Do Religious People Really Believe in Their Religion?

[colmcille1]

Unfortunately this is true. And this bring on another shaky “moral” principle: “might makes right”. Which sounds wonderful for the those who are part of the “mighty”, and sounds pretty despicable to those who are outside.

And since God is the “mightiest” of all, the Christian attitude is “let’s worship God, no matter how he acts, lest we get in his bad graces and he will ‘reward’ us with eternal torture and punishment”. Typical slave attitude, fear the master, because of the repercussions, and “lick up to him” to get a few morsels off his table.

Hi all,
The above is, in a nutshell, typical of the self-serving “logic” of the non-religious mindset.
Natural Enquirer (#293) has addressed it directly and succintly in his refutation of same.
I merely draw attention to it as an overview of the kind of tawdry parlour game most non-believers indulge in; it is truly breathtaking in its ignorance; it serves as a sober reminder of the level of thought that one periodically faces on these forums.
Whether done as a self-conscious smart-alec attempt at gaining notoriety or as a sad display of inferior reasoning, either way, it is seen for what it is and refuted accordingly.
God Bless,
Colmcille.

 

[R_Daneel]

Let me restate the argument thus far.
Catholic Church: There exists an entity which is omnibenevolent and omnipotent.
sinnerdexter: Such an entity cannot exist, because omnibenevolence and omnipotence are incompatible with the existence of suffering.
Me: On the contrary, if suffering has a beneficial end, as the Catholic Church teaches, there is no incompatibility.

Well, to be precise, the argument is a bit different.
“Such an entity cannot exist, because omnibenevolence and omnipotence are incompatible with the existence of unnecessary suffering.”

To that you say: “On the contrary, IF suffering has a beneficial end, as the Catholic Church teaches, there is no incompatibility.”

Which should read: “IF it were possible to substantiate that ALL sufferings have a beneficial corollary, and NONE of the sufferings are even an iota over the necessary amount, then the sufferings could be reconciled with omnipotence and omnibenevolence”.

In this case the Church’s teaching would be correct. But the Church does not even attempt to substantiate the claim, it just declares (maybe “ex cathedra”) that “IF…”. And that is nothing but just another empty claim.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

If I were trying to prove the redemptive value of suffering, then I would need to substantiate the claim that suffering has a higher purpose. But in order to refute sinnerdexter’s proof that suffering and benevolence are logically incompatible, only the existence of a possible counterexample is needed.

It’s like this. He’s saying, “It is mathematically impossible to solve the equation 2x + y = 9.” And I say, “No, one solution would be if x = 4 and y = 1.” Now you’re saying “But you haven’t proven that x = 4 and y = 1.” I know I haven’t. I haven’t even tried to, because it’s not necessary in order to refute his claim. The existence of a solution proves that he is wrong when he says that no solution is possible.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

But to show that suffering is beneficial or redemptive you have to show how links between such things as a child dying in an isolated forest by being torn apart by wolves shortly after birth from a dead mother – even though no one sees this nor does the newborn learn any lessons from this – and some good outcome are not only possible or likely, but even necessary, since the least unnecessary evil in the world is inconsistent with the God hypothesis. I can’t conceive of any way that that links between the putative newborn’s suffering and some benefitical or redemptive outcome could ever be demonstrated without making some equally unprovable assumptions about a magical sort of knowledge of how such disparate things in the universe are connected or how these can be shown to be necessary. If we start by assuming that God exists then it would also follow that the newborn’s suffering must be beneficial, but we can’t start there and convince an audience which does not already believe in God.

I actually thought I sent a reply to this post last night, but I can’t seem to find it. I pretty much covered this in my last reply to R Daneel, but just to explicitly connect the dots: you’re right, I have not proven a good outcome from the baby being eaten. I have not tried to do so. But it is possible that an overall good can come from it, which we cannot perceive, and so your proof fails.

I am not trying to convince you to believe in God. I am refuting your proof of his nonexistence.

I think I should make that last paragraph my signature. Save precious keystrokes!

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

Sorry for the multiple posts - one last point before I try to get some actual work done.

The reason I tend to drop the word “unnecessary” is that it really doesn’t add anything to the argument, because it is simply impossible for us to know if suffering is necessary or unnecessary. At best, you can claim “apparently unnecessary”, but I trust it’s obvious how useless that is to disprove God.

 

[R_Daneel]

If I were trying to prove the redemptive value of suffering, then I would need to substantiate the claim that suffering has a higher purpose. But in order to refute sinnerdexter’s proof that suffering and benevolence are logically incompatible, only the existence of a possible counterexample is needed.

Actually, no. A possible counterexample is not enough. With just a possible counterexample all you showed that “maybe” or “possibly” the existence of suffering could be reconciled with omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Which is, of course true. It “may be reconciled”, but maybe is not “it is reconciled”. You know, this problem is usually referred to as the most serious problem for Christianity. No one could ever come up with an actual resolution for it. And probably never will, until God comes down, personally and actually explains just how each and every one of those “seemingly” unexplainable sufferings can be explained.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

Thank you! We have reached agreement that sinnerdexter’s proof fails! You say suffering could be reconciled with God; he said it could not be. I’m glad we are on the same page.

And probably never will, until God comes down, personally and actually explains just how each and every one of those “seemingly” unexplainable sufferings can be explained.

Indeed. On that glorious day, every tear shall be wiped away. Come quickly, Lord Jesus!

 

[Moonstruck888]

Indeed. On that glorious day, every tear shall be wiped away. Come quickly, Lord Jesus!

Unless of course you’re one of the five billion or so of us who isn’t a Christian of course. Then there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

Unless of course you’re one of the five billion or so of us who isn’t a Christian of course. Then there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.

That, of course, is not Catholic doctrine. A Catholic statement would be, “unless of course you’re one of the unknown number of people who choose to persist unrepentantly in mortal sin.” That’s a fairly significant difference.

 

[Moonstruck888]

That, of course, is not Catholic doctrine. A Catholic statement would be, “unless of course you’re one of the unknown number of people who choose to persist unrepentantly in mortal sin.” That’s a fairly significant difference.

What is the one sin that God cannot forgive?

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

What is the one sin that God cannot forgive?

There is no such sin. I’m guessing you’re referring to blasphemy against the holy spirit, which scripture says will not (not cannot) be forgiven. Blasphemy against the holy spirit is generally understood to mean final impenitence, as that constitutes a willful frustration of the purpose of the holy spirit.

 

[sinnerdexter]

NaturalEnquirer: Wittgenstein’s theory of language, or the whole philosophical movement of positivism, are important aids to the discussion here. The basic idea is that we cannot establish the REAL possibility of anything just by imagining it and then expecting it to do any work in settling public debates, which have to operate on empirical data we can all access and logical reasoning from that data which we can all understand. I can imagine that my computer operates by being powered by invisible ghosts which no empirical test can ever detect, but this act of imagination does nothing establish the real possibility that that is how my computer operates. Before we can establish the real possibility of anything, such that it has weight against empirical data or logical reasoning, it must also have the support of tangible empirical data or be implied by some necessary conceptual consequence of such empirical data.

Now the possibility which you imagine can reconcile God’s goodness with the fact of evil is that even in cases where we cannot detect by empirical evidence or by logical inference from the available empirical evidence that some particular evil has an ultimately benevolent or redemptive quality, there is still some secret, hidden connection which we cannot detect by empirical evidence or reasoning from that evidence between that apparent evil and the good consequences which excuse it. But such an imaginary possibility is unsupported by the type of reasons which are required to give it weight in an argument conducted within the sphere of public reason, where things count as real reasons, real doubts, and real possibilities only if they are based in tangible empirical evidence or logical inference from that evidence. When you say it is still possible that the apparent evil we see may be redeemed by some subterranean connection of events, I can just as easily counter that by saying that it is also possible that the evil we see won’t be redeemed by some subterranean connection of events. So the only concrete thing we are left with which has some real, empirical weight is the fact of evil which has no apparent excuse we can discern.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

Please look back at my post with the analogy to a math equation. I have not proven that my values for x and y are correct. Other solutions exist, and one of the others might be correct.

But the existence of any solution refutes your claim that the equation is not solvable.

 

[sinnerdexter]

Please look back at my post with the analogy to a math equation. I have not proven that my values for x and y are correct. Other solutions exist, and one of the others might be correct.

But the existence of any solution refutes your claim that the equation is not solvable.

Actually, it’s more like you saying, “you all aren’t clever enough to find it, but I’m sure there really is an answer”. That would be fair enough if it was just a general accusation of unnecessary suffering, but for a specific example like the newborn eaten by wolves, one would expect a specific counterexample.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

I notice you just changed your tune from “you can’t prove your answer,” to “you don’t have an answer,” even though you and R Daneel have both described my answer. No, I can’t prove that my x and y are the correct values, but they do solve the problem.

I think we’ve worn this topic out.

 

[sinnerdexter]

NaturalEnquirer: The problem in your reasoning turns on your notion of ‘possible.’ If we were walking together at night down a street in a slum section of a major city in July, and a man wearing a mask and carrying a gun came towards us, I would say that from the tangible, empirical evidence and from logical inferences based on that evidence, the man is a robber about to attack us, so we had better run. But if you then said, “No, it is possible that he is a devotee of Hallowe’en who is still wearing his holiday costume even in July,” I would say that that was crazy, since your assertion was based on a bare, theoretical notion of ‘possibility’ which did not arise from any tangible empirical evidence (such as it’s being October 31st) or from any logical inference from such tangible empirical evidence. If we ever actually used such purely ungrounded notions of ‘possibility’ in our reasoning, all our thinking and action would be paralyzed, since we would always have to entertain all the vast array of theoretical possibilities that everything was actually different from what the empirical evidence or logical inference from the empirical evidence suggested it was. Since we don’t ever grant such purely notional views of possibility any weight in our reasoning, then we shouldn’t do so in our philosophical reasoning either.

Thus, returning to the case at hand, based on the empirical data in the situation of the newborn being eaten by wolves, we can discern and logically infer no real possibility of this event having a benevolent or redemptive value. To say that it might possibly have such a value even though the data provide us with no grounds for inferring such a value, and we cannot develop any logical train of thought that would tie such a value to the available data, is to use an empty and unreal notion of possibility which does not have any weight in a rational argument. You can’t throw an empty notion of theoretical possibility into the scales against a clear empirical case where the evidence suggests that there is no possibility of suffering being redeemed and pretend that the evidence-backed and the empty possibilities balance each other out. First you have to show why it is just as reasonable to think that the newborn being eaten by wolves is as consistent with a benevolent purpose as it is to think it is inconsistent with a benevolent purpose.

If we admitted that type of empty, theoretical, empirically and rationally unsupported possibility as a valid move in our reasoning and arguments, then we could justify not getting up for work in the morning because it is possible that what seems to be reality is just a dream or an elaborate optical illusion. But while that is just as theoretically ‘possible’ as that the evil in the world has an ultimately benevolent purpose, neither is a sufficiently empirically or logically supported possibility for us ever to take either one seriously.

 

[sinnerdexter]

There is a God. There is a God.

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

I’m just a convert, and so ignorant of a lot of things.

But remind me—which of the corporeal and spiritual works of mercy is it to tell believers over and over ‘there is no God, or if there is, He is a petty tyrant,’ all the while maintaining a Catholic identity?

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

NaturalEnquirer: The problem in your reasoning turns on your notion of ‘possible.’ If we were walking together at night down a street in a slum section of a major city in July, and a man wearing a mask and carrying a gun came towards us, I would say that from the tangible, empirical evidence and from logical inferences based on that evidence, the man is a robber about to attack us, so we had better run. But if you then said, “No, it is possible that he is a devotee of Hallowe’en who is still wearing his holiday costume even in July,” I would say that that was crazy, since your assertion was based on a bare, theoretical notion of ‘possibility’ which did not arise from any tangible empirical evidence (such as it’s being October 31st) or from any logical inference from such tangible empirical evidence. If we ever actually used such purely ungrounded notions of ‘possibility’ in our reasoning, all our thinking and action would be paralyzed, since we would always have to entertain all the vast array of theoretical possibilities that everything was actually different from what the empirical evidence or logical inference from the empirical evidence suggested it was. Since we don’t ever grant such purely notional views of possibility any weight in our reasoning, then we shouldn’t do so in our philosophical reasoning either.

Thus, returning to the case at hand, based on the empirical data in the situation of the newborn being eaten by wolves, we can discern and logically infer no real possibility of this event having a benevolent or redemptive value. To say that it might possibly have such a value even though the data provide us with no grounds for inferring such a value, and we cannot develop any logical train of thought that would tie such a value to the available data, is to use an empty and unreal notion of possibility which does not have any weight in a rational argument. You can’t throw an empty notion of theoretical possibility into the scales against a clear empirical case where the evidence suggests that there is no possibility of suffering being redeemed and pretend that the evidence-backed and the empty possibilities balance each other out. First you have to show why it is just as reasonable to think that the newborn being eaten by wolves is as consistent with a benevolent purpose as it is to think it is inconsistent with a benevolent purpose.

If we admitted that type of empty, theoretical, empirically and rationally unsupported possibility as a valid move in our reasoning and arguments, then we could justify not getting up for work in the morning because it is possible that what seems to be reality is just a dream or an elaborate optical illusion. But while that is just as theoretically ‘possible’ as that the evil in the world has an ultimately benevolent purpose, neither is a sufficiently empirically or logically supported possibility for us ever to take either one seriously.

No. Different scenarios require different levels of confidence. For prudential decisions in day to day life, such as running away from armed thugs, you don’t need more than a gut feel. For conviction in a criminal court, you need proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Which is an ambiguous term, but maybe 90%? 95%? 99%?

But for logical proofs, like you’re trying to make, nothing less than 100% will do. And you’re not there. If you want a logical proof that two triangles are congruent, you can’t just eyeball them and point out your vast experience judging triangle congruence. You need to prove it, step by step, or you don’t have proof. You might be right, you might not.

That’s where you’re at with your proof from unnecessary suffering. Really, calling for empirical proof of a heavenly claim is just plain off-base. The two domains don’t normally overlap. It’s like if we were discussing kangaroos and you insisted on using data from China. You’re saying, “Based on my earthly observations, I have concluded that there is no heavenly benefit to suffering.” That’s analagous to saying “Based on my observations in the steppes of China, I have concluded that there kangaroos don’t exist.”

If you want to say “Earthly suffering causes me to conclude that a benevolent deity does not exist,” fine. That’s a personal aesthetic judgment, and I’ve got no problem with that. But you went further - you didn’t say that you don’t believe, you said that he must not exist, and there you’re writing checks your logic can’t cash.

 

[NaturalEnquirer]

There is a God. There is a God.

Zing indeed.