Existence and evidence

[ateista]

What does the word existence mean?

We are all familiar with physical existence, let’s call it P-existence. It imples space, time, energy and matter. When we speak of physical existence, we talk about objects, composed of matter and energy, existing in some point in space. Physical objects can interact, they can exert “influence” on other objects.

We are also familiar with concepts. They are not physical objects. Their existence is dependent on matter, however. Objects do not exist as ontological entities, they exist as states of minds. Let’s call this type of existence C-existence. Concepts are “inert”, they do not interact with concepts, they cannot influence physical existence. The concept of 2 hydrogen atoms and 1 oxigen atom will not “create” the concept of a water molecule.

Concepts come in different “flavors”. Some of them refer to actual physical objects (dogs, buildings, etc.) or properties of physical objects (colors, numbers and other mathematical concepts), others refer to actions (honesty, love, nation-state) and yet others refer to fully imaginary entities (like dragons, fairies, witches, Hamlet etc.).

Some philosophers assert that concepts are totally independent from matter. They say that concepts are not created by our minds, rather they are “discovered” by our mind in some “magical” way. Such assertions cannot be taken seriously. If the Sun would go nova and obliterate the whole Earth, all of our ideas, stories would cease to exist in any meaningful manner.

Materialists stop right here.

Believers assert a third kind of existence. It is not physical, but not merely conceptual either. Let’s call it X-existence (in math “x” usually denotes unknowns). This existence is supposed to be “active” in the sense that it can effect material existence, but it cannot be affected by material existence. Allegedly it has some other attributes, like being outside of space and time, etc.

We are not familiar with such kind of existence. Nowhere in the universe have we ever seen of found such existence. It can be posited as a hypothesis, however.

The question arises: what kind of evidence is there to support this hypothesis? What is there to substantiate that the concept of such existence is meaningful?

In this thread I am looking forward to talk about both metaphysics (what exists?) and epistemology (how do we know it?). It is an immensely broad subject, yet I find it necessary to include both as topics, since they are so intricately interconnected.

Thank you for your thoughts about these matters.

 

[Sarpedon]

The question arises: what kind of evidence is there to support this hypothesis? What is there to substantiate that the concept of such existence is meaningful?

hmm…you could argue that p-existence (which is not self-existent) must draw its “existence” from x-existence (which is self-existent).

Now, of course, the question is: can p-existence be self-existent? Let me know your thoughts on this and I’ll proceed from there.

I’d like to say from the start that I am not well versed in Catholic teaching in this area so I am not necessarily participating in this thread as a Catholic.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

We are also familiar with concepts. They are not physical objects. Their existence is dependent on matter, however. …

Some philosophers assert that concepts are totally independent from matter. They say that concepts are not created by our minds, rather they are “discovered” by our mind in some “magical” way. Such assertions cannot be taken seriously. If the Sun would go nova and obliterate the whole Earth, all of our ideas, stories would cease to exist in any meaningful manner.

Stories are not the only kind of concept however. There are logically necessary truths, truths that would hold in every possible world, even worlds without intelligent entities. The concept that 2 + 2 = 4 would still be true after the supernova; if intelligent life evolved elsewhere in the universe after the supernova they would find this out too. Moreover the notion that concepts are “created” by our minds is just as “magical”, if not more so, as the notion that they are “discovered” by our minds. You could argue that concepts don’t “exist” independently of some entity holding the concept (the old “if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, does it still make a sound?” argument). I just can’t buy it; the success of science is based on the assumption that objective reality exists independent of the observer (at least at the macro-level).

Believers assert a third kind of existence. It is not physical, but not merely conceptual either. Let’s call it X-existence (in math “x” usually denotes unknowns). This existence is supposed to be “active” in the sense that it can effect material existence, but it cannot be affected by material existence. Allegedly it has some other attributes, like being outside of space and time, etc.

We are not familiar with such kind of existence. Nowhere in the universe have we ever seen of found such existence. It can be posited as a hypothesis, however.

The question arises: what kind of evidence is there to support this hypothesis? What is there to substantiate that the concept of such existence is meaningful?

The last question is the easy one. Because you are able to posit x-existence as a hypothesis, it obviously has “meaning” - otherwise the hypothesis could not in principle be shown true or false. You clearly understand what you are talking about when you posit the possibility of x-existence.

Now, for evidence, we are looking for evidence of an immaterial entity affecting physical reality. I define “evidence” as “data which increases the posterior probability of the hypothesis”. People will disagree on what can count as such “evidence” precisely because they disagree on the prior probability of such an entity existing. And you asked for “evidence”, not “metaphysical proof”, so my bar is quite a bit lower.

The only type of data which is relevant is physical processes unexplained by prior ones. Obviously, if physical laws provide a complete explanation for what we observe in the universe, then by Occam’s Razor we would reject the hypothesis that an immaterial entity is directly involved (the entity could still exist, however, just not be affecting material processes in any way). And the question could still remain, why the laws are the way they are.

As for such unexplained processes, there are still three possibilities: 1) they are unexplained as yet. Future physics will provide the explanation. 2) they happened because an x-entity directly intervened 3) they are completely uncaused. Assessing the likelihoods here is not easy. However, I am not optimistic (and that’s a huge understatement) that a physical explanation will be forthcoming for apparently uncaused random processes at the quantum level. All attempts to do this have either been disproven (e.g. the EPR) or else highly contrived (e.g. the Bohm interpretation). So, how to distinguish between x-intervention and lack of causation? The only way that I can see is to posit some intention or purpose in the x-agent, and compare the likelihoods under the two hypotheses. (And here is incidentally where I part company with “Intelligent Design” and Dembski. It is necessary to assume something about the designer, and it is absolutely necessary to use a Bayesian approach.) I’ll discuss this more later, but just want to see if you agree with the basic metaphysics and epistemology.

 

[ateista]

hmm…you could argue that p-existence (which is not self-existent) must draw its “existence” from x-existence (which is self-existent).

This is a hypothesis. To substantiate it you would have to have some reason why p-existence is not self-existent, why x-existence is self-existent and why x-existence can be used as an explanatory factor.

Now, of course, the question is: can p-existence be self-existent? Let me know your thoughts on this and I’ll proceed from there.

I treat it as self-evident. The reason is the principle of preservation of matter / energy / momentum, etc. These laws of nature are as well substantiated as one can expect. Of course, as with any law of nature the possibility is there that it is incorrect and needs to be amended or discarded. But for the time being it can be accepted as universally true, and thus the self-existence of p-existence is supported.

I’d like to say from the start that I am not well versed in Catholic teaching in this area so I am not necessarily participating in this thread as a Catholic.

Your (name removed by moderator)ut is always appreciated.

 

[Dranu]

SeekingCatholic seems to hammered it down. Just a few points to add:

SeekingCatholic:

Obviously, if physical laws provide a complete explanation for what we observe in the universe, then by Occam’s Razor we would reject the hypothesis that an immaterial entity is directly involved (the entity could still exist, however, just not be affecting material processes in any way). And the question could still remain, why the laws are the way they are.

I would have to say that these ‘laws’ themselves are already in ‘x-existence’. Hence, if the laws are binding on the physical objects, the actual laws must exist in ‘x-existence’ somehow. Now whether those ‘laws’ are just something very odd like and actual existing law or more rationally explained as coming from a source, like perhaps concepts of a necessary mind that govern all, who knows?

Ateista:

We are all familiar with physical existence, let’s call it P-existence. It imples space, time, energy and matter. When we speak of physical existence, we talk about objects, composed of matter and energy, existing in some point in space. Physical objects can interact, they can exert “influence” on other objects.

Why make a huge distinction between P-existence and X-existence? Would you agree that P-existence is talking about existence in reality? In other words, if X-existence is supposed, it must also be thought of existing in reality (versus in C-existence alone). P-existence, only describes a type of limit of existence in reality, thus it shares with X-existence, but falls short of that more true existence in reality since it is subject to constant change. In that way ‘P-existence’ can’t really be understood as true existence, because its existence is subject to temporality. It can be understood as a privation of X-existence, but only under X’s banner (since it has privation). Anyway, just a little side-track I can work with the distinctions you made anyhow

----On a side note, St. Anselm (when speaking of a proof of God), divides existence in two. That which ‘exists in reality’ and that which ‘exists in intellect’.
.

 

[Sarpedon]

This is a hypothesis. To substantiate it you would have to have some reason why p-existence is not self-existent, why x-existence is self-existent and why x-existence can be used as an explanatory factor.

I know. If we can demonstrate that p-existence is not self-existent and needs to draw its existence from some self-existent entity, then we have proved that some form of existence other than “p” and “c” is real. If I understand your position, you would call this “x” existence.

I treat it as self-evident. The reason is the principle of preservation of matter / energy / momentum, etc. These laws of nature are as well substantiated as one can expect. Of course, as with any law of nature the possibility is there that it is incorrect and needs to be amended or discarded. But for the time being it can be accepted as universally true, and thus the self-existence of p-existence is supported.

The continued functioning of energy and its governing laws does not prove that such things are self-existent. Even if the framework of the universe operates according to itself without direct intervention or support from anything else, this does not address how the framework of the universe exists in of itself, making the universe possible.

The fact that we can observe energy functioning without intervention does not address how the energy exists in the first place.

 

[ateista]

Stories are not the only kind of concept however. There are logically necessary truths, truths that would hold in every possible world, even worlds without intelligent entities.

I agree that the laws of nature “exist” in a possible world without intelligent entites - if there are laws of nature in a hypothetical world. The word “exist” means here that the physical regularities are there to be discovered (if there are regularities at all, which is far from being obvious!).

I use the word “concept” as a recognized regularity. One hydrogen atom plus another hydrogen atom would make two hydrogen atoms - as ontological entites. But the concept of “two” hydrogen atoms would not exist without some intelligent entity who can recognize the “abstraction” of “two”.

The question of the falling tree could be restated a bit differently. If there is a functioning CD player in an empty forest, there are sound waves or vibrations present. But there is no “music” there. Or as Klick and Klack said once: if there is a male in the forest and no woman present, is he still wrong?

The concept that 2 + 2 = 4 would still be true after the supernova; if intelligent life evolved elsewhere in the universe after the supernova they would find this out too.

I disagree based upon what I said in the previous paragraph. Though I agree that a new intelligent life would discover the same existing regularities.

Moreover the notion that concepts are “created” by our minds is just as “magical”, if not more so, as the notion that they are “discovered” by our minds.

I don’t think so. I agree with your next statement, namely that there is an objectively existing reality, and we discover the regularities in it.

But the process does not stop there. In mathematics we can create a brand new “numbering notation” which contains the “normal” integers as a subset. For example we can create numbers in the form of “A + B * sqrt(-5)”, where “A” and “B” are integers in the usual sense, and “sqrt” designates the square root. If “B” is zero, we get the usual set of integers.

This numbering scheme is an arbitrary extension of the “normal” numbers. It also has some new, interesting features, for example the mathematical theorem that each integer can be factored into prime numbers in only one way (apart from the sequence of the prime numbers) does not hold there. (6 = 2 * 3 or 6 = (1 + 1 * sqrt(-5)) * (1 - 1 * sqrt(-5))… which are different).

As I said in the opening post, some concepts refer to actual regularities of nature but others refer to totally imaginary entities. The first kind we formulate based upon discovering the regularities, the second kind we “make up”.

This is the reason that I consider the existence of “concepts” apart from the intelligent minds an incorrect proposition.

The last question is the easy one. Because you are able to posit x-existence as a hypothesis, it obviously has “meaning” - otherwise the hypothesis could not in principle be shown true or false.

I wonder. I can posit a definition: “the smallest positive integer which cannot be stated using less than a 100 letters”. It is a clear mathematical definiton of a number. The trouble is that it contains less than 100 letters (82 letters, counting the spaces). It is a simple proposition, still meaningless.

But we may have a miscommunication here: I meant that the word “existence” may not be meaningful when we start to speak of x-existence. So far we defined “existence” for physical ontological objects and for concepts - and they are quite different. How can the word “existence” be defined in a meaningful fashion for x-existence? That is the pertinent question.

Now, for evidence, we are looking for evidence of an immaterial entity affecting physical reality. I define “evidence” as “data which increases the posterior probability of the hypothesis”. People will disagree on what can count as such “evidence” precisely because they disagree on the prior probability of such an entity existing. And you asked for “evidence”, not “metaphysical proof”, so my bar is quite a bit lower.

Right on. Evidence is a much lower requirement.

The only type of data which is relevant is physical processes unexplained by prior ones. Obviously, if physical laws provide a complete explanation for what we observe in the universe, then by Occam’s Razor we would reject the hypothesis that an immaterial entity is directly involved (the entity could still exist, however, just not be affecting material processes in any way).

Very well put.

And the question could still remain, why the laws are the way they are.

True, however questions like that are not interesting to me.

As for such unexplained processes, there are still three possibilities: 1) they are unexplained as yet. Future physics will provide the explanation. 2) they happened because an x-entity directly intervened 3) they are completely uncaused.

Agreed, with one caveat: I would say “future development of natural sciences”, rather than “future physics”. But that is just nitpicking.

Assessing the likelihoods here is not easy. However, I am not optimistic (and that’s a huge understatement) that a physical explanation will be forthcoming for apparently uncaused random processes at the quantum level. All attempts to do this have either been disproven (e.g. the EPR) or else highly contrived (e.g. the Bohm interpretation).

They may be genuinely random. The truth is that quantum physics is a very new science and I think we have barely scratched the surface of it.

It is also interesting that many times our original “concept” was proven insufficient, like in the famous dilemma “is light a wave or a particle?”. It turned out an invalid dichotomy.

The fact that you are not optimistic (I am) is unfortunately not a deciding factor. It happened time and again that previously unexplained and seemingly unexplainable events became clear and easy to explain as science progressed. Of course it is not true that prior successes will “ensure” further successes, but it looks highly probable that they will.

So, how to distinguish between x-intervention and lack of causation? The only way that I can see is to posit some intention or purpose in the x-agent, and compare the likelihoods under the two hypotheses.

I don’t think that we can eliminate the first possibility just yet. After all that is the most likely one.

(And here is incidentally where I part company with “Intelligent Design” and Dembski.

I sure am glad to hear that.

It is necessary to assume something about the designer, and it is absolutely necessary to use a Bayesian approach.) I’ll discuss this more later, but just want to see if you agree with the basic metaphysics and epistemology.

I would like to hear more.

There is one observation I would like to inject here. The hypothesis of a non-material entity effecting material existence has a serious stumbling block: at the “time and place” of intervention there is an “interface” between the two types of exisitence. At this point we can “catch” the non-material entity “red-handed”.

The reason for this is that a non-material entity causing a material change is either really “magic”, or the non-material entity must assume some material properties in order to cause a change - that is it must cease to be “fully” immaterial. After all we can agree that the only known non-material entites (concepts) are “inert”, they cannot effect a material change.

 

[ateista]

I know. If we can demonstrate that p-existence is not self-existent and needs to draw its existence from some self-existent entity, then we have proved that some form of existence other than “p” and “c” is real. If I understand your position, you would call this “x” existence.

You are right. That is what I meant.

The continued functioning of energy and its governing laws does not prove that such things are self-existent. Even if the framework of the universe operates according to itself without direct intervention or support from anything else, this does not address how the framework of the universe exists in of itself, making the universe possible.

The fact that we can observe energy functioning without intervention does not address how the energy exists in the first place.

Energy cannot be separated from matter, which cannot be separated from space and time. As far as we can tell, they are self-existent. I see no reason to assume otherwise.

Maybe you do. That is what I would like to hear about. What properties of space - time - energy - matter (let’s call it STEM - after all everything stems from them - in my opinion… ) would make it not self-existent?

 

[CatsAndDogs]

Quote:
Originally Posted by ateista
This is a hypothesis. To substantiate it you would have to have some reason why p-existence is not self-existent, why x-existence is self-existent and why x-existence can be used as an explanatory factor.

I know. If we can demonstrate that p-existence is not self-existent and needs to draw its existence from some self-existent entity, then we have proved that some form of existence other than “p” and “c” is real. If I understand your position, you would call this “x” existence.

Are we missing a pair of “types” of existence here? Existence qua existence, and non-existence qua non-existence?

• “O” existent (conjectured: see below)
• “C” existence is a “super-limited fleshing out (by ‘personal intellect’)” of an “x” existence.
• “P” existence is a “thorough fleshing out (by physicality)” of an “x” existence.
• “X” existence is a “non-fleshing out (yet possessing “fleshability”)” of actual “Existence” (“e”) existence qua existence.
• “E” existence is the only self-existent existence.

There may also be an “o” (oblivion) type of existence, which is one step “further” from “e” than “c” is, which is incapable of being fleshed out as it possesses no “fleshability”.

The only “self-existent” existence is “e” existence. All others are “special cases” of “e” given varying degrees of “fleshing”.

The materialist wishes to place “realness” on the “p” (or material) level of existence because he’s a “materialist”.

 

[Sarpedon]

Maybe you do. That is what I would like to hear about. What properties of space - time - energy - matter (let’s call it STEM - after all everything stems from them - in my opinion… ) would make it not self-existent?

Causation

A self existent entity must not be caused by any other thing. As far as I am aware, all STEM is caused or affected by something else.

If STEM is uncaused, then what starts the chain of causation? Would there be a chain at all? If the foundational building blocks of the universe are self-existent as independant entities with no need for anything else, why would they interact with each other to create the world we know?

 

[Nullasalus]

Believers assert a third kind of existence. It is not physical, but not merely conceptual either. Let’s call it X-existence (in math “x” usually denotes unknowns). This existence is supposed to be “active” in the sense that it can effect material existence, but it cannot be affected by material existence. Allegedly it has some other attributes, like being outside of space and time, etc.

We are not familiar with such kind of existence. Nowhere in the universe have we ever seen of found such existence.

Actually, we’re rather familiar with such - a computer simulation provides a decent analogue to that kind of relational existence. Not a perfect analogue, especially given some (and there are a variety) concepts of the relationship between X and P. But a programmer exists outside of the time of the simulation, the simulation’s physics do not impact the programmer’s, etc. Nick Bostrom (not exactly a ‘Believer’ philosopher) gets into this with his discussion over simulated realities.

So, there’s some rather powerful circumstantial evidence right there.

The additional problem for the atheist (though less recognized) is that the self-existence of STEM actually isn’t enough to get them where they need to go. You need STEM -mind. If space, time, energy, matter, and intelligence/mind are all fundamental, theism/deism trumps. The believers, on this question, occupy the most reasonable position - IMHO and such.

 

[CatsAndDogs]

Actually, we’re rather familiar with such - a computer simulation provides a decent analogue to that kind of relational existence. Not a perfect analogue, especially given some (and there are a variety) concepts of the relationship between X and P. But a programmer exists outside of the time of the simulation, the simulation’s physics do not impact the programmer’s, etc. Nick Bostrom (not exactly a ‘Believer’ philosopher) gets into this with his discussion over simulated realities.

So, there’s some rather powerful circumstantial evidence right there.

The additional problem for the atheist (though less recognized) is that the self-existence of STEM actually isn’t enough to get them where they need to go. You need STEM -mind. If space, time, energy, matter, and intelligence/mind are all fundamental, theism/deism trumps. The believers, on this question, occupy the most reasonable position - IMHO and such.

What does the materialist say the STEM “grows” from?

They appear to posit the idea that it grows either out of “itself”, or from a “cloud” into which we are not allowed to see (or at least can’t see into quite yet but will eventually be able to see into).

The STEM seems to have no “initial cause” just as a plant doesn’t have an “initial starter cell” (there is no “starter cell” identifiable as the “seed”).

When we see a plant (a STEM) we know it came from a seed, and we know the seed came from a previous plant, but where did the seed/plant combination come from?

I choose to never accept “infinity” as an answer to a problem, other than as another way of saying “I don’t have a clue what the answer is to this problem!”, so the infinite loop of “infinite circular causation (no beginnng and no ending)” is not acceptable as anything but a statement of ignorance.

God, having created his “book” (creation) with persons in it which have free will (angelic and human) whom God can “guide”, with ultimate subtlety by a “tweaking” of their environment (ie. ANY non-free-will part of their environment), and who reacts with utter wisdom (due to being in His own “time” [He’s never “rushed”]) in that “tweaking” to “get His message across”, is the perfect non-infinity-invoking solution to the question of existence.

If the materialist were really only concerned with “understanding reality as it is physically observable”, ie the “way of the engineer”, then he would leave matters of the “meaning” of existence to those who deal with meaning as opposed to his stated concerns, which are utility.

But the “religious (scientistic) materialist” IS concerned with the meaning of existence because he realizes that from meaning comes “limitation” (of action, ie. morals), and to “limit” the engineer in non-“absolute-utilitarian” (ie. utterly materialistic) ways is an “intrinsic evil” to the scientistic materialist.

 

[Nullasalus]

What does the materialist say the STEM “grows” from?

They appear to posit the idea that it grows either out of “itself”, or from a “cloud” into which we are not allowed to see (or at least can’t see into quite yet but will eventually be able to see into).

My take is that we know that minds are capable of creating and ordering… well, just about everything we experience. Again, back to Nick Bostrom and simulation theory. And we certainly know minds exist. So it makes sense to posit mind as truly fundamental.

The alternatives are weak. ‘The physical has always existed / just popped into existence uncaused, and it happened to be rational and ordered and capable of giving rise to minds.’ It’s on the level of positing primordial chaos as a creative agent. No matter which route is taken - from ‘there’s an infinite number of universes that come into existence’ or otherwise - you’re always left with a question where mind is the most preferable answer. As I said, rationality leads you to, at least, deism. And deism intellectually opens the door to theism.

So sayeth I, anyway.

 

[ateista]

Causation

Yes, causation needs to be considered.

A self existent entity must not be caused by any other thing. As far as I am aware, all STEM is caused or affected by something else.

If STEM is uncaused, then what starts the chain of causation? Would there be a chain at all? If the foundational building blocks of the universe are self-existent as independant entities with no need for anything else, why would they interact with each other to create the world we know?

We must be very careful to avoid the trap of the fallacy of composition.

Just a refresher. The fallacy of composition is manifested by the following argument:

All elements (E) in the collection (C) share a common property (P).
Therefore the collection (C) also has the property (P).

This is not correct. Sometimes the collection does indeed have the property (P), sometimes it does not, and still other times the property cannot even be defined for the collection.

Respective examples: “each tile in the floor is white, therefore the whole floor is white” - is a correct generalization from the individual to the whole.

Another one: “each tile in the floor is square, therefore the whole floor is square” - is an incorrect generalization from the individual to the whole. The floor may be square, but it may be an oblong.

And finally: “each human has exactly one mother, therefore the whole humanity also has exactly one mother” - incorrect, since the property of “having a mother” cannot even be defined for the collection.
So we must be careful.

First, causation is a generally accepted and observed phenomenon. But it does not mean that the whole physical universe contains one and only one uninterrupted causal chain.

We also accept (axiomatically) that freedom of action exists. Not just for humans, but also for any organism with a mind capable of making decisions. (Not even animals are “railroad cars” on tracks). Therefore we can observe the beginning of new causal chains every time a human decision is made.

Also the physical universe is not actually an “entity”, it is a collection of entities.

So, in order to establish a necessary “first cause” one must somehow establish that the universe, the collection of entities (some of which are not causally determined) needs an “external causing factor”.

This cannot be done by stipulating that “all elements within the universe are externally caused, therefore the universe is caused”. It would be a fallacious argument as presented. It must be established without referring only to the causality principle. I don’t see how it could be done, but of course you are most welcome to try.

The same objection applies to any and all of the “first something” arguments. In their usual form they commit the same fallacy.

 

[ateista]

Actually, we’re rather familiar with such - a computer simulation provides a decent analogue to that kind of relational existence.

Computer simulations and AI (artificial intelligence) are a great analogy for the human mind. Both are directly dependent on the underlying “hardware”. The purported X-existence is independent of physical “infrastrucure”. The mind is the activity of the brain, and as such it does not qualify as X-existence.

A crude example would be: walking is an activity of the legs, but it is dependent on the legs as “foundation”. Walking is not a material ontological entity, but it needs the material underpinning to exist. So it is part of P-existence.

Not a perfect analogue, especially given some (and there are a variety) concepts of the relationship between X and P. But a programmer exists outside of the time of the simulation, the simulation’s physics do not impact the programmer’s, etc. Nick Bostrom (not exactly a ‘Believer’ philosopher) gets into this with his discussion over simulated realities.

So, there’s some rather powerful circumstantial evidence right there.

Not so, since none of them are independent of the P-existence.

The additional problem for the atheist (though less recognized) is that the self-existence of STEM actually isn’t enough to get them where they need to go. You need STEM -mind.

Right. And the mind is the electro-chemical activity of the brain, and as such it is part of P-existence.

If space, time, energy, matter, and intelligence/mind are all fundamental, theism/deism trumps. The believers, on this question, occupy the most reasonable position - IMHO and such.

I don’t see how? If STEM and the STEM-mind are all fundamental, how could deism / theism be even suggested as a hypothesis? As SekingCatholic so well expressed, the X-existence should not even be proposed as a hypothesis, if the physical existence “supports itself”. And so far it does.

 

[CatsAndDogs]

My take is that we know that minds are capable of creating and ordering… well, just about everything we experience. Again, back to Nick Bostrom and simulation theory. And we certainly know minds exist. So it makes sense to posit mind as truly fundamental.

The alternatives are weak. ‘The physical has always existed / just popped into existence uncaused, and it happened to be rational and ordered and capable of giving rise to minds.’ It’s on the level of positing primordial chaos as a creative agent. No matter which route is taken - from ‘there’s an infinite number of universes that come into existence’ or otherwise - you’re always left with a question where mind is the most preferable answer. As I said, rationality leads you to, at least, deism. And deism intellectually opens the door to theism.

So sayeth I, anyway.

Hear hear!

That was my path:

• Primitive (childlike) “Beauty-ism” (“Aestheticalism”?), based on “beauty is good” and “to be ‘worshipped’”.
• Scientism, based on order (“science” descriptive of beautiful order) IS beautiful, and good, and worthy of “worship”.
• Deism, based on a “mind” (of SOME sort) behind the order and beauty which is worthy of “worship”.
• Catholicism, based on the only logically consistent BIG religion where ONE POINT OF INTERPRETATION of truth (the Magisterium) is it’s chief (and distinguishing) characteristic, which answers the aforesaid questions relating to beauty, rational order, and mind.

Anytime anyone mentions “infinity”, like a lawyer whose mouth is moving, I know he’s trying to pull a fast one.

 

[CatsAndDogs]

Yes, causation needs to be considered.

We must be very careful to avoid the trap of the fallacy of composition.

Just a refresher. The fallacy of composition is manifested by the following argument:

balhblahblah…

So we must be careful.

First, causation is a generally accepted and observed phenomenon. But it does not mean that the whole physical universe contains one and only one uninterrupted causal chain.

The WHOLE physical universe IS a single thing, as it is ONE ENERGY (with matter being a special case of energy) FIELD.

All parts are “contiguous” with all other parts via some “track” across this field.

Any perturbation of THE FIELD affects ALL parts of THE field. That is what the “causal chain” IS, in fact.

In truth, there is no “causal chain” but rather a “causal web (blanket)”.

We also accept (axiomatically) that freedom of action exists. Not just for humans, but also for any organism with a mind capable of making decisions. (Not even animals are “railroad cars” on tracks). Therefore we can observe the beginning of new causal chains every time a human decision is made.

These are not “beginnings” (of causal chains), but only intermediate perturbations of the one causal web. They ARE novel in that they couldn’t be determinalistically predicted but they are just normal perturbations in their effects, like any non-free-will commenced perturbations.

Also the physical universe is not actually an “entity”, it is a collection of entities.

This is your primary error.

So, in order to establish a necessary “first cause” one must somehow establish that the universe, the collection of entities (some of which are not causally determined) needs an “external causing factor”.

The question on the table is: “What created the field on which all pertubations play out?”

The first cause is NOT what PERTURBED the field first, but what CREATED the field in the first place.

This cannot be done by stipulating that “all elements within the universe are externally caused, therefore the universe is caused”. It would be a fallacious argument as presented. It must be established without referring only to the causality principle. I don’t see how it could be done, but of course you are most welcome to try.

The same objection applies to any and all of the “first something” arguments. In their usual form they commit the same fallacy.

The fallacy that the universe is not “the (single thing) universe” but “a big bag of isolated things which might or might not affect each other depending on various (imagined?) conditions of those isolated things” is to posit a “universe” which has NO overarching order!

What is your evidence that the universe’s order is not UNIVERSAL?

 

[Nullasalus]

Computer simulations and AI (artificial intelligence) are a great analogy for the human mind. Both are directly dependent on the underlying “hardware”. The purported X-existence is independent of physical “infrastrucure”. The mind is the activity of the brain, and as such it does not qualify as X-existence.

You’re bringing in human consciousness arguments where they don’t need to be yet. And you’re making a mistake as to what happens when you realize the possibility of simulations.

In our universe, any simulation we make is (except for mental simulations, but let’s put those aside for now) going to be dependent on hardware. Sure, that’s a given. But we also know that the simulated worlds we make would not have to conform directly to the laws and realities of our own world - we could tweak fundamental values of physics or physical reality in sim-existence. We could even make it such that creating simulations in sim-existence is an impossible feat, even though we know that in P-existence it’s possible.

Now, imagine we’re in a simulation. (Like any ‘fundamental nature of reality’ claim, it’s not falsifiable in a Popperian sense. But, for now, imagine.) Just as sim-existence would not = P-existence for those within the simulation, “our” P-existence would not necessarily = P-existence in the world of the programmer (PRG-existence). In fact, one could argue that chances are such that it certainly wouldn’t.

That P-existence != PRG-existence indicates X-existence or close enough. X-existence is posited to be non-physical, but the only physical we know is that which is contained in P-existence, which we know can differ from sim-existence drastically. So reason favors PRG = not-P. You can try to salvage materialism by arguing ‘Well, it would be not-P, but since P-existence is as fundamental as we know, PRG would have to be so close to P to count as P.’ But at that point, ‘physicalism’ loses all meaning. Everything is going to be physicalism. The immaterial is just one more flavor of physicalism.

(This has been par for the course for materialism. Russell thought quantum mechanics discoveries undermined materialism, because suddenly the material was absolutely nothing like what previous materialists thought. Well, they just expanded the definition of materialism to include quantum discoveries. And when dark matter/energy was indicated to possibly be the majority constituent in our universe, well, they decided dark matter/dark energy was included under materialism as well.)

I don’t see how? If STEM and the STEM-mind are all fundamental, how could deism / theism be even suggested as a hypothesis? As SekingCatholic so well expressed, the X-existence should not even be proposed as a hypothesis, if the physical existence “supports itself”. And so far it does.

That’s not exactly what SeekingCatholic said, and if so, I’d simply disagree. They said…

Obviously, if physical laws provide a complete explanation for what we observe in the universe, then by Occam’s Razor we would reject the hypothesis that an immaterial entity is directly involved (the entity could still exist, however, just not be affecting material processes in any way).

“By Occam’s Razor”. The problem comes in when we ask what the alternatives are to deism/theism when it comes to the existence of the reality we know. We know we can give rise to realities via simulation. We know, oddly enough, that if P holds we can give rise to a simulation of our own reality. In short, we know that minds can work to give rise to “realities”. What we don’t know is whether the fundamentally mindless can give rise to said realities - if they can just pop out of nothingness, uncaused, with all the rules and necessities in play to give rise to rational reality including agents capable of making reality. In other words, we have to assume vastly more for the ‘P-reality came about with no guidance or intention from a fundamental mind’ hypothesis than we do for ‘P-reality came about with guidance/intention from a fundamental mind’. Occam’s razor doesn’t slice deism/theism. It slices atheism. Which may explain why Occam was a cleric.

Let me stress this - it doesn’t matter if STEM is fundamental if mind is fundamental as well. STEM + Mind = Deism/theism. And all available (inconclusive) evidence points towards, at the very least, STEM + Mind. The alternative is “STEM + Beats me, we just got lucky”.

The error goes away when you realize that positioning ‘No God’ as the null hypothesis is a tremendous mistake.

 

[Nullasalus]

Hear hear!

That was my path:

• Primitive (childlike) “Beauty-ism” (“Aestheticalism”?), based on “beauty is good” and “to be ‘worshipped’”.
• Scientism, based on order (“science” descriptive of beautiful order) IS beautiful, and good, and worthy of “worship”.
• Deism, based on a “mind” (of SOME sort) behind the order and beauty which is worthy of “worship”.
• Catholicism, based on the only logically consistent BIG religion where ONE POINT OF INTERPRETATION of truth (the Magisterium) is it’s chief (and distinguishing) characteristic, which answers the aforesaid questions relating to beauty, rational order, and mind.

Anytime anyone mentions “infinity”, like a lawyer whose mouth is moving, I know he’s trying to pull a fast one.

Glad to see someone else took a similar path to myself. I think one of the biggest problems with modern discussion/evangelizing is that few people are aware of the deism step. It really is a big piece of the puzzle. I think most realize this by instinct, but typically are unable to put it into words. (The historical Deist v Theist hostility doesn’t help, but I think we’re now in an age where a fresh reintroduction of natural philosophy is in order.)

 

[CatsAndDogs]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Nullasalus
Actually, we’re rather familiar with such - a computer simulation provides a decent analogue to that kind of relational existence.

Computer simulations and AI (artificial intelligence) are a great analogy for the human mind. Both are directly dependent on the underlying “hardware”. The purported X-existence is independent of physical “infrastrucure”. The mind is the activity of the brain, and as such it does not qualify as X-existence.

A crude example would be: walking is an activity of the legs, but it is dependent on the legs as “foundation”. Walking is not a material ontological entity, but it needs the material underpinning to exist. So it is part of P-existence.

What you are missing is that ALL “existences” have as their “substrate” the “e” existence, which is what gives “p” existence it’s particular quality of being “fleshed out”.

The so-called “x” existence is simply the “prototype” existence, and NOT the “existence” of God.

In truth, “e” existence is the “substrate” shared between the “prototype” layer (“x”) and God’s “being”. God is “made of” “e” existence, but He is not just the “stuff of” “e” existence, anymore than a (human) person is “just the stuff of ‘p’ existence”.

God is composed of “e” stuff, but He is the singular MIND composed of “e” stuff.