LeafByNiggle
Well-known member
So when you say “The billionaire is clearly rationalizing a selfish position” are you classifying his action as a poor prudential judgment or a violation of a moral rule?The billionaire [in your example] is clearly rationalizing a selfish position just as the person who votes for Nancy Pelosi is just as clearly rationalizing away her obvious support of abortion. Voting for Senator Casey of PA might have been valid; voting for Obama was not (based on the assumption that the moral rule prohibits voting for pro-abortion candidates).
Same question for voting for Nancy Pelosi. Is voting for her a poor prudential judgment or a violation of a moral rule?
I am not trying to distinguish between a good prudential judgment and a bad prudential judgment. I am trying to distinguish between prudential and moral. So the point where the decision switches from good to bad is not what I am after. I am only interested in the point where the decision switches from moral to prudential. I am trying to clarify your use of the term “prudential judgment”, so when you instead use terms like “valid” and “invalid” I don’t know if you are claiming these decisions to be prudential or not.It is not necessary (nor is it even possible) to know the exact point where valid choices end and dishonest rationalization begins - that’s the prudential part of the judgment. It is possible, however, as you point out, to know that some positions are valid and others are invalid and not knowing where the former becomes the latter doesn’t change that.
So if somebody said “I don’t think Nancy Pelosi falls in the category of pro-abortion, so I’m going to vote for her” would they be making a prudential judgment? (An incorrect prudential judgment, but prudential nonetheless?)As I said, regarding capital punishment we are disagreeing over the rule, not its application, just as - regarding voting - the disagreement is over whether the rule prohibits supporting a pro-abortion candidate, not whether Candidate X falls into that category.