G
Gorgias
Guest
Freely asserted, freely denied.for the record, I reject the thomistic philosophy, because it is incoherent.
But, I get what youâre saying: current-day philosophers have a problem with Thomas.
No, but much of what he says, stands in line with Church teaching. Much of what he says is quoted by the Church in its own teachings. I agree that we canât just point to Aquinas blindly and assert âif Thomas said it, it must be right!â â but we can do so for much of what he says.And also for the reason that it is NOT the official catholic philosophy.
Saying âthe Church doesnât teach thisâ is a beginnerâs mistake in trying to understand the Church: it doesnât teach all things because it doesnât want to make magisterial statements about all things. That doesnât mean that there arenât philosophical underpinnings to support what it teaches!Also for the record, the catholic church has NO official philosophy.
If âactionâ means something, then there must be a âchangeâ. If âchangeâ means something, there must be a âbefore and afterâ. There is noting here that would require a âtemporalâ framework.
I would assert that the effects of God are experienced as actions within a temporal framework. Subtle differenceâŚNow, regardless of the specifics of the âcausationâ, there is an âactionâ there.
This argument fails. Itâs a beingâs existence that change affects. (Also, note that in God, his essence is his existence.)Mind you, it is not required nor asserted that Godâs âessenceâ would change. (Whatever that âessenceâ might be.) Just like your essence does not change when you make a decision to create an answer to this post.
Not in the context of God: Godâs will is actualized, it doesnât imply distinct action, though. If so, then Godâs will would be distinct from his activity. And, if that were the case, then God would be composite. Making this distinction that youâre trying to make has the effect of changing the definition of God. Thatâs why, if we posit him as we do, you canât make these assertions. You can say âwell, then, if these are the results, then the premise must be badâ, but the assertions you make arenât necessary assertions, theyâre arbitrary. Therefore, if they donât work out, you have to throw out the assertions and try again.Yes, I heard it before. God âeternally willsâ X. ⌠the word âwillsâ implies an action.
This is exactly what I mean: since you make assertions that donât hold with the original premises, and the assertions donât hold, you want to throw away the original premises. However, your assertions simply point out that God is different sort of being than us. Your implicit assumption â that the way things work for us is the way they must work for God â is whatâs getting you into the weeds here. But, I can understand that, if âit ainât worth itâ for you, then you wouldnât attempt to work with the implications of that distinction.I say that the presented âconcept of Godâ is incoherent. In the presented picture there is no difference between âactionâ and âinactionâ, between âchangeâ and âno changeâ, between âbeforeâ and âduringâ and âafterâ.
No⌠Iâm saying that you have to consider the context, and not apply the concepts blindly as if they are identical in different contexts! I donât think that it undercuts my argument: rather, it helps us understand what these things mean, and it helps us understand that, in different contexts, these things must have different implications!On one hand you argue that you are in the position of speaking âauthoritativelyâ about âtimelessâ existence, and its âinternal workingsâ (eternally wills!), you use words like âcausationâ, âactionâ, but when I point out the problems with your assertions, you say that these words mean something totally different, thereby undercutting your whole argument.
Only if you are unwilling to consider what it means to be outside a temporal framework which, apparently, you are: all of your assertions continually rely on the implicit assumption that Godâs existence is within a temporal framework which is entangled with ours! Youâll need to provide a basis for this assumption if you wish us to have a meaningful discussion!You say that my arguments are fine in a temporal framework, but they are inapplicable to the ânon-temporalâ one. So we are unable to find a âcommon languageâ.
No, I am not saying that âone cannot say anything meaningful about âtimelessâ existenceâ: rather, Iâm saying that your assertions that imply that whatever is said of temporal existence must be said of timeless existence are based on a poor foundation. Many things can be said â and have been, in this thread! â about timeless existence. However, since you continue to want to ground these statements in the context of temporal existence, you reject them, without realizing the set of unspoken assumptions youâre making!In a sense you say that one cannot say anything meaningful about the âtimelessâ existence (starting from a temporal frame), and then you turn around and try to say something (also starting from a temporal frame - like âeternally willedâ), and you are surprised when such undefined nonsense is rejected.
LOL⌠if I were asserting that temporal and eternal frameworks were identical, you might have a chance of making that claim. Iâm not, thoughâŚThere is a philosophical term for what you committed here. It is called the âfallacy of the stolen conceptâ.