Double Effect: Trolley problem and loop varient

[Pug]

Pug originally stated, “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay …”
As Pug refers to a “reasonable” rather than “actual” will, my questions are aimed at deternining what a “reasonable will” ought to be.

What do you think the reasonable will of the five on the track and the survivors of the platoon ought to be?

Partly I had in mind that I may not shove someone if they ask to be shoved for a bad reason. If, say, they are a paraplegic and ask to be taken into a plane and shoved out of it without a shoot, well, it is not okay for me to shove them in accordance with their will. Their will is not reasonable. I have another duty to this soul, and that is to help them.

Also, Doc Keele is right that I partly wish for something objective, if remotely possible. That is why I gave the crowded subway platform example. I don’t know if any particular individual on the platform is adverse to being shoved a little, but the man on the street agrees to a little shoving/contact so that one can move from one side of it to the other. Else we’d all stand there immobile for hours, and still, we’d be touching the whole time.

And, you too are right. We sometimes don’t ascertain the person’s actual will in a situation.

I agree with VC that I wouldn’t want to walk around in a platoon wondering if my buddies were about to throw me to the wolves to save their own skins.

So, what is the reasonble will of the rest of the platoon? I don’t know. My best guess is that they wish to remain in solidarity. I’d rather they all died than friendship be lost between men. Probably the one soldier feels the same as well. It is harder to ask about the man who is tied to the track. The solidarity is not so clear. Not all of them are going to die, but only some, and not the person who is deciding.

 

[Doc_Keele]

Yes, it’s intuitive that being “heroic” must be a choice, rather than a social duty and expectation. We’d like for someone to jump on the grenade to save us, but we couldn’t expect it or demand it.

 

[o_mlly]

Well, if I were to attribute to the platoon a righteous and other-centered will (as you would have us do) then I say that no platoon member ought to wish another platoon member to push another platoon member onto a grenade.

I wouldn’t will it. I doubt many soldiers would.

Furthermore, if this were seen as an acceptable act, each soldier would fear the other would push him in the line of fire to save himself or at least to himself and one other. Furthermore, any platoon in which this happened would a) ostracize the pusher (regardless of any his objections that “we were all going to die if I didn’t do it!”) and b) likely suffer survivor’s guilt for having survived at the expense of an another. The idea of condoning this sort of thing would seem to me to completely undermine trust in the team.

VC

I assume you have never led men in battle. It is a difficult decision to send others to near certain death to insure the larger group survives but it is a righteous decision.

Do you recall the dialogue Luke attributes to Christ and His Father in the Agony of the Garden which we read yesterday? Christ willed not to drink the metaphorical fourth cup of consummation of the Passover but also, and moreso, to do the Father’s will. A contradiction of intentions solved by ordering them to the intellect.

I disagree that the righteous will declines to be pushed or would ostracize the pusher. To do so would imply that this life is all that matters. Because Christ allowed Himself to be “pushed”, death became transformation, not termination for all mankind.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

It is a difficult decision to send others to near certain death to insure the larger group survives but it is a righteous decision.

But that isn’t the same as throwing one of your own on a grenade, is it? Or grabbing the nearest soldier to use him as a human shield?

I ask the above sincerely, not rhetorically. If you are a combat veteran, especially one in a command position, could you give us some insight? Are those two things allowed and/or encouraged?

VC

 

[o_mlly]

But that isn’t the same as throwing one of your own on a grenade, is it? Or grabbing the nearest soldier to use him as a human shield?

I ask the above sincerely, not rhetorically. If you are a combat veteran, especially one in a command position, could you give us some insight? Are those two things allowed and/or encouraged?

VC

You regress from the present issue: What is the “reasonable” will of those in the scenarios. As the good Doc points out, this is an objective issue with but one true answer. Is not Christ’s example sufficient?

I think our discussion too quickly moves from Christ’s example (the perfect) to man’s emulation of Christ (imperfect). In particular, the Army Field Manual? (“Lord, should we strike with the sword?” … But Jesus said, “No more of this!”). War is a messy business but we do have rules:

Basic principles. Among the so-called unwritten rules or laws of war are three interdependent basic principles that underlie all of the other rules or laws of civilized warfare, both written and unwritten, and form the general guide for conduct where no more specific rule applies, to wit:

a. The principle of military necessity, under which, subject to the principles of humanity and chivalry, a belligerent is justified in applying any amount and any kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the **least possible expenditure of **time, life, and money;

b. The principle of humanily, prohibiting employment of any such kind or degree of violence as is not actually necessary for the purpose of the war; and

c. The principle of chivalry, which denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or conduct.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rules_warfare-1934.pdf

4-13. The Misconduct Stress Behavior of Refusing to Obey an Order
a. A soldier deliberately refusing to obey an order in combat, as a misconduct stress behavior, may be tactically inappropriate (based on an unduly narrow, self-interested, or pessimistic perception of the situation). Alternatively, it may be tactically appropriate (based on a realistic perception that the order is unwise and will get one killed for no purpose). However, all orders which do not involve explicit violation of the Law of Land Warfare are presumed to be lawful and must be obeyed. The dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy (let alone fear or misgivings) cannot legally justify or excuse the disobedience of a lawful order. Combat refusal by units has historically been dealt with by measures as extreme as **summary execution **of ringleaders or decimation (the arbitrary execution of every tenth soldier). The UCMJ currently provides a maximum punishment of death for this offense when it is committed before the enemy.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/22-51/22-51_d.htm#4-13
(emphases mine)

Will you comment on Christ’s conflicted will and His resolution to freely accept death as an **evil **effect in order to achieve the good effect of obeying the Father? Is that not **the **righteous will? Are we not called to perfection? Recall the present issue is not what is the actual will of fallen man; rather what is the “reasonable” will. In Christ, I submit, we have the perfect example. If we can examine the perfect, why divert our attention to the imperfect?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

o_mlly,

I appreciate the information. I don’t think, though, that it answers the question about whether or not the military condones one of its own pushing one of its own on a live grenade. I’m not talking about ordering soldiers into dangerous and risky situations to achieve a military objective. I’m just talking about a soldier throwing another on a grenade to save his own life, or his life and one other in a three man squad.

Will you comment on Christ’s conflicted will and His resolution to freely accept death as an **evil **effect in order to achieve the good effect of obeying the Father? Is that not **the **righteous will? Are we not called to perfection? Recall the present issue is not what is the actual will of fallen man; rather what is the “reasonable” will. In Christ, I submit, we have the perfect example. If we can examine the perfect, why divert our attention to the imperfect?

Yes, I can comment. Perhaps I misunderstand you, but I think your line of thought quickly runs into some difficulty. Both the Father’s and Christ’s permissive will allowed evildoers to put Him to death. There is no question of some permissible act that has two effects here. Those who put Christ to death, or had a hand in it like Judas, stand condemned, “It were better for him, if that man had not been born.”

What you seem to be doing is trying to connect the dots from the fact that Christ accepts death to the notion that the fatman on the bridge ought to accept death as well, to the notion that the man who pushes the fatman does so lawfully. But Christ would not will Judas to betray him, nor the Romans to kill him, even if he accepted it.

I doubt even if Judas or the executioners has a good motive – insight into the plan of salvation that Christ must die – could they lawfully give him up or kill him. Though they may certainly attribute to Christ the righteous will of accepting death for that end. But, they wouldn’t want to be direct* agents* of that end.

Perhaps you think differently? Perhaps you think Judas lawfully betrayed Christ (or could have) and that those responsible for his death lawfully acted (or could have) since there was a good end to be had (and/or if they had a good motive)?

I may be missing the point, though, or thoroughly misunderstanding. Thanks for explaining further if you think it would be profitable.

VC

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly,

I appreciate the information. I don’t think, though, that it answers the question about whether or not the military condones one of its own pushing one of its own on a live grenade.

I think it does by defining what a reasonable will is in the Army FM as the proper disposition of combat soldiers. (I still think Christ’s example is more direct and reliable.) Under the condition set by Pug:

Originally Posted by o_mlly
Pug originally stated, “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay …”
As Pug refers to a “reasonable” rather than “actual” will, my questions are aimed at deternining what a “reasonable will” ought to be.

Furhter from the FM 7-21.13:
The proper dispostion of a combat soldier’s will as defined by the FM:
SELFLESS SERVICE

1-32. Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and your soldiers before your own.

… If a man hasn’t discovered something that he will die for, he isn’t fit to live.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.1-10

1-33. In serving your country, you are doing your duty loyally, without thought of recognition or gain. Your fellow soldiers and the mission come before your personal comfort or safety. Selfless service is your commitment as a team member to go a little further, endure a little longer, and look a little closer to see how you can add to the effort of the unit, platoon, or company. Selfless service is larger than just one person. With dedication to the value of selfless service, each and every soldier can rightfully look back and say, “I am proud to have served my country as a soldier.”

1-34. To demonstrate the value of selfless service, do the following:

■Focus your priorities on service to the Nation.
■Place the needs of the Army, your unit and your fellow soldiers above your personal gain.
■Balance the mission, your family, and your personal needs.
■Accept personal responsibility for your own performance.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-21-13/chap1.htm

Since the above describes the reasonable will of all involved, all would will to sacrifice themself for their comrades. If the actual will of the one thrown is not as it should be then who’s will is out of order? Both? I think not; the lack of character in the one thrown is the only disordered will in the group. As I mentioned the thrower should have a prudential reason for not sacrificing himself (he is the leader, the only map reader, the only father/mother in the group, etc.) It doesn’t matter, I think, whether we agree that the thrower’s reason is sufficient, only that he or she does.

Yes, I can comment. Perhaps I misunderstand you, but I think your line of thought quickly runs into some difficulty. Both the Father’s and Christ’s permissive will allowed evildoers to put Him to death. There is no question of some permissible act that has two effects here. Those who put Christ to death, or had a hand in it like Judas, stand condemned, “It were better for him, if that man had not been born.”

What you seem to be doing is trying to connect the dots from the fact that Christ accepts death to the notion that the fatman on the bridge ought to accept death as well, to the notion that the man who pushes the fatman does so lawfully. But Christ would not will Judas to betray him, nor the Romans to kill him, even if he accepted it.

I doubt even if Judas or the executioners has a good motive – insight into the plan of salvation that Christ must die – could they lawfully give him up or kill him. Though they may certainly attribute to Christ the righteous will of accepting death for that end. But, they wouldn’t want to be direct* agents* of that end.

Perhaps you think differently? Perhaps you think Judas lawfully betrayed Christ (or could have) and that those responsible for his death lawfully acted (or could have) since there was a good end to be had (and/or if they had a good motive)?

Who died at the hands of others in the end? I think you digress in examining the will of any but Christ’s since His is the perfect example. That He **freely accepts death **for the sake of a higher good is all that is important in determining the “reasonable will” of the characters in the various scenarios and, I think, answers Pug’s question: What is the reasonable will of the thrown soldier?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Under the condition set by Pug:Originally Posted by o_mlly
Pug originally stated, “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay …”
As Pug refers to a “reasonable” rather than “actual” will, my questions are aimed at deternining what a “reasonable will” ought to be.

You might want to check back with Pug. I think he was speaking of shoving a person, not shoving a person into the path of a train or shoving a person onto a grenade.

In fact, what Pug said was “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay,** like** to worm across a crowded subway platform, or to push their wheelchair.” It seems to me that in the both those cases their consent to being shoved would be implicit, or even explicit. By implicit I mean they agree to it because they put themselves in a situation where it is to be expected, tolerated, looked for. Exactly the same way a football player implicitly agrees to being tackled. He can’t claim he was assaulted. Unless he is assaulted, that is, he is tackled in a manner beyond what is expected or implicitly consented to.

So, I ask again. In the military, when a leader takes a squad out is it expected by the squad, or condoned by the military, that someone can push another onto a grenade or into the line of fire? Does the leader say “Boys, I’m going to push any of you that are unmarried without kids into oncoming fire to save myself and the married fellows. That is what the army says you ought to want anyway!”

You seem to be building your case upon military code, so it seems you could answer that question. If this is what the code leads to, is intended to lead to, can you say affirmatively that the military condones it? Expects it? Wants it?

o_mlly:

Who died at the hands of others in the end? I think you digress in examining the will of any but Christ’s since His is the perfect example. That He **freely accepts death **for the sake of a higher good is all that is important in determining the “reasonable will” of the characters in the various scenarios and, I think, answers Pug’s question: What is the reasonable will of the thrown soldier?

I don’t think it a digression. The will of Christ was to accept death at the hands of evildoers, not to will the evil done, nor that a person do the evil. You can’t simply say that because Christ’s will was to accept death that those who administer death act lawfully. But that is what you are trying to do, it seems. You wish to say that the fatman should accept death like Christ did, and therefore the one who pushes him off the bridge acts lawfully.

VC

 

[o_mlly]

You might want to check back with Pug. I think he was speaking of shoving a person, not shoving a person into the path of a train or shoving a person onto a grenade.

I’m sure Pug can speak for himself.

In fact, what Pug said was “Shoving a person in accordance with their reasonable will is okay,** like** to worm across a crowded subway platform, or to push their wheelchair.” It seems to me that in the both those cases their consent to being shoved would be implicit, or even explicit. By implicit I mean they agree to it because they put themselves in a situation where it is to be expected, tolerated, looked for. Exactly the same way a football player implicitly agrees to being tackled. He can’t claim he was assaulted. Unless he is assaulted, that is, he is tackled in a manner beyond what is expected or implicitly consented to.

Having read the “Selfless” military codes, how can you differentiate the football player expectations of being tackled from the soldier’s expectations of dying?

So, I ask again. In the military, when a leader takes a squad out is it expected by the squad, or condoned by the military, that someone can push another onto a grenade or into the line of fire? Does the leader say “Boys, I’m going to push any of you that are unmarried without kids into oncoming fire to save myself and the married fellows. That is what the army says you ought to want anyway!”

Laws and codes are, as I’m sure you know, written in general terms and principles. Your outrageous quote above, seems to me, to mock the code and the leaders that attempt to follow it

You seem to be building your case upon military code, so it seems you could answer that question. If this is what the code leads to, is intended to lead to, can you say affirmatively that the military condones it? Expects it? Wants it?

Read my posts … Christ, I have consistently maintained, is the perfect examplar. I argue from His example and Catholic doctrine. It is you my, friend, that keep referring to military codes. I have provided citations only at your prompting. In as much as the codes agree with Catholic teaching, I support them.

I don’t think it a digression. The will of Christ was to accept death at the hands of evildoers, not to will the evil done, nor that a person do the evil. You can’t simply say that because Christ’s will was to accept death that those who administer death act lawfully.

Never said that and never would. I would rather you quote me than put “words into my mouth” that I never wrote.
The will of Christ, from Scripture, is that He willed the Father’s will, not His, be done.

But that is what you are trying to do, it seems. You wish to say that the fatman should accept death like Christ did, and therefore the one who pushes him off the bridge acts lawfully.VC

I’ve not commented on the last(?) mutation of the DE example. I generally don’t “wish” to say things rather I write what I mean.
I do claim that the reasonable will of the fat-man tied to the track in the first two scenarios is to encourage the operator to flip the switch. To will otherwise, is to will the greater physical evil of 5 deaths. Do you disagree?

Once again and this time with conviction, I end my contributions to this discussion and thank all the posters for their comments and insights. I won’t be taking any train rides in the near future!

 

[Verbum_Caro]

"o_mlly:

Once again and this time with conviction, I end my contributions to this discussion and thank all the posters for their comments and insights.

Thank you to you as well. Since you are leaving, I won’t respond to your post above, save for your two direct questions:

To will otherwise, is to will the greater physical evil of 5 deaths. Do you disagree?

Nope. I don’t think I ever indicated otherwise.

o_mlly:

I do claim that the reasonable will of the fat-man tied to the track in the first two scenarios is to encourage the operator to flip the switch.

Yes to the first scenario, possibly no to the second.

VC

 

[Betterave]

“I do claim that the reasonable will of the fat-man tied to the track in the first two scenarios is to encourage the operator to flip the switch. To will otherwise, is to will the greater physical evil of 5 deaths. Do you disagree?”
Nope. I don’t think I ever indicated otherwise.

But you’ll also agree that the fat man’s natural inclination towards self-preservation is such that he is not *obliged *to will his own death; correct?

“I do claim that the reasonable will of the fat-man tied to the track in the first two scenarios is to encourage the operator to flip the switch.”
Yes to the first scenario, possibly no to the second.

…because he cannot will a greater moral evil to be committed, which his being hit becomes if it is an instrumental (not just accidental) means to preventing the death of the five. (And the question remains, for me, at least: is this a reasonable distinction to make in the circumstances?)

 

[Betterave]

Which brings me to the following observation. We can distinguish between scenario 3 and scenaros 1 and 2, because in scenario 3 the fatman isn’t on one of the paths, he isn’t in jeopardy. But, can we also distinguish between scenario 1 and scenario 2?

I liked my car and tourists examples. I gave a scenario that I thought analogous to scenario 1. But, note, it was the friction between the car and buildings that stopped the car, and the man was in the way, because he was in the zone of harm. I would postulate that in order to make it analogous to scenario 2, the car wouldn’t be stoppable by sideswiping the buildings, but only by running down the pedestrian. So, the question is could you run over a pedestrian to save some tourists? I would hazard that the traditional applications of double effect would say no.

What I don’t like about the scenario is that you’re off the tracks. It’s hard to really have intuitive clarity about which options are possible (I know: it’s all stipulative anyway; but still…). What do you see as being the advantage of the new scenario? What element of the situation is it supposed to help us to see?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

But you’ll also agree that the fat man’s natural inclination towards self-preservation is such that he is not *obliged *to will his own death; correct?

Yes.

…because he cannot will a greater moral evil to be committed, which his being hit becomes if it is an instrumental (not just accidental) means to preventing the death of the five. (And the question remains, for me, at least: is this a reasonable distinction to make in the circumstances?)

Yes, exactly. (You were very observant to see that I had in mind not willing a moral evil).

And I have the exact same reservation you do. Perhaps it isn’t a reasonable distinction to make, or perhaps it is.

VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

What I don’t like about the scenario is that you’re off the tracks. It’s hard to really have intuitive clarity about which options are possible (I know: it’s all stipulative anyway; but still…). What do you see as being the advantage of the new scenario? What element of the situation is it supposed to help us to see?

It really might not be helpful. . . it was just an attempt.

I was trying to construct something off the tracks because it seems to me that the fact the fatman is on the track in scenario 2 exerts a great deal of influence. I was trying to get someone into the “zone of danger” (i.e. not on a bridge) and also as the key element in stopping the vehicle (i.e.not just being hit because the others are missed as in scenario 1, but rather the others are missed because he is hit as in scenario 2).

I imagined first one track, a trolley going down it, 5 people tied on it, and a man walking along the track. Could you stick something out of the trolley (like a pole?) or somehow lasso the man walking along the track in order to use him as a an anchor to stop the trolley? That was my idea. . . but it seemed so implausible (lasso??) that I though the car example might recreate it.

(sigh).

Can you provide any assistance and clarity?

VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

p.s.: VC, can you explain what you mean by “principal conditions”? I’m not familiar with that concept.

Forgot about this. I was thinking of the following, as an example:
St. Thomas Aquinas:

A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

See ST Ia IIae q. 18 a.10.

VC

 

[Betterave]

Suppose there’s only one track, fatman is in front of five, fatman is an obstruction - now you have no choice to switch tracks but you still see that you will hit fatman and doing so will prevent you from hitting the five: do you want to say that you intend to hit fatman? Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think your answer, if you are to be consistent, must be yes. Now the question is, is this an evil intention? Or do you recognize that he is an obstruction, and that is what your (legitimate!) intention is directed toward, not the fact that he is a man?

I think a consideration of this scenario sheds light on our problem. What do you think of it?

I think that the object of an act always includes a certain (perhaps limited, from the perspective of a *full evaluation of the moral act/possible moral acts in question) consideration of circumstances. What those object-circumstances are must be determined according to our judgment about what is objectively inevitable, what things objectively fall under the purview of the agent’s responsibility in the case in question, while our further consideration of intention and circumstances seems to aim at agent-subjective (e.g., malice) and subjectively-imposed-upon-the-agent (e.g., the mad philosopher is on the train screaming at you to do something) factors, as well as matters of degree (e.g., number of people in danger).

*Cf. ST Ia IIae q.18 a.10 r.: “But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action’s species.”