Does morality exist?

[Syntax]

My view would be the first no right or wrong exists, but ethical judgments still purport to make judgments about the outside world. Therefore, they are all objectively false.] I will point out, however, that I am as justified in applying the term “anti-realist” to your position as you are in applying it to mine since the proper use of the term turns on which of us has the true understanding of morality in a Godless universe.

huh??..That’s not correct at all. No. An anti-realist says *all *objective moral claims are false because NO wrongmaking or rightmaking properties exist all across the board. A realist, on the other hand, will say that only *some *objective moral claims are false in instances when someone makes an error in ascribing a property to situation for which it really doesn’t hold. A utilitarian and a virtue-ethicist will disagree about what counts as a moral principle, for instance–so one of the theories is wrong–but neither of them are anti-realists because they both agree that moral properties exist. They just disagree about *which ones *those properties are. Understand?

The statement is true if wrongness is in fact a really existent property, but this claim assumes the point in question. What makes wrongness a really existent property? I’m looking for something like a syllogism that has “wrongness is a really existent property” as a conclusion, not as a premise.

You’re right. There’s no knock-down syllogistic proof of wrong-making properties in that post…actually, there’s no knock-down proof at all. However, there’s equally no knock-down proof that wrong-making properties don’t exist either. So, initially, Anti-realism is in the same boat as the realist. Similarly, there is no knock-down proof for the existence of gravity, electrons, or numbers either, no matter how much we try to marshall syllogistic arguments in favor of their existence.

The problem is the limitation of logic itself: It simply can’t tell you what exists and what doesn’t exist. It’s impossible to arrive at any conclusion one way or another about the existence or non-existence of something through valid inference. So we can only give *indirect proofs *for their existence or non-existence, such as using an inference to the best explanation, probability, and the principle of sufficient reason to account for the various patterns and regularities in phenomena that we observe (just like the inference that the force of gravity exists, because if it didn’t, then no one has an explanation for why objects regularly fall when their supports are undermined. Clearly there must be SOME reason why objects continue to fall, right?).

Nevertheless, I DO give a very good reason for thinking these properties exist in post #186, and that both anti-realism and non-cognitivism are false. The main reasons are twofold: (a) noncognitivism is self-contradictory and (b) anti-realism cannot account for the various phenomena that we observe. Because of (a) and (b), we therefore have much MORE reason to believe cognitive realism is true and that noncognitive anti-realism is false.

In that post, I talk about the property of “beauty” as a concept that applies to different changing instances, and infer that it must somehow exist independent of context and of its changing physical instantiations in the world. The existence of properties explains the consistency in human behavior throughout both changing contexts and changing objects.

Here’s two other short arguments against anti-realism. Neither is deductively valid, only inductively strong, since they are both inferences to the best explanation:

John like happiness
Bill likes happiness.
So, Bill and John both like the same thing, namely happiness.
Therefore, happiness must exist in order for John and Bill to like the same thing.

or

John think torturing babies is wrong.
Bill thinks killing innocent people for fun is wrong.
So, both think the same thing about two different actions, namely, that they are wrong.
Therefore, wrongness must exist to account for why John and Bill think that these actions are wrong, otherwise they would always be saying something false.

But are they saying something false? Are the statements meaningless? What reason do we have for thinking they are saying something false? Where’s the argument?

The conclusions of both these arguments, being inferences to the best explanation, are intuitively plausible and self-evident both to me and everyone else. If you think the conclusions are false, then you will have to explain why the reasoning employed in both arguments is not intuitively plausible. For example, what makes it okay to infer the existence of electrons, gravity, and numbers, but not okay to infer the existence of moral properties? Why is one argument good, and the other argument bad? The burden of proof is on you to explain this distinction (unless of course you think gravity, electrons, and numbers don’t exist either so that all inferences to the best explanation are faulty). These are the potential consequences anti-realism has to face if it is going to make sense to itself.

 

[AntiTheist]

You’re right. There’s no knock-down syllogistic proof of wrong-making properties in that post…actually, there’s no knock-down proof at all. However, there’s equally no knock-down proof that wrong-making properties don’t exist either. So, initially, Anti-realism is in the same boat as the realist.

Seems to me that the burden of proof is on the person claiming that X exists (here, let X = morality).

Similarly, there is no knock-down proof for the existence of gravity, electrons, or numbers either, no matter how much we try to marshall syllogistic arguments in favor of their existence.

We don’t need “syllogistic arguments” for these things. Gravity is a theory – a model for understanding a series of observed facts that has explanatory power. If a better model comes along, we’ll discard gravity tomorrow. Electrons can be demonstrated through experiment. Numbers are labels that we put on concepts that we have derived from physical realities. Come on now.

John like happiness
Bill likes happiness.
So, Bill and John both like the same thing, namely happiness.
Therefore, happiness must exist in order for John and Bill to like the same thing.

It must, eh?

Try this one:
John likes unicorns.
Bill likes unicorns.
So, Bill and John both like the same thing, namely unicorns.
Therefore, unicorns must exist in order for John and Bill to like the same thing.

 

[Syntax]

I don’t agree at all that “beauty is defined by each physical instance of it.” “Beauty” is a term that individuals attribute to things they find aesthetically pleasing. That’s all it is. You can’t start with a circular definition, like “beauty is defined by each physical instance of beauty” and then expect any reasonable person to understand you when you speak

.
The bold-faced piece is a contradiction. So is the latter. See below.

EDIT: I realize now, upon re-reading this, that you probably intended to attribute “beauty is defined by each physical instance of it” to me. That’s not my definition. “Beauty” isn’t a “thing” by my account. Not at all. **It’s shorthand for “stuff that is aesthetically pleasing to me.” **There’s no contradition – at all – in saying that some things are more aesthetically pleasing to me than others and that some things are more pleasing to one individual than they are to another

…
You are saying that beauty is just what each individual finds beautiful. So a person has an opinion that X is beautiful and that Y is ugly. And another person has an opinion that Y is beautiful and that X is ugly. Therefore, X and Y are both beautiful and ugly. Contradiction. Your proposed reductionism continues to fail no matter how much to try to squirm out of it.

[Not all people are going to call a goddess more beautiful than a woman; in fact, some of us like imperfection a lot more than some ideal

This doesn’t matter. Beauty still holds the same across changing opinions, contexts, objects.
[/quote]

 

[Mijoy2]

A person much bigger and stronger then you beats and tortures you for no other reason then for the thrill of scaring you, seeing you in pain, cowering and pleading for mercy. Do you feel they have done you worng? Or do you feel they are just having fun and this is how they chose to have fun?

I’d suggested you would feel wronged. To be wronged implies a right and wrong.

Therefore morality exists. Albiet it’s not always as clear as above.

Aren’t I a genuis? And I never even took philosophy in college.

 

[Syntax]

We don’t need “syllogistic arguments” for these things…

No one said we did (except Ender).

Gravity is a theory – a model for understanding a series of observed facts that has explanatory power. If a better model comes along, we’ll discard gravity tomorrow.

Precisely, theories about morality provide a better understanding of human behavior and expectations too. Further, you are wrong about gravity. We won’t discard the existence of gravity, we will just refine the concept, just like we do with ethical theories when new a priori discoveries are made.

Electrons can be demonstrated through experiment. .

No they can’t. No one has ever observed an electron, just probability patterns. Their existence is inferred from these models.

Numbers are labels that we put on concepts that we have derived from physical realities. Come on now…

What entity satisfies the operation 2-squared? Wait, nothing does? hmmm…

 

[AntiTheist]

.You are saying that beauty is just what each individual finds beautiful. So a person has an opinion that X is beautiful and that Y is ugly. And another person has an opinion that Y is beautiful and that X is ugly. Therefore, X and Y are both beautiful and ugly. Contradiction.

I don’t see the problem with saying that object X is beautiful according to one set of values and ugly according to an entirely different set of values.

The object is still the object. Just because one person calls it something and another person calls it another thing doesn’t change what it is, outside of those name-callings.

Again, “beautiful” just means “pleasing to my senses.” An object can be pleasing to my senses and not pleasing to the senses of someone else. Where’s the contradiction?

Mijoy2:

A person much bigger and stronger then you beats and tortures you for no other reason then for the thrill of scaring you, seeing you in pain, cowering and pleading for mercy. Do you feel they have done you worng?

How I would feel in that situation would be irrelevant to the question of whether “wrong” exists as something outside of my mind.

 

[Syntax]

I don’t see the problem with saying that object X is beautiful according to one set of values and ugly according to an entirely different set of values.

The object is still the object. Just because one person calls it something and another person calls it another thing doesn’t change what it is, outside of those name-callings.

Again, “beautiful” **just **means “pleasing to my senses.” An object can be pleasing to my senses and not pleasing to the senses of someone else. Where’s the contradiction?.

The bold-faced piece is generating the contradiction–it is your noncognitivism whose consequences you seem not to understand at all that quickly gets you into a mess:

beautiful = pleasing to A
beautfiul = pleasing to B
pleasing to A (not =) pleasing to B
Therefore, beautiful (not =) beautiful

 

[Betterave]

beautiful = pleasing to A
beautfiul = pleasing to B
pleasing to A (not =) pleasing to B
Therefore, beautiful (not =) beautiful

Therefore, either {beautiful (not=) pleasing to x} or {beautiful is not a real property, since real things are identical with themselves}

 

[Leela]

Seems to me that the burden of proof is on the person claiming that X exists (here, let X = morality).

I think that the burden of proof is always on whoever wants to convince someone else of something. Does that make sense? In that case, you share the burden.

 

[Betterave]

I don’t know what you mean by unconditionally binding. We can behave morally only by freely choosing between good and evil so in that regard we cannot be bound. If you mean universally true in every situation then I’m not sure you can say that murder is immoral because it is in fact not held universally to be true. It may be universally true that I may not murder someone of my tribe but it has been held in the past by pretty much everyone - and is so today among many - that murder of someone in another tribe is a positive good.

Unconditionally binding just means that I can choose to behave immorally and that doesn’t make it moral - the categories are objective, they do not shift because of my personal preferences. Cultural norms are different from personal preferences. If some of the content of the category/notion of murder changes, that doesn’t mean it has no stable content, and it doesn’t mean that both conceptions are equally well grounded. Different cultural norms are obviously not all equally objectively grounded. (If you disagree with this claim (I’m not sure how anyone could), please explain why.)

Quote:
There are no good reasons to doubt that many of the putative moral laws we apprehend are objectively grounded (true moral laws) and many good reasons to think that they are objectively grounded (in our institutions of reason-giving and the basic conceptual structures by which we grasp reality).
This is no argument at all; it is merely a declaration that you prefer your rationale to mine. I’m still waiting for an explanation.

Actually you’re right; it’s not an argument. It was a premise in an argument. The justification of the premise was supposed to be found in the arguments already and subsequently presented. If you see reason to reject those arguments, please give me those reasons.

Quote:
You might object: but why not accept Anti’s alternate ‘basic conceptual structure’? It’s novel and unintuitive, sure; but why not?
If it is novel it is only because most atheists are unwilling to face the logic of their own belief and pretend that there is some reason to behave morally even though they can’t rationally explain why. Anti is unique in accepting the conclusion his belief requires, a position, by the way, that is neither novel nor unintuitive as it is precisely the same conclusion Dostoyevsky (among others) expressed 150 years ago.

Have we gone through positivism 101 and why it is wrong yet? I think we have. We don’t affirm things are real because we can rationally explain why they are real. That is simply not how our basic apprehension of reality works as I’ve tried to explain to you. If you want to reject these explanations, please give your reasons for doing so.

Quote:
Well, why would we do that?.. It’s so we can grasp reality as it really is - that’s the claim I’m hearing, at least. …What do you think motivates Anti’s position?
He believes, as do I (and Fyodor) that it describes reality. What more motivation is necessary?

But why believe that? When you choose to claim that what everyone else perceives to be the case is not really the case, you are claiming to have a privileged point of view. A blind person can believe and claim that color doesn’t exist - but if he’s right, he’ll have to do some very special explaining to convince the rest of us who can see color. Obviously there has to be some explanation grounding his belief, not just the blank assertion that his more ‘economical’ point of view is superior.

Quote:
One of the things that appear to us is our practical mastery in the domain of morality, our ability to reflect upon our preferences and to form judgments on their basis. Judgments are not preferences, they are practical (action-directed) axioms based on our preferences, and they can be, qua judgments, public statements of value, and therefore public practical axioms. Moral judgments, then, instantiate the possibility of public practical axioms in a particular way, namely as unconditionally binding imperatives in terms of which we recognize and interact with the collection of features of reality that we call moral - virtue, vice, right, wrong, good, bad, admirable, base, beautiful, ugly. These ways of apprehending reality are not proposed to the individual such that she can agree to see the world in these terms or not. When we look at our own capacity for understanding what is, these are objectively constituted categories of reality that are given to us and transcend, contextualize, give meaning to, our personal preferences.
I really don’t know what you’re trying to say here. I think more clarity is going to require less jargon.

Thanks for your honesty. Why don’t you just tell me what you do understand and ask me about what you don’t.

 

[Betterave]

I think you’re confusing my usage of the term “reason”. By reason, I do NOT mean “stated motivation” nor “implicit motivation”. Rather, I mean “something that *actually *counts in favor of an action.”

Are the italics on the word “actually” supposed to convince me that you’re designating a real distinction here? If so, it didn’t work.

Assume there is no afterlife. For many conventional cases, then, people still have reason to be moral: if I lie to people, they won’t trust me, etc. The state of the world actually counts in favor of my actions. But I can construct realistic cases where doing the right thing will not have good effects for me, and doing the wrong thing will have good effects for me. And I can be fully aware that acting wrongly hurts others, and yet it might puzzle me why my moral reasons for doing right outweigh my prudential reasons for doing wrong. Now you could make the case that “goodness is its own reward”; indeed, Plato makes this case at length in the Republic. But is this case plausible?

Thus, atheistic morality collapses into prudential ethics. Indeed, this is the tragedy that many less-than-scrupulous Kantians encounter in their daily lives.

But prudential ethics are not ipso facto (qua prudential, as Betterave would say ), more or less objective than divine command ethical theories, surely?

 

[Betterave]

No. This means that any consistent atheistic ethic would be, in some cases at least, voluntarist. “You tell me why a thing is wrong, but you do not tell me why I should not do wrong.” Example: a scientist has good epistemic reasons to experiment on human beings, but good moral reasons not to do the experiment. Why should the moral reasons prevail? I do not question that we have an intuition that morality prevails here, but I do point out that our moral intuitions sometimes carry little or no weight in our actions.

What are “epistemic reasons” - a species of practical (action-guiding) syllogisms? For example…? Why should the moral reasons prevail? Because they’re moral reasons. Why should we expect the moral reasons to prevail? We shouldn’t, unless we know that the scientist is a virtuous person; if she is a virtuous person, this fact is our reason for thinking that the moral reasons will prevail.

I think we’re on the same page here. To be clear, though: I think atheists can be moral realists, but they do not have an answer to the question: Why be moral?

Rather they have no answer to the question: If I’m not a virtuous person, for whom moral reasons matter, why be moral? But no one has a compelling answer to that question. (Certainly not realists who can conceive of Lucifer’s revolt against God as a moral possibility - note that there is no assumption here about the real existence of God.)

 

[Betterave]

I assume that things that are objectively good or bad do not change with time or place; that is, if it was good in the past it cannot be good in the future and vice versa. Do you agree?

I assume that no particular ever occurs twice, every historical occurrence is unique, and that as Aristotle says, it is irrational to demand the kind of exactness from ethics, which deals with unique particulars, that we demand from mathematics. Does that answer your question?

But it is only when this natural flourishing/languishing is expressed conceptually and is made into the object of practical reasonings, reflections on the good, that a moral being comes into existence. (This is why an infant cannot commit morally evil acts.)

It isn’t clear though why the fact that we can conceptualize morality makes morality objectively exist any more than the fact that we can conceptualize God and unicorns makes them actually exist.

It is clear when we consider the fact that we do not just conceptualize morality, we apply our moral concepts hundreds of time everyday to the real situations that we face. (And this is in stark contrast to our unicorn-concept, I’ll assume.)

Ah, but my intention was to make the exact opposite point. Given that (for this debate) God does not exist (which I stipulated in the OP) then neither can objective morality. It is therefore irrational for an atheist to claim both that he disbelieves in God and that he can behave morally.

“Exact opposite”? I don’t think so. The broader context of your argument is that most of us believe in objective reality, we need God for morality to be objective, so we should believe in God. So you’re saying we have to go:

1. want objective morality
2. need God for objective morality
3. God

I think that’s implausible and I’m suggesting:

1. have objective morality
2. recognizing objective morality can direct us towards God

And I’m pretty sure my position is the more ‘orthodox’ one. But again, that’s all just an aside.

 

[Betterave]

Anti offers claims against the existence of objective morality independent of whether or not god exists. Therefore the statement is not performing any axiomatic functions at all here.

Second, “god does not exist” is not being accepted as true without proof by anybody–not by me anyways. Both sides are simply trying to give reasons for or against believing objective morality exists independent of any claims made about God’s existence. But if “God does not exist” were an axiom, then it **would ** be supporting other claims made in these posts, but it clearly is not. Therefore, it is not functioning as an axiom, at least not in the context of our discussion. So the assumption is irrelevant.

Quite right… although I can’t resist throwing in a complication (that’s all we need right now!):

We are supposing God does not exist; we can suppose this and consistently say with Voltaire:

Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer.
If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.

…and I think we should be able to see that this claim would radically undermine the possibility of our “God does not exist” supposition doing any real work in our arguments. But notice that the same might very well apply if our supposition had been “God does exist”!

(Therefore, etc., etc… Q.E.D.(?)) Think about it…

 

[Syntax]

Quite right… although I can’t resist throwing in a complication (that’s all we need right now!):

We are supposing God does not exist; we can suppose this and consistently say with Voltaire:

Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer.
If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.

…and I think we should be able to see that this claim would radically undermine the possibility of our “God does not exist” supposition doing any real work in our arguments. But notice that the same might very well apply if our supposition had been “God does exist”!

(Therefore, etc., etc… Q.E.D.(?)) Think about it…

Now it seems we are taking it to the next level, and perhaps it would be better if we didn’t go there to avoid confusion. In any case, I must admit I’m a little lost. Are you saying that both the assertion and denial of God’s existence are simply implicit assumptions *motivating *both sides of the debate? I could certainly agree with that.

However, though you and I presumably believe Voltaire’s conditional “If God did not exist, then it would be necessary to invent him” is a true conditional, i.e., given its antecedent, the the consequent must follow, a **moral realist **atheist, on the other hand, could simply deny the antecedent entails the consequent, so that if God does not exist, then it would not be necessary to invent him–and I know that most respected atheists will do exactly this. Just take the converse of Voltaire’s statement which is logically equivalent: “If it is not necessary to invent God, then God exists.” This sounds absurd to an atheist’s ears, and this is precisely why most of them will typically deny Voltaire-type AND Dostoevsky type conditionals…I’m not defending the atheist view. I am simply overly concerned for logical consistency and fairness. anyway…

Maybe we should drop this meta-meta-ethical topic, maybe not. Your call.

 

[Ender]

Dostoevsky didn’t say this.

What he said was this:

“Where God is, all things are possible; where God is not, all things are permissible.”

Ender

 

[AntiTheist]

The bold-faced piece is generating the contradiction–it is your noncognitivism whose consequences you seem not to understand at all that quickly gets you into a mess:

beautiful = pleasing to A
beautfiul = pleasing to B
pleasing to A (not =) pleasing to B
Therefore, beautiful (not =) beautiful

The equations that you’ve written are correct. “Beautiful” as used by person A and “beautiful” as used by person B do not refer to the same thing. The first “beautiful” refers to person A’s feeling that the object is pleasing to his senes, and the second “beautiful” refers to person B’s feelings that the object is pleasing to his senses.

Again, I fail to see where the “contradiction” is.

“Beauty” is not a quality possessed by the object, but a term attributed to an object by a person depending upon the degree of his senses being pleased by the object. Clearly, different people are going to call different things “beautiful,” and some people are going to assign the term to an object X, while others are not going to assign that term to object X. It’s obviously not a “contradiction” to say that one label can be applied to many different things, so what’s your argument here, exactly?

I apologize for imposing upon you, but you’re going to have to do a better job of explaining your position so I can grasp exactly what you’re saying. I obviously haven’t imbibed the same philosophical texts as you have, so you’re going to have to go slowly with me.

Leela:

I think that the burden of proof is always on whoever wants to convince someone else of something.

Well, yes and no. Let’s say a guy believes in unicorns (because Bill believes in unicorns and John believes in unicorns, so unicorns must exist for them both to believe in them QED).

If he expects others to believe in unicorns, the burden of proof is indeed upon him. If I say, “I don’t believe you,” the burden of proof isn’t on me all of a sudden to provide evidence that no unicorns exist. Now, if I went around trumpeting “No unicorns exist” as a positive claim, I suppose that technically I would have to provide evidence for that claim if I wanted people to believe me. Now, of course, I could simply say that I’m not interested in convincing people that there are no unicorns because it’s bloody obvious.

My position about morality is similar. I do not accept that it exists outside of human value judgments because there is no good evidence for it and because the arguments for it hold no water (see the above John and Bill syllogism). Do I have hard proof that no morality exists outside of human consciousness? No, of course not. For all I know, Cthulhu is sitting in a parallel dimension with a list of do’s and don’ts for humanity. I’m saying that based on the information to available to me, it seems highly doubtful that such a thing exists.

Is that “convincing” to people? I don’t think I particularly care whether I’m “convincing” to people, who for the most part have already made up their minds and are not going to be “convinced” of anything no matter what. My main purpose is to point out that just because there’s no morality, that doesn’t mean that everyone is instantly going to become a monster or that civilization is going to collapse.

Indeed, people get along just fine, despite the fact that no morality exists.

More to come later.

 

[James_S_Saint]

What he said was this:

“Where God is, all things are possible; where God is not, all things are permissible.”

Ender

But then the only place where all things are truly permissible is in a total vacuum (that is how we know it is a vacuum). In a world of high chaos, more is permissible, including death and destruction.

Real morality is formed from the real world and the consequences the real world brings regardless of what anyone liked.

 

[Betterave]

Now it seems we are taking it to the next level, and perhaps it would be better if we didn’t go there to avoid confusion. In any case, I must admit I’m a little lost. Are you saying that both the assertion and denial of God’s existence are **simply **implicit assumptions motivating both sides of the debate? I could certainly agree with that.

I’d drop the “simply” - I think there’s probably something more substantive going on, something St. Anselm, for instance, noticed, but to avoid further confusion (including my own, perhaps) I’ll leave it at that.

Just take the converse of Voltaire’s statement which is logically equivalent: “If it is not necessary to invent God, then God exists.” This sounds absurd to an atheist’s ears, and this is precisely why most of them will typically deny Voltaire-type AND Dostoevsky type conditionals…

Interesting…

I think a better conversion of Voltaire’s claim would be:

“If we had no need to invent God, then this could only be because of God’s really already existing.”

I think this removes the sting of absurdity and should give the reflective atheist something to think about (if he at all understood in the first place what Voltaire was talking about).

 

[Betterave]

The equations that you’ve written are correct. “Beautiful” as used by person A and “beautiful” as used by person B do not refer to the same thing. The first “beautiful” refers to person A’s feeling that the object is pleasing to his senes, and the second “beautiful” refers to person B’s feelings that the object is pleasing to his senses.

Again, I fail to see where the “contradiction” is.

“Beauty” is not a quality possessed by the object, but a term attributed to an object by a person depending upon the degree of his senses being pleased by the object. Clearly, different people are going to call different things “beautiful,” and some people are going to assign the term to an object X, while others are not going to assign that term to object X. It’s obviously not a “contradiction” to say that one label can be applied to many different things, so what’s your argument here, exactly?

I apologize for imposing upon you, but you’re going to have to do a better job of explaining your position so I can grasp exactly what you’re saying. I obviously haven’t imbibed the same philosophical texts as you have, so you’re going to have to go slowly with me.

Nice show of humility, Anti! I think that makes a lot of us feel good, so if you value making others feel good, you too now have something to feel good about! (Is that how it works?)

Anyway, I guess you didn’t notice, but I’ve already sugggested a defense for you against this argument. It went like this:

1. Hypothesis: beautiful = pleasing to A
2. Hypothesis: beautfiul = pleasing to B
3. Hypothesis: pleasing to A (not =) pleasing to B
4. from 1,2, and 3: Therefore, beautiful (not =) beautiful

…but (beautiful (not =) beautiful) is a contradiction…

Therefore,
either {beautiful (not=) pleasing to x} (Syntax’s conclusion)
or {beautiful is not a real property, since real things are identical with themselves} (Anti’s conclusion)

If this is right (I think it is), you’re not caught in an outright contradiction; you’re just making wildly unintuitive and groundless claims.

Leela:
Well, yes and no. Let’s say a guy believes in unicorns (because Bill believes in unicorns and John believes in unicorns, so unicorns must exist for them both to believe in them QED).

If he expects others to believe in unicorns, the burden of proof is indeed upon him. If I say, “I don’t believe you,” the burden of proof isn’t on me all of a sudden to provide evidence that no unicorns exist. Now, if I went around trumpeting “No unicorns exist” as a positive claim, I suppose that technically I would have to provide evidence for that claim if I wanted people to believe me. Now, of course, I could simply say that I’m not interested in convincing people that there are no unicorns because it’s bloody obvious.

I already tried to address this unicorn nonsense. Why do you ignore that fact?

Indeed, people get along just fine, despite the fact that no morality exists.

did you really just post that?