Does morality exist?

[Syntax]

Well, Syntax, it’s nice to see someone actually trying to offer an argument. I appreciate that – and I appreciate the fact that your post is actually coherent and comprehensible – even if it is really just more of the same.

I’m only going to address one of your points in this post because if we can’t agree on that point, then further conversation is pointless.

Those aren’t truth statements. Let’s take the first one. “Happiness is better than suffering.” Really? How would you go about demonstrating this? What, exactly, does “better” mean?

Of course “happiness is better than suffering” is a truth-valuable statement. If someone says “happiness is not better than misery” he would be saying something false.

What do you mean by “demonstrated”? Empircally shown, or logically proven? “Happiness is better than misery” is a *moral axiom *of any given moral theory, whether deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-based. Can you “demonstrate” the principle of non-contradiction, the law of exculded middle, or that a line is the shortest distance between two points in Euclidean geometry? None of these truths can be logically or empirically “demonstrated,” but that doesn’t entail these truths are meaningless.

“Better-than” is the good-making property we predicate of people’s actions or states of affairs.

You might say “Most people find happiness more desirable than suffering.” That’s a statement with a truth value. We could investigate that by taking a poll. Or you could say that “Being consistently happy tends to improve a person’s health.” We could study that, also.

Are you sure about this? What do you mean by “happiness”? We certianly don’t observe happiness anywhere. “Happiness” is a theoretical term presupposing value-ascriptions to mental states independent of sense-experience. Therefore, we can’t study it at all based on your empirical assumption since it is simply not an observable “thing.” Hence, the statement “Most people find happiness more desirable than suffering” is a vacuous statement since “happiness” is a meaningless term.

But “Happiness is better than suffering” is a value judgment that, in and of itself, can’t be said to be true or false unless you give the statement a context and a value system against which to measure the terms…Just plain ol’ unqualified happiness can’t be said to be “better” than suffering any more than plants can be “better” than the fourth of July. If we don’t have a context, then “better” is a meaningless word.

One needs only a context and a guiding set of personal values to apply the principle, but the principle itself is necessarily true and holds across all contexts and different personal values. Moreover we already possess the meanings of the terms “happiness” and “better-than” before we apply them in particular contexts, otherwise it would be impossible to use these concepts at all when particular occasions presented themselves requiring our judgment!! The value-judgment “better-than” itself is not reducible to context. Our use of it in contexts presupposes that we already have an implicit understanding of what “better-than” means.

There certainly have been those – Nietzsche, for one – who have argued that suffering is valuable and of greater value than happiness. This is part of Nietzsche’s argument against utilitarianism – there are things greater than simply being happy. Indeed, he argues that while others might wish for an end to suffering, he wishes suffering to be increased because it is through suffering that one demonstrates strength and grows in strength.

“Happiness is better than misery” is the supreme and only principle for utilitarianism for sure, but it is also a principle adopted by all moral systems whether deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-based. Moral systems other than utilitarianism simply adopt *additional *value-statments such as “knowledge is better than ignorance,” or “acting from duty is better than acting from compulsion.”

Nietzsche didn’t value suffering, in and of itself, more than happiness in and of itself. He simply valued the mental states of overcoming and strength more than mental states of pleasure. But his valuing of overcoming and strength presupposes this very notion of well-being and the good. Nietzsche cannot do without the concept of** the good**, even in his own perspectivist philosophy.

So apparently Nietzsche thinks “happiness is better than misery” is false? I thought the statement doesn’t have a truth-value.

 

[Syntax]

Agreed, but just because some things that cannot be observed nonetheless exist says nothing about whether objective morality is among that group.

That’s true. But to help motivate the thesis that empirical observation is not the arbiter of what exists would be to show that most things you believe exist are not empirically verifiable. So let me ask you, do you think numbers exist? Does the pythagorean theorem exist? Do perfect circles exist? Do tables, gravity, energy, electrons, and forces exist? None of these presumed entities are empirically verifiable.

If I make a value judgment I can accept that I am stating what I believe to be objectively true but what makes it objectively true?

The truth-maker for value-judgments are good and bad-making properties that attach to actions or states-of-affairs.

what of the situation where people’s value judgments are complete opposites?

Either one or both judgments are false.

Both believe the exact same thing regarding “value-judgments about the outside world” but, as both of them cannot be objectively true, why should we believe that either of them is?

As in Hilary Putnam’s words “No sane person should believe that something is purely subjective merely because it cannot be settled beyond controversy.” Just look at the history of disagreements in science.

I don’t think you’ve made your case; I don’t find your arguments nearly as compelling as you think they are.

Then offer a counterargument instead of just insisting on a contrary claim.

The fact that many atheists disbelieve this claim says nothing whatever about whether it is true or false.

That’s correct. But the fact that some people don’t believe this conditional necessarily holds is an indication that this premise needs much more support.

 

[AntiTheist]

In my reply above to Syntax, I was using the colloqual meaning of “happiness” as a mental state of pleasure and “suffering” as the opposite of that. As I anticipated, he’s not using the terms that way.

In fact, the way that Syntax uses these terms, the phrase “happiness is better than misery” (do you define misery as something different than suffering?) is an utterly meaningless phrase. It doesn’t define “happiness” and it doesn’t define “misery” – presumably, different individuals will have different ideas of happiness and misery. If we assume that a person will consider doing things he likes and values “happiness” and will consider doing things he dislikes and doesn’t value “misery,” then the statement reduces to “An individual finds what he likes and values better than what he dislikes and doesn’t value,” which really means, “An individual likes what he likes and dislikes what he dislikes.” Big insight there.

We’re right back at square one. Different individuals value different things, and without the context of an individual’s set of values, it makes no sense to say that one thing is “better” than another. An example would be the colloquial meaning of happiness. Nietzsche values the colloquial meaning of happiness less than a utilitarian.

Which one of them has the correct value, and how do you know?

 

[Syntax]

What is wrong with that position? You state that disbelieving the existence of objective moral facts is an anti-realist position but that assumes the whole basis for this debate has been settled in your favor.

Huh? I’m just re-stating what a non-cognitivist anti-realist believes.

Explain how you know there are objective moral facts and that moral claims have truth values.

…the same way that I know numbers, properties, propositions, electrons, tables, thoughts, feelings, and the laws of physics exist: Either through inference to the best explanation, through the principle of sufficient reason, or through a priori logical probability.

 

[Syntax]

In my reply above to Syntax, I was using the colloqual meaning of “happiness” as a mental state of pleasure and “suffering” as the opposite of that. As I anticipated, he’s not using the terms that way.

In fact, the way that Syntax uses these terms, the phrase “happiness is better than misery” (do you define misery as something different than suffering?) is an utterly meaningless phrase.

huh?..Is the statement “All bachelors are unmarried men” a meaningless phrase because the terms “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are synonymous? The statement might be analytically or trivially true, but the statement isn’t therefore meaningless. Some terms are more semantically basic than others.

It doesn’t define “happiness” and it doesn’t define “misery” – presumably, different individuals will have different ideas of happiness and misery.

People will have different interpretations of what would count as their own particular happiness and will strive for this happiness in many different ways based on their particular values, but happiness itself is not reductively explained by what, in fact, makes each individual happy since it is different in each case.

If we assume that a person will consider doing things he likes and values “happiness” and will consider doing things he dislikes and doesn’t value “misery,” then the statement reduces to “An individual finds what he likes and values better than what he dislikes and doesn’t value,” which really means, “An individual likes what he likes and dislikes what he dislikes.” Big insight there.

Ibid, above…You are asking for too much here. Though there are variations on interpretations of the concept of happiness such as “eudaimonia” or “pleasure” or “well-being,” all are still parts of what humans take to be the Good. And every philosopher is well aware that the Good cannot be defined, but just given numerous instances. But why should this be problematic? We can’t define the term “red” either but we use it all the time predicating it of objects in the world. We can’t define a perfect circle either, but we can offer descriptions of its various geometrical properties and relations. We can’t define the concept of “number” either, but we can still apply it to various calculations, predictions, and value-assesments. The list goes on and on for various semantically basic terms.

You are touching on the old problem Plato addressed. When asking for a definition of justice he found that all his interlocutors provided different physical instantiations of justice. But what he noticed is that even though each individual had a different definition of justice, they all implicitly understood some aspect of it that made their judgments possible however imperfect these judgments were. The continual refinement of this definition of justice is precisely the a priori task of philosophy. Though some contexts make our application of the concept more epistemically difficult than others, the notion itself is irreducible to these contexts.

We’re right back at square one. Different individuals value different things, and without the context of an individual’s set of values, it makes no sense to say that one thing is “better” than another. An example would be the colloquial meaning of happiness. Nietzsche values the colloquial meaning of happiness less than a utilitarian.

If Nietzsche values the colloquial meaning of happiness less than the utilitarian, surely he must therefore understand what happiness means for him not to value it as much as the utilitarian. For how could he make any judgment calls about its value if it were meaningless?

 

[Syntax]

If we assume that a person will consider doing things he likes and values “happiness” and will consider doing things he dislikes and doesn’t value “misery,” then the statement reduces to “An individual finds what he likes and values better than what he dislikes and doesn’t value,” which really means, “An individual likes what he likes and dislikes what he dislikes.” Big insight there.

.

If the meaning of one statement can be **reduced **to the meaning of another statement, then the two statements are identical in meaning. But your claim ends up in contradiction. Therefore, the two statements are not identical in meaning because neither one tolerates a substitutional paraphrasing of the other.

(1)“Happiness is more valuable than misery” = “individual x values happiness more than he values misery.”
(2) But suppose individual y values misery more than he values happiness.
(3) So, by the same schema, “Happiness is more valuable than misery” = “individual y values misery more than he values happiness.”
(4) Therefore, by (1-3), happiness is both more and less valuable than misery.
–contradiction

The point is that you cannot reduce happiness to indivdual likes and dislikes. The translational paraphrase simply won’t work.

 

[Syntax]

If we assume that a person will consider doing things he likes and values “happiness” and will consider doing things he dislikes and doesn’t value “misery,” then the statement reduces to “An individual finds what he likes and values better than what he dislikes and doesn’t value,” which really means, “An individual likes what he likes and dislikes what he dislikes.” Big insight there.

.

If the meaning of one statement can be **reduced **to the meaning of another statement, then the two statements are identical in meaning. But your claim ends up in contradiction. Therefore, the two statements are not identical in meaning because neither one tolerates a substitutional paraphrasing of the other.

(1)“Happiness is more valuable than misery” = “individual x values happiness more than he values misery.”
(2) But suppose individual y values misery more than he values happiness.
(3) So, by the same schema, “Happiness is more valuable than misery” = “individual y values misery more than he values happiness.”
(4) Therefore, by (1-3), happiness is both more and less valuable than misery.
–contradiction

The point is that you cannot reduce happiness to indivdual likes and dislikes. The translational paraphrase simply won’t work.

 

[Syntax]

…and so we are left wondering: If the mistakenness of this 2nd-order belief is “unbeknownst” to the realist, how has it come to be “beknown” to the subjectivist observer of the realist? What is his privileged observational vantage point?

And then we can usually see without much difficulty, looking at his arguments, that it is a matter of knowledge-by-fiat on his part - which is indeed absurd to the rest of us.

I completely agree. There is no more reason to think the subjectivist has a priviledged vantage point over the content of my own first-order beliefs than I do. This is an absurd position which has so many intuitively obvious arguments against it, but one which AnitTheist continues to propose, however implicitly, when he claims normative statements are reductively identical to statements of individual likes and dislikes. Both linguistically and epistemologically his positition is *prima facie *absurd, and I have not yet heard any arguments to the contrary supporting his position, just stipulations and brute assertions.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I completely agree. There is no more reason to think the subjectivist has a priviledged vantage point over the content of my own first-order beliefs than I do.

thats what i keep telling him.

This is an absurd position which has so many intuitively obvious arguments against it, but one which AnitTheist continues to propose, however implicitly, when he claims normative statements are reductively identical to statements of individual likes and dislikes. Both linguistically and epistemologically his positition is *prima facie *absurd, and I have not yet heard any arguments to the contrary supporting his position, just stipulations and brute assertions.

yeah!, what you said.

 

[Betterave]

Well, Syntax, it’s nice to see someone actually trying to offer an argument. I appreciate that – and I appreciate the fact that your post is actually coherent and comprehensible – even if it is really just more of the same.

…and that’s about the all the substance of any of Anti’s replies. Makes you wonder where his arguments are. Of course it sounds like he ought to have been asking for a lot more clarifications, not just insisting on his p.o.v., since he apparently hasn’t been understanding the arguments made against his position (surprise, surprise!).

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
people inevitably do have beliefs… And beliefs can be true or false. Therefore moral beliefs can be true or false… Therefore moral beliefs/judgments are not preferences (preferences cannot be true or false).

So… in a sense the source of the universality of moral laws is the basic structure of belief as such, so in that sense believing - not particular beliefs, but the general phenomenon of human believing as such - can be regarded as the source of the universality of moral laws.

I think you’ve overstepped on this one; I don’t see how the conclusion logically follows from the conditions.[Can you be more specific?] Also, I think you’ve changed the terms sufficiently that we are talking about different things. We haven’t been debating whether moral laws are universal (among mankind) but whether they objectively exist or are you contending that these words mean the same thing?

I’m not sure what you mean. Do you think the distinction is important? I’m not sure if you’re noticing the difference between “universal moral laws” and the “universality of moral laws”. The former is a reference to putatively universal moral propositions; the latter refers to the property of ‘universality,’ universality, that is, w.r.t. moral beings, i.e., w.r.t. beings with moral awareness, i.e., w.r.t. beings who understand reality using moral categories - i.e., w.r.t. us non-sociopathic human beings! To say that the application of a category to a kind of being is universal is obviously to make a putatively ‘objective’ claim, and to do so is obviously to deny that it is a function simply of ‘purely personal preferences.’ Does any of this rule out skeptical claims? No, but the point is that skeptical claims stand in need of justification. If I say that dinosaurs never really existed as living creatures, because it’s possible they never did, and it is possible since I can invent specious reasons for doubting that they did, that does not mean that the proposition in question is an interesting one that reasonable people ought to entertain - and far less, does it mean I can positively assert (AntiTheist-style) that my anti-dinosaur theory is true. Does that help?

Quote:
These comments apply to the structure of morality, not so much to the particular content, which might vary (just as judgments about anything may vary).

But if the content may vary (and we know if fact that it varies greatly) then how can it be that morality exists objectively? Doesn’t objective truth mean that it is true for everyone? Surely it wouldn’t be dependent on whether or not someone believed in it.

To say that it exists objectively is to say that it exists independently of the choices of individual - in other words, if someone chooses not to be moral, they are choosing to be immoral, not amoral, just like if someone chooses not to be reasonable, they are choosing to be irrational, not arational. (The choice of pure negation is not an option simply because of the kind of being that we are.) It is not to say that its content never varies.

Why distinguish between ‘truth’ and ‘objective truth’? What I think you need to understand here is pretty simple: We know that what we believe is not made true just because we believe it. “I believe X” means “I hold X to be true.” So why do we hold claims to be true? One reason might be that they are axiomatic for our understanding of the world. That morality is something that matters objectively is one of those claims - it is a first principle apprehended by induction. We can fail to see why or what the ultimate grounds for this are, just as we might fail to see why gravity works. But we do see how things work in the world and that means we are able to apply our categories of understanding to particular things we meet in the world. If you want to say we are ‘deceived’ about this, you need to explain how that is possible. If you don’t give an explanation, we can’t help but be inclined to just dismiss you as someone who doesn’t understand the concepts that the rest of us use and apply all the time (and which you probably do too, despite your attempt to doubt the obvious).

 

[Betterave]

Quote:
You (or rather Antitheist) might reply that you don’t believe that, for instance, raping a small child is wrong. You just prefer that it not happen. Normally socialized human beings however understand that personal preferences, as such, have no normative force and they believe that a normative proscription of such acts is objectively called for, and that if any belief is justified (and of course many beliefs are justified), this is most certainly one of them.

There are plenty of examples of (mis)behavior, however, that challenge this position, such as torture for entertainment (Sioux), carving a persons beating heart of his chest (Aztecs), eating your enemies or slaughtering them to the last man, woman, and child. These were all normative for their time and place so on what basis can those practices be seen as any less normative (or valid) that our current belief that those things are wrong?

Not all norms are moral norms, however. That is, they are not based on an attempt to integrate one’s social standards to conform to what is right or good. That’s why it is important to point out, as Syntax has, that much so-called moral thinking is really just laziness - it is not based on a genuine attempt to apprehend what is good and right. But laziness is just one more objective feature of moral beings like ourselves that we include in our account of what morality is objectively like (pro statu isto).

Quote:
They know this because they are aware of moral reality - this is sometimes called having a conscience - and the phenomenon of conscience is an objectively ascertainable fact about human nature.

Based on the different practices I just mentioned it would seem that the objectively ascertainable fact of the conscience isn’t quite as obvious as you claim. *[Lazy, poorly formed conscience does not equal no conscience.]

Nor is it obvious, even if we could -]prove/-] apprehend the existence of a conscience, that it would mean that an objective morality existed; it could mean nothing more than that everyone has some code of ethics (however formed). It isn’t clear how the existence of a conscience requires the existence of objective morality.

The existence of conscience is first of all an empirical fact which forms part of our objective account of what morality is. Anyway, I hope that what you claim “isn’t clear” here has been made clear above. If not, please say why not.

 

[Syntax]

Hi Ender,

Why not allow for the possibility that at least some assertions of value may have truth value? If you say that they can never have truth value because their truth cannot be empirically verified, you are taking an anti-realist position because you are putting limits on what can be regarded as real as only that which can be verified. In other words, you are declaring everything that cannot be verified as unreal.

Best,
Leela

That’s exactly right. He and AntTheist are asserting what’s known as the “verification criterion of meaning and truth,” namely, no statement is meaningful or true unless it is, in principle, verifiable. “God exists” is unverifiable, but it’s not meaningless. “A thing cannot be both simultaneously red and green all over” is unverifiable, but it’s not meaningless.

Also, this very criterion is self-undermining since it itself, is unverifiable. No respectable thinker believes this criterion anymore. It was a blunder made by the logical positivists such as Carnap, Ayer, Mach, and Wittgenstein at the turn of the century. Unfortunately, some scientists continue to hold this view as well. But it is a philosophical thesis, not a scientific one. The statement itself is, ironically, very unscientific!

 

[Leela]

That’s exactly right. He and AntTheist are asserting what’s known as the “verification criterion of meaning and truth,” namely, no statement is meaningful or true unless it is, in principle, verifiable. “God exists” is unverifiable, but it’s not meaningless. “A thing cannot be both simultaneously red and green all over” is unverifiable, but it’s not meaningless.

Also, this very criterion is self-undermining since it itself, is unverifiable. No respectable thinker believes this criterion anymore. It was a blunder made by the logical positivists such as Carnap, Ayer, Mach, and Wittgenstein at the turn of the century. Unfortunately, some scientists continue to hold this view as well. But it is a philosophical thesis, not a scientific one. The statement itself is, ironically, very unscientific!

Hi Syntax,

I have been very impressed by your posts in this thread. I would love it if you would read my OP in this thread on demands for justifying religious beliefs and share any thoughts you have.

Thanks,
Leela

 

[Betterave]

we are all born corrupt, but they were also atheists, ultimately that was the source of their corruption. with no G-d we are not special Creations, we are just another configuration of matter, political expediency determines the value of lives then as they have no intrinsic value. it took they took more than 100 million lives last century

we may be born tainted with original sin, but none of us are born actual sinners, and certainly not as monsters a la Pol Pot! Anyway, yeah, millions of lives, blah, blah - so maybe our psychological condition subjectively requires belief in a God-concept to regulate it… but that’s not taken as evidence of ‘objective’ reality - of that, mysteriously, only the subjectivist has true knowledge.

i never said anything about the dignity of the individual. their participation in “reason giving institutions” doesnt have any relevance to the situation. nor does the opinion of the people you mention affect ones behavior. no matter how many subjective opinions there are, they are toothless. i loved JPG, but if i were not following G-d, his opinion wouldnt sway me to any particular way. with no G-d. my value would become “whatever pleases me” not what pleases JPG.

ive seen this argument countless times. and they are right, there are no “objective morals” built into the universe. all we have is G-ds subjective opinion, which forms a de facto “objective morality” for us to know right and wrong. pages and pages of big words covers the bare fact. subjectivism is nothing more than peoples opinions, and therefore dangerous as a moral system, the example being of course, the genocides of the last century.

now you said something earlier to the effect that proving a moral system needs some basis outside G-d for it to be taken seriously by others. why? the existence of G-d is the only real question. once thats shown, the rest falls into place. otherwise they are right.

Of course it might be ‘dangerous,’ subjectively speaking; so what? But it might not be in all cases. The subjectivist is likely to be quite satisfied with post-modern bourgeois European culture, for instance, and take your ignoring this fact as evidence that you’re just not taking his (subjective) convictions seriously - which (subjectively) annoys him, but which he nonetheless accepts as part of the way the world is.

it doesnt matter if morality evolved (yes, i think its silly too), its still subjective, and still an opinion. that doesnt move the ball at all. further, ethics arent an average of how people feel, it deals with individuals actions, and i have yet to see any subjectivist argument that says, i cant do as i please, as long as i can avoid the consequences.

and i wouldnt fall for the “noble and honest” routine, i used that when i was an atheist too. you will see how fast it dissapears when you corner someone. funny how rationalism dissapears faster than snow on a summers day when it doesnt agree with the position one desires to hold.

quite possibly true - but not necessarily - and even if true, cornering people isn’t always a good idea, for multiple reasons (you don’t want to get kicked or scratched and you do want to act out of love)!

 

[Syntax]

…and that’s about the all the substance of any of Anti’s replies. Makes you wonder where his arguments are. Of course it sounds like he ought to have been asking for a lot more clarifications, not just insisting on his p.o.v., since he apparently hasn’t been understanding the arguments made against his position (surprise, surprise!).

yes:thumbsup:…

I love this one:

Ender says,

“But if the content may vary (and we know if fact that it varies greatly) then how can it be that morality exists objectively? Doesn’t objective truth mean that it is true for everyone? Surely it wouldn’t be dependent on whether or not someone believed in it.”

I just knew this confusion was lurking somewhere between the concepts of “objectivity,” “belief,” and “truth” as in the “what is true for you may not be true for me” fallacy. Lol. Thanks for noticing it, Betterave.

Ender, Betterave clarifies this distinction for you, and hopefully you can understand it by now:

…Why distinguish between ‘truth’ and ‘objective truth’? What I think you need to understand here is pretty simple: We know that what we believe is not made true just because we believe it. “I believe X” means “I hold X to be true…”

…not that X is true, since the statement “I believe that X is true” is not the same statement as “X is true.”

“I believe that X is true” can be a true report about what you believe,

even though,

“X is true” remains false.

Ender, I strongly suggest you recognize this distinctions. Betterave goes on further to clarify the notion of epistemic justification, essential for whether or not our *belief *that X counts as knowledge that X, when he says,

So why do we hold claims to be true? One reason might be that they are axiomatic for our understanding of the world. That morality is something that **matters objectively **is one of those claims - it is a **first principle **apprehended by induction.

So we are more or less *justified in holding * a proposition to be true if and only if it satisfies one or more of the following conditions:

(1) the proposition is apprehended inductively through an inference from most observed cases to all cases, or,
(2) it itself is a 1st principle or axiom which is indibutably certain commanding universal assent.
…
We can also add that a proposition is justified if,
(3) the proposition has more explanatory power than alternative hypotheses and explains a wider range of phenomena, or.
(4) it itself is a conclusion arrived at by a valid and sound argument.

By no means an exhaustive list, these conditions at least get everyone started on the right track in evaluating whose position among us is the more plausible one.

With some tiny modifications here and there, we can then say that in order for me to properly know the proposition P, the following conditions are each necessary and together jointly sufficient for my knowing that P.

P is true
I believe that P
P is appropriately justified.

Notice, I can believe that P, and P is true, but not be justified in believing that P: hence I don’t know that P. (e.g., astrological predictions, fortune-telling)
Notice, I can believe that P, and P is false, but still be justfied in believing that P; hence I don’t know that P. (e.g., that space and time are absolute instead of relative)

Betterave and I are claiming you and AntiTheist have little justification for believing that
(a) objective moral facts do not exist
(b) objective moral statements are truth-valueless.
(c) objective moral statements are identical to subjective mental reports about individual preferences.

Both of us have been consistently marshalling arguments against (a), (b), and (c) but we are not seeing any good arguments on yours or AntiTheist’s behalf for them. In fact, our arguments have satisfied one or more of the conditions listed above (1)-(4) for being justified in thinking (a), (b), and (c) are all false. But we haven’t seen any argument from you or AntTheist that satisfies any one of these conditions (1)-(4) for thinking that (a), (b), or (c) are all true.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

we may be born tainted with original sin, but none of us are born actual sinners, and certainly not as monsters a la Pol Pot! Anyway, yeah, millions of lives, blah, blah - so maybe our psychological condition subjectively requires belief in a God-concept to regulate it… but that’s not taken as evidence of ‘objective’ reality - of that, mysteriously, only the subjectivist has true knowledge.

im only talking about the obvious correlation between atheism, and modern genocides.

Of course it might be ‘dangerous,’ subjectively speaking; so what? But it might not be in all cases. The subjectivist is likely to be quite satisfied with post-modern bourgeois European culture, for instance, and take your ignoring this fact as evidence that you’re just not taking his (subjective) convictions seriously - which (subjectively) annoys him, but which he nonetheless accepts as part of the way the world is.

yes, opinions are important to people when reason doesnt support them

 

[Syntax]

Hi Syntax,

I have been very impressed by your posts in this thread. I would love it if you would read my OP in this thread on demands for justifying religious beliefs and share any thoughts you have.

There are too many claims in that post which deserve to be taken apart one by one, and I’m not sure the argument by analogy on which this pragmatic view depends is an accurate analogy. But I will respond to a couple claims you make.

When does the intellectual responsibility of having evidence to support our beliefs arise? And what do we mean by evidence, anyway? Having dropped the notion of objectivity as being in accordence with reality and having replaced it with objectivity as the ability to get consensus among informed inquirers, evidence is then whatever may help us get consensus about a belief.

First, “objectivity” is a metaphysical notion about the representational character of truth, not an epistemic notion about evidence or justification, but you are really close to conflating these two notions.

Second, I think your claim I bold-faced is false. I don’t think “objectivity” should be defined whatsoever in terms of “universal consensus,” since that kind of move would relativize the notion of truth to “what most people think” when what most people think could still easily be false. So I retain the definition of “objectivity” as “propositions which are in accordance with reality” in spite of universal consensus. But you seem to flat out disagree.

Evidence is only of issue when there is some need to get consensus…

It is true that evidence becomes important when universal consensus becomes a goal in public discourse, but universal consensus does not constitute evidence.

Moreover, having appropriate evidence is an important issue not only when my goal is to persuade my opponent that my own beliefs are justified or true, but also when the consistency and plausibility of my own beliefs are at stake independent of what others think: for surely having evidence is of private importance, too, independent of what others may think, is it not?..At least I know *I couldn’t live with myself *if I knew some of my beliefs were inconsistent with each other, for example…lol

there is no outside authority to which we can appeal about what ought to be counted as evidence beyond what authority has been agreed upon between the parties that seek to have one another’s backing for their public projects.

This is true. But is it problematic? An atheist and a religious person, if they are both rational, both agree on what counts as appropriate evidence such as 1st-person experience, empirical data, probability, and reason. The only difference between the atheist and the man of faith is that the the atheist lacks a 1st-person religious/spiritual experience. So with respect to **this kind **of (lack of) evidence the atheist’s belief that *there is no God *is a rational belief. What is problematic for the atheist is not so much the private 1st-person experience of the religious person, but rather the alleged authority of others’ own testimony for which he thinks is not a reliable authority–and he is right, especially the more the content of that testimony (Jesus rose from the Dead, e.g.) becomes increasingly unlikely. However, his belief could also be irrational with respect to other sources of justification, such as probability, logic, and the principle of sufficient reason. And supposing he does have a 1st-person veridical religious experience and then denies that it is veridical–then he would also be behaving irrationally.

However, I do know that some atheists will deny 1st-person experience counts as evidence, but this is another subject that would take too long to discuss, and which I think would be self-undermining since, by the same token, the atheist ought not to be trusting the veracity of any of his own ordinary day-to-day experiences going about his world.

When we ask what counts as evidence, this will vary depending on context, but it doesn’t vary from one individual or culture to another (at least it shouldn’t because others would simply be wrong). In other words, what counts as evidence is contextual, not relative. For instance, if a person cites his experience of seeing his own hands as evidence for his belief “I have hands” in the context of philosophical discussion of whether or not we have good reason for believing we are not brains in a vat (BIV), then the person’s “evidence” cannot be counted as such at all, since in the context of *this *discussion the data would appear exactly the same if he were a BIV because a BIV would have an experience perfectly indistinguishable from a non-BIV. Moreover, everyone would still be in unanimous agreement that this context changes the standards of what counts as acceptable evidence.

On the other hand, when I cite my experience of seeing my own hands as a sufficient reason to believe “I have hands” in the *normal everyday *context, then this is perfectly admissible as evidence, and everyone agrees that it is.

 

[Syntax]

In addition to her moral projects to get people to adhere to her ethics, another area where a believer may face a justified demand for evidence is if she makes any scientific or historical claims. Rorty wrote that “On a pragmatist account, scientific inquiry is best viewed as the attempt to find a single, unified, coherent description of the world–the description that makes it easiest to predict the consequences of events and actions…” This attempt is the attempt to gratify particular desires–the desire to predict and control.

Though I agree with Rorty that science aims at a “single, unified, coherent description of the world” for purposes of prediction and control, I also think science aims at truth and a better understanding of how things actually work–which is that aspect of science Rorty’s pragmatism seems to ignore.

More importantly, his pragmatism ignores that the only explanation for these apparent “successes” in science can only be attributed to the fact that scientists are learning something about how the objective world works independent of human goals and purposes, and this is precisely where I have a fundamental disagreement with him: truth is NOT reducible to human practices and goals. It seems most pragmatism employs this kind of pragmatic/reductionist attitude toward “truth” in some form or another.

claims about virgin birth, raising the dead, the Biblical account of the origin of the universe, and the effectiveness of various sacraments are the sorts of assertions that, if taken to be historically and scientifically true, need to face up to the demands for evidence and the standards for what counts as evidence that apply to the public projects of doing history and doing science.

(Just to clarify, the Church doesn’t take the Biblical account of the origin of the universe as a literal reading of what actually happened. Only fundamentalists do that. It is also perfectly consistent with our faith to believe in human evolution. The Church herself does not take any official position on it, and there are no “official” requirements to believe one way or another…though alot of catholics don’t know this. Anyway…)

As *historical or scientifc claims *these propositions are certainly accountable to scientific and historical standards, but they are also accountable to other standards since they are not merely scientific or historical claims. They are also spiritual and metaphysical kinds of claims, and for which they are therefore not *fully *accountable to scientific and historical standards of what counts as “evidence.”

It is possible to imagine a theist whose beliefs about God are “sufficiently privatized” such that they do not serve the scientific purposes of predicting and controlling the world or influencing the moral choices of others. Such beliefs would not conflict with science and would not need to face any demands for evidence.

I believe the bold-faced piece is false. Though I agree the Articles of Faith do not confllict with science, they are still rational beliefs, therefore, they do demand evidence in terms of 1st-person experience and personal witnessing, just not always the scientific or historical kind of evidence. I always found it interesting that Aquinas said, “A believer’s act of faith does not terminate in propositions but in the realities which those propositions express.” 1st-person experience and personal witnessing is still sufficient evidence even for the historical truth of the claim “Christ rose from the dead,” for example, precisely because it is not merely a historical proposition demanding historical evidence, but contains a much deeper reality than what any ordinary historical proposition could be capable of expressing at all.

Richard Rorty has recommended such “public versus private” considerations to help us untangle beliefs as part of his version of pragmatism. Someone who holds to a privatized version of religion may view “the supposed tension between science and religion as the illusion of opposition between copperative endeavors and private projects.”

Though Christ’s own historical resurrection occurs also as a private experience within the believer himself, this experience alone is sufficient evidence for the historical reality of it. So the claim is also a very publicly believable claim, for which reasons and justifications should be offered to others (again, just not historical or scientific ones).

I’m laughing because this sounds absurd even to my own ears, but I whole-heartedly believe it. It’s weird, but this is the best way I can express it. This is why I wouldn’t hold any atheist accountable for not believing it without this 1st-person experience. The debate comes down to precisely what kind of higher spiritual and metaphysical realities the historical proposition “Jesus rose from the dead” is capable of expressing. And I don’t think the atheist has the gift of grace necessary for having the kind of epistemic access to the metaphysical/spiritual import of this claim that he would like to; he has access only to its historical import which is precisely why he is incapable of accepting its historical truth. So I think the atheist is perfectly rational for denying it. On the other hand, those who believe it are perfectly rational for asserting it because they have a kind priviledged epistemic access to its content due to God’s grace.

hmmm…I definitely want to think about this more. This is fascinating!

 

[Mike_Dye]

If the question is “Does morality exist?” My reply is yes morality exists. You will probably have to go to another country to find evidence of it though. When I was young you could find it here but no longer.

 

[Leela]

hmmm…I definitely want to think about this more. This is fascinating!

Hi Syntax,

I posted your comments in the “Demanding Evidence Thread.” I we can continue the conversation there.

Best,
Leela