?

The territory remains what it is. We are talking about ‘concepts’, ‘truth’ and ‘language’, though and these are all “map words”. Truth is a concept we have (map!) about the relationship between our maps and the territory.

Sounds like you are committing a genetic fallacy here. Just because the use of language-expressions are *necessary conditions *for **us **to be able to express the propostions that we do by means of them, does not entail that these propositions are dependent for ther existence on any particular language or on us.

Argh. The ‘particular language’ canard again. See above.

It need not even be expressed outwardly. Just the ability to FORMULATE a proposition – at all – requires language. “Proposition” is transcendentally dependent on language. Maybe it will help to consider whether you think math is entailed by a formula. Do you suppose you can propose “a^2 = b^2 + c^2” without implicating math? If not, then you already understand why propositions (FORGET WHICH LANGUAGE – DOESN’T MATTER WHICH) implicate language.

If all German speakers die, the proposition expressed by an English token-utterances still exists, and so does its truth value. Moreover, if this argument holds for German speakers, it also ought to hold for all language speakers, for there is nothing priviledged about English-speakers and their language for being the *one-and-only *ontological ground for the existence of all propositions. So propositions exist independent of any particular language or language-speakers.
Q.E.D

Propositions can be expressed in any number of particular languages. But all of them, all of them that we know of, require language. And we are not looking around for “non-language propositions” any more than we wonder about ‘non-math formulas’, because one implicates the other, necessarily – propositions entail the use of language, formulas entail the use of math rule and symbols (a form of language).

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Some concepts are linguistic products, but not all of them. Moreover, don’t conflate the relation of ontological dependency with source of origin. Just because the source of an entity’s existence arises in language, does not entail that entity cannot exist independent of that language. You need an argument to support this if you think it does. So far, I haven’t seen any.

I don’t need to support that any more than I need to support the idea that propositions are made of marshmallows. There’s no reason to think such is the case, and it’s not even coherent as a proposition, because a propositions is by definition a language construct. Do you think “formulas” might exist indepent of math???

The bold-faced piece is clearly a contradiction, when did I ever say that? You are saying “If there are no existent human beings they are still discussing things.” I don’t think that’s true. lol.

That was the point I was trying to convey to you. It’s absurd, and analogous to suggesting “propositions can exist independently of language”. No language, no propositions. Just above I think you were asking me to “support” my belief that propositions cannot exist without language, which is the very same invitation as inviting me to support the idea that discussion exists without any extant beings capable of discussion.

What is a tautology, your statement above? No, it’s a contradiction.

You were suggesting that “2+2=4” was some kind of “truth” as a statement about reality. It’s not. It’s a definition, a tautology. “All bachelors are unmarried” is a not a statement about the real world. It’s not at all dependent on any state or feature of reality, and has no potential to be false. It’s a definition, which is a different, and trivial (although extremely useful) form of truth, distinct from statements that do pertain to the state of the real world. 'An object in motion tends to stay in motion…", for example, trades in the sense of truth that pertains to conditions and behavior of reality around us.

Saying “2+2=4” tells us precisely nothing about the world, except for verifying language’s ability to create tautologies, definitions. It’s only ‘necessarily true’ insofar as it is declarative.

I think the latter bold-faced piece is false. Question: what entity satsifies the operation 2-squared? Wait, nothing?

Depends on if language (and thus beings with language facilities) are around to make the question coherent or not. Do we have conceptual thinkers around or not? If so, we can both understand the question, and express an answer based on the rules implied (mathematical squares, for example).

However, if there are no conceptual thinkers/linguists in existence, then it’s an incoherent question. It can’t even be a question in that case, as there are no conceptual thinker’s and linguists.

And yet, gravity still would attenuate according to the inverse square law, even without any living things in existence. But doesn’t this make math “real” then? Nature is what it is. It’s the territory, not the map. Math and physics are our maps. No map makers, map-capable beings, no maps, and thus no physics, no math. Nature continues to function as it does, no matter. Our descriptions don’t and can’t change anything.

The operation admits of one and only one very unique answer: 4. It is not satisfied only by 4 apples or 4 oranges, because the operation can be applied to all different kinds of objects. Morever, the equation 2-squared=4 is necessarily true independent of my existence, or anybody else’s for that matter. Are you denying this?

No, not at all, no more than I would deny any other definition (“all bachelors are unmarried”). With language, we can express rules, and then we can apply them. But this tells us precisely nothing in itself about reality, except for the fact that we can use language and rules to produce statements.

If you are, it sounds like metaphysical Idealism to me *par excellence *–the exact thing you are accusing me of doing.

It’s not independent of your existence, of the existence of minds that use language and concepts, and we have no basis to think such an idea is anything more than magical thinking. Does the statement “2+2=4” obtain if there are no minds, no living beings, no language and no concepts, and there never were? Please consider my emphasis on statement (you can substitute “concept” there and try that too, if you like) if/when you answer.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Syntax:

Lol! whatever. Try defining justice, the good, the beautiful, the number 2. Wait, you can’t?

We can, and we do. If you can provide meaning for a term, it can be used to convey meaning, and it’s then not at all useful as part of our language. Do you suppose any of those you’ve listed are not capable of conveying meaning and being useful in communication?

Therefore the concepts are meaningless as you use them? These concepts are used all the time without having explicit definitions. I see nothing problematic here.

Not sure where you got the idea I think that’s problematic. Tautologies are effective, here. They are a feature of language.

I never suggested I was defining Truth in relation to language because I’ve explicitly said elswhere it cannot be so defined (though I do have religious views about the concept which isn’t relevant to our discussion–so let’s leave that part alone.) So at most we can indirectly mention a linguistic deflationary description of it when we say,

“P” is true if and only if P.

I suspect the “irrelevant” religious views are confounding the rest of the thinking, there. In any case, insofar as P refers to some state of affairs in the real world (a claim about the ‘territory’), “P” is “true” only to the extent its features are isomorphic to the real world (a part of our “map”). But this in no way makes maps a cosmic feature of the territory. No mappers, no maps.

The adjective “true” is dependent on human language but the concept of “the Truth” is not.

A concept is a (set of) relationship(s) between subjects and objects – that’s language. Go look up the definitions of your favorite words. What do you find? Isomorphisms - the relationship of a given word vis-a-vis semantically related words! Where you have concept, you have language.

Nor is it an kind of empirical abstraction from the world or from human language practices. Like I’ve said, there’s not much we can say about it, other than offer vague and indirect descriptions of it.

I think we can and should say that all it signifies is magical thinking about the world. Otherwise, it appears to be perfectly empty, incoherent.

But this ought not to bar from taking it as a concept that is innately presupposed in all our linguistic activities and is prior to all experience. For the very concept makes possible the statement: “P” is true if and only if P. I find it odd you keep using the term “transcendental,” because this is precisely what I am saying and Immanuel Kant’s Transcendental project would agree with me…

You understand that some concepts are dependent on other concepts. “‘P’ is true iff P” is dependent on ‘true’, conceptually. And that is the case with all sentences – the semantics of the terms used to form the sentence need to obtain in order to convey meaning. What is now fairly clear that you don’t understand is that concepts themselves are a product of language, that when we engage in concept formation we are necessarily engaging in language. This is what language involves, and what concept formation produces. Giving voice to it, be it in German or English or whatever is beside the point. Forming a “statement” that relies on symbols and concepts standing in relation to each other is the human engaging language.

It doesn’t matter how much lofty, fluffy, or numinous terms you want to hang on it – capitalizing the “T” in “Truth”, for example – or invoking all manner of superstitions about “other forms of reality” in which math formulas and “justice” stand as Platonic objects of some kind (I know, don’t ask how that works!); it’s still statements about those (imagined) things – map making.

The map is not the territory.

I’ve already shown that your own views are really convoluted. You need to get your use of terms straight. You might find we agree more than you think.

Like I said, your completes are general, vague. Give me an example, just one, that has some specifics, and we can look at it (and move on to others if need be, afterwards).

-TS

 

[Betterave]

I think you search my posts here, you will see I’m regularly complaining about people I talk with confusing map with territory. The map is not the territory. I’m quite clear on that. “Truth” is a map-centric concept. Reality is what it is, independent of any minds or any will (objective reality). That’s the ‘territory’. Any statement about the territory is a function of the map, necessarily, just because it is a statement. It’s not an assumption as you suggest above, it’s a predicate. You can’t say anything without making a statement, which is hopefully obvious when put that way. Do you suppose it’s an “assumption” that I must use langauge to express a proposition?

The territory remains what it is. We are talking about ‘concepts’, ‘truth’ and ‘language’, though and these are all “map words”. Truth is a concept we have (map!) about the relationship between our maps and the territory.

I was wondering too why Syntax was focussing on *particular *languages.

What you claim here is interesting though. “The territory remains what it is.” This sounds like your claim that “reality is reality” or that you believe in “the reality of reality” (which is of course comforting to hear!). Okay, but the map apparently *doesn’t *simply “remain what it is,” and the *only *way to talk about the territory is through ‘using’ a map(?). And apparently your map is different from mine… So how do we know we’re mapping the same territory? Nothing ever gets expressed directly about the territory, that is, the territory never expresses itself - indeed, the territory could be altered and we could continue to use our maps (express our concepts) just the same. But “territory” means *reality *and it is axiomatic for you that reality never changes? (Even though the *appearance *of reality *does *change, since it is brought to light (expressed) in different conceptual schemes? What is the purpose of your clinging to the reality of a reality which apparently never appears? What does it mean to characterize such a reality as real? In characterizing it, aren’t you conceptualizing it, i.e., making it part of the map?)

And what about our concepts here? Are we still mapping the changeless territory? Is our own map-making part of the changeless territory? (Is that what you want to say?) Or are maps *not *always about changeless territories? (Are they *ever *about changeless territories?)

I hope you’ll put some thought into answering these questions.

 

[Betterave]

The map is not the territory.

So we cannot map our maps? If we are mapping a map (aren’t you doing that?), then isn’t the map the territory? How are these terms supposed to correlate, exactly?

 

[Betterave]

“propositions are made of marshmallows” - I think that’s one of those truth-filled myths that Leela has been talking about - delicious!

 

[Touchstone]

I was wondering too why Syntax was focussing on *particular *languages.

What you claim here is interesting though. “The territory remains what it is.” This sounds like your claim that “reality is reality” or that you believe in “the reality of reality” (which is of course comforting to hear!). Okay, but the map apparently *doesn’t *simply “remain what it is,” and the *only *way to talk about the territory is through ‘using’ a map(?).

Right. The only tools we have produce “maps”.

And apparently your map is different from mine… So how do we know we’re mapping the same territory?

We can identify similarities in our maps. This produces a starkly parsimonious explanation: we are, in fact, charting out the same territory. To the extent we produce models (here is where ‘map’ metaphorically starts to break down) that are consistent with each other, and effictive in making novel, precise predictions for future or unknown situations, we simply have no other reasoned explanation for the match beyond supposing that the consistency obtains from our experiencing a shared, objective, extramental reality.

Nothing ever gets expressed directly about the territory, that is, the territory never expresses itself - indeed, the territory could be altered and we could continue to use our maps (express our concepts) just the same.

Yes.

But “territory” means *reality *and it is axiomatic for you that reality never changes?

No, not axiomatic. It’s not a necessary assumption (which is what makes a proposition axiomatic). Perhaps reality does change, even at the most fundamental levels, has or will. What I intend by reality’s “unchangeability” (apologies if I used that term – it’s awkward here) is NOT that reality can’t change, but rather that our “mapping” has perfectly no ontological influence on it. Reality is what is, changing or no, completely independent of our mapping efforts, or, more importantly, regardless of whether there are minds, concepts, languages and maps at all, anywhere, ever. The territory is UNCHANGED BY MAPS. That’s the point I was trying to convey. Reality may change dramatically, in all sorts of ways, itself.

(Even though the *appearance *of reality *does *change, since it is brought to light (expressed) in different conceptual schemes? What is the purpose of your clinging to the reality of a reality which apparently never appears?

It does appear. It just gets “modeled” imperfectly. But “imperfectly” can be astonishingly impressive and practically useful, even so. I can fly coast to coast in 5.5 hours, thanks to a shared “map” of the territory that is reality. To the extent we can distill a consensus of observations and models that perform – that enable a 250,000lb hunk of metal to fly 2,500 miles at 35,000 feet – reality does appear to us. Performance in objective terms is the validation of our our appearances.

In any case, it’s not saving the “reality of reality”. The reality of reality is the only hypothesis that isn’t laughable by way of accounting for the agreements we do arrive at, the similarity and performance of our maps.

What does it mean to characterize such a reality as real? In characterizing it, aren’t you conceptualizing it, i.e., making it part of the map?)

As above, performance is the validation of appearances. To the extent we can objectively predict, test, verify and perform with our “maps”, we support not just the performance of those maps, but the underlying metaphysical conjecture that reality is real (this accounts for the agreement and performance).

And what about our concepts here? Are we still mapping the changeless territory?

Sorry about the confusion there. Reality can be as static or dynamic as it will be. Our map-making is just an effort to achieve ever more effective approximations of the territory. If the territory is “fluid”, our map-making just gets that much more complex, and has to “co-fluid” in some respect, if it is to be useful.

Is our own map-making part of the changeless territory? (Is that what you want to say?) Or are maps *not *always about changeless territories? (Are they *ever *about changeless territories?)

Hah. Now I’m lost. This was “Douglas Hoftadter” quality in it’s self-referential complexity. We are part of the territory, and so “map-making” is a phenomenon, just like flowers blooming in the spring, or the tide coming in. But just as the tides and the flowers are effects, so too are our maps. That’s part of a performative map, but a tricksy one; it requires some nuance in the model to keep that clearly in view, AND at the same time not get the maps (conceptually) confused with the territory.

I hope you’ll put some thought into answering these questions.

I believe I did. Let me know where my responses take you.

-TS