Does God have contingent properties?

[rossum]

However, I think we have gotten a bit off of my initial question: “Does God have contingent properties?” I seems that rossum believes that He does and in fact has many since he is not a necessary being at all.

Correct. The obvious contingent property is “Creator”. Another example is “Father”. I do not accept the existence of any necessary being, God included. Only contingent beings exist.

rossum

 

[Someone2841]

It does sound that semantics to me too… If the universe is collection (set) of all things that exist, then

God exists, God did not create himself, and therefore God did not create the universe.

But so what? Why can’t we begin here and say God is the necessary cause for everything else in that universe? The Principle of Sufficient Reason (if you buy into that) would seem to necessitate such a being in any universe, and God as that necessary being seems logically coherent to me. Then we go our separate ways and discuss the nature of God, time, cause, and change. My point is: just bringing up a different definition of the universe (ATE vs STEM) does not seem to prove anything. It might make discussion of certain things easier, though.

You seem to be bringing this up over and over: how can you tell cause and effect without time? I think you are getting hung up on the words themselves. This is what I mean by “God causes time”:
The existence of time is contingent on the existence of God because God wills time to exist in the single non-temporal moment of His existence.
In that same moment, He wills the existence of everything else that exists (EETA?) and responds to their requests. He can do that, because he is God. As has been said already, we see God as changing through time because we perceive in time what God perceives in His “single non-temporal moment.”

I understand that you disagree with many premises here (e.g., God as a necessary being), and that’s alright, but I think the logic is consistent nonetheless.

 

[Someone2841]

Correct. The obvious contingent property is “Creator”. Another example is “Father”. I do not accept the existence of any necessary being, God included. Only contingent beings exist.

rossum

If every being is contingent on another being, either:

(1) some beings are contingent upon each other, but themselves not contingent upon anything else?
(2) some beings are a part of an infinite regression of contingencies?

If neither (1) nor (2) are true, then I contend that there must be at least one being that is not contingent on any other being for its existence. Besides the possibility of a casual loop, the problem I see with (1) is that a exists iff b exists does not explain why a and/or be exist in the first place. The problem with (2) is that I don’t think infinite regress works.

My point is, if everything needs a reason (PSR again), and contingent beings find their reason in other beings, then we need at least one being to be its own reason for existence - a necessary being (such as God.)

---- Edit ----

What is the existence of time contingent upon? It seems that you believe that time exists because it has to exist (a necessary being).

 

[rossum]

If every being is contingent on another being, either:

(1) some beings are contingent upon each other, but themselves not contingent upon anything else?
(2) some beings are a part of an infinite regression of contingencies?

Option 2, an infinite regression.

My point is, if everything needs a reason

I dislike the word “reason” in this context. Better to say, “a set of causes”.

What is the existence of time contingent upon? It seems that you believe that time exists because it has to exist (a necessary being).

Time does not have to exist. The Buddhist multiverse is a series of universes, some purely spiritual and others a mix of material and spiritual.

rossum

 

[Someone2841]

I dislike the word “reason” in this context. Better to say, “a set of causes”.

In your view that everything in contingent, this is not a problem. If something can exist uncaused, reason is better.

Option 2, an infinite regression.

Alright. If x exists as a part of an infinite chain of causes, how did we ever arrive at x in the first place? It would have taken an infinite amount of causes to arrive at x from some point y infinitely back in the casual chain, y itself still being a part of the infinite regress.

Time does not have to exist. The Buddhist multiverse is a series of universes, some purely spiritual and others a mix of material and spiritual.

rossum

So there are some Buddhist universes where things exists without time? Is there an universe where only a finite number of beings exist? Is there a universe where a finite number of beings exists without time? What are the nature of these things? Are any of these things contingent?

If a universe is ATE, is it not the multiverse?

 

[rossum]

Alright. If x exists as a part of an infinite chain of causes, how did we ever arrive at x in the first place?

Can we ever arrive at zero? That is part of an infinite chain, starting at minus infinity. Any number is part of an infinite chain, yet we have no problem using numbers. It depends where you start on the chain. If I start at minus infinity than I can never reach zero; if I start at -10 then I can reach zero in ten steps.

So there are some Buddhist universes where things exists without time? Is there an universe where only a finite number of beings exist? Is there a universe where a finite number of beings exists without time? What are the nature of these things? Are any of these things contingent?

None of those things are useful. They do not conduce to peace, happiness and nirvana.

At one time the Blessed One was staying at Kosambi in the Simsapa Grove. Then the Blessed One, taking a few Simsapa leaves in his hand, said to the monks: “What do you think, monks? Which are the more numerous, the few leaves I have here in my hand, or those up in the trees of the grove?”

“Lord, the Blessed One is holding only a few leaves: those up in the trees are far more numerous.”

"In the same way, monks, there are many more things that I have found out, but not revealed to you. What I have revealed to you is only a little. And why, monks, have I not revealed it?

“Because, monks, it is not related to the goal, it is not fundamental to the holy life, does not conduce to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, tranquillity, higher knowledge, enlightenment or Nibbana. That is why I have not revealed it.”

– Simsapa sutta, Samyutta Nikaya 56.31

If a universe is ATE, is it not the multiverse?

The multiverse and anything else that exists.

rossum

 

[Someone2841]

Can we ever arrive at zero? That is part of an infinite chain, starting at minus infinity. Any number is part of an infinite chain, yet we have no problem using numbers. It depends where you start on the chain. If I start at minus infinity than I can never reach zero; if I start at -10 then I can reach zero in ten steps.

This is my point. Zero is not caused by -1; there would be a problem if it were. In many inductive definitions of the set {1, 2, 3,…} each number is defined by the number before indefinitely, but infinity is never reached. In the same way, infinite regress doesn’t reach now.

None of those things are useful. They do not conduce to peace, happiness and nirvana.

At one time the Blessed One was staying at Kosambi in the Simsapa Grove. Then the Blessed One, taking a few Simsapa leaves in his hand, said to the monks: “What do you think, monks? Which are the more numerous, the few leaves I have here in my hand, or those up in the trees of the grove?”

“Lord, the Blessed One is holding only a few leaves: those up in the trees are far more numerous.”

"In the same way, monks, there are many more things that I have found out, but not revealed to you. What I have revealed to you is only a little. And why, monks, have I not revealed it?

“Because, monks, it is not related to the goal, it is not fundamental to the holy life, does not conduce to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, tranquillity, higher knowledge, enlightenment or Nibbana. That is why I have not revealed it.”

– Simsapa sutta, Samyutta Nikaya 56.31

rossum

This is where I step out of the discussion. If you claim to seek only things you beleive are conductive to peace, happiness, and nirvana, but not Truth, I’m afraid our discussion will be in vain.

Thank everyone for their part in this thread! God bless.

 

[polytropos]

Thanks. Looks like my University has “A most unlikely God: a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God.” Do you recommend it?

Yes, I do. That is probably the work you’re looking for, too, if you want an answer to the question of whether God has any contingent properties. The first book in his “trilogy” is an argument for God’s existence, and the last book is a clarification of the details on his view of the predicate “______ exists”. A Most Unlikely God contains the philosophical theology. (And you can certainly read it without having read From Existence to God–I’ve read Elmar Kremer’s work on his entire philosophy, which summarizes the argument, but I read Unlikely without ever having been familiar with his take on the cosmological argument.)

 

[polytropos]

I am not going to give a full response since I think anyone interested could read what we’ve said so far and judge the arguments. A couple qualifications though.

No. God exists, so God is by definition included in the ATE universe. Gods do not get special treatment in Buddhism. Even the Dharmakaya does not get special treatment.

When I said “By ‘universe’ I mean the ATE-universe minus God”, I was stipulating what I mean by universe. It isn’t special treatment. It is noting that (if some Thomist argument for God’s existence is correct, which we can assume for the sake of argument in a discussion like this) there is an absolute difference between what is pure act and what is not. The distinction is of obvious value if we can “divide” the ATE-universe in such a way that one “part” wholly causes the other. As such, we abandon the ATE-universe not as without content, but without utility or relevance, and simply speak of the ATE-universe minus God = the ‘universe’.

C is the single cause, E1 and E2 are the two different effects. So: C → E1, C → E2 and E1 =/= E2.

At T1 we have C → E1, C → E2 and ~E2, since E2 has not yet been caused. Given C → E2 and ~E2, we can deduce ~C. Given ~C and C → E1, we can deduce that C did not cause the current instance of E1, but there must have been some other cause for E1. Hence, in this case, C was not the cause of E1.

I want to make two points.

First, this does not acknowledge the fact that in post #26 I denied that this is a coherent analysis of the way God causes things. Because the ATE-universe minus God depends on God and would not exist at all if not for God (and unlike God, is temporal), what God causes (or God’s effects, or God’s “actions” if you like) are the causings of things to be (and to act) at and over times. Without specifying the time, there is no sense in talking about E1 and E2. God doesn’t cause that [rossum exists] but that [rossum exists from t1 to t2]. So as we move from t0 to t1, it is still true that “God causes that [rossum exist from t1 to t2]”. Likewise it remains true as we reach t2. (Although, one also has to define what it means for an atemporal proposition to be true at a time. This is not particularly relevant to our present discussion but has to be addressed if one is to discuss the issue of human free will.)

You can see that this account of divine causality follows pretty naturally from Thomistic natural philosophy, whereas yours is just assumed to be the case. However, the other point I want to make is this: you are implicitly assuming that cause and effect are necessarily simultaneous in formulating conditionals like “C → E1 at T1”. You denied that we could know cause and effect behave in this way in another spot.

(I do think that there is a sense in which God’s atemporal causality is simultaneous with his temporal effects. Some Thomists have defined an “ET-simultaneity” relation, as is necessary to do if something in time is to be simultaneous with something outside of time. But the ET-simultaneity relation is not transitive, so arguments like yours don’t work. There is also not really anything ad hoc about denying it transitivity, since simultaneity, given special relativity, is not transitive anyway. Simultaneity is intuitively transitive–but that doesn’t mean much.)

 

[rossum]

I am not going to give a full response since I think anyone interested could read what we’ve said so far and judge the arguments. A couple qualifications though.

Myself also. We are mostly repeating ourselves by now.

When I said “By ‘universe’ I mean the ATE-universe minus God”, I was stipulating what I mean by universe. It isn’t special treatment.

I do not accept that definition. The ATE universe is all that exists. Far too many arguments relating to God put God in a separate category, without providing any justification. That is, in effect, assuming the answer you want as a premise.

Thank you for an interesting discussion.

rossum

 

[Michael19682]

Yes. ‘Creator’ is a contingent property. Before the creation of the universe, God could not have been a creator. When nothing has been created, then there is no creator. A creator can only exist after the first thing has been created. Prior to that event, there can only be a ‘potential creator’ at most.

rossum

Hello again, rossum. We’ve met before in other areas of this forum. I have an answer for you that I did not read as of yet. Unfortunately, I don’t know of its substantiation in Catholic theology other than the early Church Father Saint Augustine, who I might quote as having said that for Christians, before “the beginning” God was busy creating hell for those who would seriously ask such questions as what happened before the beginning?
Nevertheless, I can only make of this a comparison to the buddhist concept of middle way. In buddhism this refers to the middle way of existing between the extremes of existence and non existence. In our religion, we often say that God is self made, or already made. Hence our Savior is consubstantial with God the Father and indicates he too is already made. Yet he became a Jewish man at a definite and unique point in time. Also, he chose an earthen vessel and his spirit was God. In a very real way, some of us might see in him a kind of middle way between the extreme of asking about before the creation – since we have a new beginning we witnessed – and the extreme of not asking, since we have to ask in order to get our new, definitive answer, which in large part means that like the personal form of God a Jewish man, the question is now irrelevant for several reasons 1) we await the second person’s appearance again 2) who he chose to become is relevant for tradition’s sake only, possibly. As Christians we are tied indissolubly to the Jewish narratives and prophetic visions of God, yet we have derived for us through their tradition in the person of Jesus a transcendent God. So our middle way not an official concept here is for me like an awaiting of the permanent inner peace of heaven, your analog to nirvanna, for only then will we have the knowledge, called realization, of the actual full truth in it wholeness.

 

[polytropos]

I do not accept that definition. The ATE universe is all that exists. Far too many arguments relating to God put God in a separate category, without providing any justification. That is, in effect, assuming the answer you want as a premise.

Well, it’s like saying, “by x, I mean the ATE-universe minus God.” It’s a stipulation. (I don’t think it is done without justification, though, at least not in Thomism. Plausible reasons for drawing the distinctions are that: everything else depends on God, God alone is such that his essence is his existence, God cannot change, etc. Those are all other, more fundamental theses of Thomism, which is why we didn’t really bring them up here.)

Thank you for an interesting discussion.

rossum

You as well.

 

[catholictiger]

I’ll start by just asking my question simply: While God is a necessary being, as both classical theism and Christianity attest, does God have any contingent properties?

Here are a few thoughts I have. The Catechism plainly states in paragraph 1 that “Dues… hominem libere creavit” (“God… freely created man.”) Therefore, if God has the libertarian free will to create man, he must have had the free choice to not create man. (Question: While it is compatible with God’s nature to create man, did he have a choice at all if God’s nature necessitated the creation of man? It seems that in that case, he did not freely create man.) If God created man freely, then is the property “God created man” not a contingent property of God? (Otherwise, if it was necessary that God created man, is man too a necessary being?)

I hope nobody takes these ramblings the wrong way… I have only began looking into this sort of philosophy recently and have no delusions of my thoughts being that coherent. I hope that people have some thoughts and/or resources on this topic. Thanks in advance!

The Divine Nature has no Contingent Properties as it is impossible for it to have properties that aren’t necessary. If he has even one tiny continent propriety he is no longer necessary.

We must remember this. We use our limited finite language to speak of an infinite uncreated, necessary being.

For example God doesn’t really come down from heaven, because God already exists on earth. But we say this because this is how we understand it.

God has no potentiality in him, meaning no contingency.