The “cause” is the train that is going to either kill five people or one person in both loop and non-loop cases.
Coder, I didn’t ask about the cause of the fat man getting hit. I pointed out that the fat man getting hit in the second scenario is not just a concomitant effect of the flipping the switch (as it is in the first scenario) but is an effect
which is also a cause.
You said the fat man getting hit was “related to the ends” in both scenarios. Yes, in the first scenario him getting hit is a result of flipping of the switch, one flips the switch in order to divert the trolley away from the 5, and so man getting hit is “related to the end” of diverting the trolley way from the 5.
But, in the second scenario that “relation to the end” is a cause and effect relation. Getting hit is a result of flipping the switch, but it is also a cause (not the only cause) of the end. That is a type of relationship to the end that the fat man simply doesn’t have in the first scenario.
The person who flips the switch is dealing with these facts and did not intend the train or the people to be in this situation to begin with.
Clearly so.
To hold the person morally culpable for using the person’s body in the loop case is absurd because he was just dealing with a situation presented to him that he had absolutely no control over. Morality exists within a circumstantial framework. The framework is not the use of the man’s body vs. non-use of the man’s body because that is an inner framework of the situation that in this case is morally irrelevant. It is morally irrelevant because the relevant framework in both cases is that the results based on the moral decision are identical.
I’m not sure, but are you restating the position that when one uses a means that is the only means available to accomplish an end that, in fact, one is not using it as a means to an end morally speaking? (Is that the axiom, or did I butcher it?)
If it is the axiom, can you show some support for that idea in someone else’s language? Maybe that will help me?
No one is willing anything here.
Well, you will to save 5 don’t you? And I think you will to flip the switch, too? (And I think there are other things one wills).
None of the options are desirable.
Yes, I agree, but that is because each of the two options in either scenario result in evil consequences. You still have a choice between undesirables outcomes.
But, that is the way things go sometimes. For instance, turning down a job offer could mean going without bread. Taking it could mean someone else going without bread. Neither is desirable.
If you were going to use that argument then you would have to say that in the non-loop case, the person who flips the switch willed the man to die. See below.
I’m not sure why you say I cannot use the argument “You can will a cause without willing all of it effects, but you can’t will an effect without willing its chain of causes” in the first scenario? Every PDE analysis of the trolley problem (the original) uses this argument. The driver flips a switch, which causes the trolley to miss the 5 and hit the 1. That cause (flipping the switch) has those two concomitant effects. The driver wills the first and not the second effect.
What is the “evil effect” in these cases? The “evil effect” is the death of the man. His getting hit is not the evil effect.
Why is his getting hit not
an evil effect?
Just so that I can understand your position better, perhaps you could analyze both scenarios where both choices don’t kill anyone, just hit them? Would there be
no evil effects in that case? (I have an idea why the “death of the man” might be insisted upon, and I can comment on that later if you’d like.)
Coder, let me say that in my travels I haven’t seen a PDE analysis from a moral theologian or ethicist that allows this loop scenario. Do you know of one? Could you point us to it? It might help me out.
This is important, because it is quite possible to claim that in the loop scenario it is morally permissible to flip the switch under some other analysis, or even that intuitively we feel that we ought to allow it. But this is different than saying that the problem doesn’t violate rule #3 of PDE (evil effect not a a cause of the good effect).
Maybe PDE just doesn’t give us the right answer here. It wouldn’t be the first time that someone has found a limitation with PDE analysis as applied to certain situations.
Thank you for engaging in this discussion. I am finding it profitable. Please let me know if there is any way that I can return the favor.
VC