Does the Trinity have one mind or three minds?

[JapaneseKappa]

I understand かっぱ as using “thing” in what Latin and English speakers would translate as substantia and “substance” respectively, and these are themselves translations of what the Greeks call οὐσία.

I know that, etymologically, ὑπόστασις should translate to substantia, since the Greek ὑπό translates to the Latin sub and στασις to stans, but the Latin Fathers decided to translate ὑπόστασις to persona (in English “person”) and ὁμοούσιος as consubstantia. I’d prefer to stick with their choices and in their tradition when speaking in English, since the English expressions of these ideas are rooted in the Latin Fathers’ tradition.

I mean, I guess we could use * essentia*, but the nice thing about consubstantia is that it not only rules out Arianism, but also polytheism. If we were to say that the Father and the Son have the same essentia, that could be interpreted as saying they are two particulars with the same nature, like how you and I are two individuals with the same human nature. But this is equivalent to saying that the Father and Christ are two gods, which is false, as there is only one instance or particular of the Divine Nature, not three (monotheism). By saying they are consubstantial, we are saying they are the same being, the same concrete reality, which inherently means they are the same essence or nature too.

Now, at the same time, “thing” is a very vague word, and we could say that the Father and Son are two things too, as long as we understand that saying that the Father and Son are two things, yet one thing, is an equivocation, because they are two things in regards to relation and procession and one thing in terms of substance, being, and nature.

I translated Kawawappa’s “thing” as referring to substance, being, and nature, because I think his error is in failing to distinguish between the Persons themselves and the sole instantiation of the Divine Nature. He’s doesn’t think we believe in three instances of the Divine Nature, but rather he thinks we really believe, rather than nominally believe due to our mode of knowing, in three parts or attributes of one instance of the Divine nature.

When I say “thing” I mean specifically “Whatever it is you’re referring to when you say the father/the son/God.” It doesn’t matter if it’s essence is identical to its substance or if it is a potato.

I will clarify my earlier position:

I claim that the diagram I drew is a qualitatively exhaustive depiction of how you can talk about God’s relations. That is to say: when you talk about two different “things” on the ends of a reflexive relation involving God, you are either talking about parts of God, or you are talking about God twice.

This is actually an easy mistake to make, because to say that the Father and Son are the same substance together doesn’t rule out that they are parts, like how my eyes, emotions, and mind are all one substance, Lucretius, but at the same time different parts that can be separated from each other. The doctine of Divine Simplicity does rule out “parts” in this sense.

It does rule out such parts.

Classical theism characterizes divine simplicity as “God is without the sort of metaphysical complexity where God would have different parts which are distinct from himself.” The fact that your emotions are a part of you that are distinct from you (i.e. your emotions are not identically the same thing as you) means that God can’t have that kind of relationship full stop.

But, as St. Thomas explains it, although it is true that in an outer procession, the act terminates outside the agent, the opposite is true in an internal procession, which terminates within the agent himself. He uses an analogy of our own minds, for the deeper our understanding of something, the the more union there is between the knower and the concept, which is by nature/definition the same essence of the the something…
And since only acts of the intellect and will are inner processions, this explains, I think, why there are only processions that terminate in the Son and Spirit. Divine attributes like goodness are simply not relational like acts of the mind and will.

So here is the rub. You are “labeling the boxes differently,” then arguing that they are different-but-the-same.

Here is the heart of the matter, which all the faffing about with relationships fails to resolve, and merely confuses. Let us consider the father (F), the son (S) and God (G).

1. Either there is a respect in which F and S are different, or there is not.
2. Suppose that there is a respect (R) in which F and S are different, and let the difference be characterized by some description “d” such that F is d, while S is not d.
3. Within R, either F is identically the same as G, or F is not identically the same as G.
4. If F is not identically the same as G in R, then we have contradicted a trinitarian requirement (i.e. that F be identically the same as G.)
5. Repeat 3 and 4 with S instead of F
6. Therefore, according to 4 and 5, S and F must both be identically the same as G in R.
7. Therefore, according to 2 and 6, G is both “d” and “not d” in R.
8. 7 is a violation of the law of non-contradiction.
9. Therefore 2 either violates a trinitarian requirement, or is logically impossible.
10. Suppose there does not exist a respect in which F and S are different.
11. 1. is a violation of a trinitarian requirement (i.e. that F and S be different)

 

[PluniaZ]

I don’t understand why the phrase can’t refer to both things. He’s correct that the Son receives his honor from the Father, like everything else that the Son has:

Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, unless it is something He sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, these things the Son also does in like manner.

For not even the Father judges anyone, but He has given all judgment to the Son, so that all will honor the Son even as they honor the Father. He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him.

…For just as the Father has life in Himself, even so He gave to the Son also to have life in Himself.

Christi pax.

Because the teaching of the Church is that Jesus is equal to the Father according to his Godhead, and less than the Father according to his humanity.

But you all seem desperate to find a way to make the Son less than the Father according to their Godhead. Maybe you should pause and pray about this for a while.

 

[levinas12]

I disagree.

It seems you are utilizing from your vantage point the limited act of accounting in time to signify non-simplicity in order to say the Unity of Persons is not Divinely Simple.

God is Divinely Simple, even as it can be applied to God’s Personhood.

Take a look at Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question III (On the Simplicity of God). In this question, Thomas discusses a number of compositions: (1) spatial/temporal parts pertaining to a material body; (2) matter and form; (3) essence and subject (suppositum); (4) essence and esse; (5) genus and species; (6) subject and accident; (6) composition with other things.

None of these compositions pertain to God. None of these compositions pertain to God. This is what I understand to be Divine Simplicity.

When I said that the Divine Simplicity belong to Divine Substance. I was thinking of what Aristotle calls the “first substance”, prote ousia, the concrete existing substance. In creatures, examples of first substance would, e.g., this particular man, this particular tree … existing entities. “Second substance” would be what we mean by “nature” or “essence”, e.g., humanity, treeness, definable by genus and species…

In the case of God there is only “first substance”; there is no “second substance”. That is, in God, there is no distinction between “essence” and “subject” (“suppositum”).

In my opinion, “suppositum” here does not refer to “person” but to “first substance”, the prote ousia.

This is what my previous response was getting at.

There is a Divine Plurality of Persons - but God’s Substance is simple (without composition).

The unity of the Divine Persons is the One Divine Substance; but the Persons as subsistent Relations are distinct from one another.

It’s also important to note that “intellect” and “will” belong to the Divine Substance (without the creaturely composition of faculties). Though there are three Persons, there is only One Intellect and One Will in the One Simple Divine Substance.

 

[meltzerboy]

Take a look at Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part I, Question III (On the Simplicity of God). In this question, Thomas discusses a number of compositions: (1) spatial/temporal parts pertaining to a material body; (2) matter and form; (3) essence and subject (suppositum); (4) essence and esse; (5) genus and species; (6) subject and accident; (6) composition with other things.

None of these compositions pertain to God. None of these compositions pertain to God. This is what I understand to be Divine Simplicity.

When I said that the Divine Simplicity belong to Divine Substance. I was thinking of what Aristotle calls the “first substance”, prote ousia, the concrete existing substance. In creatures, examples of first substance would, e.g., this particular man, this particular tree … existing entities. “Second substance” would be what we mean by “nature” or “essence”, e.g., humanity, treeness, definable by genus and species…

In the case of God there is only “first substance”; there is no “second substance”. That is, in God, there is no distinction between “essence” and “subject” (“suppositum”).

In my opinion, “suppositum” here does not refer to “person” but to “first substance”, the prote ousia.

This is what my previous response was getting at.

There is a Divine Plurality of Persons - but God’s Substance is simple (without composition).

The unity of the Divine Persons is the One Divine Substance; but the Persons as subsistent Relations are distinct from one another.

It’s also important to note that “intellect” and “will” belong to the Divine Substance (without the creaturely composition of faculties). Though there are three Persons, there is only One Intellect and One Will in the One Simple Divine Substance.

What exactly does the word “Person” mean? I know it does not mean nature, will, intellect. Does it mean function, relationship, parts, or something else?

 

[JimG]

What exactly does the word “Person” mean? I know it does not mean nature, will, intellect. Does it mean function, relationship, parts, or something else?

I’m just speaking off the top of my head here, not from philosophical or theological sources. It seems to me that the word “person” refers to that aspect of a being which can say “I.” which is self referential. It’s been said that nature refers to the “what,” and person refers to the “who.” Not every object has the aspect of personhood, of course: rocks and trees do not speak of themselves as subjects; they are not self-referential. Angels, human beings, and God, do have the aspect of personhood. But person and nature are not “parts” of a being. Rather, nature determines what one is; person answers who one is.

 

[Wesrock]

I’m newer at this, so please, any more informed Catholics, let me know if I’ve made a mess of things.

Here is the heart of the matter, which all the faffing about with relationships fails to resolve, and merely confuses. Let us consider the father (F), the son (S) and God (G).

1. Either there is a respect in which F and S are different, or there is not.
2. Suppose that there is a respect (R) in which F and S are different, and let the difference be characterized by some description “d” such that F is d, while S is not d.
3. Within R, either F is identically the same as G, or F is not identically the same as G.
4. If F is not identically the same as G in R, then we have contradicted a trinitarian requirement (i.e. that F be identically the same as G.)
5. Repeat 3 and 4 with S instead of F
6. Therefore, according to 4 and 5, S and F must both be identically the same as G in R.
7. Therefore, according to 2 and 6, G is both “d” and “not d” in R.
8. 7 is a violation of the law of non-contradiction.
9. Therefore 2 either violates a trinitarian requirement, or is logically impossible.
10. Suppose there does not exist a respect in which F and S are different.
11. 1. is a violation of a trinitarian requirement (i.e. that F and S be different)

Generally speaking, a different “who” requires a different “what” and is thought of as interchangeable, but that’s not the claim for the Trinity. What the Father is, what the Son is, and what the Spirit is is the same. There is no difference. Not just in type, but in being. However, the who of each is different. There are three whos to one what. But it’s not so simple as calling the whos different parts to the what. They are not parts of the what.

If I may borrow from Lucretius’ example, and Lucretius please let me know if I have done wrong.

Lucretius:

]In God, not only is his conception of Himself the same nature as Himself, but his essence is also his existence, his goodness, etc. And since his concept of Himself is perfect, it is in complete union with his intellect with is his essence which is his goodness which is his etc.

So, God’s understanding of Himself is identical and in complete unity with Himself and his existence. Still, God’s Concept of God, the Logos, arises from God, making God conceiving Himself distinct from God as He conceives Himself, of course in a way that doesn’t make the Word a part of God.

JapaneseKappa replied:

JapaneseKappa:

That is to say: when you talk about two different “things” on the ends of a reflexive relation involving God, you are either talking about parts of God, or you are talking about God twice.

…The fact that your emotions are a part of you that are distinct from you (i.e. your emotions are not identically the same thing as you) means that God can’t have that kind of relationship full stop.

To the latter point, I think it’s been emphasized already that within God the reflection is not just partial but is perfect and total.

To your former point, you are partially right. It’s the same *what *in both cases, neither deprived in what it is in what the other has. No different. The what of the Generator (Paternity) and the Generated (Filiation) is the same thing. These are not distinct from God, but they are two distinct and opposed internal relationships that, within the divinity, gives rise to what we call Persons, or the whos (not the Dr. Seuss kind). It doesn’t give rise to a separate what or thing, but which in God (as it does not in something lesser or imperfect), who perfectly has reflective knowledge of Himself, two “whos”.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

Jesus is God and man. Jesus “sitting at the right hand of the Father” can only refer to His humanity. In His Divinity, Jesus is in the Father, and the Father in Him.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perichoresis

Christ is not divided in His humanity and His Divinity. Christ is one person in two natures, divine and human. If Jesus sits at the right hand of the Father, it is in both His humanity and His divinity.

 

[PluniaZ]

Christ is not divided in His humanity and His Divinity. Christ is one person in two natures, divine and human. If Jesus sits at the right hand of the Father, it is in both His humanity and His divinity.

“The communicatio idiomatum is based on the oneness of person subsisting in the two natures of Jesus Christ. Hence it can be used as long as both the subject and the predicate of a sentence stand for the person of Jesus Christ, or present a common subject of predication. For in this case we simply affirm that He Who subsists in the Divine nature and possesses certain Divine properties is the same as He Who subsists in the human nature and possesses certain human properties.”

“There is no communicatio idiomatum between the two natures of Christ, or between the Word and the human nature as such or its parts. The fundamental error of the Ubiquitists consists in predicating of the human nature or of humanity the properties of the Divine nature.”

newadvent.org/cathen/04169a.htm

The Divine Nature of Jesus is omnipresent and immutable. It cannot be confined at a particular place, nor can it be elevated or exalted more than it already is.

Thus, you can say, “God died on the Cross” and “Mary bore God in her womb” and “The Son of God is seated at the right hand of the Father.” But you cannot say, “The Divine Nature suffered a change on the cross” or “The Divine Nature was confined within the limits of Mary’s womb” or “The Divine Nature of the Son was changed in such a way that it became seated at the right hand of the Father, when it was not before.”

The Orthodox Church of America expressly states that “sits at the right hand of the Father” is to be understood in terms of the glorification of Christ’s human nature:

It is this participation in divinity, called theosis (which literally means deification or divinization) in Orthodox theology, that the ascension of Christ has fulfilled for humanity. The symbolical expression of the “sitting at the right hand” of God means nothing other than this.

oca.org/orthodoxy/the-orthodox-faith/doctrine-scripture/the-symbol-of-faith/ascension

 

[Wesrock]

Sitting at the right hand is not necessarily a lesser greatness, and could even denote equality. We can also understand it to be pointing out how Christ’s human nature has been so glorified as to be “seated” so.

 

[levinas12]

What exactly does the word “Person” mean? I know it does not mean nature, will, intellect. Does it mean function, relationship, parts, or something else?

Think of Abraham Lincoln (AL). To say AL is a human being is to talk his “substance” which is definable in terms of genus and species - rational animal. The Greeks call this the “form”, the “eidos”, which is identical in any number of particular entities. This is to talk about AL qua human being. - to talk the “what”, the “quiddity”.

However, to talk about AL as a person is to talk about a “who”, not a “what” - and this “who” is unique, unrepeatable, incommunicable (unlike the “form” which is instantiated in many particulars). The “person” is a singularity outside Aristotle’s metaphysical categories (substance and the various accidents).

To talk about AL a a person is talk about AL qua AL, not AL qua human being.

The person AL nonetheless has to have a nature, a form, an “eidos” or “essence” but these latter are not the person - this is to say that, after defining AL’s substance (rational animal) there still more reality to talk about - that is, the “who” of AL over and above the “what” of AL.

 

[levinas12]

Divine simplicity pertains to God full stop. If you look up divine simplicity, none of the explanations say:

The Divine Substance is without the sort of metaphysical complexity where the Divine Substance would have different parts which are distinct from itself.

Divine simplicity implies that when we say God is love, God is existence, and God is omnipotent, we mean that love, existence, omnipotence and God are all identically the same thing.

I will assert that you have merely repeated yourself, and not answered my objection that “internal relations” require distinct “internal parts” which are explicitly denied by divine simplicity.

There is a plurality of subsistent “relations” in God - these “relations” are different from one another - they are the Divine Persons.

What I mean by Divine Simplicity is addressed by Thomas Aquinas in ST, Part I, Question III where various types of compositions are discussed and ruled out in God’s case (see my previous posting #241). Thomas does not think that the really different “subsistent relations” known as the Divine Persons negate the simplicity of the Divine Substance. God is both One Primary Substance (prote ousia) and also Three Persons.

How do you explain the plurality of the Three Persons while the Substance remains One?

 

[Expatreprocedit]

The Orthodox Church of America expressly states that “sits at the right hand of the Father” is to be understood in terms of the glorification of Christ’s human nature:

Quote:
It is this participation in divinity, called theosis (which literally means deification or divinization) in Orthodox theology, that the ascension of Christ has fulfilled for humanity. The symbolical expression of the “sitting at the right hand” of God means nothing other than this.

oca.org/orthodoxy/the-orthod…aith/ascension

---

I do not believe that excerpt says what you say it does. It is talking about Theosis, as it says “participation in divinity.” It does not say that “sitting at the right hand of the Father” pertains only to Christ’s human nature, and not His divine nature. Again, you cannot divide Christ up that way.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

"
The Divine Nature of Jesus is omnipresent and immutable. It cannot be confined at a particular place, nor can it be elevated or exalted more than it already is.

Thus, you can say, “God died on the Cross” and “Mary bore God in her womb” and “The Son of God is seated at the right hand of the Father.” But you cannot say, “The Divine Nature suffered a change on the cross” or “The Divine Nature was confined within the limits of Mary’s womb” or “The Divine Nature of the Son was changed in such a way that it became seated at the right hand of the Father, when it was not before.”

The excerpted misunderstands what the expression “sitting at the right hand of the Father” means. It does not mean Christ’s divine nature is “confined to a particular place”, that is a naive interpretation. It also doesn’t mean that the Divine Nature suffers change. It shows an eternal relationship of the Father and the Son. New Advent seems hung up on applying spatial and temporal concepts to the eternal.

 

[PluniaZ]

The Orthodox Church of America expressly states that “sits at the right hand of the Father” is to be understood in terms of the glorification of Christ’s human nature:

Quote:
It is this participation in divinity, called theosis (which literally means deification or divinization) in Orthodox theology, that the ascension of Christ has fulfilled for humanity. The symbolical expression of the “sitting at the right hand” of God means nothing other than this.

oca.org/orthodoxy/the-orthod…aith/ascension

---

I do not believe that excerpt says what you say it does. It is talking about Theosis, as it says “participation in divinity.” It does not say that “sitting at the right hand of the Father” pertains only to Christ’s human nature, and not His divine nature. Again, you cannot divide Christ up that way.

The OCA website speaks for itself:

To say that Jesus is “exalted at the right hand of God” as Saint Peter preached in the first Christian sermon (Acts 2.33) means exactly this: that man has been restored to communion with God, to a union which is, according to Orthodox doctrine, far greater and more perfect than that given to man in his original creation (see Eph 1–2).

Man was created with the potential to be a “partaker of the divine nature,” to refer to the Apostle Peter once more (2 Pet 1.4). It is this participation in divinity, called theosis (which literally means deification or divinization) in Orthodox theology, that the ascension of Christ has fulfilled for humanity. The symbolical expression of the “sitting at the right hand” of God means nothing other than this.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

The OCA website speaks for itself:

You keep missing the words the “Divine Nature”. Of necessity, means that not only the human but the divine nature of Christ is being talked about.

 

[PluniaZ]

You keep missing the words the “Divine Nature”. Of necessity, means that not only the human but the divine nature of Christ is being talked about.

And what do you think is being said about it?

 

[Expatreprocedit]

And what do you think is being said about it?

Theosis is the participation of human nature in the divine nature through Christ, Christ sitting at the right hand of the Father is symbolic of Theosis, By union with Christ we can particpate in His divine nature, which in a sense places us also at the right hand of the Father. I think I disagree with the statement that Christ sitting at the right hand means no more than that.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

Further question for Plunia: Does not the use of the Father-Son relationship as a model for the first two persons of the Trinity in itself show a certain priority of the Father, not taking away from the equal divinty of the Son? A Father-Son relationship is by its nature hierarchical.

 

[PluniaZ]

Further question for Plunia: Does not the use of the Father-Son relationship as a model for the first two persons of the Trinity in itself show a certain priority of the Father, not taking away from the equal divinty of the Son? A Father-Son relationship is by its nature hierarchical.

I’d rather not speculate. We aren’t the first people to wonder about the relationship between the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. If a doctrine of a Father-Son hierarchy were permissible, the Church would have told us so by now.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Generally speaking, a different “who” requires a different “what” and is thought of as interchangeable, but that’s not the claim for the Trinity. What the Father is, what the Son is, and what the Spirit is is the same. There is no difference. Not just in type, but in being. However, the who of each is different. There are three whos to one what. But it’s not so simple as calling the whos different parts to the what. They are not parts of the what.

If you re-read my syllogism, you will find that it does not make appeal to “parts” “types” or “whats.” The use of “respects” is general enough to raise an objection against any kind of difference.

To your former point, you are partially right. It’s the same *what *in both cases, neither deprived in what it is in what the other has. No different. The what of the Generator (Paternity) and the Generated (Filiation) is the same thing. These are not distinct from God, but they are two distinct and opposed internal relationships that, within the divinity, gives rise to what we call Persons, or the whos (not the Dr. Seuss kind). It doesn’t give rise to a separate what or thing, but which in God (as it does not in something lesser or imperfect), who perfectly has reflective knowledge of Himself, two “whos”.

You cannot claim they are distinct but not different. If they are distinct, then there exists some respect in which they are different. My syllogism forces you to choose in step #1.

1. Either there is a respect in which F and S are different, or there is not.