Does God have contingent properties?

[polytropos]

If there is no time, then a number of common words cease to have meaning.

I didn’t say that there is no time. I said that there is no identifiable time prior to the creation of the universe, because the universe was created with time.

God exists timelessly, however. So even “after” creating, he does not exist in time.

Though one particular problem here might be the idea of creation as the big bang, ie. there was no matter and then God made some matter which now acts independently of him. That is not the classical understanding of creation, whereby the world depends on God just as much now as it did in the first moment it existed. Creation is a sustaining of things at all times at which they exist. So there is no “after” creation either.

In the absence of time we can no longer say, “God existed before creation”.

Well, I’m not denying that time is real. But I am denying that “God existed before creation” in the sense that no one can identify a time at which God existed but the universe did not.

It also becomes difficult to distinguish cause (which is before) from effect (which is after). If we cannot define either ‘before’ or ‘after’ then we cannot distinguish cause from effect. It becomes al logical to sat “time caused God,” as to say, “God caused time”. If we cannot determine which came first, then the two statements are indistinguishable.

I do not think a temporal distinction is essential to cause and effect. For example, a potter spins some clay on his wheel. The effect (the clay’s changing) is simultaneous (though not instantaneous) with the cause (the potter’s hands acting). (The particular example doesn’t matter much. What is important is that causation makes sense whether or not the cause and effect differ in time or not, since what is essential to calling something an effect is that it depends on the cause for its existence/occurrence.)

So it does make sense to say that God caused time, though God is not in time. God’s creation is a single act; he creates everything and all times at once. (Even if the cause is not in time, then the effects might be–and might not be at the same times.) A naive metaphor would be a light source radiating onto a line. Perhaps the light first passes through a colored filter, so the color varies along the line. The line is like the timeline, the light source is like God. God is not on the line, but all of the light reaching the line depends on him. If the light were turned off, then the light would disappear.

You are correct. Any act of creation/causation is contingent on the existence of time. God alone cannot create; only God within time can create. Creation is an action within time. In the absence of time we cannot define change, and creation is, obviously, a change.

For the reasons I enunciated above, this is not implied by what I said where you quoted me.

 

[polytropos]

I think that the Bible disagrees with you. If the Bible was written by an unchanging God, then it would read very differently:

On the first day God said, “Let there be light,” and on the second day God said, “Let there be light,” and on the third day God said, “Let there be light,” and on the fourth day …

An unchanging God cannot change, and so can never do anything different. Difference is change, and without change there can be no difference.

Most people understand Genesis as a theological account of the way that Creation is ordered. They are not committed to the position that God acts at t1 and then does some different act at t2 if other theoretical concerns lead them to hold otherwise.

In narratives it often makes sense to write as though God acts one way and then acts another, while the distinction (ontologically) is really between the differing in time of his effects. An atemporal being, in acting to create time, will have effects that occur at different times.

I do not accept the concept of a “necessary being”. Primarily because it is useless. If God is necessary, then whatever God causes is also necessary. Hence the entire world is necessary.

How con a necessary God do something that is not necessary? If all of God is necessary, then God’s actions are also necessary – He has no choice about what He does. If His actions are not necessary, then He is not completely necessary, but is part necessary and part (the acting/non-acting part) not necessary.

I’ve given an argument against this in #6. God virtually contains the forms of everything that does (or can) exist, but only his own goodness necessitates his will. Whatever else is created is not necessary because it is not absolutely good and does not necessitate his will. There is in a sense a contingent “part” of God’s will, but the distinction is logical and not real by divine simplicity; God’s act in any possible world (even in those in which he does not create) is numerically identical with his act in every other possible world, because the identity conditions of his act is his willing of his own goodness. But the aspects which do not necessitate his will because not absolutely good can vary from possible world to possible world.

Part of the strength of the Thomist account, I think, is that this can all be fleshed out in painstaking detail and can be (it is claimed) demonstrated from the other conclusions of natural theology. (As I also pointed out in #6, this model of God’s knowing has structural similarities to the Thomist understanding of human action as well, which makes it doubly attractive.) But here I just offer it as a consistent account; if the account I’ve given is consistent, then your assertion that necessity of God implies necessity of the world is false, because it does not take into account an alternative possibility.

 

[rossum]

I didn’t say that there is no time. I said that there is no identifiable time prior to the creation of the universe, because the universe was created with time.

Please define “prior” when there “is no identifiable time”. If the universe was created “with time” then there is no time when the universe did not exist, and hence the universe is eternal. Since anything eternal cannot be created, then the universe was not created.

God exists timelessly, however. So even “after” creating, he does not exist in time.

But God’s actions do not exist timelessly. Gods actions start, sustain and stop within time. Hence we have two separate things, a timeless God, who cannot act, and God’s actions which are not timeless. The same thing cannot have two opposed properties.

Though one particular problem here might be the idea of creation as the big bang, ie. there was no matter and then God made some matter which now acts independently of him. That is not the classical understanding of creation, whereby the world depends on God just as much now as it did in the first moment it existed. Creation is a sustaining of things at all times at which they exist. So there is no “after” creation either.

In a philosophical discussion, I do not use the scientific definition of the material STEM universe that started at the Big Bang; that definition is for scientific discussions. In a philosophical discussion I use a different definition: “All that exists”, the ATE universe. Starting from that base, then a number of common argumnts fail, because they are only relevant to the STEM universe.

Well, I’m not denying that time is real. But I am denying that “God existed before creation” in the sense that no one can identify a time at which God existed but the universe did not.

Then there is no time when the universe did not exist, and the universe is eternal and uncreated.

I do not think a temporal distinction is essential to cause and effect. For example, a potter spins some clay on his wheel. The effect (the clay’s changing) is simultaneous (though not instantaneous) with the cause (the potter’s hands acting).

I disagree. The cause is the change is in the potter’s mind, which takes time to travel down the potter’s nerves to the potter’s muscles, which then effect the clay. Real actions take time to travel any distance.

rossum

 

[rossum]

Most people understand Genesis as a theological account of the way that Creation is ordered. They are not committed to the position that God acts at t1 and then does some different act at t2 if other theoretical concerns lead them to hold otherwise.

I am not Christian, so I am not prepared to accept an argument based purely on Christian theology. If God performs action A1 at T1, and performs a different action A2 at T2, then God has changed. Alternatively, God has stayed the same, but God’s actions have changed. That second option leads to two different entities, one unchanging and one changing.

This is an old problem: how an unchanging entity can have changing effects. The Kabbalah includes an attempt to resolve the dilemma with its concept of the Sephiroth.

Consider an action by God (G) within time, say the parting of the Red Sea (P):

G → P

By the standard logic of an implication we have:

~P → ~G

If the effect is not present, then the cause cannot be present. If God does exist, then our initial statement was incorrect, and we have:

(G + X) → P

for some X that is not God. Hence, God cannot act alone, but there must be some other element, X, that allows God to act. In either case there are difficulties for an eternal unchanging omnipotent God.

If God is allowed to change, then the difficulty can be resolved as:

G@T1 → P

and

G@T2 → ~P

Which restores God’s omnipotence at the expense of His unchangeableness. The unchanging cannot act; whatever acts cannot be unchanging.

rossum

 

[polytropos]

Please define “prior” when there “is no identifiable time”. If the universe was created “with time” then there is no time when the universe did not exist, and hence the universe is eternal. Since anything eternal cannot be created, then the universe was not created.

I said there is no identifiable time prior to the existence of the universe. That means I agree that there is no sense of talking about what was prior to the existence of the universe.

I likewise agree that since “the universe was created with time”, “there is no time when the universe did not exist,” or more formally: “for all t, the universe exists at t”. But when we put it that way, it becomes obvious that it does not follow that the universe is eternal. We should distinguish between eternal, or existing outside time, and sempiternal, or existing through an infinite past and, less relevantly, future. Here you appear to mean that the universe is sempiternal. However, the sempiternity of the universe does not follow either, since if the universe and time were created some finite time ago, then they simply have a first moment. There is no moment before the “first moment,” but for each moment including and after the first moment, both the universe and time exist.

In other words, you have a timeline modeled on the set T = [0, infinity). For every t in T, the universe exists. There *is no t in T-complement, though, so there is no time at which the universe does not exist. We can’t identify any t < 0 such that the universe doesn’t exist not because the universe exists on the timeline (-infinity, infinity), but rather because there does not exist any t in T where t < 0.

(Another possibility is that the set is rather T’ = (0, infinity). Potentially that could cause problems for kalam arguments, but I don’t think it is theologically problematic. I know some arguments against an eternal past would rule out that possibility as well, though. In general I am skeptical against arguments against an eternal past, and nothing I say rides on them.)

I’d also note, though again nothing rides on it, that a sempiternal being cannot be created in the sense that it does not come into existence, but assuming sempiternity is possible, a sempiternal being could be “created” in the classical sense that it is sustained in existence at every time at which it exists.

But God’s actions do not exist timelessly. Gods actions start, sustain and stop within time. Hence we have two separate things, a timeless God, who cannot act, and God’s actions which are not timeless. The same thing cannot have two opposed properties.

If we substitute “effects” for “actions,” then I (mostly) agree. God is timeless, and his effects are in time. But by disambiguating in that way, we see that there is no problem, for a thing’s effects are not it; the theist doesn’t want to say that God and his effects are the same anyway.

This does not mean that a timeless God cannot act, though. It means that God’s causation is not in time, while its effects are. For God, in a single act, wills that all of time exists. Since temporal distinctions basically “emerge” in the act of creation, there is no reason that they should demarcate God’s causation. But there is no contradiction here.

In a philosophical discussion, I do not use the scientific definition of the material STEM universe that started at the Big Bang; that definition is for scientific discussions. In a philosophical discussion I use a different definition: “All that exists”, the ATE universe. Starting from that base, then a number of common argumnts fail, because they are only relevant to the STEM universe.

My reference to the big bang wasn’t really significant. I only brought it up because that seems to be your understanding of creation (a beginning in time), while the classical notion is different.

As far as the difference between STEM and ATE universes, it’s a semantic distinction that does not impact the philosophy. If we consider the ATE-universe to be the mereological sum of all that exists, then we can simply define the universe as the ATE-universe minus God. (I’m not sure exactly what you are referring to, as far as common arguments that fail. Maybe that theists like to say that God causes the universe, but not himself, but the ATE-universe includes God? I find it implausible that this is some sort of devastating distinction.)

 

[polytropos]

The cause is the change is in the potter’s mind, which takes time to travel down the potter’s nerves to the potter’s muscles, which then effect the clay. Real actions take time to travel any distance.

You have misunderstood the nature of my claim. I did not say that cause and effect cannot be temporally distinct. I said that a temporal distinction is not essential to cause and effect. As such, providing a counterexample does not rebut my claim; it would have to be argued that cause and effect must be temporally distinct, not that they can be. (Thomists admit both types in distinguishing between per se and per accidens causes.)

However, this seems just to be a case of description relativity that does not undermine my point. If someone punches me in the jaw, then maybe one cause of it was that I made a rude joke. (And maybe a cause of that was that my parents didn’t teach me to be polite.) But none of that changes the fact that we can refer to his fist as the cause of the movement of my head as he punches me.

(Another factor here is the distinction between event and substance ontologies. On the event understanding, I have an image of some “effect” that I identify as caused by some temporally prior image that I call a “cause.” This is basically Hume’s understanding. But it doesn’t rule the substantial understanding of simultaneous causation, where just one of those images will be of one substance acting on the second, the hands shaping the clay. The Thomist might say that the hands are imparting their actuality to the clay; the hands have an accidental form, the shape which the person has decided to give them, and the clay takes on that accidental form. But this further metaphysical jargon is only mentioned out of interest.)

I am not Christian, so I am not prepared to accept an argument based purely on Christian theology. If God performs action A1 at T1, and performs a different action A2 at T2, then God has changed. Alternatively, God has stayed the same, but God’s actions have changed. That second option leads to two different entities, one unchanging and one changing.

I am not appealing to Christian authority. You appealed to Genesis (and the Bible generally) as a counterexample to the claim that God acts in the world and does not change. I am merely pointing out that the Bible does not consist of philosophical treatises and may be interpreted in light of philosophical considerations. (The Bible actually underdetermines the nature of God significantly, so to an extent philosophizing will be necessary.)

As I said in my last response, God may have two effects at two different times without himself changing.

Consider an action by God (G) within time, say the parting of the Red Sea (P):

G → P

By the standard logic of an implication we have:

~P → ~G

If the effect is not present, then the cause cannot be present.

Right. This is rendered consistent when we disambiguate what is meant by God’s action. It can mean God’s causing or an effect of God’s causing. We can consider them separately.

If “effect” is meant by “action”, then the two conditionals hold, but the result is pretty trivial, since God’s effects are not part of God.

If God’s causing is meant by “action”, then disambiguation is required. Since God creates the universe with temporal distinctions, the objects of his creation are temporal states of affairs. Where p is a basic proposition (like an existential claim, say “rossum exists”), God does not will that p full stop, but rather God wills (tenselessly) that [p from t1 to t2].

But then we cannot make sense of the claim being made here. We know that “Necessarily, if God wills that [p from t1 to t2], then p from t1 to t2.” But as time goes on, the consequent never will become false.

To deny this analysis of God’s causation would be to interpret the theist’s position uncharitably. The theist holds that God is outside time and causes things to exist at every moment they exist, so naturally he holds God as causing things that exist at times, not things unqualifiedly. (A previous poster has tried to make this argument before, saying that God’s willing the world to exist at any time implies that the universe exists sempiternally. But the source of the difficulty here is not the theist’s account but rather that no theist would adopt such an analysis of causation that can’t even distinguish between objects existing at one time versus another.)

To make a couple comments about the dialectical situation: A Thomist would claim that we can know from philosophical theology that God acts and causes change in the world (that’s how we know he exists) and is eternal (in the outside-of-time sense) because pure act. If these conclusions necessarily are inconsistent, then the Thomist is in trouble, for we could then infer the falsity of one of his premises. But if there exists some consistent resolution, then the Thomist is on solid ground. I have offered a resolution that is also motivated by the findings of philosophical theology (God exists outside of time as cause, so he wills certain effects that are themselves located in time, and their location in time is what he wills. God is identical with his causation, but not identical with his effects.)

 

[Someone2841]

I am not Christian, so I am not prepared to accept an argument based purely on Christian theology. If God performs action A1 at T1, and performs a different action A2 at T2, then God has changed. Alternatively, God has stayed the same, but God’s actions have changed. That second option leads to two different entities, one unchanging and one changing.

This is an old problem: how an unchanging entity can have changing effects. The Kabbalah includes an attempt to resolve the dilemma with its concept of the Sephiroth.

Consider an action by God (G) within time, say the parting of the Red Sea (P):

G → P

By the standard logic of an implication we have:

~P → ~G

If the effect is not present, then the cause cannot be present. If God does exist, then our initial statement was incorrect, and we have:

(G + X) → P

for some X that is not God. Hence, God cannot act alone, but there must be some other element, X, that allows God to act. In either case there are difficulties for an eternal unchanging omnipotent God.

If God is allowed to change, then the difficulty can be resolved as:

G@T1 → P

and

G@T2 → ~P

Which restores God’s omnipotence at the expense of His unchangeableness. The unchanging cannot act; whatever acts cannot be unchanging.

rossum

There is a mistake in your use of symbolic logic, and I don’t think that polytropos caught it. G → P cannot both mean “G causes P” and “G implies P.” If G is the necessary cause of P, then G ← P and not the other way around! Think of it this way. My mother (M) “causes” me (X) insofar as she gave birth to me. However, to say that M → X is wrong, because as you said this would mean that ~X → ~M. But if I didn’t exist then my mother could still exist, and this is nonsensical. Instead, M ← X because ~M → ~X; that is, if my mother were not to exist, neither would I, and this makes sense since her giving birth to me is a necessary cause of my existence.

In the same way, G->P is not the same as “God parts the Red Sea” or “God causes the parting of the Red Sea.” Rather, it simply states that G is a sufficient condition for P, that is if God exists, so does the parting of the Red Sea. On the other hand, G<-P states that G is a necessary condition for P. This is definitionally true if one takes God as the necessary condition for existence. G<-P does not necessarily mean that God directly caused the parting of the Red Sea, of course, but in this case it is assumed he did.

And thus your argument is invalid, because when written correctly G<-P means ~G->~P. This makes logical sense, and nothing needs to be resolved.

Just because God is outside of time (since he created time) does not mean that he cannot interact with time. Time exists because God wills it to exist, and from a temporal view God has existed for all time (and not somehow temporally before.) God exists before time in a casual sense, because it is God who causes time to exist and not the other way around (why would time be needed here?). When God parts the Red See, he does so in the same “eternal moment” (outside of time) that he creates time itself. It seems to anyone in time (like us) that God has effected change, but nothing has changed for God (he sees all time and space and everything therein as a “singularity” of sorts and makes all decisions “at once”). That is, at least, my understanding; one which I believe is logically sound.

 

[Richca]

Which restores God’s omnipotence at the expense of His unchangeableness. The unchanging cannot act; whatever acts cannot be unchanging.

rossum

Whatever acts must be in act. Now, God is pure act and eternally actual. How can it be said He cannot act when He is pure act? Furthermore, change is a movement from potentiality to act. Since God is pure act there is no potentiality in Him. Consequently, God is eternally actual and in act without any change.

 

[rossum]

I likewise agree that since “the universe was created with time”, “there is no time when the universe did not exist,” or more formally: “for all t, the universe exists at t”.

That is my definition of ‘eternal’: X is eternal iff X exists for all values of time.

But when we put it that way, it becomes obvious that it does not follow that the universe is eternal. We should distinguish between eternal, or existing outside time, and sempiternal, or existing through an infinite past and, less relevantly, future.

I do not accept that difference.

There is no moment before the “first moment,” but for each moment including and after the first moment, both the universe and time exist.

Agreed. However, since there is “no moment” before the first, then there is no moment in which the universe could have been created. We also need to define whether we are talking about the STEM material universe of the ATE, All That Exists universe. Since God exists, He is included in the ATE universe.

If we substitute “effects” for “actions,” then I (mostly) agree. God is timeless, and his effects are in time. But by disambiguating in that way, we see that there is no problem, for a thing’s effects are not it; the theist doesn’t want to say that God and his effects are the same anyway.

That is one possible resolution of the problem, separate God and God’s actions into two different entities with differing properties. God cannot act and God’s actions are not unchanging. That does mean that you have to give up on God’s omnipotence as well, since He cannot act. It is possible that God’s actions are omnipotent. By splitting God from His actions you need to carefully consider where to place the properties associated with the compound entity God-and-His-actions.

This does not mean that a timeless God cannot act, though. It means that God’s causation is not in time, while its effects are.

If the cause is not in time, then how can the effect be in time? The cause is separated from the effect as one is outside time and the other is inside time. How does the causation pass through the barrier?

As far as the difference between STEM and ATE universes, it’s a semantic distinction that does not impact the philosophy. If we consider the ATE-universe to be the mereological sum of all that exists, then we can simply define the universe as the ATE-universe minus God. (I’m not sure exactly what you are referring to, as far as common arguments that fail. Maybe that theists like to say that God causes the universe, but not himself, but the ATE-universe includes God? I find it implausible that this is some sort of devastating distinction.)

The ATE universe includes God so all arguments for the non-eternal nature of the universe fail. If they succeeded, then they would prove the non-eternal nature of God. If God is eternal then the ATE universe is also eternal.

The ATE universe has no cause, since any possible external cause would not exist, by definition.

rossum

 

[rossum]

You have misunderstood the nature of my claim. I did not say that cause and effect cannot be temporally distinct. I said that a temporal distinction is not essential to cause and effect. As such, providing a counterexample does not rebut my claim; it would have to be argued that cause and effect must be temporally distinct, not that they can be. (Thomists admit both types in distinguishing between per se and per accidens causes.)

If cause and effect are not temporally distinct, then how do we determine which is the cause and which is the effect? We have two different simultaneous entities, A and B. Without going back into the past, how can we determine is A caused B, if B caused A or if they are merely coincidental with no causal connection?

A mother cannot be a mother without having a child. A child cannot be a child without having a mother. Did the child cause the mother or did the mother cause the child?

A cause cannot be a cause without having actually caused something.

Two people meet at a party.

“Hello, what do you do?”

“I create.”

“Fascinating. What do you create?”

“I create … universes.”

“Wow! That’s really wonderful. How many universes have you created?”

“Erm … Well … Ah … None actually.”

“Oh my, is that the time. I really must rush.”

(Another factor here is the distinction between event and substance ontologies. On the event understanding, I have an image of some “effect” that I identify as caused by some temporally prior image that I call a “cause.” This is basically Hume’s understanding. But it doesn’t rule the substantial understanding of simultaneous causation, where just one of those images will be of one substance acting on the second, the hands shaping the clay. The Thomist might say that the hands are imparting their actuality to the clay; the hands have an accidental form, the shape which the person has decided to give them, and the clay takes on that accidental form. But this further metaphysical jargon is only mentioned out of interest.)

I reject Thomist Substance. It is a reification and not actually present in reality. The Buddhist analysis of the world is very different.

As I said in my last response, God may have two effects at two different times without himself changing.

That is not logically possible. God and X (for some X) may have different effects at different times.

Right. This is rendered consistent when we disambiguate what is meant by God’s action. It can mean God’s causing or an effect of God’s causing. We can consider them separately.

Indeed we can, but then we also need to separate the various properties into those that apply to God and those that apply to God’s actions.

To make a couple comments about the dialectical situation: A Thomist would claim that we can know from philosophical theology that God acts and causes change in the world (that’s how we know he exists) and is eternal (in the outside-of-time sense) because pure act.

Change is certainly observable in the world. In Buddhist philosophy, change is pervasive. Everything changes. Change is necessary to salvation/enlightenment. My arguments against an unchanging God are all taken from Buddhist philosophy. If there is something that does not change, then that thing cannot cause any transient effect. At best it can cause permanent effects. If the cause is permanently present, then the effect is permanently present also.

rossum

 

[rossum]

Think of it this way. My mother (M) “causes” me (X) insofar as she gave birth to me. However, to say that M → X is wrong, because as you said this would mean that ~X → ~M.

I disagree. If she has no children then she is not a mother. A parent cannot be a parent unless there is also a child.

Also your M → C is incorrect. (M AND F) → C is better. There are multiple conditions required to produce a child. A (potential) mother is just one of them.

But if I didn’t exist then my mother could still exist, and this is nonsensical.

Not so. “Mrs. Someone2841 senior” might exist, but “Someone2841’s mother” cannot exist unless you also exist.

A cause cannot be a cause unless it has actually done some causing. Until then it is merely a potential cause, not a real cause. We distinguish between “mother” and “mother-to-be” in ordinary language. To be a mother requires the existence of a child.

There is a reciprocal relationship between cause and effect.

rossum

 

[rossum]

Whatever acts must be in act. Now, God is pure act and eternally actual. How can it be said He cannot act when He is pure act? Furthermore, change is a movement from potentiality to act. Since God is pure act there is no potentiality in Him. Consequently, God is eternally actual and in act without any change.

To act is to change. God’s acts are different at different times. In the time of Abraham the Red Sea was not parted. In the time of Moses the Red Sea was parted. In the time of David the Red Sea was not parted. The Red Sea was different at different times. God’s acts were different at different times. Difference over time is change. How can an unchanging God change?

rossum

 

[polytropos]

That is my definition of ‘eternal’: X is eternal iff X exists for all values of time.

This is a useless definition, because it doesn’t help us make any of the distinctions that we want to make. Consider the following timelines for the universe’s existence:

(-infinity, infinity)
[0, infinity)
(0, infinity)
[0, 1]
(0, 1)

By your definition all of these universes are eternal.

What’s going on here is that you are equivocating on eternal. If you want to define eternal this way, fine. But clearly you have no basis then for saying that the second universe above (or even the third to fifth) therefore didn’t begin.

I do not accept that difference.

I don’t really care whether you accept the terms. But there is a distinction between existing outside of time, existing at all times, and existing through an infinite past and future. None of those three categories are the same; nothing in the first is in the second and third, though something could be in both the second and third. It is a substantial weakness of your definition of eternal that you can’t distinguish between these three cases.

Agreed. However, since there is “no moment” before the first, then there is no moment in which the universe could have been created. We also need to define whether we are talking about the STEM material universe of the ATE, All That Exists universe. Since God exists, He is included in the ATE universe.

Again, you are assuming a definition of creation that the classical theist doesn’t accept. (And you are arguing that the classical theist’s position is inconsistent–if you don’t assume his position for the sake of argument, then you are begging the question against him.) The universe depends on God absolutely at all times at which it exists. If the universe has a first moment (at which, particularizing the above, the universe absolutely depended on God), then we call that its beginning to exist in time–because it’s not the case that there was an earlier time at which it did not exist. (It doesn’t matter that there wasn’t an earlier time period.)

By ‘universe’ I mean the ATE-universe minus God.

That is one possible resolution of the problem, separate God and God’s actions into two different entities with differing properties. God cannot act and God’s actions are not unchanging. That does mean that you have to give up on God’s omnipotence as well, since He cannot act. It is possible that God’s actions are omnipotent. By splitting God from His actions you need to carefully consider where to place the properties associated with the compound entity God-and-His-actions.

What do you mean by “separating” God and God’s actions? By God’s actions, I mean God’s effects. No one would argue that God and his effects are not separated in the first place; there is no need to separate them. You are burning a straw man, here.

If the cause is not in time, then how can the effect be in time? The cause is separated from the effect as one is outside time and the other is inside time. How does the causation pass through the barrier?

God’s single act is what creates the entire universe at all times at which it exists. God only acts once for all of eternity. The temporal distinctions are in the effect of that single act, since he creates a universe in which there are temporal distinctions. If we distinguish between states of affairs, substances, or what have you in the universe, then they are all the result of God’s single eternal act, which is a willing that they obtain at the times at which they obtain (conceptually prior to his willing and acting, there are no times).

So there’s no problem of “passing” through the barrier. He creates the whole universe “at once” with its temporal distinctions.

The ATE universe includes God so all arguments for the non-eternal nature of the universe fail. If they succeeded, then they would prove the non-eternal nature of God. If God is eternal then the ATE universe is also eternal.

Uh… the ATE-universe is a mereological sum. It doesn’t have properties (eternity, or being in time, or being a dog) apart from those of its proper parts. One can’t say that the ATE-universe is non-eternal, and one can’t say that the ATE-universe is eternal, because some parts are non-eternal, and others aren’t. You can’t infer some property of a mereological sum from one (or even some) of the elements. We can consider the mereological sum of my cat and I (call it the polytropos-cat-universe). The polytropos-cat-universe is neither a cat nor a human.

Philosophy isn’t quite this simplistic. All you are doing is introducing semantic distinctions that, when clarified, pose absolutely no threat to Thomism. For the Thomist simply says that God is eternal and the ATE-universe minus God is non-eternal (as I’ve defined and used eternal).

The ATE universe has no cause, since any possible external cause would not exist, by definition.

OK, but if the ATE-universe contains God then a Thomist would not care to say that it has an external cause anyway. The ATE-universe minus God is caused by God, and God does not have a cause.

 

[polytropos]

If cause and effect are not temporally distinct, then how do we determine which is the cause and which is the effect? We have two different simultaneous entities, A and B. Without going back into the past, how can we determine is A caused B, if B caused A or if they are merely coincidental with no causal connection?

Well, first note that you are posing an epistemological question, while my claim is ontological (and wouldn’t be undermined if we needed temporal distinction in practice). A cause modifies or creates its effect. I would say that we can understand that in terms of cause.

However, I think the epistemological question is insignificant anyway. Consider again the image of someone shaping a pot of clay. I charge that we can understand that causality is occurring, even without any knowledge of temporal succession–ie. if the “image” is merely a snapshot. (It’s plausible also that we could view images of causal relations that we are hitherto unfamiliar with, and understand them as well.)

However, this claim can be strengthened further still, since my claim does not rely on a snapshot. The clay changes over time. To say that cause and effect do not require a temporal distinction is not to say that they would be like two flashes that occur at the same time, and we choose one to be the cause, one to be the effect. We watch a potter shaping clay over time, and the action of his hands coincides with the shaping of the clay. I would say that we can understand the hands as the cause of the change in the clay because we can tell that the hands are conferring their actuality (the accidental form he has given them) onto the clay. (Though in practice causality goes both ways. The clay is in another sense imparting its actuality or accidental form to his hands.)

A mother cannot be a mother without having a child. A child cannot be a child without having a mother. Did the child cause the mother or did the mother cause the child?

As I said, the claim I’m making is pretty weak, that cause and effect do not need a temporal distinction, so a counterexample is no rebuttal. There is a sense in which a mother and child are cause and effect; I do not deny that.

I reject Thomist Substance. It is a reification and not actually present in reality. The Buddhist analysis of the world is very different.

Well, that’s nice, but that is another topic. The question is whether the Thomist position is consistent. In a full treatment, the Thomist position on substances would need to be defended, but we can assume it for the sake of argument in this discussion about philosophical theology.

That is not logically possible. God and X (for some X) may have different effects at different times.

Not logically possible? You mean that a single act (cause) having two effects at different times entails a contradiction? I would like to see that contradiction.

Change is certainly observable in the world. In Buddhist philosophy, change is pervasive. Everything changes. Change is necessary to salvation/enlightenment. My arguments against an unchanging God are all taken from Buddhist philosophy. If there is something that does not change, then that thing cannot cause any transient effect. At best it can cause permanent effects. If the cause is permanently present, then the effect is permanently present also.

Well, it appears that the Buddhist arguments move to fast then, for they do not consider all of the alternatives, ie. that an unchanging God causes a universe with temporal distinctions to exist.

A sempiternal and unchanging being could only have sempiternal effects; that much I would concede. But an eternal being precedes and indeed creates the tensed universe in which change can occur. This is another topic (Aquinas’s First Way), but the Thomist would indeed claim that the assumption that there is nothing unchangeable leads to a contradiction, for he would claim that infinite essentially ordered causal series are impossible.

 

[Someone2841]

I disagree. If she has no children then she is not a mother. A parent cannot be a parent unless there is also a child.

Also your M → C is incorrect. (M AND F) → C is better. There are multiple conditions required to produce a child. A (potential) mother is just one of them.

Not so. “Mrs. Someone2841 senior” might exist, but “Someone2841’s mother” cannot exist unless you also exist.

A cause cannot be a cause unless it has actually done some causing. Until then it is merely a potential cause, not a real cause. We distinguish between “mother” and “mother-to-be” in ordinary language. To be a mother requires the existence of a child.

Let’s be more clear. The following counterfactual is necessarily true.
If entity X is the necessary cause for entity Y, then if X were not to exist then Y would not have existed either.

This is only saying that an effect needs something to cause it (PSR), and if no necessary cause were present for a given effect then it could have never happened.

Let M be the mother and C be M’s child; that is, M gave birth to C. To make things clearer, let m be the predicate “is a mother.”
(Ex. 1) Clearly ∃C⇒mM (by the very definition of motherhood, I’d say!) and ~mM⇒∄C, both which are perfectly logical.

(Ex. 2) The case you bring up is ∄C⇒~mM and thus mM⇒∃C. This is only true if C is M’s only child, of course, but since you assumed that, I will to. (Thus mM⇒∃C is assumed henceforth.)

(Ex. 3) However, ∄M⇒∄C and thus ∃C⇒∃M are true counter factual statements. If the Mother never existed, then neither would the Child. Thus, the Child’s very existence implies the Mother’s existence. As stated in the second example, it is true that if the (only) Child had not existed, then the Mother would not be a mother (and thus, we have misnamed our variable. Oops! )

(Ex. 4) ∃M⇒∃C just doesn’t make sense like mM⇒∃C does. Why would the existence of Mother be contingent on the existence of the Child? It is not the same as Mother being a mother is contingent on the existence of the (presumably only) child.

And of course you can add variables and make further claims all you want, but the ones above still stand on their own. So, if F is C’s Father, then obviously ∃C⇒∃M and ∃F] and ∄M or ∄F]⇒∄C. However, ∃M and ∃F]⇒∃C is wrong for the same reason that the initial statement of Ex. 4 is wrong: the Mother and Father could have just not done anything to make a Child (you could probably pick at that point )

There is a reciprocal relationship between cause and effect.
rossum

Not to say there is no truth to what you are saying. I think another point of contention here is that we have all been fairly non-committal when it comes to the word “cause.” If a mother can be a cause for a child, then I would say the mother can exist without that child (especially if there are more children.) In the case of God causing the universe and/or time, I would say the idea of “a causes b” is equivalent to “b exists because of a” or “b’s existence is contingent upon a’s” but not (necessarily) “a exists because of b.”

Whatever we take “cause” to mean, we must make it appropriate to the situation. Can the statements “God is immutable” and “God causes X” be reconciled? If we assume that cause implies change, then it seems that we have failed because God is unchanging. However, if we assume that “X exists only because God exists” but “God can exist without X”, I think it is fair to say that “God causes X” and in this case “God wills X to exist” and even “God has always willed X” in His “eternal moment.”

 

[Someone2841]

I like this discussion we are having about the Immutability of God and His relationship with time, cause, and change. However, I think we have gotten a bit off of my initial question: “Does God have contingent properties?” I seems that rossum believes that He does and in fact has many since he is not a necessary being at all. Polytropos mentioned something I thought was great about “Cambridge” changes and properties, and how the only contingent properties God posses are those that are Cambridge.

If we are interested in continuing this interesting discussion, should we move it to a new, more relevant thread? Does anyone have anything to say about God and His contingent properties? Are there others not “Cambridge”?

 

[polytropos]

I like this discussion we are having about the Immutability of God and His relationship with time, cause, and change. However, I think we have gotten a bit off of my initial question: “Does God have contingent properties?” I seems that rossum believes that He does and in fact has many since he is not a necessary being at all. Polytropos mentioned something I thought was great about “Cambridge” changes and properties, and how the only contingent properties God posses are those that are Cambridge.

If we are interested in continuing this interesting discussion, should we move it to a new, more relevant thread? Does anyone have anything to say about God and His contingent properties? Are there others not “Cambridge”?

I have nothing else to say about the contingency of God’s properties. However, if you are interested, you should check out some of Barry Miller’s work. (Some of it is expensive and might be tough to access without a university library. But it is very good stuff.)

I think I’ve said my piece about the relationship of God to time and don’t need to continue in another thread. I will leave rossum with the last word.

 

[Someone2841]

I have nothing else to say about the contingency of God’s properties. However, if you are interested, you should check out some of Barry Miller’s work. (Some of it is expensive and might be tough to access without a university library. But it is very good stuff.)

Thanks. Looks like my University has “A most unlikely God: a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God.” Do you recommend it?

I think I’ve said my piece about the relationship of God to time and don’t need to continue in another thread. I will leave rossum with the last word.

You’re braver than I am! Thanks for your (name removed by moderator)ut.

 

[rossum]

This is a useless definition, because it doesn’t help us make any of the distinctions that we want to make. Consider the following timelines for the universe’s existence:

(-infinity, infinity)
[0, infinity)
(0, infinity)
[0, 1]
(0, 1)

By your definition all of these universes are eternal.

All these universes are eternal from within the universe. Since I am talking here about the ATE universe, then nothing exists outside the ATE universe. Hence all the universes are eternal by all existent measures.

I don’t really care whether you accept the terms. But there is a distinction between existing outside of time, existing at all times, and existing through an infinite past and future. None of those three categories are the same; nothing in the first is in the second and third, though something could be in both the second and third. It is a substantial weakness of your definition of eternal that you can’t distinguish between these three cases.

How does something that is outside time act inside time? It cannot be simultaneously outside and have part inside. If it is outside then it cannot act inside. If it acts inside then it is not completely outside. Again, we need to split it into two parts: God is outside time and God’s acts are inside time. We now have two different entities and must treat them separately.

Again, you are assuming a definition of creation that the classical theist doesn’t accept.

I am talking about the ATE universe. Since God is included within that universe then the ATE universe exists whenever God exists.

By ‘universe’ I mean the ATE-universe minus God.

No. God exists, so God is by definition included in the ATE universe. Gods do not get special treatment in Buddhism. Even the Dharmakaya does not get special treatment.

What do you mean by “separating” God and God’s actions? By God’s actions, I mean God’s effects. No one would argue that God and his effects are not separated in the first place; there is no need to separate them. You are burning a straw man, here.

A single thing cannot have opposed properties. A single thing cannot both change and be unchanging. Since God is claimed to be unchanging, and God’s actions change, then we have two different entities. God is unchanging but cannot act. God’s actions can act but do change.

God’s single act is what creates the entire universe at all times at which it exists.

God cannot create the ATE universe. If He did then God would Himself be created. If the ATE universe is created, then God, as part of that universe, is also created.

Philosophy isn’t quite this simplistic. All you are doing is introducing semantic distinctions that, when clarified, pose absolutely no threat to Thomism. For the Thomist simply says that God is eternal and the ATE-universe minus God is non-eternal (as I’ve defined and used eternal).

God may be eternal, but God’s actions are not. We are back to two different entities: one changes while the other does not. One acts while the other cannot.

OK, but if the ATE-universe contains God then a Thomist would not care to say that it has an external cause anyway. The ATE-universe minus God is caused by God, and God does not have a cause.

We are agreed that God did not create the ATE universe, which has no external cause.

rossum

 

[rossum]

Consider again the image of someone shaping a pot of clay. I charge that we can understand that causality is occurring, even without any knowledge of temporal succession–ie. if the “image” is merely a snapshot.

Look at that snapshot. Is the potter changing the shape of the clay, or is she merely resting her hand on it? You cannot tell without looking at the previous snapshot. Is the clay soft, or has it already been fired? You cannot tell without looking at the history of the clay. There is a great deal that you cannot tell without looking at previous snapshots. You need to have the temporal history of events.

However, this claim can be strengthened further still, since my claim does not rely on a snapshot. The clay changes over time.

How can you tell? If you do not have the history of the hand and the clay, you have no basis for saying that the clay has changed, or that the change was caused by the potter.

Not logically possible? You mean that a single act (cause) having two effects at different times entails a contradiction? I would like to see that contradiction.

C is the single cause, E1 and E2 are the two different effects. So: C → E1, C → E2 and E1 =/= E2.

At T1 we have C → E1, C → E2 and ~E2, since E2 has not yet been caused. Given C → E2 and ~E2, we can deduce ~C. Given ~C and C → E1, we can deduce that C did not cause the current instance of E1, but there must have been some other cause for E1. Hence, in this case, C was not the cause of E1.

Well, it appears that the Buddhist arguments move to fast then, for they do not consider all of the alternatives, ie. that an unchanging God causes a universe with temporal distinctions to exist.

Remember that I refer to the ATE universe. God did not cause that universe, as you agree. At least part of that universe has temporal distinctions.

rossum