Eternal Creation Ex Nihilo vs Modern Cosmology

[Skeptic92]

You are asking for an enumeration of things that exist?

The laws don’t interact with things, things behave in certain ways and the laws describe those behaviors.

And why do they behave in this way? You haven’t explained what it is these laws even are; what are these laws describing? It can’t be nothing, but I can’t see where you have actually explained these “laws”. Are they Platonic Forms? Are they the interactions of causal powers given the nature of things? Are they simply regularities? If they are regularities, why do things act with such regularity? This seems to be presupposing the chiefly theological doctrine of Occasionalism; do you have any philosophical argument for this problematic premise?

You are begging an awful lot of questions here you know.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

And why do they behave in this way? You haven’t explained what it is these laws even are; what are these laws describing? It can’t be nothing, but I can’t see where you have actually explained these “laws”. Are they Platonic Forms? Are they the interactions of causal powers given the nature of things? Are they simply regularities? If they are regularities, why do things act with such regularity? This seems to be presupposing the chiefly theological doctrine of Occasionalism; do you have any philosophical argument for this problematic premise?

You are begging an awful lot of questions here you know.

The laws are mathematical equations that describe the behavior of things that exist. Everything that exists has regularities because that’s the way things are. What does Occasionalism have to do with this?

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Its interesting that we find ourselves in a reality where things behave consistently according to their particular natures. Why should this be true? I see no necessary reason why physics ought to behave the way it does and I have never been satisfied with a just so story.

Why not? Do you have some reason to suppose that the fundamental nature of reality will be satisfying to you?

 

[Skeptic92]

The laws are mathematical equations that describe the behavior of things that exist. Everything that exists has regularities because that’s the way things are. What does Occasionalism have to do with this?

And why are they like that? You haven’t explained anything so far; so either you are asserting the existence of Brute Facts, which leads to denial of non-contradiction, or there is something missing from your explanation. I’m seeing only a couple of coherent options out; they describe the interaction of substances, given their essential causal powers, or the Laws of Physics are Platonic Forms. The regularity thesis hasn’t stood up to scrutiny; as so far you haven’t given an explanation as to what a law of physics actually is, let alone how it is causally efficacious.

If you grant that it is the interaction of existential substances given their essential nature; we are in agreement. If they are Platonic Forms you still must explain how the Forms interact with the material universe; which is a major problem in Neo-Platonic Philosophy.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

On the one hand, he admits that physical mathematically-based laws (including general relativity) break down at the singularity, that he must assume mathematical constants that don’t hold in our universe, that the laws of thermodynamics must be violated, that the direction of time must be modified, that material existence ultimately doesn’t have a cause - all in order to create a cosmological model that (he admits) is not completely accurate. His argument for doing this is that whatever principles hold in our universe do not necessarily hold outside of our universe.

Classical descriptions (including general relativity) break down at the big bang, not all mathematical laws. It may be that there are other singularities, e.g. in quantum gravity.

On the other hand, he uses Baysian statistics to calculate the probability of our universe existing versus other universes. He uses the basic principle (I mean in the scientific sense) of cause and effect in his analysis of how a parent universe can create another universe. He uses the laws of logic (and math) to reach his conclusions. All of this is based on his empirical observation of this universe, as it must be.

In a nutshell, Carroll is being completely arbitrary in what basic principles he picks and chooses from our universe and then applies outside of our universe; other than they are necessary for his model to have any semblance of legitimacy. This no longer qualifies as science. Carroll has no empirical evidence to support these assumptions.

Why do Baysian statistics still apply outside of our universe or any mathematical functions at all? Why do commonly observed principles of causation apply sometimes, but not other times? Because otherwise his model doesn’t work.

preposterousuniverse.com/writings/dtung/

For example, we could imagine arguing that there is no puzzle associated with the value of the vacuum energy. It had to be some number, and we have (perhaps) measured what that value is, and there’s nothing more to be said. (Some physicists, although a minority, do hold this view, and similarly for other fine-tuning problems.) The counter-argument is that the vacuum energy is really a parameter that we measure in the “effective field theory” that governs physics at low energies, regardless of the virtual high-energy processes we have not yet explored in experiments. Even though there is only one universe, there are many effective field theories, and many parameters in the theories relevant to low-energy physics. So the vacuum energy is not a unique object; we have expectations for it based on our experience with other parameters in effective field theories, and can sensibly compare its measured value to those expectations. It is in terms of that comparison that we can legitimately call the vacuum energy finely-tuned.

He also does admit that they may be completely wrong about “picking things out of a hat.”

 

[JapaneseKappa]

If you grant that it is the interaction of existential substances given their essential nature; we are in agreement. If they are Platonic Forms you still must explain how the Forms interact with the material universe; which is a major problem in Neo-Platonic Philosophy.

Yes, things behave the way they do because of the way that they are.

And why are they like that?

Because that’s the way they are. Do you have a reason for supposing there is an other answer to that question?

 

[ChainBreaker]

Why not? Do you have some reason to suppose that the fundamental nature of reality will be satisfying to you?

The problem is, in the context of physical laws, consistent behaviour that is not ontologically necessary or necessarily intrinsic to a things nature only makes logical sense if physical reality is being regulated intentionally by that which is not physical. Otherwise one would have to conclude that the laws of physics comes out of absolutely nothing since they are not necessary and therefore not intrinsic to the nature of physical things themselves. Or we have to appeal to platonic forms as a means through which physical things are regulated.

If physical laws are not intrinsic to physical things themselves then physical laws are separate from physical things.This is ontologically impossible if we assume that only physical reality exists, and it is ontologically impossible for something to come from nothing.

 

[Skeptic92]

Yes, things behave the way they do because of the way that they are.

Thank you; we are in a crude form of agreement; you have, however, validated the premises of the First Cause Argument. Which I’m not sure was your intent. Since you appear to at least crudely argue with Scholastic Metaphysics over Naturalist Metaphysics; can we now go to Thomas, and stop pretending that a good physicist, a good philosopher makes. That’s one of the greatest intellectual blunders of the modern age; a good physicist is a good physicist, a good philosopher is a good philosopher.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Otherwise one would have to conclude that the laws of physics comes out of absolutely nothing

And why can’t we do that?

 

[Skeptic92]

And why can’t we do that?

You are forced to conclude that reality is unintellgible, and make the advancements of modern physics, and science in general, ontologically and epistemologically a miracle. It would amount to the greatest argument for God that someone could manage; we are able to gain knowledge of what is, in principle, unintellgible.

This is as you are required to deny ex nihilo nihil fit, otherwise known as 'From nothing, nothing comes. This, however, carries far reaching implications in the very tools of rational thinking; the very principles of logic. At the very least we presuppose 3 fundamental ontological laws of logic, that can not be denied without denying the validity of reason itself. These are; non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle.

We know from the principle of identity that being is, whilst non-being is not, and nothing and non-being are indiscernible and therefore identical. It is hard to see how something can arise from nothing; for there is nothing to act, and there is no power to act. It appears that for something to come from nothing, requires that it must be both active, and not active in the same respect at the same time. Which is a formal contradiction; therefore ex nihilo nihil fit is necessarily true, unless we deny Noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle. At which point rational thinking is impossible. As we both exist, and not exist, in the same respect at the same time. I am both responding to you, and not responding to you, in the exact same sense at the same time. Upon denial of noncontradiction; those previous two statements would be true. Which is absurd.

 

[tdgesq]

Classical descriptions (including general relativity) break down at the big bang, not all mathematical laws. It may be that there are other singularities, e.g. in quantum gravity.

Unfortunately, this doesn’t lend any credence to the idea that Bayesian probability models will “work” outside of our universe, yet Carroll assumes they will in response to the teleological problem with multiverse theories. Neither does it help explain why the principles of causation within our universe would/could not exist when it comes to the creation of our universe at the boundary of space/time; particularly when he postulates that a parent universe can cause a multitude of other universes.

The point here is threefold:

1. Carroll necessarily derives all of his mathematical knowledge, all of his metaphysical assumptions, all of his empiriological data from this universe - just like the rest of us. He has no choice but to use those concepts in his analysis of what is outside this universe.
2. Unless he can demonstrate why it is reasonable to kick some fundamental concepts derived from our universe, yet retain others, he’s simply being arbitrary.
3. We obviously can’t “see” beyond the boundary of space/time. There is no way to test (at least most of) his hypotheses. This is one of the reasons why Carroll, to his credit, describes multiverse as not a theory, but a prediction of a theory.

preposterousuniverse.com/writings/dtung/

Here is another problem. In Carroll’s words:

There is no reason, within anything we currently understand about the ultimate structure of reality, to think of the existence and persistence and regularity of the universe as things that require external explanation. Indeed, for most scientists, adding on another layer of metaphysical structure in order to purportedly explain these nomological facts is an unnecessary complication.

It appears that Carroll is again the one who decides when a fact of nature is sufficiently “nomological” that it requires no explanation. The need for multiverse to explain the beginning of our universe is apparently not one of them, but the explanation for the characteristics it has is one of them. The real problem is that Carroll is firmly in the realm of philosophy throughout his multiverse postulation, where arbitrariness and begging the question are not allowed.

He also does admit that they may be completely wrong about “picking things out of a hat.”

Don’t get me wrong, I do think Carroll is honest, and I enjoy watching him speak on cosmology. He is the only person I’ve seen be the clear winner in a debate with WL Craig. The problem is that his model relies on some basic philosophical assumptions, or more accurately the rejection of those assumptions, without sufficient warrant. He doesn’t have a scientific theory. He has (admittedly) a prediction of a scientific theory.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

You are forced to conclude that reality is unintellgible, and make the advancements of modern physics, and science in general, ontologically and epistemologically a miracle. It would amount to the greatest argument for God that someone could manage; we are able to gain knowledge of what is, in principle, unintellgible.

This is as you are required to deny ex nihilo nihil fit, otherwise known as 'From nothing, nothing comes. This, however, carries far reaching implications in the very tools of rational thinking; the very principles of logic. At the very least we presuppose 3 fundamental ontological laws of logic, that can not be denied without denying the validity of reason itself. These are; non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle.

Nothing can come from a metaphysical nothing. Something exists. Therefore there was never a state of metaphysical nothing. The universe always existed and did not “come from nothing.”

 

[Skeptic92]

Nothing can come from a metaphysical nothing. Something exists. Therefore there was never a state of metaphysical nothing. The universe always existed and did not “come from nothing.”

Protip; Aquinas’ Five Ways presuppose that the universe has existed eternally, so the universe “always existing” doesn’t contradict Aquinas demonstration for the Existence of God.

Given your concession already; it appears that you have validated the Second Way of Aquinas, which means you have conceded the Existence of God.

 

[ChainBreaker]

Nothing can come from a metaphysical nothing. Something exists. Therefore there was never a state of metaphysical nothing. The universe always existed and did not “come from nothing.”

You have made a leap from the idea that existence cannot not exist to the idea that the entirety of existence is in fact the physical universe without any argument to that effect. This is a circular argument often made by proponents of metaphysical naturalism.

That which exists necessarily, as such that it is the antithesis of nothing, by definition has in its nature the fullness of its existence. What I mean by this is that necessary reality cannot become more than what it necessarily is. There can be no change and thus no potency in its nature since if it did change then it would mean that it does not have the fullness of its existence in its nature thus having potency and therefore is not necessary existence.

For example If a triangle exists necessarily, then everything that is true of triangularity would exist in that triangle; it would be identical with its existence. But if that triangle were to turn blue, then we would have to say that blue is not identical to the nature of a triangle since if it were, the triangle would necessarily be blue eternally. If one insists that blue is identical to the nature of a triangle on the principle that out of nothing comes nothing then one would have no choice but to say that the triangle is not necessarily real since it has potency in it. To say otherwise would be to contradict the principle of ontological necessity. therefore the triangle and its potency would have to be dependent on something else for its actuality.

The universe changes, new natures come into existence, it is in a constant state of becoming, and since out of nothing comes nothing the universe cannot be considered to be necessary existence. In fact, it is precisely because something cannot come from nothing that the physical universe is necessarily dependent upon something that is not physical, does not change, and is the antithesis of nothing, in-order to exist.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

You have made a leap from the idea that existence cannot not exist to the idea that the entirety of existence is in fact the physical universe without any argument to that effect. This is a circular argument often made by proponents of metaphysical naturalism.

Sure, we can address that argument, but we are leaving the realm of “causes,” “reasons” or “dependencies” of the universe.

You are quite right that it is logically possible for there to exist things that do not interact with the physical world that we observe in any way shape or form. God could logically exist and have had nothing whatsoever to do with the physical universe. A spaghetti monster could exist and have no interaction with our physical universe. We could actually be brains in jars, and the universe could have been created last Thursday.

We can’t rule out those possibilities, but likewise we have no reasons to posit them in the first place.

That which exists necessarily, as such that it is the antithesis of nothing, by definition has in its nature the fullness of its existence.

I am asserting the set of things that exist cannot have ever been empty.

The opposite of “nothing exists” is not “everything exists” it is “something exists.” The set of things that exist (by definition) contains all the existence that there is. This places no restrictions on what sort of members the set may have. The set could contain three elephants and an asteroid and it would satisfy the criteria demanded by “something exists.”

You are right in the sense that we cannot a-priori predict what members the set will have. All we could know a-priori about the members of the set is what we could derive from the fact that they exist.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Protip; Aquinas’ Five Ways presuppose that the universe has existed eternally, so the universe “always existing” doesn’t contradict Aquinas demonstration for the Existence of God.

Given your concession already; it appears that you have validated the Second Way of Aquinas, which means you have conceded the Existence of God.

But the second way uses exactly the language that Sean Carroll uses in his talk. Certainly within the universe we can observe causes, but we have no reason to think that the observations we make about things inside the universe apply to the universe as a whole. The second way is invalidated simply by proposing that we don’t know whether or not the universe as a whole must have had a cause.

“That’s like looking at someone taking a picture with an iPhone and asking ‘but where does the film go?’”

 

[Skeptic92]

But the second way uses exactly the language that Sean Carroll uses in his talk. Certainly within the universe we can observe causes, but we have no reason to think that the observations we make about things inside the universe apply to the universe as a whole. The second way is invalidated simply by proposing that we don’t know whether or not the universe as a whole must have had a cause.

“That’s like looking at someone taking a picture with an iPhone and asking ‘but where does the film go?’”

No; Sean Carroll uses the language of modern naturalists and adherents of scientism. Aquinas uses the language of an Aristotelian who has systematically argued for the Metaphysics. The Second Way is validated by the notions of efficient causality and an essentially ordered series. You have conceded both; for if you didn’t you would be asserting that I do not depend upon my body, which depends upon the cells that make that body, which depends upon spatial displacement, which depends upon temporal placement, etc. These are Efficient-Formal Causes of your being, and as such are essentially ordered and therefore can not regress into infinity.

However; since you have asserting that “something exists”. you have also validated the Third Way, and is presented in syllogistic form now;
Ite Ad Thomam Blogspot:

P1A) If everything is contingent, i.e., possible to be and not to be (c), then at one time there would have been nothing in existence (o).
P2A) Now if at one time there would have been nothing in existence (o), even now there would be nothing in existence .
CA) Therefore, if everything is contingent (c), then even now there would be nothing in existence .

P1B) If everything is contingent (c), then even now there would be nothing in existence .
P2B) It is false that even now nothing is in existence (~n).
CB) Therefore, not all beings are contingent, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary (~c).

P1C) There are necessary things (~c).
P2C) If there are necessary things (~c), then their necessity is either caused by another, or not caused by another (a ∧ ~a).
P3C) If it is caused by another (a), then there must be an uncaused necessary being (g).
P4C) If it is not caused by another (~a), then there must be an uncaused necessary being (g).
CC) Therefore, there is an uncaused necessary being, not receiving its necessity from another, but rather causing in others their necessity; this all men speak of as God (g).

source: iteadthomam.blogspot.co.uk/2010/02/third-way-in-syllogistic-form.html

can you offer a refutation? Since you have conceded the first argument of this chain, you appear to have conceded it all.

 

[ChainBreaker]

Sure, we can address that argument, but we are leaving the realm of “causes,” “reasons” or “dependencies” of the universe.

You are quite right that it is logically possible for there to exist things that do not interact with the physical world that we observe in any way shape or form. God could logically exist and have had nothing whatsoever to do with the physical universe. A spaghetti monster could exist and have no interaction with our physical universe. We could actually be brains in jars, and the universe could have been created last Thursday.

We can’t rule out those possibilities, but likewise we have no reasons to posit them in the first place.

I am asserting the set of things that exist cannot have ever been empty.

The opposite of “nothing exists” is not “everything exists” it is “something exists.” The set of things that exist (by definition) contains all the existence that there is. This places no restrictions on what sort of members the set may have. The set could contain three elephants and an asteroid and it would satisfy the criteria demanded by “something exists.”

You are right in the sense that we cannot a-priori predict what members the set will have. All we could know a-priori about the members of the set is what we could derive from the fact that they exist.

Would you kindly address my argument please.

 

[ChainBreaker]

I am asserting the set of things that exist cannot have ever been empty.

And this is the crux of the problem. You are asserting something purely for the sake of fitting reality into your world view and then saying that such is the true state of things. You are making a circular argument.

 

[ChainBreaker]

We can’t rule out those possibilities, but likewise we have no reasons to posit them in the first place.

To say that we only know that physical reality exists and that therefore physical reality necessarily exists is a circular argument. since lack of knowledge does not necessitate the conclusion.

Regardless, my argument proves that the physical universe is not necessary and that therefore the universe is dependent on a being that is necessary.