Does morality exist?

[Leela]

And “relations all the way down”? You need to explain what that means. I don’t understand it.

That means that, for example, the number 4 has no essence to speak of. All we can say about 4 is that certain sentences are true about it such as 1+3=4 or 17-13=4 or the square root of 16 is 4. We can go on all day listing relations between 4 and other numbers and none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness any better than any other.

It seems that you would like to think of 4-ness as having existed somewhere “out there” waiting for humans to evolve and start using it and that the Laws of Physics always existed in some way waiting for humans to come along and discover them and that the Moral Law was out there somewhere as well waiting for humans to come along and conform to it. I guess that all could make sense to someone who believes that these ideas could have always existed in the mind of God, but it doesn’t work for me.

 

[Leela]

No. It is not enough. That position is precisely what my argument is against. The burden of an explanation is on you to account for this “sameness-relation” between two tokens if concept-types and properties don’t exist. Like I said, I call this position “ostrich nominalim,” hiding your head in the sand and not facing this very phenomenon at hand which cries out for explanation. If you have another hypothesis alternative to my own, I’m all ears.

It’s enough for me. I don’t see the problem.

 

[Leela]

Is a tool useful by itself? Don’t we need a representation of the reality in relation to which we are going to use the tool, before the tool can realize its tooly essence?

Why would we need a representation of reality to be able to use a tool?

“such sentences are tools for coping with reality rather than representations of reality” - is this claim itself not a representation of reality? Isn’t it nonsense? (TLP 7: Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.)

No, it is not a representation of reality. It is a description of reality–a way of using reality.

 

[Betterave]

That means that, for example, the number 4 has no essence to speak of. All we can say about 4 is that certain sentences are true about it such as 1+3=4 or 17-13=4 or the square root of 16 is 4. We can go on all day listing relations between 4 and other numbers and none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness any better than any other.

It seems that you would like to think of 4-ness as having existed somewhere “out there” waiting for humans to evolve and start using it and that the Laws of Physics always existed in some way waiting for humans to come along and discover them and that the Moral Law was out there somewhere as well waiting for humans to come along and conform to it. I guess that all could make sense to someone who believes that these ideas could have always existed in the mind of God, but it doesn’t work for me.

I really don’t think that is the point we’re after in the context of this discussion. It doesn’t need to exist anywhere. The point is that it is real in the sense that it is self-identical, we can all grasp the same concept and see that it applies in all of the relations we can list, and because it is what it is and we know what it is, we are able to apply it to any number of new relations. We usually think that this gives us grounds for assuming that it is a conceptually discrete entity and that it remains itself in each relationship in which it is posited, regardless of when, where, or by whom such a relationship is posited. This just feels irresistible to most of us. How do you resist? Or do you just not feel the temptation to see things this way?

 

[Betterave]

Why would we need a representation of reality to be able to use a tool?

Touche’! But the point is that we are not just talking about use here (transparent coping, if you prefer); we are talking about (reflecting on) our ascribing the property of being a tool. In other words, we are not just using a tool, but using a tool while representing it (having a thematic awareness of it) as a tool.

No, it is not a representation of reality. It is a description of reality–a way of using reality.

Can you explain how this is more than a verbal distinction?

 

[Syntax]

That means that, for example, the number 4 has no essence to speak of. All we can say about 4 is that certain sentences are true about it such as 1+3=4 or 17-13=4 or the square root of 16 is 4. We can go on all day I]listing relations between 4 and other numbers and none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness

any better than any other…

You are begging the question: I asked you what justification you had for thinking there are no essences but just relations all the way down, and your reply is, “the number 4 has no essence to speak of because…none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness.” Well duh! Because relations are not essences! You’ve offered no argument yet. But I will repeat my own, deductively demonstrating there **do exist **intrinsic properties of numbers, and if you disagree, you need to tell me where my argument is wrong. It starts by **assuming your position and performing a reductio leading to ** an absurdity:

(1) Suppose the numbers 4 and 5 have no intrinsic properties that distinguish one from the other.
(2) If they have no intrinsic properties distinguishing one from the other, then the terms flanking each side of the “>” relation can be switched in the formula X > Y, while preserving the truth-value of the original relation because, after all, there is nothing distinct or particularly unique about them as numbers.
(3) If switching the terms flanking both sides of the “>” relation preserves the statement’s truth-value, then 4>5 can be just as equally true as 5>4.
(4) But 4>5 is false.
(5) Therefore, switching the terms flanking both sides of the “>” relation does NOT preserve the statement’s truth-value.
(6) Therefore, there is **something ** perculiar about the numbers 4 and 5 which prevents us from introducing them into any such relation as we please.
(7) Therefore, the numbers 4 and 5 do have intrinsic properties that distinguish one from the other.

If the numbers 4 and 5 do not each posses some intrinsic property that distinguished them, then we *would *be able to switch the terms on each side of the “>” sign and preserve the original statement’s truth-value. But it is not permissible to do this. So they are different numbers each with a different intrinsic property. The numbers 4 and 5 would not maintain this consistency in their various relations with other numbers if they did not have some peculiar property about them that prevented us from doing anything we wanted with them.

How about being divisible by two? Is this not a property of all even numbers? What about being prime, or being a multiple of 5, or being a product of two odd numbers? The list goes on and on in mathematics and arithematic…

It seems that you would like to think of 4-ness as having existed somewhere “out there” waiting for humans to evolve and start using it and that the Laws of Physics always existed in some way waiting for humans to come along and discover them and that the Moral Law was out there somewhere as well waiting for humans to come along and conform to it. I guess that all could make sense to someone who believes that these ideas could have always existed in the mind of God, but it doesn’t work for me.

So these things don’t exist “out there”? Where then? Do they exist at all? Now your pragmatism is really coming out. Are Moral Laws and the Laws of Physics human inventions? So gravity doesn’t exist independent of my conceptions? Try jumping off a cliff, you’ll quickly find the concept is not an invention. Why would you think this? These absurdities are just bafflling to me.

 

[Betterave]

That means that, for example, the number 4 has no essence to speak of. All we can say about 4 is that certain sentences are true about it such as 1+3=4 or 17-13=4 or the square root of 16 is 4. We can go on all day listing relations between 4 and other numbers and none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness any better than any other.

Here’s a naive suggestion:
The essence of 4-ness is best expressed by 1+1+1+1.

Any takers?

Next question:
What is the essence of oneness?

 

[Syntax]

It’s enough for me. I don’t see the problem.

The problem is linguistic and logical if all that exists are token particulars.

If

a is red1
b is red2

It will always be impossible, not to mention false, in public discouse to ever derive the following statement.

a and b are both red.

and you are left with an infinity of meanings and the impossibility of communication.

I would say that’s a huge problem. But maybe you still don’t understand me, which I suspect is most likely the case anyway.

 

[Syntax]

Here’s a naive suggestion:
The essence of 4-ness is best expressed by 1+1+1+1.

Any takers?

Next question:
What is the essence of oneness?

Set theory does some work with these questions, but it discards the notion of essences. I don’t care much for set theory. It’s reductivism in disguise, but has some useful purposes I guess.

Define 0

0={null set}

1={0}={null set}

2={0,1}={null set, {null set}}

3={0,1, 2}={null set, {null set}, {null set, {null set}}}

 

[Leela]

Can you explain how this is more than a verbal distinction?

It is important because when we think of such descriptions as representations, then we start involving ourselves in all sorts of philosophical problems that perhaps are not really problems like whether this sentence is in the correct relation to the way things really are and trying to make any sense of what it could mean to compare a sentence to reality for agreement. This sort of problem characterizes most of the history of philosophy which, you may be aware, has the reputation of not making any progress toward consensus on the answers to any of the questions that Plato posed thousands of years ago.

If a sentence is a way of using reality, we don’t need to ask if it correctly mirrors reality any more than we would ask this question about a hammer. Like hammers, sentences don’t need to represent reality to be helpful as we try to satisfy our human needs and interests. Granted that one of those human interests may be to correctly represent reality. But if we think of this goal as just one of many human projects the character of the questions about these representations changes. Rather than concerning our selves with trying to contain the essence of reality in our sentences, we can examine proposed intellectual realities like we would paintings in a gallery–not in an effort to find out which is the true painting but to appreciate each on its own merits and use them for whatever purposes they are useful for. The old questions then come to seem like arguments over whether polar or rectangular coordinates are true.

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

The problem is linguistic and logical if all that exists are token particulars.

If

a is red1
b is red2

It will always be impossible, not to mention false, in public discouse to ever derive the following statement.

a and b are both red.

and you are left with an infinity of meanings and the impossibility of communication.

I would say that’s a huge problem. But maybe you still don’t understand me, which I suspect is most likely the case anyway.

I don’t think that all that exists are particulars. There also exist relations between particulars. Where we disagree I think is in whether or not such relations as redness exist prior to a human being relating such things as firetrucks and apples.

 

[Leela]

You are begging the question: I asked you what justification you had for thinking there are no essences but just relations all the way down, and your reply is, “the number 4 has no essence to speak of because…none of these relations expresses the essence of 4-ness.” Well duh! Because relations are not essences! You’ve offered no argument yet. But I will repeat my own, deductively demonstrating there **do exist **intrinsic properties of numbers, and if you disagree, you need to tell me where my argument is wrong. It starts by **assuming your position and performing a reductio leading to ** an absurdity:

(1) Suppose the numbers 4 and 5 have no intrinsic properties that distinguish one from the other.

I don’t have to think that 4 and 5 have intrinsic properties to say that 4 and 5 are not the same number. “4” and “5” stand for an innumerable set of relations between numbers, but that does not mean that any sort of relation such as 5<4 is one of those relations. It is not. But 5>4 is one of those relations.

How about being divisible by two? Is this not a property of all even numbers? What about being prime, or being a multiple of 5, or being a product of two odd numbers? The list goes on and on in mathematics and arithematic…

These are mathematical definitions not possessions of numbers that imply that there must be some essence for these possessions to adhere in. “even-ness” is not a possession of 4, it is a way or relating 4 to other numbers such as 2 and 6.

Apples fell from trees before Newton created the Laws of Gravitation. Let’s agree on that much. Such things happened long before humans came along to invent gravity. Of course, physics now prefer Einstein’s account of falling apples in terns of the curvature of space rather than Newton’s gravity thought of as a force.

Best,
Leela

 

[Ender]

And to think that some people accuse subjectivists of being lazy! Syntax made this point originally, so maybe you read it? Anyway, I’m the one who first specifically pointed out that *you *seemed to be lazy - thanks for confirming that!

(Are you convinced yet Ender? - too funny!)

Well, I have a lot of trouble extracting your points too. I read (most of) your posts but I’m never sure if my interpretation is consistent with what you intended. It’s not a question of being lazy; I do think less technical jargon would lead to more clarity. In any event, I’m pretty much in lock step with Anti.

Syntax:

I’m chuckling because I don’t like defending what the atheist actually believes

I understand that feeling but don’t forget that for this discussion we are all atheists.

Ender

 

[Ender]

The discussions about numbers and fire engines are a bit too abstract for me; can we go back to something that seems more concrete, er relevant … specifically, beauty? Clearly the concept of beauty exists; most people admire colorful sunsets and equally use the same term - beautiful - to describe them. Just as clearly, however, people disagree on what they find beautiful. Now if you and I see the same thing and you find it beautiful and I find it repulsive, is one of us wrong? If this is not a question of correct and incorrect then on what basis can we say that beauty objectively exists and isn’t this objection equally applicable to morality?

We call items like apples and fire engines red because they reflect light at about 650nm so if an apple seems red to you and yellow to me, one of us has to be wrong and we can determine which. Terms like apples and oranges have fixed meanings; terms like beauty and morality do not. The terms are certainly concrete but, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then why is morality any different?

Ender

 

[Betterave]

I don’t have to think that 4 and 5 have intrinsic properties to say that 4 and 5 are not the same number. “4” and “5” stand for an innumerable set of relations between numbers, but that does not mean that any sort of relation such as 5<4 is one of those relations. It is not. But 5>4 is one of those relations.

In other words, you’re an ostrich nominalist? You might want to read or re-read:

David Armstrong, “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 61, 1980: 440-449.

 

[Betterave]

Well, I have a lot of trouble extracting your points too. I read (most of) your posts but I’m never sure if my interpretation is consistent with what you intended. It’s not a question of being lazy; I do think less technical jargon would lead to more clarity. In any event, I’m pretty much in lock step with Anti.

You guys really need to understand something: I’m a real person, not a robot. You can ask me for clarification of points you don’t understand. That’s the point of dialogue! If you simply don’t care to understand…

The discussions about numbers and fire engines are a bit too abstract for me; can we go back to something that seems more concrete, er relevant … specifically, beauty? Clearly the concept of beauty exists; most people admire colorful sunsets and equally use the same term - beautiful - to describe them. Just as clearly, however, people disagree on what they find beautiful. Now if you and I see the same thing and you find it beautiful and I find it repulsive, is one of us wrong? If this is not a question of correct and incorrect then on what basis can we say that beauty objectively exists and isn’t this objection equally applicable to morality?

But why not just say that beauty is complex and that different people are sensitive to and/or blind to different aspects of it??? That doesn’t make it a matter of purely personal preference! Take the experience of noticing that a person you’ve known for some time is very thoughtful and caring in subtle ways - you’re noticing something real (and good and beautiful) that you just never noticed before, just like if you’d noticed for the first time that someone had a mole on her neck, or that your dog was thirsty.

We call items like apples and fire engines red because they reflect light at about 650nm so if an apple seems red to you and yellow to me, one of us has to be wrong and we can determine which. [But we don’t determine this on the basis of measuring wavelengths of reflected light!] Terms like apples and oranges have fixed meanings; terms like beauty and morality do not. The terms are certainly concrete but, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then why is morality any different?

Suppose:
The color blind person gets his colors wrong just because he disagrees with the majority. The psychopath gets his morals wrong just because he disagrees with the majority.

Now would you agree: Both are getting something objectively wrong and the objectivity-maker (“just because…”) is the same for both cases? Their respective reasons for going wrong are different, but each suffers from a certain kind of blindness/insensitivity to some aspect of reality.

(We could add: Suppose a non-native English speaker learned the names for apple and orange the wrong way (his book told him oranges were called “apples” and vice versa…))

 

[Leela]

In other words, you’re an ostrich nominalist?

Sticks and stones…

Instead of simply attaching a label to what you think my position is, would you care to comment on whether my explanation is a successful argument against your proposition that numbers have intrinsic properties?

 

[Betterave]

It is important because when we think of such descriptions as representations, then we start involving ourselves in all sorts of philosophical problems that perhaps are not really problems like whether this sentence is in the correct relation to the way things really are and trying to make any sense of what it could mean to compare a sentence to reality for agreement. This sort of problem characterizes most of the history of philosophy which, you may be aware, has the reputation of not making any progress toward consensus on the answers to any of the questions that Plato posed thousands of years ago.

If a sentence is a way of using reality, we don’t need to ask if it correctly mirrors reality any more than we would ask this question about a hammer. Like hammers, sentences don’t need to represent reality to be helpful as we try to satisfy our human needs and interests. Granted that one of those human interests may be to correctly represent reality. But if we think of this goal as just one of many human projects the character of the questions about these representations changes. Rather than concerning our selves with trying to contain the essence of reality in our sentences, we can examine proposed intellectual realities like we would paintings in a gallery–not in an effort to find out which is the true painting but to appreciate each on its own merits and use them for whatever purposes they are useful for. The old questions then come to seem like arguments over whether polar or rectangular coordinates are true.

I don’t think ‘reputations’ are important here.

And I don’t think paintings are useful or that they contradict each other. Descriptions of reality are useful and they do contradict one another. Pointing out that sometimes they don’t doesn’t do any work in directing us towards a ‘better’ (or just useful) description of (distinction between) descriptions/representations. What do you take the essence of a ‘representation’ to be, such that it is narrower than your “description”? What are you trying to do when you make this distinction - describe something? represent something? How do you distinguish your doing the one rather than the other?

(If you’re only after aesthetic appreciation of a work of art, then imho your representation/description (which is it?) of the history of philosophy could use some work!)

 

[Betterave]

Sticks and stones…

Instead of simply attaching a label to what you think my position is, would you care to comment on whether my explanation is a successful argument against your proposition that numbers have intrinsic properties?

I was referring you to a well-known article that situates this debate, not calling you names!

“I don’t have to think that 4 and 5 have intrinsic properties to say that 4 and 5 are not the same number. “4” and “5” stand for an innumerable set of relations between numbers, but that does not mean that any sort of relation such as 5<4 is one of those relations. It is not. But 5>4 is one of those relations.”

Why is 5>4 one of those relations and 5<4 not? Your answer seems to be that 4 and 5 are related that way because that is one of the ways they are related. Does that satisfy you?

But you also seem to (have to) say that the number 4 itself really is related to all sorts of other numbers - it is greater than 3, for instance. But that is not because of what 4 and 3 are intrinsically are…? But isn’t 4 intrinsically the number that is 1 greater than 3? If you don’t understand this about the number 4 itself, isn’t it possible that you simply don’t understand ‘the number 4’?

 

[Syntax]

I don’t have to think that 4 and 5 have intrinsic properties to say that 4 and 5 are not the same number. “4” and “5” stand for an innumerable set of relations between numbers, but that does not mean that any sort of relation such as 5<4 is one of those relations. It is not. But 5>4 is one of those relations.

First, you didn’t address where my previous argument was wrong, you just disagreed with my conclusion. Please tell me which premise you think is false and why. Here it is again in another form.

Your reasoning is epistemically circular:

How do you know that 4 and 5 are different numbers?
“Because they stand in different relations.” Ok.

But how do you know that 5 stands to 4 in this relation: 5>4; but 4 does not stand to 5 in this relation: 4>5?
Because they stand in these different relations.

No. That’s redundant, and you’ve explained nothing.

Notice the truth-value of each relation is dependent on the order of the relata, not on the relation “>.” Therefore, they cannot be defined by the relation. The relation itself doesn’t change, but when the order of the terms are switched, the truth of the relation no longer holds. That’s immediate evidence for an intrinsic distinction between 4 and 5, because its truth does NOT depend on the relation “>” at all but entirely dependent on which numbers are placed where!

These are mathematical definitions not possessions of numbers that imply that there must be some essence for these possessions to adhere in. “even-ness” is not a possession of 4, it is a way or relating 4 to other numbers such as 2 and 6.

The first half is contradictory since “to define” actually means “to list the essential predicates” obtaining to a concept, as in “bachelors are unmarried men” not “bachelors are unmarried men with brown hair.” So if these are definitions, then they are essential defintions.

Second, would you please specify the precise relation you are referring to when you say “even-ness”?..because “divisible by 2” sounds like a property, not a relation. If it were a relation, it would relate one number to another in some fashion. So it would have this schema

x (divisible by 2) y

Can you show me how this works? A relation has one of following features and you need to identify which type it is.

reflexive as in 4=4
symmetrical as in (4/2=2 and 2=4/2)
asymmetric as in (5>4 but not 4>5)
transitive as in (a=b, b=c, a=c)

Truly, I wish you explained your views better because I really don’t see why we should think they are true at all. You just posit them without reason.

Yes, and check out Armstrong’s article “Ostrich Nominalism”…good stuff.