As for the necessity of causing someone to sin, I was thinking that manA buys something from manB and so on until someone buys from manD who is a sinner. Now buying something provides income to the seller. Assuming this chain of purchases it seems that manA has provided the funds for the sins of manD (since man D has an income by virtue of man A’s purchase. But if everyone is a sinner this is especially true, and so just by being in the company of a sinner you are contributing to their sins.
The Church does not teach, as you state above, that by being in the company of a sinner you are contributing to their sins. That is an incorrect interpretation of Catholic moral theology. For instance, Jesus taught us to “render unto Caesar” the taxes due to Caesar, yet by doing so, under your interpretation, we are reponsible for contributing the the sins of Ceasar, right?
It is true that things we do or say may cause others, in their turn, to act. What is our responsibility? What we do or say can influence the actions of others. When our actions lead others to do evil, it is called “scandal” by Catholic teaching.
There are two general types of our actions that influence others: (1) Acts that we do which we
know will influence others, and (2) actions whose effects on others we do not know, and which might or might not reasonably guess.
(1) Conscious occasion of evil
With the first type, one of two things will have to be true, either: (a) I
know that my action will influence another person’s action and I
will (intend) that that should be the case; or (b) I know that this will happen, but I do not intend that it should–rather, I merely allow it.
(1) (a) Direct conscious occasion of evil
In the case of (1)(a), “know and intend” – It can be an instance of willingly causing another’s evil action as a *end
(i.e. goal, objective), that is, I have no further purpose in mind. Or, it may be that I do have a further purpose in mind, as when I want to gain something (e.g. money) by willingly causing another’s evil action, which is to cause another’s evil action as a means. *
(1) (b) Indirect conscious occasion of evil
In the case of (2), “know but not intend” – although I do not will (intend) that my actions cause another’s evil act, I do recognize that they are likely to do so.
***(2) Non-conscious occasion of evil ***
This is the situation where I do not know or recognize as unlikely (perhaps, may merely guess) that my acts may cause other people to be influenced into doing something evil. For instance, someone sees me out to lunch with a woman from work, and begins to spread gossip about how I am cheating on my wife. I have no idea that my action would have the results that it had, nor did I think it likely.
Morality of each of these
For
direct, conscious occasions of evil, I am completely responsible for these. I do intend the evil action on the other person’s par, whether as an end or as a means. My action is immoral, for intending evil is precisely what is meant by immorality.
For
indirect, conscious occasions of evil, I may or may not be responsible for the other person’s action (and so I may or may not be morally guilty). This is the sort of situation where we must use
the Principle of Double Effectto judge whether or not our action is morally licit.
For
non-conscious occasions of sin, if the other person is led to do evil in such a case sheerly because of his or her own malice, then I have no responsibility for the subbsequent evil action; the person could and should know better. However, when the other person is led by weakness, youthfulness, etc. something else needs to be considered. Charity demands that, when possible, we refrain from words or deeds that would be a source of damage to the weak. In this situation, the
Principle of Double Effect is used to judge whether or not our action is morally licit.
The above is a summary of the teaching from my ethics professor from decades past, Fr. Martin D. O’Keefe, S.J., of blessed memory, from his text
Known from the Things That Are.
