Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

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in this case the necessary cause is not a “means to an” end because there are no alternatives. In moral decision making the term “means to an end” refers to means made as choices.
Coder,

Could you show why it the case that if there is no alternative way to obtain a given end that engaging in that action is not considered employing it as means to an end? Morally speaking, of course.

Or perhaps, could you show from where you derive the axiom, or where we could find a complimentary source that states that the term “means to an end” obtains only where we have a choice of various means?
In the second case the man’s death is no less “necessary” than in the first from the perspective of a moral decision.
Right, in the second case the man’s -]death/-] getting hit (please! stick to getting hit!) is no less necessary, but it is more necessary. If the fat man rolls off the track in the first scenario (either before or after my flipping the switch) I can still obtain my ultimate goal. But if the man rolls of the track in the second scenario (either before or after my flipping the switch) I can’t obtain my ultimate goal.

In the first case I don’t hope for man to get hit at all, because it isn’t necessary that he be hit to accomplish my ultimate aim. But in the second case I do hope for it, don’t I? It is necessary that he be hit for me to accomplish my ultimate aim.

Thanks for your time. Keep trying to help me see it, it’s important.
VC
 
It is best to apply the brakes, hit the horn constantly, and attempt to derail the train by switching back and forth from one direction to another.
 
Coder,
Could you show why it the case that if there is no alternative way to obtain a given end that engaging in that action is not considered employing it as means to an end? Morally speaking, of course.
Hi, the principle cited is “the good effect must not be obtained by means of the evil effect;…” Therefore, we must examine “means” in this context. The purpose of this principle is to guide moral decision making. So therefore “means” refers to “methods chosen”. The degree to which free choice is involved directly relates to the morality of a decision. In the loop case, the means in question (the man’s death by getting hit) is physically related to the ends but no more morally related to the ends than in the first case.
Right, in the second case the man’s -]death/-] getting hit (please! stick to getting hit!) is no less necessary, but it is more necessary.
I meant no “more” necessary, sorry. His getting hit is more neccessary but his death is no more necessary because in both cases his death is a necessary result. The problem as presented rules out the scenario that he could roll off the track. The problem is presented to be evaluated based on the fact that the man would die in both cases. Given this very fact of the problem statement, the involvement of the man’s body in the loop case does not bear on the moral decision as it relates to the non-loop case because it does not bear on whether the man would die or not.
 
Keep going Coder! Help me understand.

I might have a few more questions/observations later, but let me start with this:
In the loop case, the means in question (the man’s death by getting hit) is physically related to the ends but no more morally related to the ends than in the first case.
“Physically related to the ends” is a bit misleading, isn’t it? Yes, the man getting hit is physically related to the ultimate intention in both scenarios. But in the second scenario that physical relation isn’t just concomitant (as it is in the first) it is precisely cause and effect.

You can will a cause without willing all of it effects, but you can’t will an effect without willing its chain of causes, can you?

VC
 
… Or, if one still wants to parse the -]man/-] soldier and his mass, let’s put it this way. The problem is intending to use a man as an obstruction. Or intending to hit an obstruction that happens to be a man …VC
If you justify the heroic soldier, how can you condemn the trolley operator? Or, do you also condemn the soldier’s action as immoral?

Now that’s really my last comment, promise!
 
“Physically related to the ends” is a bit misleading, isn’t it? Yes, the man getting hit is physically related to the ultimate intention in both scenarios. But in the second scenario that physical relation isn’t just concomitant (as it is in the first) it is precisely cause and effect.
The “cause” is the train that is going to either kill five people or one person in both loop and non-loop cases. The person who flips the switch is dealing with these facts and did not intend the train or the people to be in this situation to begin with. To hold the person morally culpable for using the person’s body in the loop case is absurd because he was just dealing with a situation presented to him that he had absolutely no control over. Morality exists within a circumstantial framework. The framework is not the use of the man’s body vs. non-use of the man’s body because that is an inner framework of the situation that in this case is morally irrelevant. It is morally irrelevant because the relevant framework in both cases is that the results based on the moral decision are identical.
You can will a cause without willing all of it effects, but you can’t will an effect without willing its chain of causes, can you?
No one is willing anything here. None of the options are desirable. If you were going to use that argument then you would have to say that in the non-loop case, the person who flips the switch willed the man to die. See below.
“the good effect must not be obtained by means of the evil effect;…”
What is the “evil effect” in these cases? The “evil effect” is the death of the man. His getting hit is not the evil effect.
 
If you justify the heroic soldier, how can you condemn the trolley operator? Or, do you also condemn the soldier’s action as immoral?

Now that’s really my last comment, promise!
No, I don’t condemn the heroic soldier who jumps on a grenade.

But, surely there must be a difference between a soldier jumping on a grenade and a soldier throwing someone else on a grenade?

VC
 
The “cause” is the train that is going to either kill five people or one person in both loop and non-loop cases.
Coder, I didn’t ask about the cause of the fat man getting hit. I pointed out that the fat man getting hit in the second scenario is not just a concomitant effect of the flipping the switch (as it is in the first scenario) but is an effect which is also a cause.

You said the fat man getting hit was “related to the ends” in both scenarios. Yes, in the first scenario him getting hit is a result of flipping of the switch, one flips the switch in order to divert the trolley away from the 5, and so man getting hit is “related to the end” of diverting the trolley way from the 5.

But, in the second scenario that “relation to the end” is a cause and effect relation. Getting hit is a result of flipping the switch, but it is also a cause (not the only cause) of the end. That is a type of relationship to the end that the fat man simply doesn’t have in the first scenario.
The person who flips the switch is dealing with these facts and did not intend the train or the people to be in this situation to begin with.
Clearly so.
To hold the person morally culpable for using the person’s body in the loop case is absurd because he was just dealing with a situation presented to him that he had absolutely no control over. Morality exists within a circumstantial framework. The framework is not the use of the man’s body vs. non-use of the man’s body because that is an inner framework of the situation that in this case is morally irrelevant. It is morally irrelevant because the relevant framework in both cases is that the results based on the moral decision are identical.
I’m not sure, but are you restating the position that when one uses a means that is the only means available to accomplish an end that, in fact, one is not using it as a means to an end morally speaking? (Is that the axiom, or did I butcher it?)

If it is the axiom, can you show some support for that idea in someone else’s language? Maybe that will help me?
No one is willing anything here.
Well, you will to save 5 don’t you? And I think you will to flip the switch, too? (And I think there are other things one wills).
None of the options are desirable.
Yes, I agree, but that is because each of the two options in either scenario result in evil consequences. You still have a choice between undesirables outcomes.

But, that is the way things go sometimes. For instance, turning down a job offer could mean going without bread. Taking it could mean someone else going without bread. Neither is desirable.
If you were going to use that argument then you would have to say that in the non-loop case, the person who flips the switch willed the man to die. See below.
I’m not sure why you say I cannot use the argument “You can will a cause without willing all of it effects, but you can’t will an effect without willing its chain of causes” in the first scenario? Every PDE analysis of the trolley problem (the original) uses this argument. The driver flips a switch, which causes the trolley to miss the 5 and hit the 1. That cause (flipping the switch) has those two concomitant effects. The driver wills the first and not the second effect.
What is the “evil effect” in these cases? The “evil effect” is the death of the man. His getting hit is not the evil effect.
Why is his getting hit not an evil effect?

Just so that I can understand your position better, perhaps you could analyze both scenarios where both choices don’t kill anyone, just hit them? Would there be no evil effects in that case? (I have an idea why the “death of the man” might be insisted upon, and I can comment on that later if you’d like.)

Coder, let me say that in my travels I haven’t seen a PDE analysis from a moral theologian or ethicist that allows this loop scenario. Do you know of one? Could you point us to it? It might help me out.

This is important, because it is quite possible to claim that in the loop scenario it is morally permissible to flip the switch under some other analysis, or even that intuitively we feel that we ought to allow it. But this is different than saying that the problem doesn’t violate rule #3 of PDE (evil effect not a a cause of the good effect).

Maybe PDE just doesn’t give us the right answer here. It wouldn’t be the first time that someone has found a limitation with PDE analysis as applied to certain situations.

Thank you for engaging in this discussion. I am finding it profitable. Please let me know if there is any way that I can return the favor.

VC
 
Maybe PDE just doesn’t give us the right answer here. It wouldn’t be the first time that someone has found a limitation with PDE analysis as applied to certain situations.
VC,

Which situation do you have in mind where PDE fails to give the correct answer? (I’m asking what situation you have in mind for “wouldn’t be the first time”.)

Also, would throwing the switch be more like a soldier casting himself on a grenade if the fat man were in vocal range and told you to throw the switch onto him (loop variant of trolley)?
 
Hi, first, some of my posts may sometimes not be semantically adhering to your terminology, and I am expecting you to see the spirit of what I am saying .
This is important, because it is quite possible to claim that in the loop scenario it is morally permissible to flip the switch under some other analysis, or even that intuitively we feel that we ought to allow it. But this is different than saying that the problem doesn’t violate rule #3 of PDE (evil effect not a a cause of the good effect).
It may not be a limitation of the scope of PDE. Rather, I think that what we need to see is that what is a means in one scenario may be a side effect in another. In the non-loop case, the man’s being hit and death is a side effect. In the loop case, his being hit and death is ***still a side effect. ***Because in both cases, it is a side effect of saving the five given the restrictions of the scenario. It is not a means because it is not chosen, it is a side effect because it is accepted.
 
The driver flips a switch, which causes the trolley to miss the 5 and hit the 1. That cause (flipping the switch) has those two concomitant effects. The driver wills the first and not the second effect.
Precisely, my dear Watson and this is the why the use of his body in the loop case is not a “means” because it is a second effect that is not a willed! (If this were on a test in college one might think that its purpose is to see if one can discern when something is a means or a side effect based on the options available.)
Why is his getting hit not an evil effect?
It’s an evil effect in both cases but since it results in his death in both cases there is no reason to focus on it. Remember, the use of his body in the loop case is still a side effect of saving the five given the restrictive scenario. Even though in this case his body is the (physical, not chosen) means, the necessity of using his body is a side effect of saving the five in this scenario. This, my dear friend, is the crux.
 
VC,

Which situation do you have in mind where PDE fails to give the correct answer? (I’m asking what situation you have in mind for “wouldn’t be the first time”.)
Hi Pug,

Glad you’ve joined us. You always bring a helpful moderating influence to these discussions, and insightful observations.

I’m talking about the second scenario (the loop). I’ve not seen scenario #2 survive a PDE analysis (besides here on this thread) . I was under the impression that this is actually the point of the loop scenario as proposed by its creator – to show that PDE disallows something that we ought to allow.

Some of the posters on this thread also seem to want to allow flipping the switch in scenario #2. But, there seems to be an effort to want to allow it through a PDE analysis.

What I meant was, perhaps PDE just doesn’t work here for those posters (who want to allow flipping the switch in scenario #2). When I said it “wouldn’t be the first time” I meant it wouldn’t be the first time someone found PDE wanting in a certain circumstance. I’ve seen various criticisms of it, not the least of which is that in complex cases it *can *be notoriously tricky to apply, and doesn’t give a consistent result when employed by ethicists (let alone arm-chair enthusiasts such as ourselves).
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Pug:
Also, would throwing the switch be more like a soldier casting himself on a grenade if the fat man were in vocal range and told you to throw the switch onto him (loop variant of trolley)?
I’d like to think on it some more. Perhaps we could hash it out here in this thread?

VC
 
Hi, first, some of my posts may sometimes not be semantically adhering to your terminology, and I am expecting you to see the spirit of what I am saying.
I’ll strive to do that, thanks. Hope you’ll do the same for me.
It may not be a limitation of the scope of PDE. Rather, I think that what we need to see is that what is a means in one scenario may be a side effect in another. In the non-loop case, the man’s being hit and death is a side effect. In the loop case, his being hit and death is ***still a side effect. ***Because in both cases, it is a side effect of saving the five given the restrictions of the scenario. It is not a means because it is not chosen, it is a side effect because it is accepted.
Coder,

Thanks, I understand better now (I think) what you are getting at regarding not choosing to hit the man. But I have to wonder if this way of looking at it causes some difficulty.

The problem, as I see it, is that when something is an intermediate cause of something else then choosing the remote cause means choosing the intermediate cause. And, the way I see it, flipping the switch is the remote cause, and hitting the fat man is the intermediate cause of saving the 5. It doesn’t seem to me that calling it a side effect changes what it really is.

Maybe it would help me if you could explain how this way of looking at it would work in a somewhat similar scenario. (Forgive me for adding a scenario 3 to the mix!)

Scenario 3:
Imagine one section of track, at the end of which are 5 people. In the middle of the section of track is a bridge that acts as a loading dock. Normally, a train can stop there and crates stacked on the bridge are lowered down through a trap door by a small crane onto the flat cargo area. There is a fat man on the bridge. You can flip a switch to open the trapdoor so that he falls on the track. He’s fat enough to stop the trolley.

Can you flip that switch? Specifically, is him getting hit only an accepted side effect of saving the 5?

Thanks,
VC

P.S.
It may not be a limitation of the scope of PDE.
Are you aware of any author using PDE to justify flipping the switch in the loop problem?

VC
 
Hi VC,
Scenario 3:
…You can flip a switch to open the trapdoor so that he falls on the track. He’s -]fat/-] large enough to stop the trolley. Can you flip that switch? Specifically, is him getting hit only an accepted side effect of saving the 5?
This is interesting because it does show that in the loop case, the question of whether we have the right to decide whether a person should be sacrificed to save others is raised. In the non-loop case one could argue that the saving act was diverting the train and that hitting the other man was a “true” side effect. Despite these issues that stir the emotions, nonetheless, the necessity of the death of the one man is still a side effect in the saving of the five.

Perhaps a person in good conscience could truly think that they had no right to make such decisions because this would trespass against the authority of God in regards to fate. However, if one were to argue this then even in the non-loop case if the train was headed toward the five and only flipping the switch would alter the course, then one would have to say even in that case that the right to decide the fate of the single man is in question.

In summary, in all these situations, there is a necessity that one will die if five are saved. I consider this necessity to be a side effect of saving the five. Again, I consider it a side effect in all three cases because the hitting and death of the man is not a chosen means among options but an accepted necessity.
 
Thank you Coder.

Would you mind if I asked for others to comment on this last post of your before I do? I would be interested in what everyone else thought, especially those who have participated in this thread, but also others.

I am especially interested in what others think about this part of your post:
In summary, in all these situations, there is a necessity that one will die if five are saved. I consider this necessity to be a side effect of saving the five. Again, I consider it a side effect in all three cases because the hitting and death of the man is not a chosen means among options but an accepted necessity.
What do you folks think? Is the hitting of the man not a chosen means but rather an accepted necessity because you can’t save the five without him getting hit? Does this mean that in all three cases you can flip the switch? If you accept something as a necessity to accomplish a good, does it make it morally permissible?

In conjunction with the above, can others weigh in on whether one can flip a switch and drop a man in front of the train because that is the only way to stop the train from hitting 5 (scenario#3)?

Thanks all, and thanks Coder
God Bless,
VC

(p.s. if I didn’t summarize anything above correctly, please correct it?)
 
Thank you Coder.

Would you mind if I asked for others to comment on this last post of your before I do? I would be interested in what everyone else thought, especially those who have participated in this thread, but also others.

I am especially interested in what others think about this part of your post:

What do you folks think? Is the hitting of the man not a chosen means but rather an accepted necessity because you can’t save the five without him getting hit? Does this mean that in all three cases you can flip the switch? If you accept something as a necessity to accomplish a good, does it make it morally permissible?

In conjunction with the above, can others weigh in on whether one can flip a switch and drop a man in front of the train because that is the only way to stop the train from hitting 5 (scenario#3)?

Thanks all, and thanks Coder
God Bless,
VC

(p.s. if I didn’t summarize anything above correctly, please correct it?)
What do you folks think? Is the hitting of the man not a chosen means but rather an accepted necessity because you can’t save the five without him getting hit? Does this mean that in all three cases you can flip the switch? If you accept something as a necessity to accomplish a good, does it make it morally permissible?
Well, you asked for it. I think you can flip the switch for the first two but only because in this experiment morality and immorality have been done away with by the Mad Philosopher. It is not moral nor is it immoral for the trolleyman to flip the switch, it is just a choice of the lesser of two evils sans morality or immorality.
In conjunction with the above, can others weigh in on whether one can flip a switch and drop a man in front of the train because that is the only way to stop the train from hitting 5 (scenario#3)?
No, you cannot. As the object in that case would be to move to sacrifice one who is not otherwise at risk. It would be immoral in that case to choose to sacrifice him.
 
Thanks Thing.

You say about scenario #3 that
No, you cannot. As the object in that case would be to move to sacrifice one who is not otherwise at risk. It would be immoral in that case to choose to sacrifice him.
It seems what you are saying is that what matters is that the Fat Man isn’t in any jeapordy. Is that a fair restatement?

Is that because he isn’t in the path of the train? If so, neither is the Fat Man in scenario #1 or scenario #2. But, it seems all of them can be in the path of the train if you put them there. But, notably in the first scenario it wouldn’t matter if the Fat Man wasn’t there at all.

The idea of being “otherwise at risk” is interesting. Would you mind scenario #3b? What if you in a group of people and a grenade is lobbed in your midst. Everyone is at risk to be killed by it. You can’t get to the grenade because of those closer to it. It is about to explode. Can you push the Fat Man in front of you onto it?

VC
 
No, you cannot. As the object in that case would be to move to sacrifice one who is not otherwise at risk. It would be immoral in that case to choose to sacrifice him.
  1. I understand, and I thought about that but even in the original non-loop case, he’s not at risk if the trolley just stays on course.
  2. Also, are you saying that it would not be moral to accept the death of one person if millions were spared? I understand that this is ugly because of our instinct that we have no right to make such a decision. However, considering the Golden Rule and in a society where everyone had given implicit permission to sacrifice them in such caes, then I think that in Scenario 3 it would be moral to decide about the sacrifice. In a society where such permission is not implicit, I still think that one must save as many as possible and I know it’s uncomfortable.
 
Thanks Thing.

You say about scenario #3 that

It seems what you are saying is that what matters is that the Fat Man isn’t in any jeapordy. Is that a fair restatement?
The fatman has nothing to do with this dilemma. He is safe.
Is that because he isn’t in the path of the train? If so, neither is the Fat Man in scenario #1 or scenario #2. But, it seems all of them can be in the path of the train if you put them there. But, notably in the first scenario it wouldn’t matter if the Fat Man wasn’t there at all.
The fatman in the first two scenarios is already tied to the tracks. He is not safe. He has become the lesser of two evils. Anyone tied to any of the connected tracks is at risk.
The idea of being “otherwise at risk” is interesting. Would you mind scenario #3b? What if you in a group of people and a grenade is lobbed in your midst. Everyone is at risk to be killed by it. You can’t get to the grenade because of those closer to it. It is about to explode. Can you push the Fat Man in front of you onto it?

VC
No. Because everyone is at risk and everyone is at the same time potentially not at risk. Someone else may chose to jump onto it and save the fatman. It would be immoral to decide who should be placed on it as that person is potentially not otherwise at risk if a volunteer intervenes.
 
No. Because everyone is at risk and everyone is at the same time potentially not at risk. Someone else may chose to jump onto it and save the fatman. It would be immoral to decide who should be placed on it as that person is potentially not otherwise at risk if a volunteer intervenes.
Ah, I see. To make it more like the train scenario then: in that group of of people within the blast radius of the grenade only the Fat Man is close enough to get on top it.

So, to be clear:

4 other people, you, and the Fat Man are at risk of getting caught in the explosion.

None of the 4 people, nor you can jump on the grenade.

Can you push the fat man on the grenade there by saving the 4 people?

VC
 
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