Does sweetness exist, really, or does it only taste that way to us?

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This is nothing to the purpose and is an evasion: do you hold all phenomena have causes or not?
Unknown. Since there many phenomena we cannot discern causes for, we are unable to say one way or the other. The universe may be completely deterministic in the Laplacian sense, and just appears otherwise, or it may have some element of fundamental randomness at work in it.
If you hold that things randomly happen for no reason at all, then that’s as magical as it gets.
I don’t think that word means what you think it means:
Webster:
a : the use of means (as charms or spells) believed to have supernatural power over natural forces
b : magic rites or incantations
2
a : an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source
b : something that seems to cast a spell : enchantment
3
: the art of producing illusions by sleight of hand
All of those are telic inferences, explanations relying on agents and (supernatural) causes. The “unknown” here is “anti-magical”, and denies the viability of any of the meanings of “magic” above.
You certainly don’t abandon the principle of causality, as your randomness logically leads to.
Causes are where we find them! We are ever looking, but do not always find them we look.
The existence of an uncaused cause, a prime mover, can be proven by demonstration using sense perception, the law of contradiction and cause and effect.
That is all derived from “inside the universe” phenomena. What have you got to work on as far as how things work “outside the universe”, if such a concept obtains? If it’s “nothing” – and I think it must be, you’re nowhere. We don’t know anything about an uncaused cause.
This was done 2000 years ago by Aristotle, and is continued to be proven today, despite the fact that most in academia lack the intellectual bravery to honestly read Aristotle’s Metaphysics or a majority of his works. But anyway, this is irrelevant to the discussion.
The “prime mover” continues to be proven today??? What would you cite as a good example of current “proofs” for this?
So you are in effect saying “things can happen for no reason, but only very very small things.” No matter how much you shrink it, this claim still undermines science and leads to irrationality.
Then I must ask what you mean by “irrationality”. If our rule in science is “the evidence must be accommodated”, and I suggest that is a governing principle in science, then that’s that. If we observe that quantum events happen probabilistically, what would a “rational” person conclude, in your view?

-TS
 
Unknown. Since there many phenomena we cannot discern causes for, we are unable to say one way or the other.
Then it is irrational for you to be an atheist, since you admit yourself the universe may have an “unknown” cause. Why do you label yourself an atheist rather than an agnostic?
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touchstone:
The “prime mover” continues to be proven today??? What would you cite as a good example of current “proofs” for this?
I see this getting derailed quickly, but I will briefly state a proof, under the assumption you will make a thread about it if you want to start a new discussion.

We empirically observe things coming to be. A house, for example, comes to be when before it was not. Coming to be is a metaphysical phenomena and has nothing to do with an increase in matter or energy. Hence, it would be true to say that all the particles in a house were existing before its being built, and so, nothing is added, materially, one way or the other. Yet something has happened. Namely, we have an effect (a house) being produced by a cause (a builder.) Thus, we have reason based on the senses that effects have causes. Indeed, we conclude that every effect has a cause. This is substantiated by the fact that a) all observable effects have causes and b) denying this leads to irrationally assuming that something can pop into being out of nothing. So, since every effect must have a cause, we must posit a cause for every effect. It is impossible to have a series of infinite effects unless there be a first cause. This is because, there can only exist a set of potentially infinite effects, and they remain merely potential unless first acted on by a cause. In a set of an infinite amount of dominos, the nature of each domino is to fall after it is struck by the previous domino. Now, it is possible for there to be a set of infinitely falling dominos, but only if they have first been moved by a first cause. This is because the very nature of the set is “moved after being moved by”. It is “moved second, moved by first.” It is not “moved first, moved by second.” Or at any rate, if you do conclude that it has the latter nature, you have effectively proved there is a first cause. This furthermore shows why the first cause must be uncaused, or unmoved, since everything which moves or changes is moved or changed by another. (Note, not everything which changes another need itself be changed. This is a common error in those attacking the first cause argument. It is not “every cause must have a cause” but “every effect must have a cause.”) [This is a very brief run through of the proof by the way. No doubt it could be cleaned up quite a bit.]
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touchstone:
Then I must ask what you mean by “irrationality”.
That something comes from nothing - i.e. that a thing can happen, not for an unknown/undetermined cause, but for no cause at all.
If we observe that quantum events happen probabilistically, what would a “rational” person conclude, in your view?
That we lack the tools in which to fully know why a given phenomena is occuring, and bet that in the future more light will be shed on such issues. But I would never say that “therefore, there is no cause for this.” The spirit of science is so grand because it keeps alive this burning faith that there is a logical harmony and order to the universe. It is constantly trying to make this picture more and more clear.
 
It also follows from the proof that the cause is changeless and unmoved. Aristotle called this the prime mover and said that it “moved things as the beloved” and gave an example of a motionless picture which drew men to itself. A brilliant example to demonstrate what he meant. God or the Prime Mover does not move or change itself; rather, all things are moved by it by a sort of impulse in their existence, whether those things be matter, energy, people, etc.
 
We don’t know anything about an uncaused cause.
On the contrary, we know that it is a) uncaused and b) a causative agent. Extrapolations of this is what theology deals with: i.e. eternal, immaterial, unextended, personal, etc.
 
Then it is irrational for you to be an atheist, since you admit yourself the universe may have an “unknown” cause. Why do you label yourself an atheist rather than an agnostic?
facepalm

Every atheist is an agnostic. Atheism is just a strong form of agnosticism, since you cannot prove a universal negative. I’ve never had a siggy quote in 20+ years of forum posting, but perhaps I need to adopt one with that info. It seems hardly in need to point out, but…
I see this getting derailed quickly, but I will briefly state a proof, under the assumption you will make a thread about it if you want to start a new discussion.
We empirically observe things coming to be. A house, for example, comes to be when before it was not. Coming to be is a metaphysical phenomena and has nothing to do with an increase in matter or energy. Hence, it would be true to say that all the particles in a house were existing before its being built, and so, nothing is added, materially, one way or the other. Yet something has happened. Namely, we have an effect (a house) being produced by a cause (a builder.) Thus, we have reason based on the senses that effects have causes. Indeed, we conclude that every effect has a cause. This is substantiated by the fact that a) all observable effects have causes and b) denying this leads to irrationally assuming that something can pop into being out of nothing. So, since every effect must have a cause, we must posit a cause for every effect. It is impossible to have a series of infinite effects unless there be a first cause. This is because, there can only exist a set of potentially infinite effects, and they remain merely potential unless first acted on by a cause. In a set of an infinite amount of dominos, the nature of each domino is to fall after it is struck by the previous domino. Now, it is possible for there to be a set of infinitely falling dominos, but only if they have first been moved by a first cause. This is because the very nature of the set is “moved after being moved by”. It is “moved second, moved by first.” It is not “moved first, moved by second.” Or at any rate, if you do conclude that it has the latter nature, you have effectively proved there is a first cause. This furthermore shows why the first cause must be uncaused, or unmoved, since everything which moves or changes is moved or changed by another. (Note, not everything which changes another need itself be changed. This is a common error in those attacking the first cause argument. It is not “every cause must have a cause” but “every effect must have a cause.”) [This is a very brief run through of the proof by the way. No doubt it could be cleaned up quite a bit.]
This would have to be its own thread, you’re right.
That something comes from nothing - i.e. that a thing can happen, not for an unknown/undetermined cause, but for no cause at all.
That doesn’t speak to irrationality. If that’s how the universe is – and reality is what it is, no matter what we would prefer or like to think about it – then it’s reasonable to describe it as it appears to us, especially as determined and rigorous investigation have taken place and proceed. I suggest it’s unreasonable to suppose that one’s intuitions confer reality upon reality, that one’s mind is what structures fundamental reality outside the mind, and that is what is required to insist that nature “just can’t be that way”, in small things or large. Reality can’t be bothered by our intuitions.
That we lack the tools in which to fully know why a given phenomena is occuring, and bet that in the future more light will be shed on such issues. But I would never say that “therefore, there is no cause for this.”
Science is always tentative, I repeat once again. It doesn’t and can’t say “there is no cause for this”. It’s just an option that can’t be ruled out for cases where causes are unknown. The scientific conclusion is “there is no known cause for this”.
The spirit of science is so grand because it keeps alive this burning faith that there is a logical harmony and order to the universe. It is constantly trying to make this picture more and more clear.
Yes, but that doesn’t provide warrant for dogma. It’s a research program, a metaphysical bet, that nature is to some degree intelligible. Completely or exhaustively intelligible isn’t even a coherent concept, so we stake our enterprise on just seeing how far we can get with our continuing efforts. The effort never stops, but we never reach the end, and always have unknowns to acknowledge.

-TS
 
Every atheist is an agnostic.
And so is every believer…:confused: There seems to me quite a difference between:I think God does exist, I think he does not exist, I don’t know if he exists. But, anyway that’s beside the point.
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touchstone:
That doesn’t speak to irrationality. If that’s how the universe is – and reality is what it is, no matter what we would prefer or like to think about it – then it’s reasonable to describe it as it appears to us…
You fail to understand the metaphysical ramifications of what you’re saying. My point speaks precisely to irrationality because, if things can come into being without a cause, then the principle of contradiction is violated and no meaningful statements can be had whatsoever. All science, language, knowability, etc. is destroyed.

It’s never reasonable to describe a thing popping into being out of nothing. Nothing has no properties, and thus it is impossible for “it” to become something. There is no space, time, matter, etc in actual metaphysical nothingness. Therefore, since nothing is precisely “no existing thing” an existing thing can never “come out of” it, since “coming-out-of-ness” is a property, and metaphysical nothingness is propertiless. (This is why there can never be any proof of nothing producing something, since, even if complete darkness and voidness were to suddenly have a particle pop into itself [which is also impossible, since for a thing to produce itself, it would have to exist prior to itself, which is absurd], that voidness has the property of being able to contain the particle. It has, at least, the property of space.)Furthermore, you’ve not given one example of something coming into being from metaphysical nothingness. Indeed as I said, such evidence is impossible, since real nothingness cannot be observed by the senses whatsoever. On the other hand, the proof I’ve given is 100% demonstrative.

With all due respect, I think you don’t have much acquintance with philosophy of ontology or being. and this is why you are not grasping your epistemological implications. Metaphysics is not about “hyper” physics or quantum physics or some sort of physical science/empiricism. It’s about first principles or systems of thought, which undergird all thought whatsoever. It’s about the very assumptions that all our science, physics, etc. are built upon, and how we know reality in the first place. It is thus impossible that a science can come along afterward and falsify a metaphysical assumption, since it rests on the validity of these assumptions to begin with. Any attempt to undermine the principles of causality and contradiction are nothing more than a slitting of one’s own intellectual throat.
 
Getting to the point of my post there, which you ignored:

**Physical facts (material explanations) may provide accounts for sweetness in particular, or qualia generally. **

Yea or nay?

That will tell me if I understood you or not.

-TS
Not to be rude, but are you serious…? You think I have not clearly answered this question yet? :confused: Or do you just have so little intellectual integrity that you are unable to admit that you are wrong, so instead you just change the subject and ignore very pointed and repeated requests to respond to a point (in this case, the point that you have committed an obvious and silly straw man argument)?? Mind-boggling!

Here is my claim:

Just as “no amount of physical description of redness will make a blind person to see redness”, “no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.”

If you disagree, that can only be because you don’t understand the meanings of the terms. On the other hand, you have substituted the expression “provide an account for” in place of the original “portray”… so I’m not sure what you mean by each expression, but perhaps you’re trying to fudge in another straw man or ambiguous term?
 
With all due respect, I think you don’t have much acquintance with philosophy of ontology or being. and this is why you are not grasping your epistemological implications. Metaphysics is not about “hyper” physics or quantum physics or some sort of physical science/empiricism. It’s about first principles or systems of thought, which undergird all thought whatsoever. It’s about the very assumptions that all our science, physics, etc. are built upon, and how we know reality in the first place. It is thus impossible that a science can come along afterward and falsify a metaphysical assumption, since it rests on the validity of these assumptions to begin with. Any attempt to undermine the principles of causality and contradiction are nothing more than a slitting of one’s own intellectual throat.
With due respect, I don’t think you understand much about how science works. Science starts with “that’s just the way it is” and proceeds to mathematical description. The resulting mathematical model can then be appealed to to answer the question “why?” in particular cases (e.g., why did this radioactive decay event happen?), but the scientific model does not thereby require an appeal to an ultimate cause for why the mathematical model is the way it is observed to be, and it certainly doesn’t rule out a probabilistic answer or an answer of “we don’t know - our model does not answer that question and was not designed to”.
 
With due respect, I don’t think you understand much about how science works. Science starts with “that’s just the way it is” and proceeds to mathematical description. The resulting mathematical model can then be appealed to to answer the question “why?” in particular cases (e.g., why did this radioactive decay event happen?), but the scientific model does not thereby require an appeal to an ultimate cause for why the mathematical model is the way it is observed to be, and it certainly doesn’t rule out a probabilistic answer or an answer of “we don’t know - our model does not answer that question and was not designed to”.
Science is an empirical practice which tries to answer why certain phenomena occured. It assumes axiomatically that things happen for a reason, or that all effects have causes. My point is that it is nonsensical then to use evidence to try to support the contrary - that things happen for no cause or reason - since you would effectively be using a cause-effect example (nothing causing or effectively giving rise to something) to undermine the cause-effect principle itself, which is absurd. All you could conclude by such an example is that we do not presently know the cause at work; not that there is no cause at work.

Ex nihilo nihil fit is a principle that can never be proven, since all proofs rest on its validity. Neither can it be disproven, unless you first axiomatically reject its validity. But it is only by assuming its valid that we move from scientific ignorance to knowledge.
 
Science is an empirical practice which tries to answer why certain phenomena occured. [Yes] It assumes axiomatically that -]things happen for a reason, or that all effects have causes/-] [NO - why would you say this? - It is perfectly possible (even inevitable) that certain phenomena will fall outside of the range of explanation of a given empirical model - this fact doesn’t nullify the model in question!]. My point is that it is nonsensical then to use evidence to try to support the contrary - that things happen for no cause or reason - since you would effectively be using a cause-effect example (nothing causing or effectively giving rise to something) to undermine the cause-effect principle itself, which is absurd. [Yes, that would be absurd.] All you could conclude by such an example is that we do not presently know the cause at work; not that there is no cause at work.

Ex nihilo nihil fit is a principle that can never be proven, since all proofs rest on its validity. [How so??? (Certainly not!)]
Neither can it be disproven, unless you first axiomatically reject its validity. [That’s true.] But it is only by assuming its valid that we move from scientific ignorance to knowledge.

Sorry, but that’s just wrong.
 
It is perfectly possible (even inevitable) that certain phenomena will fall outside of the range of explanation of a given empirical model - this fact doesn’t nullify the model in question!
Of course this is inevitable; otherwise, scientific advancement would be impossible. Yet it does nullify the model in question insofar as it shows that it is unable to account for all phenomena going on. This is how theories evolve and accommodate new data. Old models are touched up in order to shed light on new evidence. When we run up against a phenomena we can’t explain, we don’t throw our hands up and say, “that does it! there is no cause for this!”

This shows clearly why science rests on the supposition “from nothing nothing comes.” If this principle is rejected, then it becomes plausible to posit that a given phenomena happened for no reason at all. It just came into being out of no where (from no-being or non-where/non-place) with no explanation whatsoever. This is because metaphysical nothingness cannot have any properties - even explanatory properties or “able-to-give-rise-to-something” properties. It is unable, by definition, to have any explanatory power or be testable in any way, since “it” lacks all being whatsoever and could never be “observed” or sensed in a lab somewhere.
 
Betterave;
[NO - why would you say this? - It is perfectly possible (even inevitable) that certain phenomena will fall outside of the range of explanation of a given empirical model - this fact doesn’t nullify the model in question!].
The fact that certain knowlege falls outside of the range of a restrictive system such as empiricism does not impugn the fact that as; The Exodus pointed out “It assumes axiomatically that things happen for a reason, or that all effects have causes”.

There is no necessity inherant in a reason that it must be comprehensible; or for that matter empirically discernable; nonetheless - all occurrances occur rationally; or for a reason.
[How so??? (Certainly not!)]
Ex nihilo nihil fit is implictly axiomatic; all rational discussion rests upon the acceptance of certain principles; and all consequential discourse on matters which is preceeded by the axiomatic understanding of “Ex nihilo nihil fit” are valid – nonetheless; not all knowlege is per se posterior to “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; but all knowlege where “Ex nihilo nihil fit” is prior rests upon it; including the knowlege of all posteriors to “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; including it’s own proof – because the proof of “Ex nihilo nihil fit” must presuppose “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; or else one could argue any contesation would be a violation of the Principle of Locality; and not “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; moreover; if one were to eliminate all that was potential for the contestation from Locality; we must also eliminate the observer; ie-ergo;- all proof for “Ex nihilo nihil fit” must presuppose it.

👍
 
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betterave:
Ex nihilo nihil fit is a principle that can never be proven, since all proofs rest on its validity. [How so??? (Certainly not!)]
I suppose you could make the claim that, by proving something always comes from something, this therefore proves the opposite, that nothing gives rise to nothing. Since all things which we experience come from other existing things, we have no proof whatsoever of a thing ever coming to be out of sheer nothingness. But I want to avoid this claim, since modern physics is trying to do the very opposite - show by empirical evidence that things actually do “pop into being” out of nothing (albeit only very small things - as if size made a difference.) Instead, I like to show how it is absurd to deny the very premise in which supports the demonstration in the first place. I also am trying to show that metaphysical nothingness can never be used in a demonstration, since it is a negation of all being whatsoever - space, time, energy, etc. (I suppose I would, if pressed, admit however that I think ex nihilo nihil fit can be proven.)
 
Of course this is inevitable; otherwise, scientific advancement would be impossible. Yet it does nullify the model in question insofar as it shows that it is unable to account for all phenomena going on. This is how theories evolve and accommodate new data. Old models are touched up in order to shed light on new evidence. When we run up against a phenomena we can’t explain, we don’t throw our hands up and say, “that does it! there is no cause for this!”

This shows clearly why science rests on the supposition “from nothing nothing comes.” If this principle is rejected, then it becomes plausible to posit that a given phenomena happened for no reason at all. It just came into being out of no where (from no-being or non-where/non-place) with no explanation whatsoever. This is because metaphysical nothingness cannot have any properties - even explanatory properties or “able-to-give-rise-to-something” properties. It is unable, by definition, to have any explanatory power or be testable in any way, since “it” lacks all being whatsoever and could never be “observed” or sensed in a lab somewhere.
If the ‘nihil’-principle is rejected, it does *not *become plausible to posit that a given phenomenon happened for no reason at all, except insofar as this is a rough summary of the fact that this entity is only probabilistically determined within the relevant scientific model. To say “there was no reason for this decay event to have happened now” certainly does *not *amount to any kind of claim about metaphysical nothingness, it just points out the fact that such events can only be predicted probabilistically within the current model. But such a model is not therefore ‘unscientific’ or ‘undermined’ or ‘self-defeating’. And if it just so happened that science was never to progress beyond this level of understanding of a given phenomenon, this obviously wouldn’t undermine the scientific enterprise as such.
 
Not to be rude, but are you serious…? You think I have not clearly answered this question yet? :confused: Or do you just have so little intellectual integrity that you are unable to admit that you are wrong, so instead you just change the subject and ignore very pointed and repeated requests to respond to a point (in this case, the point that you have committed an obvious and silly straw man argument)?? Mind-boggling!

Here is my claim:

Just as “no amount of physical description of redness will make a blind person to see redness”, “no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.”

If you disagree, that can only be because you don’t understand the meanings of the terms. On the other hand, you have substituted the expression “provide an account for” in place of the original “portray”… so I’m not sure what you mean by each expression, but perhaps you’re trying to fudge in another straw man or ambiguous term?
I’m still unable to decipher your position, and didn’t get a yea or nay to what I asked (why?). But let’s try a different angle: what does “portray” mean, as you are using it there? That seems to be a key that I’m missing – how would we distinguish a “portrayal of sweetness” from a “non-portrayal of sweetness”. When I think of portrayal, I think “description” and “representation”, which suggests to me that a physical description of the sensation (brain-states, chemical and electrical patterns, etc.) would qualify. What qualifies an account of such a sensation as a “portrayal” in your view?

-TS
 
  1. Material descriptions cannot account for qualia.
  2. “redness” is a quale
    Ergo: Material descriptions cannot account for “redness”.
This rests on an answer in (1) to the very point in dispute.

If you do not subscribe to 1, then we should understand what the criterion is for accepting a material description of a given quale. What is that criterion for you, if you are not begging the question?

-TS
Hi TS,

Questions about realism only seem important in terms of a correspondence theory of truth–trying to find word that cut reality at the seams. I think that is the premise that we need not and ought not accept (if only because dropping it means we can forget about silly questions like, is sweetness real?). We don’t have to decide which words capture the true essence of a food (e.g., sweetness, color, etc.), we can just use whatever descriptions are useful for whatever purposes that are are useful. Such a pragmatic approach dissolves philosophical reality-appearance debates into questions of the relative utility of descriptions for different purposes.

Best,
Leela
 
Betterave;

The fact that certain knowlege falls outside of the range of a restrictive system such as empiricism does not impugn the fact that as; The Exodus pointed out “It assumes axiomatically that things happen for a reason, or that all effects have causes”.

There is no necessity inherant in a reason that it must be comprehensible; or for that matter empirically discernable; nonetheless - all occurrances occur rationally; or for a reason.
You appear to conflate ‘empiricism’ with ‘given empirical models’. Empiricism is not an empirical model.
Ex nihilo nihil fit is implictly axiomatic; all rational discussion rests upon the acceptance of certain principles; and all consequential discourse on matters which is preceeded by the axiomatic understanding of “Ex nihilo nihil fit” are valid – nonetheless; not all knowlege is per se posterior to “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; but all knowlege where “Ex nihilo nihil fit” is prior rests upon it; including the knowlege of all posteriors to “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; including it’s own proof – because the proof of “Ex nihilo nihil fit” must presuppose “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; or else one could argue any contesation would be a violation of the Principle of Locality; and not “Ex nihilo nihil fit”; moreover; if one were to eliminate all that was potential for the contestation from Locality; we must also eliminate the observer; ie-ergo;- all proof for “Ex nihilo nihil fit” must presuppose it.
In other words, you agree with me. 👍
 
Hi TS,

Questions about realism only seem important in terms of a correspondence theory of truth–trying to find word that cut reality at the seams. I think that is the premise that we need not and ought not accept (if only because dropping it means we can forget about silly questions like, is sweetness real?). We don’t have to decide which words capture the true essence of a food (e.g., sweetness, color, etc.), we can just use whatever descriptions are useful for whatever purposes that are are useful. Such a pragmatic approach dissolves philosophical reality-appearance debates into questions of the relative utility of descriptions for different purposes.

Best,
Leela
Oh great, another introduction of another straw man premise! Wonderful! How is this little tidbit of rhetoric supposed to contribute to answering any question here?
 
If the ‘nihil’-principle is rejected, it does *not *become plausible to posit that a given phenomenon happened for no reason at all, except insofar as this is a rough summary of the fact that this entity is only probabilistically determined within the relevant scientific model. To say “there was no reason for this decay event to have happened now” certainly does *not *amount to any kind of claim about metaphysical nothingness, it just points out the fact that such events can only be predicted probabilistically within the current model. But such a model is not therefore ‘unscientific’ or ‘undermined’ or ‘self-defeating’. And if it just so happened that science was never to progress beyond this level of understanding of a given phenomenon, this obviously wouldn’t undermine the scientific enterprise as such.
I agree. I don’t see the problem here? I was merely maintaining that it is irrationtal to go from “this theory shows x’s occurence probablitistically” to “therefore there is no cause for x.” We may in fact never know the cause of x, but one would undermine his own practice - science - if he were to then go on to say that this means therefore there is no cause of x.

At any rate, I’ve beat this dead horse long enough. Anyone else interested is free to read back over the exchange.
 
Here is my claim:

Just as “no amount of physical description of redness will make a blind person to see redness”, “no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.”
I think what is objectionable is the notion that “seeing” or “tasting” are activities that are somehow more in touch with the intrinsic reality of a thing than “describing” is. Coming up with descriptions of a thing, like “it is sweet,” is better thought of as a way of using a thing rather than as a way of getting in touch with its essence through matching up bits of language with bits of reality.

Best,
Leela
 
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