Does sweetness exist, really, or does it only taste that way to us?

[Betterave]

I’m still unable to decipher your position, and didn’t get a yea or nay to what I asked (why?).

Stunning! You don’t know whether my answer was yea or nay? Really?? Truly??? (Why not?)

But let’s try a different angle: what does “portray” mean, as you are using it there? That seems to be a key that I’m missing – how would we distinguish a “portrayal of sweetness” from a “non-portrayal of sweetness”. When I think of portrayal, I think “description” and “representation”, which suggests to me that a physical description of the sensation (brain-states, chemical and electrical patterns, etc.) would qualify. What qualifies an account of such a sensation as a “portrayal” in your view?

Sure, a different angle. Forget about that whole “making up an argument and attributing it to me” thing - let’s just put that behind us.

A portrayal of the quale sweetness would convey knowledge of what sweetness is actually like. A non-portrayal of the quale sweetness would not. The quale sweetness is not like a physical description of a brain-state, a chemical, or an electrical pattern; therefore the quale sweetness cannot be portrayed by such descriptions.

 

[Leela]

Oh great, another introduction of another straw man premise! Wonderful! How is this little tidbit of rhetoric supposed to contribute to answering any question here?

It is supposed to dissolve the OP’s question (is sweetness real or apparent?) as one that buys into a premise that we have good reason to reject.

 

[Betterave]

I think what is objectionable is the notion that “seeing” or “tasting” are activities that are somehow more in touch with the intrinsic reality of a thing than “describing” is. Coming up with descriptions of a thing, like “it is sweet,” is better thought of as a way of using a thing rather than as a way of getting in touch with its essence through matching up bits of language with bits of reality.

Best,
Leela

That’s nice, Leela, but unfortunately you’re completely missing the point of the discussion here, which has not been about “getting in touch with” the real essence, blah, blah, blah.

We don’t just “come up with” a description of something, as you describe it - we learn to use language from other members of our linguistic community. Many of our uses of language relate to particular instances of aesthetic appreciation and are contingent upon our having certain aesthetic experiences. Lacking those experiences, we lack an understanding of those uses of language. Your apparent attempt to “get in touch with” a ‘better way of thinking’ seems to be groundless and irrelevant.

 

[Betterave]

It is supposed to dissolve the OP’s question (is sweetness real or apparent?) as one that buys into a premise that we have good reason to reject.

Which premise is that? What good reason do we have to reject it? What implication do you think its rejection has for the argument taking place here? Dennett’s a fool? TS is a fool? I’m a fool? We’re all fools for even discussing it? I don’t see what your point is.

 

[Leela]

We don’t just “come up with” a description of something, as you describe it - we learn to use language from other members of our linguistic community. Many of our uses of language relate to particular instances of aesthetic appreciation and are contingent upon our having certain aesthetic experiences. Lacking those experiences, we lack an understanding of those uses of language.

Right. And from that way of thinking about language use, the question, “is sweetness real or apparent?” just melts away. One can either make fruitful use of the sentence “it is sweet” or not. One taking this evolutionary view of language use never wonders whether sweetness is an intrinsic property of a thing or an external appearance.

 

[Betterave]

Right. And from that way of thinking about language use, the question, “is sweetness real or apparent?” just melts away.

How so?

One can either make fruitful use of the sentence “it is sweet” or not.

That seems awfully simplistic.

One taking this evolutionary view of language use never wonders whether sweetness is an intrinsic property of a thing or an external appearance.

Why not?

 

[Touchstone]

Stunning! You don’t know whether my answer was yea or nay? Really?? Truly??? (Why not?)

You haven’t said. My understanding from what you wrote previously is “nay”, that you don’t think such is even possible, or even “to begin” is possible. When I ask for a direct clarification, you resist.

Sure, a different angle. Forget about that whole “making up an argument and attributing it to me” thing - let’s just put that behind us.

I can only process posts as I understand them. I think your language regarding “portrayal” of sweetness supports my original reading, but I’ve offered to let you set the record straight, perhaps to the contrary. But if you choose to be coy, fine. I can’t be bothered with that.

A portrayal of the quale sweetness would convey knowledge of what sweetness is actually like.

That doesn’t tell me anything. What, then, qualifies as ‘knowledge’ in your usage here? Maybe it’s best to avoid vague and abstract here, and just describe a scenario that would qualify as “knowledge of what sweetness is actually like”. That’s very casual, and subjective language “what it is really like”.

A non-portrayal of the quale sweetness would not.

OK, this just demands the same as above, a practical criterion for 'knowledge". What would that be. Just so as to demonstrate what I’m looking for, I’ll give an example of a criterion that would distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge: if we have posters here claim to have knowledge of the way the planets move, I can ask for predictions about the future locations of planets, up to and including the perihelion of Mercury, if I really want a fine edge. To the extent the participants can make predictions that match future observations, I will accept their claims of knowledge. To the extent they can’t, I won’t.

Ok, what’s your criterion, then?

The quale sweetness is not like a physical description of a brain-state, a chemical, or an electrical pattern;

How do you know this? I think that is a point of contention, given many papers I’ve read now. If this is known, can you point me to the evidence for this?

therefore the quale sweetness cannot be portrayed by such descriptions.

If it was a physical state, a natural phenomena, how would you know? Or the reverse, how would you detect if your assertions here were false?

I don’t see any way you have to either validate or falsify your claims. They appear to just be naked intuitions.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

You haven’t said. My understanding from what you wrote previously is “nay”, that you don’t think such is even possible, or even “to begin” is possible. When I ask for a direct clarification, you resist.

Yeah, obviously my answer is “nay” - I have been plenty clear about this!
As Voltaire once wrote: je ne sais pas l’art d’etre clair pour qui ne veut pas etre attentif.

I can only process posts as I understand them. I think your language regarding “portrayal” of sweetness supports my original reading, but I’ve offered to let you set the record straight, perhaps to the contrary. But if you choose to be coy, fine. I can’t be bothered with that.

Are you kidding me?? You think I’m being coy?? I have asked you repeatedly to explain where you pulled that rabbit of an argument from and explained very clearly how your absurd construal of my claim as a syllogistic argument has no foundation whatsoever in what I wrote… You respond by accusing me of being coy??? You’re a piece of work, that’s for sure. The intelligent response here, just so you know for future reference, would be to admit you were wrong, or to explain where you got that silly syllogism from, i.e., explain why you think you were justified in “understanding” me to have made such an argument.

That doesn’t tell me anything. What, then, qualifies as ‘knowledge’ in your usage here? Maybe it’s best to avoid vague and abstract here, and just describe a scenario that would qualify as “knowledge of what sweetness is actually like”. That’s very casual, and subjective language “what it is really like”.

It doesn’t tell you anything?? What part of it do you not understand? There was nothing vague or abstract about what I wrote: “A portrayal of the quale sweetness would convey knowledge of what sweetness is actually like.” Knowledge here is familiarity, an ability to recognize. It’s very strange that you seem not to know how the rest of your community of language users uses the word ‘knowledge’ and that you apparently find it to be a “vague and abstract” term.

OK, this just demands the same as above, a practical criterion for 'knowledge". What would that be. Just so as to demonstrate what I’m looking for, I’ll give an example of a criterion that would distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge: if we have posters here claim to have knowledge of the way the planets move, I can ask for predictions about the future locations of planets, up to and including the perihelion of Mercury, if I really want a fine edge. To the extent the participants can make predictions that match future observations, I will accept their claims of knowledge. To the extent they can’t, I won’t.

Ok, what’s your criterion, then?

First, your criterion is arbitrary and stupid. Why should that be the sine qua non test for knowledge?

My criterion is familiarity, connaissance, recognition, the ability to say: “yes, that’s it”, “no, that’s not it” - knowledge. You know what the quale of sweetness is iff you are familiar with it. It’s not complicated. Likewise, you know how the planets move if you are familiar with how they move. You don’t have to be able to make predictions about the perihelion of Mercury! (I’m just informing you how the rest of us sane language users use the term ‘knowledge’, in case you’re wondering about the grounds for my comments here.)

How do you know this? I think that is a point of contention, given many papers I’ve read now. If this is known, can you point me to the evidence for this?

I know this because I know what sweetness is like (I’ve tasted many sweet things) and I know what physical descriptions of brain states, chemicals, and “electrical patterns” are like (I’ve read about them, learned about them in school, etc.), and I know that they are not alike.

If it was a physical state, a natural phenomena, how would you know? Or the reverse, how would you detect if your assertions here were false?

First, I think it is a natural phenomenon (how could anyone deny this?) and it also very clearly ‘is’ a physical state, in some sense of ‘is’ - it is something we can observe in others solely on the basis of their physical state. I know this presumably the same way you do, it’s a pretty banal observation. But that is irrelevant to the argument that has been presented here: we nonetheless cannot know about the *quale *of sweetness qua quale by means of the kinds of physical descriptions you have presented.

I don’t see any way you have to either validate or falsify your claims. They appear to just be naked intuitions.

What is an “intuition”? What is a “naked intuition”? What are intuitions supposed to be clothed in? (I don’t know why I bother asking questions, you never answer them; however…) I’m pretty sure I have validated my claims here, repeatedly, by means of explanations of the terms involved and arguments based on those explanations.

 

[awatkins69]

I think what is objectionable is the notion that “seeing” or “tasting” are activities that are somehow more in touch with the intrinsic reality of a thing than “describing” is. Coming up with descriptions of a thing, like “it is sweet,” is better thought of as a way of using a thing rather than as a way of getting in touch with its essence through matching up bits of language with bits of reality.

Best,
Leela

Hi Leela. I haven’t been keeping up with this thread for a long time, so I’m not sure where everybody is at. I will say this much: it’s not that they are “better”. It’s that they are qualitatively and substantially different, and materialist pictures cannot account for this. All the best.

 

[awatkins69]

If it was a physical state, a natural phenomena, how would you know? Or the reverse, how would you detect if your assertions here were false?

If it was a physical state, you could describe it in physical and naturalistic terms. However, you can’t.

I don’t know that there’s any point in going back and forth, so I want to set out the argument at hand very clearly, and I want you to be very clear on which of the premises you disagree with. Otherwise I’m not going to worry about the thread anymore, since I think my time would be better spent reading something else than simply going back and forth. So let’s look at it again.

Suppose a girl named Mary was blind from birth. By the time she has reached the age of 30, she has learned all the physical facts about the human body, including every physical fact about color vision. On that day of her 30th birthday, she miraculously gains the ability to see, and the first thing she sees is a red apple.

Now:
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color vision before actually seeing red.
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that she does not have before actually seeing red.
(3) Thus, not all information is physical information.

Please, again, be very clear about which of these premises you object to.

I must say, you’re one of the few atheist philosophers who would disagree with this assessment my friend. I’m not sure what papers you read. Maybe they were Dennett, Harris, and the like. However, I suggest you see what the atheist philosophers which are taken seriously have to say. All the best.

 

[Touchstone]

If it was a physical state, you could describe it in physical and naturalistic terms. However, you can’t.

I don’t know that there’s any point in going back and forth, so I want to set out the argument at hand very clearly, and I want you to be very clear on which of the premises you disagree with. Otherwise I’m not going to worry about the thread anymore, since I think my time would be better spent reading something else than simply going back and forth. So let’s look at it again.

Sure, “Mary’s Room”, old and tired stuff, but clear enough for discussion!

Suppose a girl named Mary was blind from birth. By the time she has reached the age of 30, she has learned all the physical facts about the human body, including every physical fact about color vision. On that day of her 30th birthday, she miraculously gains the ability to see, and the first thing she sees is a red apple.

Now:
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color vision before actually seeing red.
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that she does not have before actually seeing red.
(3) Thus, not all information is physical information.

Please, again, be very clear about which of these premises you object to.

(2) of course. If (1) is true, she will be neither surprised nor the least bit improved in her knowledge upon seeing red. Thus, (3) is untenable. If (2) is sound, then (1) is false. Since you began with (1), as a hypothetical, if follows that (2) is false.

I’ll have to go look, but even Frank Jackson, the author of this thought experiment, has himself recognized the vacuous nature of the appeal to intuition that this argument represents. It only holds in a “pop-psychology” sense, and crumbles quickly when a little rigor is applied to its terms. Particularly, the knowledge claims equivocate.

I must say, you’re one of the few atheist philosophers who would disagree with this assessment my friend.

Even Jackson himself has disagreed with this argument, and abandoned it. And it was his argument. In the book There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness, edited by Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar, Frank Jackson has an essay that begins on page 421, and which says the following, which I have taken time to type in here:
Frank Jackson:

For our purposew, we can be vague about the detail and think broadly of physicalism as the view that mind is a purely physical part of a purely physical world. Exactly how to delineate the physical will not be crucial; anything of a kind that plays a central role in physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, and the like, along with the a priori asssociated functional and relational properties, count, as far as we are concerned.

Most contemporary philosophers, when given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science. Although I once dissented from the majority, I have capitulated and now see the interesting issue as being where the arguments from the intuitions against physicalism – the arguments that seem so compelling – go wrong. For some time, I have thought the case for physicalism is sufficiently strong that we can be confident that the arguments from the intuitions go wrong somehwere – but where is somewhere?

I’m not sure what papers you read. Maybe they were Dennett, Harris, and the like. However, I suggest you see what the atheist philosophers which are taken seriously have to say. All the best.

See above. What does Jackson himself have to say about the strength of what he used to argue, and which you maintain, for example?

I note that this is yet another example of science playing the role of overthrower of intuition, and intuition being the grounds that dualism and other notions are held to.

-TS

 

[Leela]

If it was a physical state, you could describe it in physical and naturalistic terms. However, you can’t.

I don’t know that there’s any point in going back and forth, so I want to set out the argument at hand very clearly, and I want you to be very clear on which of the premises you disagree with. Otherwise I’m not going to worry about the thread anymore, since I think my time would be better spent reading something else than simply going back and forth. So let’s look at it again.

Suppose a girl named Mary was blind from birth. By the time she has reached the age of 30, she has learned all the physical facts about the human body, including every physical fact about color vision. On that day of her 30th birthday, she miraculously gains the ability to see, and the first thing she sees is a red apple.

Now:
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color vision before actually seeing red.
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that she does not have before actually seeing red.
(3) Thus, not all information is physical information.

Sure, not all descriptions are physical descriptions, and any phenomenon (such as sweetness) never exhausts description. But what is it that Mary doesn’t know about the apple? As far as I can tell, the only thing that there is to know about the apple is that certain sentences are true about it such as…

It weighs .78 pounds.
It is red.
It has seeds.
It tastes sweet.
It is shiny.
It tastes tart.
It tastes a bit like a not quite ripe pear.
Mary has never seen or tasted one.
Leela has seen lots of them.
It has such and such a molecular structure.
It is can be sliced into two or more pieces.
It can be consumed, etc.

These are just a view of the infinite set of all facts about the apple that Mary supposedly knows since she knows every fact about the apple.

You seem to be saying that there is some other information about the apple that Mary doesn’t know–that you and I are on more intimate terms with the apple than Mary is. I disagree. What else is true about the apple that Mary doesn’t yet know? Sure, she has never eaten one. That is one of the many facts Mary knows. What information doesn’t she know?

 

[Betterave]

We have some serious *ignoratio enlenchi *going on here.

For those not familiar with the term, from wiki:

Ignoratio elenchi (also known as irrelevant conclusion[1] or irrelevant thesis) is the informal fallacy of presenting an argument that may [or may not!] in itself be valid, but does not address the issue in question. “Ignoratio elenchi” can be roughly translated by ignorance of refutation, that is, ignorance of what a refutation could logically be; “elenchi” (genitive singular of the Latin elenchus) is from the Greek ἔλεγχος, meaning an argument of disproof or refutation.[2]

Aristotle would describe ignoratio elenchi as a mistake made during a refutation of an argument. He called it “an ignorance” of what makes for a refutation. For Aristotle, ignoratio elenchi amounts to ignorance of logic.

 

[Leela]

… There was nothing vague or abstract about what I wrote: “A portrayal of the quale sweetness would convey knowledge of what sweetness is actually like.” Knowledge here is familiarity, an ability to recognize. It’s very strange that you seem not to know how the rest of your community of language users uses the word ‘knowledge’ and that you apparently find it to be a “vague and abstract” term.

TS is right to say that you are begging the question with your use of the term “quale” since the term refers to knowledge that cannot be conveyed in language. To me, it sounds very strange to talk about knowledge independent of language. To know something is to be justified in believing something true such as

(1) “Sweetness is like a flower blooming on your palate.” or
(2) “Sweetness is the response to certain foods by taste buds located on the tip of the tongue.”
(3) “Hershey bars are sweet.”

If the point is that eating something sweet is not the same thing as believing any particular sentence or set of sentences, then no one would disagree. But I can’t imagine what knowledge is gained by eating that cannot be gained by believing sentences since knowledge is always about believing sentences in my book and for most people these days (in my community of language users). For example, most people think it is a very strange use of the word “knowledge” to talk about sexual relations as “knowing” a woman. Today, that usage is a joke. It seems to me that to talk about “knowing” sweetness through eating is this sort of odd usage.

Best,
Leela

 

[Touchstone]

TS is right to say that you are begging the question with your use of the term “quale” since the term refers to knowledge that cannot be conveyed in language. To me, it sounds very strange to talk about knowledge independent of language. To know something is to be justified in believing something true such as

(1) “Sweetness is like a flower blooming on your palate.” or
(2) “Sweetness is the response to certain foods by taste buds located on the tip of the tongue.”
(3) “Hershey bars are sweet.”

If the point is that eating something sweet is not the same thing as believing any particular sentence or set of sentences, then no one would disagree. But I can’t imagine what knowledge is gained by eating that cannot be gained by believing sentences since knowledge is always about believing sentences in my book and for most people these days (in my community of language users). For example, most people think it is a very strange use of the word “knowledge” to talk about sexual relations as “knowing” a woman. Today, that usage is a joke. It seems to me that to talk about “knowing” sweetness through eating is this sort of odd usage.

Best,
Leela

I don’t know that such usage would be a “joke”, or somehow “illegitimate” – it seems perfectly meaningful to me in its own context. What I think you are getting at is the problem of conflation or equivocation on that term, and that indeed makes for problems, semantically. I was surprised to see that Betterave’s criterion for “knowledge” was “recognition”, “experience”, or “familiarity” – the same sense of knowledge you are pointing to in the term “knowing a woman”. This is clearly equivocation, in my view, positing one sense of a word (the experiential sense of “know”) in place of another very different sense (the epistemic sense of “know” - as in affirming propositions).

“Knowing sweetness” as in familiarity has meaning in it own context, but it’s not what is at issue here – how do we know “sweetness” is a thoroughly physical phenomenon, or not? “I know it when I see it… I recognize it” just isn’t responsive to that.

-TS

 

[Leela]

“Knowing sweetness” as in familiarity has meaning in it own context, but it’s not what is at issue here – how do we know “sweetness” is a thoroughly physical phenomenon, or not? “I know it when I see it… I recognize it” just isn’t responsive to that.

-TS

I would think that sweetness is not a thoroughly physical phenomenon depending on what you mean by physical. There is an inexaustable possibility for true descriptions of sweetness and all of them are on a par. Some of them may be categorized as physical and some as nonphysical, but none of them are any more the essence of sweetness than any other. The physical descriptions of sweetness don’t get any special priveledge as to what sweetness really is over all the other true descriptions of sweetness. Why would they? All descriptions are only ever made because we humans have the needs and desires we have. No descriptions stand out side of our human concerns and get us past appearances to a God’s eye view of the Way Things Really Are. No particular type of description is the way that the universe demands that it be described.

 

[Betterave]

TS is right to say that you are begging the question with your use of the term “quale” since the term refers to knowledge that cannot be conveyed in language.

That’s an interesting claim, but an obviously false one, it seems. Try this little phrase of language: “This honey tastes sweet”; or this one: “This lemon does not taste sweet”. The point is simply that the *qualitative *referent of sweet (not to say that there aren’t other referents) is only known to someone who has experienced sweetness qualitatively.

To me, it sounds very strange to talk about knowledge independent of language.

To me too! (Not that ‘strange’ implies ‘impossible’.)

 

[Betterave]

I don’t know that such usage would be a “joke”, or somehow “illegitimate” – it seems perfectly meaningful to me in its own context. What I think you are getting at is the problem of conflation or equivocation on that term, and that indeed makes for problems, semantically. I was surprised to see that Betterave’s criterion for “knowledge” was “recognition”, “experience”, or “familiarity” – the same sense of knowledge you are pointing to in the term “knowing a woman”. This is clearly equivocation, in my view, positing one sense of a word (the experiential sense of “know”) in place of another very different sense (the epistemic sense of “know” - as in affirming propositions).

The charge of equivocation is a much more interesting one than begging the question. Thank you for coming up with something new.

That said, I think that Leela has raised some good questions for you on this… Also, what you assert here is not at all obvious in regards to its conceptual grounding. If you don’t want to beg the question, you got some ‘splainin’ to do. How do you manage to make “the epistemic sense of know” independent from “the experiential sense of know”? At first blush that sounds kind of crazy coming from an empiricist.

“Knowing sweetness” as in familiarity has meaning in it own context, but it’s not what is at issue here – how do we know “sweetness” is a thoroughly physical phenomenon, or not? “I know it when I see it… I recognize it” just isn’t responsive to that.

Here you have straw-manned me again and thus failed to respond to my point. And again, as far as conceptual grounding goes, you have failed to specify the meaning of ‘thoroughly physical phenomenon’ as a non-trivial (non-question-begging) concept in this debate (again, see my questions to Wanstronian earlier).

 

[Touchstone]

The charge of equivocation is a much more interesting one than begging the question. Thank you for coming up with something new.

Well, before the problem was begging the question. Now it’s equivocation. I’m just responding to what I read.

That said, I think that Leela has raised some good questions for you on this… Also, what you assert here is not at all obvious in regards to its conceptual grounding. If you don’t want to beg the question, you got some ‘splainin’ to do.

I’m not making a claim like you are. I haven’t made a statement like “no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.” I think the evidence points to qualia as epiphenomenal – a physical brain state catalyzed by sensory stimulus. A supernatural anything can explain anything, so there’s no way to rule that out. Such supernatural notions are just unnecessary, and the supernatural/immaterial parts superfluous.

Your claim isn’t like that, but is instead, categorical, prescriptive, which is why I objected to it as begging the question; your conclusion is synonymous with your premise – physical explanations can’t begin…

How do you manage to make “the epistemic sense of know” independent from “the experiential sense of know”? At first blush that sounds kind of crazy coming from an empiricist.

Experience isn’t knowledge in the epistemic sense. We use “knowledge” in another sense in other context – as something like “familiar” or “recognized”, and that’s where I identify equivocation on terms in your response, switching from “epistemic knowledge” to “familiarity”. But knowledge as reasoned conclusions from the evidence isn’t experience. It relies on experience, but involves far more. So when I say “I know her”, I’m invoking a different concept for “know”, than when I say “I know force equals mass times acceleration”.

I’m interested in how one would acquire/demonstrate the knowledge required to support “no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.” In the rigorous sense of “knowledge” of course, not the “familiarity” sense.

Here you have straw-manned me again and thus failed to respond to my point. And again, as far as conceptual grounding goes, you have failed to specify the meaning of ‘thoroughly physical phenomenon’ as a non-trivial (non-question-begging) concept in this debate (again, see my questions to Wanstronian earlier).

If you see straw men as a problem, perhaps consider just stating your case directly, so it’s clear and direct from the source – you. It’s curious to get into this pattern of enticing me to play darts – “no that’s not it, you missed again”, and I think tiring for any bothering to read. My interest is clear and the same as it was when I first objected – what is the basis for this:“no amount of physical facts even begin to portray sweetness.”?

That’s pretty straightforward.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

I would think that sweetness is not a thoroughly physical phenomenon depending on what you mean by physical. There is an inexaustable possibility for true descriptions of sweetness and all of them are on a par.

Sure. As I said to Betterave, a supernatural something explains anything, anything at all. So the only way we can exclude that, and come to rest on physical explanations – not just for this, but for any given phenomenon – is to just note that the supernatural/immaterial parts of an explanation are superfluous, and don’t add anything material [sic] to the explanation.

If all explanations are equally true, as you say, then by parsimony, we don’t need anything beyond the nominalist answer.

Some of them may be categorized as physical and some as nonphysical, but none of them are any more the essence of sweetness than any other.

Which is just a roundabout way of pointing out that “essence” is a meaningless term. There isn’t any referent for the term as used, there. It’s vacuous. That being said, any and all descriptions are as “true” (or meaningless, is maybe a better way to put it) as any other. And again, all things being equal, by parsimony a physical explanation is the most economical.

The physical descriptions of sweetness don’t get any special priveledge as to what sweetness really is over all the other true descriptions of sweetness.

No, because “really” isn’t a meaningful modifier, here. Your statement is true only insofar as we agree that the incoherence of “essence” and “really” makes all explanations a tie, all structurally broken.

Why would they? All descriptions are only ever made because we humans have the needs and desires we have. No descriptions stand out side of our human concerns and get us past appearances to a God’s eye view of the Way Things Really Are. No particular type of description is the way that the universe demands that it be described.

Sure, and agree. But this is the same reason we don’t adopt the belief in “water pixies”, those magical faeries that are required to assist in the formation of water – they help combine the hydrogen and oxygen atoms into H20, doncha know! Why would we adopt a “non-pixie” theory of water formation? You cannot, repeat CANNOT POSSIBLY show those water pixies don’t exist and aren’t doing something in the water formation process.

We just understand that water pixies, interest as they are as an idea, are superfluous. They add nothing to our understanding of the process that we do not already have with a physical description. It’s parsimony, economy. If we didn’t use it, all explanations would be supernatural explanations.

-TS