Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Thing]

This distinction seems artificial. The simple fact is that in all three cases the trolley operator must either take an action that will result in the death of one man or if he allows the natural progression of events the one man will live and the five will die. It’s that simple and I don’t see how all of these other factors affect the morality even though they affect us emotionally.

According to PDE * the choice of action of hitting the well-nourished man must be either morally good or morally neutral. Because the choice of hitting a person or of hitting a person, is not a choice at all I conclude that hitting a person is morally neutral in that confined circumstance.
In any case a person is not worth less because he is one person, I must consider all persons as having equal worth. Morally, I consider the question neutral or indifferent and then considering Proportionality, if I must, I conclude that 5 is greater than 1.

In the third case it is not morally good or morally indifferent to push the well-nourished man in front of the trolley.*

 

[Coder]

Because the choice of hitting a person or of hitting a person, is not a choice at all…

Yes, this has been my point. You get a gold star from Coder

 

[Pug]

[snip]I’d like to think on it some more. Perhaps we could hash it out here in this thread?

VC

Thanks for your kind words, VC. In response to what you wrote, I went to see if I could find an article about the issue. I found one with even more fiendish scenarios in the mix. If you have access, it is this:

Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases
MICHAEL OTSUKA. Utilitas. Cambridge: Mar 2008. Vol. 20, Iss. 1; pg. 92, 19 pgs

I got it off the local library’s ProQuest. I suggest it since it was your thread originally, so you might be interested. And I’m glad to spend time thinking and hashing about my suggestion of being within vocal distance here on this thread.

 

[Thing]

Well, it could be argued. But I’ve only seen it argued this way on this thread. (Even Wikipedia (gasp!) points out that PDE forbids scenario 2)

Do you know of anyone who argues that PDE lets you flip the switch in the loop scenario (#2)?

In fact, my understanding of the person who created the loop scenario was attempting to show that PDE has some weaknesses, i.e. that it would forbid flipping the switch in scenario 2 when most people think it would be ok to do so.

One of my points in this thread has been to show how scenario 2 violates PDE. I’m not sure why some want PDE to justify scenario 2 though.

VC

Obviously I don’t actually know anyone who argues this.

But for the sake of argument: in scenario 2 there is a choice between hitting people and hitting people, so choosing is morally indifferent, the good effect is the avoiding of the five which is greater than the bad effect, that the well-nourished man happens to stop the trolley…

 

[Thing]

Yes, this has been my point. You get a gold star from Coder

Oh … thanks Coder……I think…

 

[Pug]

I am especially interested in what others think about this part of your post:

What do you folks think? Is the hitting of the man not a chosen means but rather an accepted necessity because you can’t save the five without him getting hit? Does this mean that in all three cases you can flip the switch? If you accept something as a necessity to accomplish a good, does it make it morally permissible?

In conjunction with the above, can others weigh in on whether one can flip a switch and drop a man in front of the train because that is the only way to stop the train from hitting 5 (scenario#3)?

I do not believe that acceptance of something as a necessity to accomplish a good then makes that something morally permissible.

I don’t know, yet, my answers to scenarios 2 and 3. I’ll give you some reaction, though. If the fat man were a father and those five were his children, he would cast himself from the bridge to shield his children (#3). Parents are very prone to interpose their bodies between their children and danger. In such a case, would anyone argue that he can’t do that?

Also, I find a certain repugnance in treating a person as an object and not a subject. It feels like that in 2 and 3. He doesn’t need to be a person; he could be a lump of coal for those to work. Perhaps PDE would allow you to dump a heap of coal from the bridge with the man merely stuck to the coal as a side effect. But in 2 and 3, he IS the lump of coal, and not merely stuck to it. I think the man is not a means in my coal example. But, without the coal, I’m not sure, yet.

Another thought is of the Golden Rule, not PDE, so I don’t know if that is relevant for you VC. Some fat men would indeed be angry and feel unjustly treated in 2 and 3.

EDIT: huh, maybe also some fat men would feel that way in 1 as well, I don’t know.

 

[Coder]

I do not believe that acceptance of something as a necessity to accomplish a good then makes that something morally permissible.

I phrase it as “acceptance of something as a necessity to prevent an otherwise greater evil”.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

In response to what you wrote, I went to see if I could find an article about the issue. I found one with even more fiendish scenarios in the mix. If you have access, it is this:

Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases
MICHAEL OTSUKA. Utilitas. Cambridge: Mar 2008. Vol. 20, Iss. 1; pg. 92, 19 pgs

Yes, I’ve seen that before, thanks for citing it though for the thread Pug.

I don’t know if every fiendish scenario is in that article. . . there is one really fiendish one that causes a real problem for PDE. But, I wouldn’t want to share it on this thread for fear of any evil effects it might cause.

I do not believe that acceptance of something as a necessity to accomplish a good then makes that something morally permissible.

I glad you don’t and I didn’t think you would. And, I’m not sure Coder’s rephrasing of that concept makes it any less problematic. If we can do X regardless of what X is so long as it prevents a greater evil . . . well. . . it seems to be exactly what “the end doesn’t justify an evil means” is supposed to guard against. An evil means shouldn’t get a pass because it is the only means.

Pug:

I don’t know, yet, my answers to scenarios 2 and 3.

I could make a prediction about how you’ll answer. I think you are a PDE person and will invalidate 2 and 3.

Pug:

Also, I find a certain repugnance in treating a person as an object and not a subject. It feels like that in 2 and 3. He doesn’t need to be a person; he could be a lump of coal for those to work.

Yes, Exactly.

Pug:

Perhaps PDE would allow you to dump a heap of coal from the bridge with the man merely stuck to the coal as a side effect.

I think your thinking this through. Yes, in that case dumping the coal has two effects – one good (stopping the trolley) and one bad (hurting/killing the man). But you don’t will to hurt or kill the man. Hurting him is neither an end (rule #2) or a means to an end (rule #3). So PDE would allow you to dump coal that has a man on top.

Pug:

But in 2 and 3, he IS the lump of coal, and not merely stuck to it. I think the man is not a means in my coal example. But, without the coal, I’m not sure, yet.

You are right. That is because in your coal example the train stops *in spite of the man getting hit. *The coal stops the train. It is the same in scenario 1, the train misses the 5 in spite of the man getting hit. Him getting hit isn’t what causes the train to miss or stop in either case. In 2 and 3(non-coal), it is precisely him getting hit that stops the train.

VC, who may never set foot on a train track again.

 

[Coder]

An evil means shouldn’t get a pass because it is the only means.

Hi VC, please try to explain how sacrificing one is evil when it is the only possible way to save five.

 

[Pug]

I phrase it as “acceptance of something as a necessity to prevent an otherwise greater evil”.

Coder,

You use the phrasing to emphasize that it is thrust upon you, and not something that you sought out, perhaps? I’m thinking maybe you see it as once someone or nature places you in the situation, you must act to save the five or you will stand condemned. It is just a whiff of something I sense in your tone, perhaps also detectable here:

Hi VC, please try to explain how sacrificing one is evil when it is the only possible way to save five.

Are you talking about duty, perhaps? Is that what I detect? (Of course, I may be crazy. I tend a little toward that…)

 

[Betterave]

Wait, that first part might bear more scrutiny, and might shed light on your second part. There are morally indifferent objects of an act, acts morally indifferent in their kind. But an individual act when performed isn’t indifferent because there it is always done in some circumstance, or with some intent. So when you throw a glass of water out a window, when you actually do it and not just define the human act of “throwing a glass of water out of the window” you can’t have an indifferent act.

That’s why o_mlly’s point works: because our acts as done always have their definition and their concrete circumstances (and presumably an end aimed at). And if by definition an act is indifferent, then the circumstances or the end in view when performing it justifies it (or vilifies it) when done.

Thoughts?
VC

So you think that intention is extrinsic to an act and only arises in relation to performance of an act? We could think of things that way, I guess, but I see no reason to do so. An act is not actually an act, properly speaking, apart from intention and performance, so I don’t think we should use the term ‘act’ such that it could be adequately described apart from these notions. I think to attempt to do so would be an abuse of the term ‘act’, at least in moral discourse. To speak of a morally indifferent act is not to strip the act, by an act of abstraction, of intention and performance, but to indicate that the intention and the performance themselves determine the act to be morally indifferent. Make sense?

 

[Betterave]

To me it makes sense in one way, but not in another. It might make sense as a description of a tortuous few moments of an internal monologue, but it doesn’t hold up as** an analysis of what one can actually intend**.

How do you separate these two?

The problem is you can’t define away the fact that you intend to hit this man by saying you only want to hit an obstruction that happens to be a man. You might as well say you only intend to hit his fatness and not him.

Or, if one still wants to parse the man and his mass, let’s put it this way. The problem is intending to use a man as an obstruction. Or intending to hit an obstruction that happens to be a man.

Saying “it happens to be a man” or “I merely accept it is a man” doesn’t help you out at all, I’m afraid. I can’t shoot a target (to practice marksmanship! to get the blue ribbon at the all-state biathalon! to learn how to defend my family from dingos!) when the target “happens” to be a man. Right?

VC

In the latter case, right - fear of dingos just doesn’t cut it as a proportional reason!

Back to fat man, though, new scenario: suppose there’s only one track, fat man is in front of five, fat man is an obstruction - now you have no choice to switch tracks but you still see that you will hit fat man and doing so will prevent you from hitting the five: do you want to say that you intend to hit fat man? Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think your answer, if you are to be consistent, must be yes. Now the question is, is this an evil intention? Or do you recognize that he is an obstruction, and that is what your (legitimate!) intention is directed toward, not the fact that he is a man?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Hi BetterAve,

I think I said that the object of an act (not an act itself) can be morally indifferent. But because acts themselves, as done, include intention and circumstances then there are no indifferent acts as done.

To speak of a morally indifferent act is not to strip the act, by an act of abstraction, of intention and performance, but to indicate that the intention and the performance themselves determine the act to be morally indifferent. Make sense?

My reasoning is that intent and circumstances can give an act its first moral meaning if the moral object of the act is indifferent. (If the moral object is good or evil, then it has a moral meaning by virtue of its object anyway). But given a moral object that is indifferent, the intention or circumstances will always determine a good or evil act, because intent and circumstances relate the act (in this case) to right reason. If the intent and circumstances don’t conform to right reason the act is a bad one, but if it does it is a morally good one.

Thoughts?
VC

 

[Betterave]

Hi BetterAve,

I think I said that the object of an act (not an act itself) can be morally indifferent. But because acts themselves, as done, include intention and circumstances then there are no indifferent acts as done.

You appeared to gloss ‘object(s) of an act’ as ‘acts morally indifferent in their kind’ - I didn’t (and still don’t) know what the first was supposed to mean so I ignored it.

My reasoning is that intent and circumstances can give an act its first moral meaning if the moral object of the act is indifferent. (If the moral object is good or evil, then it has a moral meaning by virtue of its object anyway). But given a moral object that is indifferent, the intention or circumstances will always determine a good or evil act, because intent and circumstances relate the act (in this case) to right reason. If the intent and circumstances don’t conform to right reason the act is a bad one, but if it does it is a morally good one.

Thoughts?
VC

Here I’ll just point out that ‘morally indifferent’ is already a *moral *meaning. It is one of the evaluations at which a moral analysis of an act can terminate, not a designation that implies no moral evaluation of the act has been applied.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

You appeared to gloss ‘object(s) of an act’ as ‘acts morally indifferent in their kind’ - I didn’t (and still don’t) know what the first was supposed to mean so I ignored it.

The “object of the act” and “kind of act” are used equivalently here. It is what is willed.

Here I’ll just point out that ‘morally indifferent’ is already a *moral *meaning. It is one of the evaluations at which a moral analysis of an act can terminate, not a designation that implies no moral evaluation of the act has been applied.

Morally indifferent doesn’t mean here that an object of an act has an indifferent moral quality. Morally indifferent, as I’ve been using it, means that an act has no moral quality, it is neither good or bad, it neither comports with or departs from the moral norm.

The point is that an act considered abstractly, the object of the act, can be good in itself, bad in itself, or indifferent in itself. If it’s good in itself we have that act’s first moral quality. If it’s bad in itself we have the act’s first moral quality. If it is indifferent in itself we don’t have the act’s moral quality yet. (When we say morally indifferent, we mean considered in the moral order it is indifferent, not that its moral quality is indifferent).

If the object is good then the act’s moral quality (good) can be changed to bad by a bad intent or a bad circumstances. If the object is bad then the act will be bad, period. No good intent or good circumstances can redeem it. If the object is indifferent then the intent or circumstances alone will give the act its moral quality.

VC

 

[Betterave]

The “object of the act” and “kind of act” are used equivalently here. It is what is willed.

So you’re implying that a different analysis applies to an act *as willed *as opposed to an act as performed? I don’t follow. Why would you say this, or what do you actually mean?

Morally indifferent doesn’t mean here that an object of an act has an indifferent moral quality. Morally indifferent, as I’ve been using it, means that an act has no moral quality, it is neither good or bad, it neither comports with or departs from the moral norm.

The point is that an act considered abstractly, the object of the act, can be good in itself, bad in itself, or indifferent in itself. If it’s good in itself we have that act’s first moral quality. If it’s bad in itself we have the act’s first moral quality. If it is indifferent in itself we don’t have the act’s moral quality yet. (When we say morally indifferent, we mean considered in the moral order it is indifferent, not that its moral quality is indifferent [What’s the difference?]).

If the object is good then the act’s moral quality (good) can be changed to bad by a bad intent or a bad circumstances. If the object is bad then the act will be bad, period. No good intent or good circumstances can redeem it. If the object is indifferent then the intent or circumstances alone will give the act its moral quality.

I don’t think any of this makes sense. If the object of an act is what I will in performing that act, then a consideration of the circumstances and intent are already included in that definition. We don’t ‘will something’ without willing it in some particular circumstances and with some intended result (if applicable). If you disagree, please try to give me an example of what you’re talking about.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

So you’re implying that a different analysis applies to an act *as willed *as opposed to an act as performed? I don’t follow. Why would you say this, or what do you actually mean?

No. What is willed is the object, why its willed is the intent (or end), how, where, when, who etc. and all the other things surrounding the act are the circumstances.

The point is that an act as done can’t be morally indifferent. “As done” doesn’t mean actually performed, it means an act in the concrete, done in some circumstance and done with some intent as opposed to an act in the abstract like “drinking water”, which is the moral object of the act – the what.

On a side note, you are familiar with 1750 - 1754 of the Catechism, I believe?

VC

 

[Betterave]

No. What is willed is the object, why its willed is the intent (or end), how, where, when, who etc. and all the other things surrounding the act are the circumstances.

CCC 1751: “The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the **matter **of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.”

The “matter of an act” is not a “kind of act”; it is one of the *partial *constitutive elements of an act. …Right??

The point is that an act as done can’t be morally indifferent. “As done” doesn’t mean actually performed, it means an act in the concrete, done in some circumstance and done with some intent as opposed to an act in the abstract like “drinking water”, which is the moral object of the act – the what.

On a side note, you are familiar with 1750 - 1754 of the Catechism, I believe?

But one *can *drink water as a concrete act without it having any moral value or disvalue, because such concrete actions are generally *not *“chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience.” Concrete acts *can *be morally indifferent.

CCC 1749: “Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.”

 

[Betterave]

CCC 1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

I take it that a corollary of the above is that a morally evaluable act requires the evaluation of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together. That is, a moral act is constituted as such only by the concurrence of object, end, and circumstances.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Betterave,

Before we continue, do you mind if I ask if you are just working these things out on your own or if you are coming from some sort of tradition?

Thanks,
VC