No, the Father and the Son are not the same “thing”. The closest approximation to “thing” in the Greek used by the Fathers and the Councils is the word “hypostasis” and the Fathers and the Councils are clear that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are different hypostases. They share the same divine Nature, but they are different persons.
I understand かっぱ as using “thing” in what Latin and English speakers would translate as
substantia and “substance” respectively, and these are themselves translations of what the Greeks call
οὐσία.
I know that, etymologically,
ὑπόστασις should translate to
substantia, since the Greek
ὑπό translates to the Latin
sub and
στασις to
stans, but the Latin Fathers decided to translate
ὑπόστασις to
persona (in English “person”) and
ὁμοούσιος as
consubstantia. I’d prefer to stick with their choices and in their tradition when speaking in English, since the English expressions of these ideas are rooted in the Latin Fathers’ tradition.
I mean, I guess we could use * essentia*, but the nice thing about
consubstantia is that it not only rules out Arianism, but also polytheism. If we were to say that the Father and the Son have the same
essentia, that could be interpreted as saying they are two particulars with the same nature, like how you and I are two individuals with the same human nature. But this is equivalent to saying that the Father and Christ are two gods, which is false, as there is only one instance or particular of the Divine Nature, not three (monotheism). By saying they are consubstantial, we are saying they are the same being, the same concrete reality, which inherently means they are the same essence or nature too.
Now, at the same time, “thing” is a very vague word, and we could say that the Father and Son are two things too, as long as we understand that saying that the Father and Son are two things, yet one thing, is an equivocation, because they are two things in regards to relation and procession and one thing in terms of substance, being, and nature.
I translated Kawawappa’s “thing” as referring to substance, being, and nature, because I think his error is in failing to distinguish between the Persons themselves and the sole instantiation of the Divine Nature. He’s doesn’t think we believe in three instances of the Divine Nature, but rather he thinks we really believe, rather than nominally believe due to our mode of knowing, in three parts or attributes of one instance of the Divine nature.
This is actually an easy mistake to make, because to say that the Father and Son are the same substance together doesn’t rule out that they are parts, like how my eyes, emotions, and mind are all one substance, Lucretius, but at the same time different parts that can be separated from each other. The doctine of Divine Simplicity does rule out “parts” in this sense.
But, as St. Thomas explains it, although it is true that in an outer procession, the act terminates outside the agent, the opposite is true in an internal procession, which terminates within the agent himself. He uses an analogy of our own minds, for the deeper our understanding of something, the the more union there is between the knower and the concept, which is by nature/definition the same essence of the the something.
Even still, a perfect understanding of something doesn’t make it have a real existence: just because I completely understand what a rock is, doesn’t mean rocks existence, nor that my existence is that of a rock. So even perfect knowledge of myself doesn’t give my concept of myself existence, because my existence has real distinction from my essence.
But this is different with God, because his existence is his essence. So his concepts actually have existence.
From my understanding, and correct me if I’m making a mistake (this is high level theology here, and theology is the most confusing of all the sciences), when God conceives of things that are not identical to him, through his concept of Himself (the Son), and gives them their existence and life, that is not identical with his experience with His own being, life, existence, essence, etc. (the Spirit), this is called
creation ex nihilo. This is an outward procession, which is why the thing is seperate both in existence and essence with God’s and its own existence and essence.
When he conceives of Himself, his very complete and perfect concept of Himself is identical to his existence as well as his essence, and since he knows himself completely and perfectly, His understanding of Himself is in perfect unity with Himself.
God analogically then so knows Himself that the very distinction between Him and His concept of Himself vanishes, which is why we refer to the Son as the
Λόγος, and as true God.
But even though God as understood and known by Himself is the same essence and being as God and in complete unity with Him, as we can see from the St. Thomas’ analogy, he is still different in
relation to God as knowing and understanding Himself. Even though the relations God knowing and God as known are now the same in essence and being, they are still different in how they arise, they are different in what is called
procession. And this is what is meant when we say there is real distinction between the persons, at least according to St. Thomas.
In other words, if I understand the Fathers and St. Thomas and others correctly then, it is the very Divine Simplicity that Katsupa thinks rules out the Trinity that actually makes it possible.
And since only acts of the intellect and will are inner processions, this explains, I think, why there are only processions that terminate in the Son and Spirit. Divine attributes like goodness are simply not relational like acts of the mind and will.
Christi pax.
