Do Consequences Matter?

[Bubba_Switzler]

1936-1937

Ah, that’s it. Thank you! (I guess I should have started with the Parable of the Talents.)

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

Consequencialism, that the morality of an act stems from the consequences, is answered in Veritatas Splendor. Consequences matter, it is just a matter of how much they do and to what degree we base our actions on them.

1. But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it the intention of the acting subject, the circumstances — and in particular the consequences — of his action, or the object itself of his act?

This is what is traditionally called the problem of the “sources of morality”. Precisely with regard to this problem there have emerged in the last few decades new or newly-revived theological and cultural trends which call for careful discernment on the part of the Church’s Magisterium.

Certain ethical theories, called “teleological”, claim to be concerned for the conformity of human acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with the values intended by him. The criteria for evaluating the moral rightness of an action are drawn from the weighing of the non-moral or pre-moral goods to be gained and the corresponding non-moral or pre-moral values to be respected. For some, concrete behaviour would be right or wrong according as whether or not it is capable of producing a better state of affairs for all concerned. Right conduct would be the one capable of “maximizing” goods and “minimizing” evils.

1. In order to offer rational criteria for a right moral decision, the theories mentioned above take account of the intention and consequences of human action. Certainly there is need to take into account both the intention — as Jesus forcefully insisted in clear disagreement with the scribes and Pharisees, who prescribed in great detail certain outward practices without paying attention to the heart (cf. Mk 7:20-21; Mt 15:19) — and the goods obtained and the evils avoided as a result of a particular act. Responsibility demands as much. But the consideration of these consequences, and also of intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice. The weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action is not an adequate method for determining whether the choice of that concrete kind of behaviour is “according to its species”, or “in itself”, morally good or bad, licit or illicit. The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.

Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one’s own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure? How could an absolute obligation be justified on the basis of such debatable calculations?

From Veritatas Splendor. This is dealing mainly with consequences as a determination of the morality of an act in place of the determination of the moral object of an act, as seen in “liberal” theology that bases the good of an act in deference to the totality of the act, pre-moral good, intention, act, and all “foreseeable” consequences. As we cannot know “all” consequences, the determination of “consequence” must play a minor role in determining the morality of an act.

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him. … The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: “It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God”

Again, this encyclical is answering proportionalism and consequentialism, but the answer inferred is that we cannot know all the consequences, and as St. Therese has said, “Intentions are all we have” since we are not omniscient, we are not able to know all that our actions will eventually produce. We do good for others, but it produces good in us as well. If we are to do good, we must look at the object, “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object”, as the object being ordered to God, falls back on us at the time of judgment, not the good that came from what we did.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Consequencialism, that the morality of an act stems from the consequences, is answered in Veritatas Splendor. Consequences matter, it is just a matter of how much they do and to what degree we base our actions on them.

What’s interesting in the quote you cite is that while their main thrust is to reject pure consequencialism, which is what everyone wants to focus on, they only tangentially acknowledge the relevance of consequences to moral decisions. They seem to treat it as common sense.

As we cannot know “all” consequences, the determination of “consequence” must play a minor role in determining the morality of an act.

This minimization of consequences does seem to be the most consistent theme.

Again, this encyclical is answering proportionalism and consequentialism, but the answer inferred is that we cannot know all the consequences, and as St. Therese has said, “Intentions are all we have” since we are not omniscient, we are not able to know all that our actions will eventually produce.

This would be a valid argument against consequentialism, the total reliance on consequences, but it seems rather odd to argue that because we are not omnicient, we should ignore consequences and focus only on intentions.