Why would a person, though, with complete dominion of reason over appetite, freely choose to do what is wrong?
Because, although not due to
appetite, he could nevertheless make an error of judgement. “Dominion of reason” doesn’t mean that he is inerrant.
This is where the freedom assertion does not hold up. A person does not choose wrong simply because he is free to do so. He chooses wrong because something about the wrong choice appears to outweigh, in the moment, what is right. This “outweighing” is the compromise of the conscience, which occurs when one does not have complete dominion of reason over appetite. Can you think of another example of when such compromise occurs?
I think you’re conflating ‘conscience’ with ‘dominion over appetite’. These two are distinct. Here’s what I have in mind:
Let’s suppose I’m looking at a huge chocolate cake. If I don’t have dominion over appetite, then I might think “I
know that eating that whole cake isn’t good for me, but I really
want to do it.” If I eat it, then, that’s a case of appetite trumping reason.
However, let’s suppose I look at a huge chocolate cake and think “it’s not going to hurt me to eat it – in fact, it looks like it’s
good! So, I’m gonna do it!” Now… this is an error. Possibly an error of conscience (not recognizing gluttony). Possibly an error of objective reason (after all, I’m not recognizing that eating the whole cake is gonna put me in sugar shock).
So, I might make an
error, which is nevertheless not an instance of
appetite over reason, and
this error is the cause of my failure to avoid sin.
So, I still think you’re conflating the two. Perhaps since the word ‘reason’ is part of the discussion, you’re thinking that every failure of reason is an instance of "lack of dominion of reason over appetite’? I still say that, if this is what you’re thinking, then this is an inaccurate assessment.
Is it true that the more information people have about the harmful consequences of a sin, the less likely they are to commit the sin?
That would depend on a number of factors, wouldn’t it? At the very least, the degree to which their conscience is properly formed!
OneSheep:
Well, in the story God did judge! He judged, and He banished.
No – judgment is “you’re going to hell, dude”. God didn’t do that. There were consequences – including banishment from the garden – but in the narrative, God didn’t condemn them to hell.
OneSheep:
Is not the sin against ones own children and a multitude of people graver than a sin against oneself?
In the end, it’s a distinction that doesn’t matter: a grave sin is a grave sin, whether or not it’s “lighter” in weight than any other grave sin. Even one – one that is considered “not as grave” – is sufficient to condemn us, if God judges is mortal.
So… no. I don’t think that knowledge of the
extent of the gravity is in play in the definition – only the knowledge that it is a grave sin, objectively speaking.