Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Betterave]

Okay, I’ll try to start fresh:

o’mlly:
“Most human acts are morally indifferent and are justified or not based on their intended effects – the ends do justify the means.”

VC:
“I think you’ll forgive BetterAve for taking you to task over your phrasing because I don’t think you were as clear the first time around that you were talking about morally indifferent objects of an act, i.e. acts which therefore have to take their moral quality from the intention.”

Now what is an end and what is a means? An end can be either a proximate end or a remote end (although these are not at all rigid categories). An end can be posited objectively or subjectively (not mutually exclusive), abstractly (universally) or concretely (with reference to a particular act), but it is always something that appears sub specie bonitatis.

A means, on the other hand, is not an action that may or may not be related to an end. A means is a means only insofar as it serves to achieve an end. Strictly speaking, a means is desired as good only insofar as it is referred to its end.

What does “the ends never justify the means” mean? It just means that certain means to an end are fully specified moral acts in themselves that must be evaluated as morally impermissible. The ‘negation’ of this claim that you are promoting is (correct me if I’m wrong): “the ends do justify the means (at least, sometimes - i.e., with the caveat that the ends never justify evil means… which happens to be just what the original dictum - “the ends never justify the means” - meant in the first place!).”

So far, so good? I hope! (fingers crossed)

So we have the claim: “(good) ends do justify (morally-indifferent) means” - and this means (a solecism, wouldn’t you say?): “a good end makes a morally-indifferent means to be morally permissible.” …Doesn’t it? Doesn’t it?! Or am I missing something?

 

[Pug]

VC, I’ve been putting off answering, because something about this topic makes me chicken. I’ve gotten lots of stuff done for work in the meantime, though. So, there was an up-side.

I don’t know if every fiendish scenario is in that article. . . there is one really fiendish one that causes a real problem for PDE. But, I wouldn’t want to share it on this thread for fear of any evil effects it might cause.

LOL. I would like to know it, though. If it is too scandalous, you can send it in a PM. I promise not to fall away. (Yes, no one knows what tomorrow may bring…)

You are right. That is because in your coal example the train stops *in spite of the man getting hit. *The coal stops the train. It is the same in scenario 1, the train misses the 5 in spite of the man getting hit. Him getting hit isn’t what causes the train to miss or stop in either case. In 2 and 3(non-coal), it is precisely him getting hit that stops the train.

But, is getting hit the evil effect? Are we sure?

To apply DE, it must be the case that the action is not intrinsically evil, or DE is out of the running, anyway. I find DE annoying, because it can be difficult to locate where to place the action. In our examples, it appears to be flipping a switch, which is indifferent. But in the throwing someone on a bomb examples, it appears to be placing a person on a bomb until it goes off. In train #2 and #3, what I am wondering is if the act could be to place a person in the path of a train until they collide, really, and not the throwing of a switch. If the putting a person on a live bomb passes as an indifferent action, then I think the putting a person in the path of a train probably passes, too.

Once we place the action, then we place the evil effect. So, the evil effect in the case of the live bomb is death or dismemberment of the person, I assume? Let us surmise, for the moment, that it is the same evil effect in the case of the train. In both cases, that evil effect is not required, but only tolerated. The death of the person does not stop the train. If the person were superman, the train would indeed stop, but he would not die. Death is not the true means of stopping the train. It is either derailment or absorption of energy. Note, this relies upon seeing death/dismemberment/harm as the evil effect. Then it is not a means.

Also, I note you didn’t comment about if it would be okay for the fat man to place himself in the path of the train, say in the case of the five were his children. Is it okay or not for a fat (extremely large) father to do this? That, to me, seems equivalent to the man throwing himself on a bomb scenario, which you do accept, I think.

Do you see how if the evil effect is not the placing of the man in the path of the train until struck, then the evil effect is not the means, so then rule number 3 of PDE is not being violated?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

So we have the claim: “(good) ends do justify (morally-indifferent) means” - and this means (a solecism, wouldn’t you say?): “a good end makes a morally-indifferent means to be morally permissible.” …Doesn’t it? Doesn’t it?! Or am I missing something?

Sounds about right! That’s what I was thinking. (Though maybe change it to “a good end could make. . .”)

Except for one thing (oh no!). . .

I don’t want to promote it. If anything, it should remain in the mail-room, yah?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

…In our examples, it appears to be flipping a switch, which is indifferent. But in the throwing someone on a bomb examples, it appears to be placing a person on a bomb until it goes off. …

The latter action is merely “shoving a person” and is morally indifferent in itself. One may shove a person to avoid an oncoming car or shove a person off a cliff. Thererfore, one must look to circumstances and intention to determine the morality of the act. Do the circumstances and the intended ends justify the means?

Properly applied, the DE prinicples and ALL other valid forms of moral analysis must come to the same conclusion as to the morality of the act after examining the circumstances and intention.

Perhaps the emotions are rattled that the soldier shoves another instead of jumping on the grenade himself. If the soldier has a 22" waist and chest to match, perhaps that fact would mitigate our indignation at imagining a person sacrificing one’s neighbor to save himself several others from death.

But, I think, it is irrelevant if the soldier who shoves possess himself a body capable of absorbing the blast. All human life is sacred because all human life belongs to God. While the soldier who shoves may not have acted heroically, he has acted morally as long as his intention was to save himself and the others and not to kill the soldier he shoved.

Nor is he necessarily a coward, lacking the human virtue of courage, as long as he has some prudential reason for preserving his life. Maximillian Marian Kolbe had a prudential reason for his self-sacrifice; others may have valid reasons to not self-sacrifice (as apparently did the man whose life Kolbe saved.)

 

[Betterave]

“(good) ends do justify (morally-indifferent) means” - and this means (a solecism, wouldn’t you say?): “a good end makes a morally-indifferent means to be morally permissible.”

So close…! My point here is that a *morally indifferent act (means) *does not need to be made *morally permissible *- it already is, by definition, qua morally indifferent act!

o_mlly wrote:

The latter action is merely “shoving a person” and is morally indifferent in itself. One may shove a person to avoid an oncoming car or shove a person off a cliff. Thererfore, one must look to circumstances and intention to determine the morality of the act. Do the circumstances and the intended ends justify the means?

Now I expect you’ll have objections to this, right? The problem is that there is a basic difficulty in establishing what belongs to the object and what belongs to the circumstances/intention. Now obviously o_mlly’s contention that the act constituting the means can be adequately described as “shoving a person” is contestable. So we have to clearly address why this is: why can’t we just insist that the object of an act is x, and that anything outside of the description given by x may/must be regarded as a ‘subjective’ or ‘circumstantial’ contribution to the finis operantis?

 

[Betterave]

p.s.: VC, can you explain what you mean by “principal conditions”? I’m not familiar with that concept.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

So close…! My point here is that a *morally indifferent act (means) *does not need to be made *morally permissible *- it already is, by definition, qua morally indifferent act!

Betterave,

I just want to respond to this part quickly, and I’ll look at the next part when I can (if it is still relevant for us).

It dawns on me now that what I had been doing was taking “means” to denote the object of an act, and you were taking “means” to be the act as done. Is that right?

I can see how “means” could more aptly denote the act as done, and not it’s object.

Maybe I took o_mlly’s assertion the wrong way by thinking “means” meant the object of an act? Maybe I approached it this was because I subscribe to the Thomist position that individual acts in the moral order aren’t generally* indifferent because the intention of the actor** gets factored in. What do you think?

VC

*I’m vaguely aware of some sort of “indifferent act” in the moral order from a Thomist perspective, but I’m not sure if it is applicable here.

**I mean the “intention” to an end – something that the individual actor brings to the table, something we talk about when talking about a concrete act, something “added”, if you will to the abstract “object of the act”.

 

[Pug]

The latter action is merely “shoving a person” and is morally indifferent in itself. One may shove a person to avoid an oncoming car or shove a person off a cliff. Thererfore, one must look to circumstances and intention to determine the morality of the act. Do the circumstances and the intended ends justify the means?

Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay, like to worm across a crowded subway platform, or to push their wheelchair. I’m not sure, exactly, what “morally indifferent” means, and what level of specification is required for it. I worry that if we strip enough specification from some things, they might somehow come out smelling like roses, even though they don’t. Does morally indifferent just mean that it can be done in some cases but not in others? (That’s the one I’ve been using on the fly for it.) Or, does morally indifferent mean things that only have a chance to be evil if you specify or add a bunch of stuff to the scenario that normally doesn’t come with it? Shoving a person against their reasonable will would normally be out of line, so it is not of the latter type, at the very least.

You are using the phrase do (the circumstances and) the ends justify the means differently than I might. For me, that is strictly a question of do whatever ends somehow manage to justify intrinsically evil means, and the answer is always no. The means cannot be justified if they are evil. Rather, the effects must be considered under sound moral principles, after we have determined that the means are not evil. But, I agree with you that shoving a person is something that can be done in the right circumstances, so I think I agree to what you are saying, just I would not choose the same words as you.

Properly applied, the DE prinicples and ALL other valid forms of moral analysis must come to the same conclusion as to the morality of the act after examining the circumstances and intention.

I think you are saying that even if a specific man thinks something passes PDE, but he thinks it does *not *pass the Golden Rule, then he cannot do it still. It must pass all the rules that he thinks are true and that he thinks apply.

Perhaps the emotions are rattled that the soldier shoves another instead of jumping on the grenade himself. If the soldier has a 22" waist and chest to match, perhaps that fact would mitigate our indignation at imagining a person sacrificing one’s neighbor to save himself several others from death.

Yes, it does upset something within myself. I can’t tell if it is an emotion or a moral sense. It doesn’t help to consider that the person doing the pushing cannot do it themselves, though. Perhaps I feel that certain types of heroism are not obligatory, and so must be voluntary, I don’t know. But as a Christian, I think that changes a little, and heroism is part of our vocation. At least self-sacrifice and putting others before ourselves.

Nor is he necessarily a coward, lacking the human virtue of courage, as long as he has some prudential reason for preserving his life. Maximillian Marian Kolbe had a prudential reason for his self-sacrifice; others may have valid reasons to not self-sacrifice (as apparently did the man whose life Kolbe saved.)

I believe the man had family, and hence a duty to his children to be there for them, if I recall.

 

[Pug]

See, what I don’t understand is how the loop and non-loop cases are different. Why would whether he was used as the “means” matter when the end results are exactly the same? This is why I question whether this concept of “means” is really valid in this context.

Is there an official right answer for this?

Coder,

I’m assuming you mean a Catholic answer? I don’t know of an official magisterial answer to this thought experiment, no. I haven’t read enough about the problem to know for sure, though. It is unlikely from my previous experience that there is one. The trolley problem and it’s variants are about 30 years old and less.

However, as a consolation, I offer a trolley problem cartoon. I had to maximize my screen to get the cartoon to display wide enough.

 

[o_mlly]

Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay, …

What about the will of the unborn child? Leaving this invented dilemma for a moment, consider the will of the baby who in Catholic teaching may be allowed to die. If we presume life, must we also not presume the will to remain alive?

Ectopic Pregnancy
Anthony R. Pivarunas examines the difficult problem of ectopic pregnancy in
“Ethical and Medical Considerations in the Treatment of Ectopic Pregnancy,” The
Linacre Quarterly 70.3 (August 2003). With the use of such devices as transvaginal
ultrasound, it is often possible to determine whether an embryo that has implanted
outside the uterus is alive or dead. If the status of the embyo cannot be determined,
the author states, there must be a presumption in favor of life. “If embryonic life is
present, total salpingectomy or partial salpingectomy with tubal re-anamastomosis
are the only licit options available.” This results in the death of the embryo, but the
action is justifiable under the principle of double effect. This approach runs contrary
to the present standard in medicine, which favors salpingostomy. (Salpingectomy
removes a section of the fallopian tube; salpingostomy slits the tube and removes the
embryo.) The author critiques the arguments of The National Catholic Bioethics
Center president emeritus Albert Moraczewski, O.P., who justifes the use of both
salpingostomy and methotrexate. Pivarunas concludes with the hope that a procedure
for transferring an ectopic pregnancy to the uterus may one day be developed
and become the standard of care.
ncbcenter.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,9,9;journal,24,36;linkingpublicationresults,1:119988,1

 

[Verbum_Caro]

o_mlly,

I know you were using that abstract in responding to the question of “reasonable will”, but did you note the controversy contained within it?

We ought to take a look at the full article, but my first impression is that the author is arguing that a salpingectomy, which removes a section of the fallopian tube could be permissible under double effect but that a salpingostomy which slits the tube and removes the embryo would not be permissible under double effect.

How would you explain the difference in the two?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly,

I know you were using that abstract in responding to the question of “reasonable will”, but did you note the controversy contained within it?

I quoted from the complete article but I see NCB requires registration (free) to access complete articles. The link sends one to a “log-in/registration” page.

We ought to take a look at the full article, but my first impression is that the author is arguing that a salpingectomy, which removes a section of the fallopian tube could be permissible under double effect but that a salpingostomy which slits the tube and removes the embryo would not be permissible under double effect.

How would you explain the difference in the two?

VC

I’ll defer to Father Tad Pacholczyk, Ph.D.
Another morally problematic technique involves cutting along the length of the fallopian tube where the child is embedded and “scooping out” the living body of the child, who dies shortly thereafter. The tube can then be sutured back up. This approach [salpingostomy], like the use of methotrexate, leaves the fallopian tube largely intact for possible future pregnancies, but also raises obvious moral objections because it likewise directly causes the death of the child. … (emphasis mine)

In this situation [salpingectomy], the intention of the surgeon is directed towards the good effect (removing the damaged tissue to save the mother’s life) while only tolerating the bad effect (death of the ectopic child). Importantly, the surgeon is choosing to act on the tube (a part of the mother’s body) rather than directly on the child. Additionally, the child’s death is not the means via which the cure occurs. … (empahsis mine)
ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=940

 

[Verbum_Caro]

o_mlly,

What are your thoughts about direct and indirect action?

When does someone act directly on a child (or, I suppose, any human being) as opposed to indirectly?

Would this impact your analysis of the grenade scenario? Does a soldier act directly or indirectly on another when he pushes him on the grenade?

What if the doctor used some other device (more analogous to a grenade) to get rid of the baby?

VC

 

[Pug]

We ought to take a look at the full article,

I can’t get to the full article. This is an abstract of some sort that was published in another journal, which I can access. The full article itself appears to be in the Linacre Quarterly, not NCBQ.

 

[Doc_Keele]

I quoted from the complete article but I see NCB requires registration (free) to access complete articles. The link sends one to a “log-in/registration” page.

I’ll defer to Father Tad Pacholczyk, Ph.D.
Another morally problematic technique involves cutting along the length of the fallopian tube where the child is embedded and “scooping out” the living body of the child, who dies shortly thereafter. The tube can then be sutured back up. This approach [salpingostomy], like the use of methotrexate, leaves the fallopian tube largely intact for possible future pregnancies, but also raises obvious moral objections because it likewise directly causes the death of the child. … (emphasis mine)

In this situation [salpingectomy], the intention of the surgeon is directed towards the good effect (removing the damaged tissue to save the mother’s life) while only tolerating the bad effect (death of the ectopic child). Importantly, the surgeon is choosing to act on the tube (a part of the mother’s body) rather than directly on the child. Additionally, the child’s death is not the means via which the cure occurs. … (empahsis mine)
ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=940

This notion of the “diseased tube” comes from Bouscaren in the 1940s - medical science has moved on and this is now a bogus justification. There’s a far better paper to read on the subject which I am critiquing currently titled “Moral Absolutism and Ectopic Pregnancy” by Christopher Kaczor in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.

 

[Thing]

Coder,

I’m assuming you mean a Catholic answer? I don’t know of an official magisterial answer to this thought experiment, no. I haven’t read enough about the problem to know for sure, though. It is unlikely from my previous experience that there is one. The trolley problem and it’s variants are about 30 years old and less.

However, as a consolation, I offer a trolley problem cartoon. I had to maximize my screen to get the cartoon to display wide enough.

If the loop varient experiment was introduced *deliberately *to give a ‘push the soldier on the grenade’ response, then its solution would be as in the grenade and soldier one. If however it was an ‘innocent’ variation afterthought and the experiment proposer did not have *that *intention then the switch operator might possibly morally make a snap decision to avoid the five though he unfortunately hits the one. …

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly,

What are your thoughts about direct and indirect action?

When does someone act directly on a child (or, I suppose, any human being) as opposed to indirectly?

Would this impact your analysis of the grenade scenario? Does a soldier act directly or indirectly on another when he pushes him on the grenade?

What if the doctor used some other device (more analogous to a grenade) to get rid of the baby?

VC

Is this the final exam? Lotta questions; let me answer what I think is the crux.

Salpingostomy analogy: Not knowing the detonation time and knowing a live soldier may roll over or run for cover, I plunge my knife into his vitals several times before I drop his dead body onto the grenade.

Salpingectomy analogy: I shove the live soldier onto the grenade and pray.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Is this the final exam?

No, not your final exam yet! I hope that is a few years off!

I was just asking for your thoughts on it.

VC

 

[Pug]

If the loop varient experiment was introduced *deliberately *to give a ‘push the soldier on the grenade’ response, then its solution would be as in the grenade and soldier one. If however it was an ‘innocent’ variation afterthought and the experiment proposer did not have *that *intention then the switch operator might possibly morally make a snap decision to avoid the five though he unfortunately hits the one. …

I think it highly likely that a person in the actual scenario would make a “snap” decision. Their gut would go “YIKES FIVE PEOPLE…I must help them, how can I not?”, and a likely response to that overwhelming situation would be to throw the switch quickly just so the train is not “aimed” directly at them, or to buy more time. I think it would be less likely for someone to go, “Yikes five people…I must push this man off a bridge to block the train.” Flipping a switch could easily cause less hesitation than pushing a person when pressed for time because we are socially trained not to push a person off a bridge, but we flip switches all the time.

I’m certainly not going to hold someone responsible for a decision made under that pressure and time constraint. Unless they say to themselves, “Oh look, fat people, my one chance to earn 50 points and no one can blame me,” I’m sure they did their best.

If this topic interests you, about how we respond and through what psychological/moral mechanism, there has been research done concerning different areas of the brain associated with different moral choices, or something similar.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I’m certainly not going to hold someone responsible for a decision made under that pressure and time constraint.

Hmmm. Pug, I’m not sure, but I might hold someone responsible for throwing a guy off a bridge in front of a train, even if he had a good reason to stop the train. I’m not certain what would happen in legal venue, either, would there be civil or criminal penalties?

By the way – for those who think it is permissible under double effect reasoning to throw a fat man off a bridge, or to switch a track to a fatman who will stop the train (not just switch a track to miss 5) – I have a question:

I assume that the 5 people versus 1 fatman survives the proportionality analysis. But, what happens when it is closer, say 2 people to 1 fatman?

Better yet, what if it is 1 person and 1 fatman? That seems proportional in a strict sense. Assuming you have no greater duty to either, could you flip the switch? Could you throw the fat man off the bridge?

If not why not?

If yes – do you think society would hold someone responsible for that? Would you hold someone responsible for that if you were friends with the person who ended up getting hit? I ask, because, personally if it was one person to one person in the first scenario I wouldn’t blame the operator who flipped the switch away from a stranger and hit a friend. But in the second scenario I would blame the operator who decided to flip the switch to “stop the train” by hitting my friend.

Pug, I don’t know where you stand regarding scenario 2 and 3, but what do you think of the above (even if you think scenario 2 and 3 aren’t permissible)?

VC