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levinas12
Guest
I stand corrected. You are a sharp cookie! Are you by chance a philosophy professor?
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JapaneseKappa
Guest
I don’t believe I’m the one equivocating when the official Catholic position is (as given by reputable, academic, Catholic philosopher Ed Feser)
Now if I formulate an argument that takes those assertions at face value, but am wrong because “is” actually means different things depending on which step you’re on, it’s actually the official Catholic position that is an equivocation.
As you keep asserting. But simply claiming that subsistence is special doesn’t actually answer my objection. I have made new drawings to make this as clear and explicit as I can. You need to explain how “subsistent relations” are different than the “incorrectly labeling boxes” scenario I have drawn.
Indeed, the fact that you keep asserting that the difference between the persons “isn’t a difference in being” suggests to me that a subsistent relation is in fact the same thing as incorrectly labeling boxes.
I’m not saying its garbage, I’m saying that it is overkill for this problem. It’d be like invoking relativity when estimating the amount of time it will take you to drive to the grocery store. Yes, relativity is real, but its effects don’t matter when your velocity never exceeds 40 mph and you only need an answer that is accurate to the nearest 5 minutes.
In the same way, Aristotalian substances give us a deep insight into a different class of problem than the one we’re working on.
Specifically, it helps with the class of problems that don’t have all the simplifying features I listed previously.
No, but I know that the chair cannot be both “near to the table” and “not near to the table” at the same time and in the same respect.
I have provided a very clear picture of possible interpretations of what an “internal” relationship in God can look like, and asserted that the two methods of talking about the relationship (i.e. as being between parts, or with the-exact-same-God appearing on both sides) are exhaustive. All you’ve done is say “nuh uh, there is a third way called subsistence” without being able to explain how subsistence is different from the “labeling the boxes” approach that I criticized.
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Lucretius
Guest
You know what I mean: your argument only works if you assume that “is” is used in the same sense, but that is not the case, as you yourself pointed out: your argument fails to grasp the difference between substance and relation, which isn’t suprising, since this is a very hard subject to grasp
I and others have explained what we mean by the inner relations of God throughout all of our comments in this thread. I would go back and reflect on our words, and those of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John Damascene.
The concept of substance (consubstantial!) is related to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity?
Christi pax.
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levinas12
Guest
George (the person) is “this man” - a primary substance, a this “something”, a “tode ti” (in Aristotelian Greek).
Harry (the person) is the “same man”.
Therefore, George is the “same” as “Harry” (a=c, b=c, then a=b).
But George is not the “same” as Harry.
These statements together constitute a contradiction.
However, God is not a primary substance in the sense of a “this something”, a “tode ti”, a concrete entity like “this man”.
God is a “pure activity”.
Think of tennis - it is referred to as a single activity - a tennis “match”.
The “substance” of God is like this.
Or think of light. Light is a pure vibration - “pure” because there is no underlying medium - no vibrating “what” … but “light” is not a contradiction … although it is paradoxical (in the everyday world, waves generally require a medium to move through) … question: is “light” a transitive or intransitive activity or does “light” transcend this distinction …
God is like “light”.
Specifically, God is Circumincession /Perichoresis … the Divine Dance where the Partners, though distinct, are in such perfect sync that They share the Same Intellect and Will …
How do you put such an activity into human language?
As Yeats pointed out, in a different context, it is difficult to articulate how we can tell the dancers from the dance …but we know that you cannot dance with yourself …
Harry (the person) is the “same man”.
Therefore, George is the “same” as “Harry” (a=c, b=c, then a=b).
But George is not the “same” as Harry.
These statements together constitute a contradiction.
However, God is not a primary substance in the sense of a “this something”, a “tode ti”, a concrete entity like “this man”.
God is a “pure activity”.
Think of tennis - it is referred to as a single activity - a tennis “match”.
The “substance” of God is like this.
Or think of light. Light is a pure vibration - “pure” because there is no underlying medium - no vibrating “what” … but “light” is not a contradiction … although it is paradoxical (in the everyday world, waves generally require a medium to move through) … question: is “light” a transitive or intransitive activity or does “light” transcend this distinction …
God is like “light”.
Specifically, God is Circumincession /Perichoresis … the Divine Dance where the Partners, though distinct, are in such perfect sync that They share the Same Intellect and Will …
How do you put such an activity into human language?
As Yeats pointed out, in a different context, it is difficult to articulate how we can tell the dancers from the dance …but we know that you cannot dance with yourself …
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JapaneseKappa
Guest
So this is indeed a slightly more complex issue. It seems to me that you’re imagining the scenario where one person has two names. So you are saying someone’s name can be George and Harry (i.e. not George) at the same time.
This is a subtle abuse of language. Specifically, it assumes something untrue about George, which is that he only has one name. That assumption is inherent in the statement “His (one) name is…”
Now, lets suppose there is actually a criteria for a “one true name.” In that case, only one of George and Harry would qualify as the “one true name” and there would be no difficulty. On the other hand, we could correct our single-name assumption and say that “one of George’s names is George” and “one of George’s names is not George.” Here there is also no contradiction, because “one of George’s names” isn’t a particular name. That is, there is no single name that is simultaneously George and not George.
Now perhaps your phrasing was deliberate, and we want to flip the order. That is to say, instead of thinking of a person “having” a name, we want to think of a name as referring to a person.
Then it is the case that George refers to some person, and that Harry refers to the same person. In that case, no one would ever assert that George and Harry (the names) are the same thing as the person they refer to. And so here the law of non-contradiction doesn’t apply because George and Harry (the names) are the same with respect to what they refer to but are different with respect to how they are spelled.
Now lets return to the case of God.
I have already quoted Feser’s explanation of the trinitarian requirements. So let us apply our shorthand to them and once again consider the case of the The Father (F), the The Son (S), and God (G). According to Feser:
When Feser says “F is G” what does he actually mean? It seems to me that he could either mean “F is identical to G in every respect” or he could mean “F is identical to G in some particular respect that I have in mind.”
When Feser says “S is G” what does he actually mean? It seems to me that he could either mean “S is identical to G in every respect” or he could mean “S is identical to G in some particular respect that I have in mind.”
When Feser says “F is not S” what does he actually mean? It seems to me that he could only mean “I have in mind some respect in which F and S are different.”
Now what? Clearly if Feser means “F/S are identical to G in every respect” then we’ve got ourselves a logical contradiction when he says F is not S. It is also clear that we have ourselves a logical contradiction if the respect Feser has in mind is the same for all three assertions. So the only way to avoid the contradiction is to claim that Feser equivocated on “is” by having different respects in mind between assertions 1, 2, and 4.
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JapaneseKappa
Guest
Let us suppose that F and S are different with respect to some relation (e.g. paternity/filiation)You know what I mean: your argument only works if you assume that “is” is used in the same sense, but that is not the case, as you yourself pointed out: your argument fails to grasp the difference between substance and relation, which isn’t suprising, since this is a very hard subject to grasp
Let us also suppose that F and S are the same as G with respect to Aristotelian substance.
So then, o understander of the difference:
Is F the same or different than G with respect to the relation?
Is S the same or different than G with respect to the relation?
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levinas12
Guest
Actually, I was thinking I was restating your contradiction. Two different human persons are “this man”, i.e., the same primary substance in Aristotle’s sense of a “tode ti”, a this “something”.
I agree this scenario would be a contradiction.
I apologize for the misunderstanding.
The issue is the domain of the variables in your syllogism. Is the domain of F, S and G “things”? Is the domain wider to include relations and activities?
And what is the nature of the copula? What does the “is” mean in “F is G” or “S is G” or “F is not S”? Is the “is” used differently in these statements?
I know you addressed these questions already but could you provide a little more guidance on the range of logical variables and the meaning of “is” in logic (as opposed to, e.g., the ."=" sign in arithmetic.
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Expatreprocedit
Guest
The Orthodox Church follows the Fathers in saying that there is an order in the Trinity, and that is who I am going with.
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Expatreprocedit
Guest
I also do not believe you are being true even to the western Catholic tradition. The Council of Florence affirmed the monarchy of the Father. So does the current Catechism. That is a hierarchy.
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JapaneseKappa
Guest
Those were the questions I was trying to answer when I said:
When I say “is identical in every respect” I mean that you can’t come up with any sense in which they are different. If there is a difference in relation (e.g. close to this table / not close to this table) then that is a respect in which they are different and they are not “identical in every respect.” My syllogism works as long as logic applies to F, S, and G.
Edit:
I will also admit that we have gotten off track from the main subject of this thread, which was about the number of minds God has. I submit that if God has 3 minds, then each member of the trinity has a different relationship to those minds and therefore “having different minds” serves as a basis for my claim that the trinity is a logical contradiction.
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PluniaZ
Guest
It would help if you could please provide quotations, cites, and, if possible, the full text of documents that you believe support your position.
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Expatreprocedit
Guest
I’m sorry I don’t have time to provide exhaustive cites or texts. You can look at CCC 248, as a start.
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PluniaZ
Guest
CCC 248
“At the outset the Eastern tradition expresses the Father’s character as first origin of the Spirit. By confessing the Spirit as he “who proceeds from the Father”, it affirms that he comes from the Father through the Son.77 The Western tradition expresses first the consubstantial communion between Father and Son, by saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque). It says this, “legitimately and with good reason”,78 for the eternal order of the divine persons in their consubstantial communion implies that the Father, as “the principle without principle”,79 is the first origin of the Spirit, but also that as Father of the only Son, he is, with the Son, the single principle from which the Holy Spirit proceeds.80 This legitimate complementarity, provided it does not become rigid, does not affect the identity of faith in the reality of the same mystery confessed.”
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Expatreprocedit
Guest
That at least confirms the legitimacy of the “Eastern” (actually Patristic, East AND West) conception of the Father as the first principle of the Spirit (acutally of the Son and the Spirit). Just to be clear, I am not agreeing with its general treatment of the Filioque issue.
Here is one the summarizing paragraphs:
264 “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the first principle and, by the eternal gift of this to the Son, from the communion of both the Father and the Son” (St. Augustine, De Trin. 15, 26, 47: PL 42, 1095)
Again, first principle. Hierarchical. There is a lot more if you read authors like Congar and Rahner.
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PluniaZ
Guest
In any event, the relations of origin are according to equality, according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: “Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above (I:42:6).” newadvent.org/summa/1043.htm
This was confirmed by the Council of Florence in 1439:
“The Father is made by none, neither created nor begotten. The Son is from the Father alone; not made nor created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; not made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding. So there is one Father, not three fathers; one Son, not three sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy spirits. And in this Trinity nothing is before or after, nothing is greater or less; but the whole three persons are co-eternal together and co-equal. So that in all things, as has been said above, the unity in Trinity and the Trinity in unity is to be worshipped. Whoever, therefore, wishes to be saved, let him think thus of the Trinity.”
“Whatever the Father is or has, he has not from another but from himself and is principle without principle. Whatever the Son is or has, he has from the Father and is principle from principle. Whatever the Holy Spirit is or has, he has from the Father together with the Son. But the Father and the Son are not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but one principle, just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three principles of creation but one principle. Therefore it condemns, reproves, anathematizes and declares to be outside the body of Christ, which is the church, whoever holds opposing or contrary views. Hence it condemns Sabellius, who confused the persons and altogether removed their real distinction. It condemns the Arians, the Eunomians and the Macedonians who say that only the Father is true God and place the Son and the Holy Spirit in the order of creatures. It also condemns any others who make degrees or inequalities in the Trinity.”
ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/FLORENCE.HTM
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levinas12
Guest
Thank you for your patience. I think I have a better understanding now of the point you were making.
There is a traditional distinction in logic between the “is” of predication and the “is” of identity. With the Trinity, all of this becomes a bit tricky.
Consider this example. 3 is odd. 5 is odd. Because this is the “is” of predication, I cannot conclude that 3 is 5. If I tried to conclude that 3 is 5, then I would be guilty of logical contradiction.
And now consider: The morning star is Venus. The evening star is Venus. I can logically conclude that the morning star is the evening star. This is the “is” of identity.
In statements about the Trinity, e.g., the Father (F) is God, the Son (S) is God, what is the “is” - predication or identity? Is “God” a property like “odd” or is “God” a concrete entity like “Venus” - in the former, the “is” is the “is” of predication; in the latter, the “is” is the “is” of identity.
Is there a third “is” beyond the “is” of predication and the “is” of identity?
What if we were to say that the Father (F) is involved in “God activity”; and likewise say the same thing about the Son (S)? What kind of logical form do these statements have?
In a previous post, I used the analogy of a tennis match. I could also have used the analogy of a football game where the players function in such perfect sync that the team seems to have one intellect and one will - or a symphony orcherstra where the musicians perform in such unison so as to achieve perfectly harmonious unity.
I apologize for getting off track here. But these distinctions might be helpful in discussing the Trinity.
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JapaneseKappa
Guest
Right, when we say 3 is odd, we mean “is” in a different respect than when we say 3 is not 5. (has the property of odd-ness vs having the same value.)
If there was, it would simply manifest itself as another “respect” which would still reveal Feser’s statement of the Catholic position to either be self-contradictory or an equivocation.
Then they would “be the same as god” with respect to the activity that they do. And they would not “be the same as each other” with respect to the activity that they do.
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levinas12
Guest
If God is an “activity” (circumincession/perichoresis), and the Father and the Son are different “relations” within that “activity”, would classical logic be able to handle this new type of “reality”?
Maybe we need a “quantum” logic to deal with pure “activity” (neither transitive nor intransitive) and pure “relations” (“relations” without a subject, e.g., the Father is not separate from his paternity … He is paternity itself, He is the relation, not a subject exercising a relation).
Needless to say, it’s hard to get away from an Aristotelian logic built on localizable “entities” and their “properties”.
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