B
Betterave
Guest
I’m not sure what you’re getting at. Why do you ask and how would you answer your own question? (I’m not deeply versed in DPE literature, if that’s what you’re asking.)
- Status
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Betterave,
I wasn’t referring to PDE, actually. I was just wondering if you’ve done much work with this section of the Catechism, or with the determinants (fonts) of morality, or with the notion of “indifferent acts” in Catholic theology.
The reason I ask is because if you have familiarity with it then I would frame my posts one way, and if not, another. Likewise, you might be very familiar with it and are operating from a certain tradition, e.g. Thomistic.
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
Hmmm… I’ve read some Thomas, more Aristotle, but I’m not really coming at this from the perspective of a particular school, not intentionally anyway.
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Hi Betterave,
Ok, so its not like you learned/were taught/formulated a position that there are no indifferent acts, or that the moral object is or isn’t x, or etc. etc? I guess what I am asking is: are you just working through these concepts now? (Determinants of morality, for instance).
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
Well, no; I have read the Catechism and I have done a certain amount of reading in moral philosophy, ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary. Of course, I’m always working through things, that’s what philosophy is! Not for the first time though - I have read through the whole CCC (years ago). I don’t see how this is relevant to actually having the dialogue about moral philosophy though: what difference if I was working through the Catechism for the first time, for example, never having read anything else? I think you could study the CCC for a long time and still not understand many parts of it very well, right?
Are you coming at this from a particular perspective that perhaps I should know about?
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Not exactly. “Matter of an act”, moral object, object of the act, essence of the act, species of the act are all equivocal terms for the same thing. So is “kind of act” as I have been using it, and as St. Thomas uses it I think, and – I believe – often used in magisterial documents.
To put it more clearly, there can many particular acts (acts “as done”) that are of the same kind. Adultery is a kind of act. The particulars add the actor’s motive and the circumstances of the act.
But, I think o_mlly, and myself, were talking about “human acts”. If you mean an “act of man” then yes, you can do it unconsciously, just like breathing or scratching your nose. But if you are talking about a “human act” then one can say that when that kind of human act “drinking water” is done, it will be done with some motive and in some circumstance and with some consequence, those accidents will give it its first moral quality because “drinking water” as a kind of act is morally indifferent in itself. There is more that could be said here, and we’ve touched on a controversy, but for the purposes of what I was discussing I don’t believe it is necessary. This is because we have been bantering about point o_mlly brought up, which was that “the ends justify the means” can be true when the moral object of an act is indifferent. Most everyone agrees that the moral object of an act can be indifferent, and that an act as done can give it its first moral quality. In those cases, then, the end could indeed make the act a good act when it was nothing before, i.e. justify it.
The corollary doesn’t quite work. Because there are acts that are evil in themselves, in their object, and the end and circumstances can’t redeem them. So, an act can have a moral quality (bad) without asking about the end or circumstances.
Yes, you are right, there is always more to learn. I just asked because I was wondering if you were trying to lead me somewhere.Not for the first time though - I have read through the whole CCC (years ago). I don’t see how this is relevant to actually having the dialogue about moral philosophy though: what difference if I was working through the Catechism for the first time, for example, never having read anything else? I think you could study the CCC for a long time and still not understand many parts of it very well, right?
Are you coming at this from a particular perspective that perhaps I should know about?
To answer your question about my perspective I suppose I am of the Thomistic tradition;and drawing on* Veritatis splendor, *the Catechism, magisterial language, etc.
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
First let me say I’m pretty sure I haven’t been trying to lead you anywhere. I’ve been interested in your comments and genuinely sympathetic to your position.
CCC 1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
As for morally neutral kinds of acts, we can of course consider any particular act (corresponding to a particular definition) as an objective kind of act, right? Or do you think that the distinctions between object, intention, and circumstances are real distinctions, rather than conceptual? (I’m not sure about this. If you think the distinction is real, please tell me how you can respond to my first question here.)
I think you’re right. There are many particular acts which fall under the single concept ‘adultery.’ But I don’t think we have any reason to deny that each one of those acts includes motive and circumstances…
CCC 1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
Hmm… maybe we’re partly just tripping up on using terms differently. I’m fine with “kinds of acts” or “kinds of human acts,” but when you and o_mlly talk about “acts” or “human acts,” I think it confuses the issue if you really mean “kinds of acts” or “the object of the act” rather than particular acts. In Thomistic language, a kind of act is a res rationis, a conceptual thing, whereas an act is a res naturae, a real thing. Agree?
As for morally neutral kinds of acts, we can of course consider any particular act (corresponding to a particular definition) as an objective kind of act, right? Or do you think that the distinctions between object, intention, and circumstances are real distinctions, rather than conceptual? (I’m not sure about this. If you think the distinction is real, please tell me how you can respond to my first question here.)
Again, I think you should say “kind of act” above, not “act.” Murder is a bad kind of act, but in the circumstances where there is no intent to kill (say, while sleepwalking), we can still talk about “objective murder,” but the real (subjective) act is not really a case of murder. You can say that in this case we are not talking about a human act, but isn’t that just to say that it doesn’t involve adequate reflection for it to be morally evil? On the other hand, I can certainly consciously choose something (e.g., fish or beef?) which upon reflection I evaluate to be a morally indifferent choice, i.e., a choice between morally indifferent options. If you think not, why not?
O
o_mlly
Guest
Been off-line for awhile. The anwer is no. The soldier may morally throw another on the grenade. That DE would follow the classic “push the (fat man) off the lifeboat built for two” case.
C
Coder
Guest
See, what I don’t understand is how the loop and non-loop cases are different. Why would whether he was used as the “means” matter when the end results are exactly the same? This is why I question whether this concept of “means” is really valid in this context.
Is there an official right answer for this?
Is there an official right answer for this?
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Why would anyone deny that each act as done, each particular act, includes motive and circumstances? I certainly don’t. Did you somehow get that impression?
I’m not sure the purpose of citing this portion of the Catechism. I don’t understand what you contention is. As far as I know I haven’t presented anything controversial regarding the determinants of morality of an act. Nor, as far as I know, have I used controversial or inaccurate terminology. Is there a problem that I’m not seeing?
That isn’t how it seemed earlier. It seemed like you had an issue with “a kind of acts” in this post, and here, and here. Perhaps I misunderstood.
"BetterAve:
Betterave, perhaps it would be opportune to review the thread to see the progression of the conversation? o _mlly said:
After you raised an objection to this, he restated with a clarification:
And I pointed out that the following:
Verbum Caro:
So when you say to me
I scratch my head a bit. I was the one who pointed out that o_mlly’s take only worked if it was the object of the act and not particular acts as done. And, throughout this whole discussion I thought I have distinguished (several times?) between the object of the act and particular acts as done.
Do you have a different take on it?
Perhaps you can restate this paragraph? I want to make sure I understand what you are saying.
It would have been more accurate for me to have appended “kind of” to the first “acts”, but I think the meaning is clear because I say in their object. But, what is important was that an act (as done) can have a moral quality without asking about the end or circumstances. That was the point of the next sentence, and I used the word “act” here. “So, an act can have a moral quality (bad) without asking about the end or circumstances.”
But then it wouldn’t be murder. There really isn’t such a thing as objective murder in the sense you mean it. The object of the act wouldn’t be murder without the intent to kill.
There’s no reflection at all, not just inadequate. I think it is a bad example in relation to what you are trying to ask. Perhaps a better example would be a man who throws a javelin in the Olympics and kills the field referee?
VC
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
I said in a prior post that there is a controversy regarding whether or not an act as done could be indifferent. But that isn’t important here, because we were talking about a morally indifferent kind of an act (the object of the act as done) which was made good (justified) by the motive (end), not a morally indifferent kind of act which ended up being indifferent as done. O_mlly was speaking about an act in its kind (the object of an act) which is morally indifferent becoming morally good (justified) because of its good motive (end).
May I suggest you start a new thread if you wish to discuss whether or not acts as done can truly be considered morally indifferent? It would probably be seen by a greater number of people and you might get some excellent contributions.
Onwards!
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
I’ll quote the catechism again:
CCC 1751 “The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.”
Note that the object chosen already includes a consideration of motive (deliberate direction of the will towards a good) and circumstances (the particular recognition and judgment of reason). That’s why I don’t think that it makes sense to talk about morally evaluating an act separately from morally evaluating an act as done. I get the impression that you want to treat a moral description as a natural kind which retains its original nature even when that description changes. I want to insist that what we evaluate in the end is always a unitary phenomenon. The distinction among its elements seem to me to just be heuristics for helping us to understand different considerations that can complicate the analysis of particular cases.
I’m not sure. Do you see what I’m trying to say above?
So let’s take one of your passages and I’ll tell you what I see wrong with it:
"The point is that an act considered abstractly, i.e., as a kind of act, the object of the act, can be good in itself, bad in itself, or indifferent in itself. If it’s good in itself we have that **kind of **act’s -]first/-] prima facie moral quality. If it’s bad in itself we have -]the/-] **that kind of **act’s -]first/-] **prima facie **moral quality. If it is indifferent in itself we -]don’t/-] again have the kind of act’s prima facie moral quality -]yet/-]. [Perhaps the last point deserves more consideration as you say, I just don’t see right now why this would be the case.]
If the object is good then the actual act’s moral quality (good) can **still **be -]changed/-] -]to/-] bad -]by/-] insofar as it is accompanied by a bad intent -]or a bad circumstances/-]. If the object is bad then the act will be bad, -]period/-] although this merely objective badness can be diminished or even neutralized according to circumstances. No good intent or good circumstances can redeem it so as to make it objectively good. If the object is indifferent then the particular intent or circumstances -]alone/-] will still -]give the act its moral quality/-] be operative in determining the moral quality of the act, as in every case of moral evaluation, good, bad, or indifferent."
B
Betterave
Guest
I hope I’ve been clear enough in my explanations above. I’ll explain again in different words: The ‘object’ of an act always already includes intention and circumstances of a standard kind. A further consideration of intention and circumstances is required only insofar as the prima facie intention and circumstances attached to the object of the act are not satisfied. This further consideration does not serve to differentiate acts as performed from acts as objects, but to distinguish different kinds of acts (sub-species of the species specified by the ‘object’ of the act). Make sense?
As for morally neutral kinds of acts, we can of course consider any particular act (corresponding to a particular definition) as an ‘objective’ kind of act, right? ‘Objective’ just means that we take it as an object for our consideration and a sufficient condition for doing so is that we are able to distinctly conceptualize it. Or do you think that the distinctions between object, intention, and circumstances are real distinctions, rather than conceptual? That is, do you think, for example, that ‘murder’ is necessarily an ‘objective’ moral category, while ‘murder under the influence of alcohol’ is necessarily an ‘objective’ moral category plus a modification by a circumstance? (That would seem highly implausible to me.)
I assume you will see my objection to this at this point?
Exactly! This is a case where an objectively bad act has its moral badness diminished to zero. So we conclude, at the end of our moral evaluation, that the act does not even count as murder.
I would prefer to allow the possibility that a sleep-walker might have some kind of reflective contribution to his acts, but in any case, I think you see my point. There are a spectrum of cases, of which this is one extreme. (The javelin thrower case would just seem to be an accident, not really the kind of case I was after insofar as it doesn’t obviously deal with intention.)
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Hi Betterave,
Let’s take it a step at a time?
VC
Let’s take it a step at a time?
Can you explain what you think this means in regard to an evil moral object?
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
Sure. Take the example of adultery: the will aims at what it apprehends, in this case conjugal goods (love, intimacy, companionship, affirmation, pleasure), although it aims at these outside of a legitimate conjugal context.
Just a reminder of a relevant part of St. Thomas’ view on the will, ST Ia IIae a.1 r.:
"But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that “the end is a good, or an apparent good.”
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Right. The will chooses a true or apparent good.
So, can you explain why you want to say that:
a) that object of an act “already includes a consideration of motive” because of the above
and
b) why it is relevant to a discussion about morality if everyone chooses a true or apparent good.
VC
So, can you explain why you want to say that:
a) that object of an act “already includes a consideration of motive” because of the above
and
b) why it is relevant to a discussion about morality if everyone chooses a true or apparent good.
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
a) ‘Motive’ just means ‘that which moves.’ That which moves the will (i.e., the intellective/rational appetite) is the good it apprehends as its end. It follows from the definition of the ‘object’ of an act that ‘object’ includes motive:
CCC 1751 “The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself.”
b) Can you clarify? I’m not sure what you’re asking here.
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Yes, that’s right. But first I wrote: “why would anyone deny that each act as done, each particular act, includes motive and circumstances”.
You answered:
It seems to me that you are you are equivocating “motive” to mean both that which moves the will in itself and the end or purpose that the actor has in mind. Motive has been used hitherto to mean “end” in the sense of the finis operatis, not the finis operis, right? And it seems that you are equivocating motive here because you say “the object chosen already includes a consideration of motive and circumstance”. Circumstance as a determinant of morality, by which we analyze an act, means that which is not the object. And “motive and circumstance” when used together (because they are being referred to as 2 of the three fonts of morality) are not contained in the object. Yes, the reason an actor chooses this moral object as opposed to this moral object means that the moral object has a relation to the end and circumstances. That is why a man steals a horse and doesn’t slander a horse when he wants to ride off into the sunset. But when you consider the moral object in itself as a kind of act it doesn’t matter why it is this moral object and not that. The kind of act, in itself, is either good, bad or neutral.
If you’d like we can start over and go again from were you take issue with o_mlly’s clarified statement that it is not true to say that the end never justifies the means.
Sure. Not to put too fine a point on it, but to use your own phrase: it is trivial to our discussion. Everyone chooses a true or apparent good. It is universal. So, every act of the will chooses a good. To say that the object of an act is always a true or apparent good has no bearing on o_mlly’s statment that the end doesn’t justify a means – meaning an act – the moral object of which is indifferent. Does it?
Let me again lay out the progress of this conversation:
Verbum Caro:
I said that adultery is a kind of act, a moral object. I say that particular acts, acts as done, add the actor’s motive and circumstances. (not the “motive” that is contained in every movement of the will by every actor everywhere).
You then say that there are “many particular acts which fall under the single concept of adultery.” Fine. Then you say that we don’t have a reason to deny that each of those acts include motives and circumstances. Of course not. Why deny it? That is what I said above, each particular act adds the motive and circumstances to the moral object (adultery).
Then you quote the catechism and say, not so, motive and circumstances are included in the moral object. That just isn’t true. The moral object “adultery” doesn’t include “while away fighting in the crusades”. Or “because my wife is cold to me”. Or “because I want to get back at my husband for selling the condo”.
Your quote from St. Thomas (by the way, I don’t think you complete the citation – it’s question 8.) just doesn’t do anything for us. The fact that every thing is good because it is a thing – goodness as a transcendental property of being – and because the will chooses a thing that has being it must choose a good – just doesn’t do much for our conversation it seems to me. “. . . everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good.” (same article).
Maybe you want to talk about the" circumstances" that are principal conditions of the moral object of the act? But we have been discussing (n.b. O_mlly’s observation about ends justifying means) the determinants of morality and motive and circumstances are not part of the object for the purposes of our discussion. Perhaps you should start another thread?
I appreciate the thought-provoking discussion,
VC
B
Betterave
Guest
V
Verbum_Caro
Guest
Rephrase: the object of an act is related to the end of the agent and the circumstances surrounding the act. But the end of the agent and the circumstances are not part of the object of the act, unless you are talking about principal conditions. Which we aren’t.
Betterave said:
It doesn’t apply in regard to what we are discussing, does it?
But the moral object “adultery” adequately describes in each and every particular act of adultery the object willed – that is why we can say of this or that particular act that this is adultery. It doesn’t matter what apparent good the will chooses when we are talking about the object for purposes of discussing o_mlly’s assertion.
Right. It isn’t just a physical event. It isn’t the object of the act – considered merely in the physical order – but the moral object of the act. It is considered in the moral order. That is why we say “adultery” and not just “sex” if we are talking about the moral object.
So, what is it you deny again?
But it isn’t relevant to this discussion. Are you talking about principal conditions?
Yes I dispute this. Because the moral object of the act describes what is done as classified in the moral order. For the man who commits adultery while away fighting at the crusades and a woman who commits adultery in Omaha at peace rally the moral object of both of their acts is:
adultery
full stop.
Am I in error?
VC
P.S. I really recommend we start over from the point of departure: O_mlly’s observation about ends and means. I’m starting to feel a sympathy with Hamlet when asked by Polonius what he was reading.
- Status