S
Sarpedon
Guest
I will be gone at camp for all of next week but after I will return to this thread.
Oh, very well described! <laughing heartily!>…And all available (inconclusive) evidence points towards, at the very least, STEM + Mind. The alternative is “STEM + Beats me, we just got lucky”.
I’ve seen that kind of response before. For my money, even ‘infinite/large number of universes’ doesn’t do the job it has to for atheist materialists, because (As Paul Davies noted) all such a posit would do is move the fundamental question up another level to ‘Alright, but what’s behind this infinite number of universes?’ I have severe doubts about whether alternate universes (whether infinity or ‘just the two’) could ever be verified to exist, even if they certainly did - but as a thought exercise, I can work with the assumption of infinite universes… and back to deism/theism I still go. It still makes more sense to posit a supreme mind backing the multitude of universes than to assume ‘Well, these things just happen and no fundamental mind is involved’, because you’re still dealing with source-level tuning, creation, etc - and ‘mind’ still remains the one answer we know is a definite possibility, while ‘creation sans mind’ remains an unfounded additional speculation.In response to that, the so-called “materialist” THEN goes to the (INFINITY INVOKING [aka “BS shoveling”) maneuver of, “But there are an INFINITE number of ‘universes’ of which SEVERAL are ‘tuned’ by chance to LOOK like they are ‘created by a mind’ to those within them who are ‘searching for a creator mind’ of their creation”.
I wouldn’t want to generalize materialists or atheists, but I’d agree that a lot of times there’s something fishy going on with the arguments. I think many try to position themselves in a pseudo-agnostic role where they aggressively question any concept of God that bears a resemblance to Judeo-Christian, but don’t want to defend any alternatives. Because the alternative is effectively “primordial chaos” - a source of unplanned, brute force, who-knows-why laws that just so happen to give rise to minds that can give rise to creativity and purposefulness. It can do absolutely everything God-as-imagined can do, except have or be subject to a mind. Oh, and it should be the null hypothesis.That is why that kind of “materialist” is really a religious person, searching for religous-type “truths”. Instead of worshipping a CREATOR, an actual answer to a question, they worship a LACK of an answer, and the “structures”, idols, that need inventing to justify that “hole”.
Obviously I misunderstood what you said before. So you speak of virtual reality (sim-worlds) which are present in some computer games (in a very rudimentary form), but bring it several steps further. Very good idea. There are only the simulated beings who do not even know that there is an “outside world”, though they may speculate about it.You’re bringing in human consciousness arguments where they don’t need to be yet. And you’re making a mistake as to what happens when you realize the possibility of simulations.
In our universe, any simulation we make is (except for mental simulations, but let’s put those aside for now) going to be dependent on hardware. Sure, that’s a given. But we also know that the simulated worlds we make would not have to conform directly to the laws and realities of our own world - we could tweak fundamental values of physics or physical reality in sim-existence. We could even make it such that creating simulations in sim-existence is an impossible feat, even though we know that in P-existence it’s possible.
Like in the “Matrix”?Now, imagine we’re in a simulation. (Like any ‘fundamental nature of reality’ claim, it’s not falsifiable in a Popperian sense. But, for now, imagine.) Just as sim-existence would not = P-existence for those within the simulation, “our” P-existence would not necessarily = P-existence in the world of the programmer (PRG-existence). In fact, one could argue that chances are such that it certainly wouldn’t.
Yes, you are right. For the beings residing in that world it is like the X-existence. True, the “laws of nature” are totally different in the two layers of existence. But that is not relevant. The programmer is indeed “God” of the simulated world. He can change the parameters of this world, he can effect them from the outside.That P-existence != PRG-existence indicates X-existence or close enough.
That does not follow. From this it only follows that the P-existence of the programmer is different from the P-existence on the simulated beings. The programmer is indeed extremely powerful compared to the beings inside the computer’s world. But it does not follow that the programmer is immaterial, or is not bound by the laws of nature, space, time, matter and energy in his world.X-existence is posited to be non-physical, but the only physical we know is that which is contained in P-existence, which we know can differ from sim-existence drastically. So reason favors PRG = not-P.
No, this does not follow either. What follows is that the P-existence of the programmer is distinct and different from the P-existence of the artificial world inside the computer.You can try to salvage materialism by arguing ‘Well, it would be not-P, but since P-existence is as fundamental as we know, PRG would have to be so close to P to count as P.’ But at that point, ‘physicalism’ loses all meaning. Everything is going to be physicalism. The immaterial is just one more flavor of physicalism.
Why are you surprised? You say this as if it were somehow improper and dishonest.(This has been par for the course for materialism. Russell thought quantum mechanics discoveries undermined materialism, because suddenly the material was absolutely nothing like what previous materialists thought. Well, they just expanded the definition of materialism to include quantum discoveries. And when dark matter/energy was indicated to possibly be the majority constituent in our universe, well, they decided dark matter/dark energy was included under materialism as well.)
Mind is a function or activity of matter (brain) as far as we can determine. The operation of the mind is akin to the operating system of the computer. Neither can exist apart from the underlying hardware. The “hardware” supplies the physical / chemical interactions of the neurons in the brain and the electronic interactions of the switches / circuits of the computer.Let me stress this - it doesn’t matter if STEM is fundamental if mind is fundamental as well. STEM + Mind = Deism/theism. And all available (inconclusive) evidence points towards, at the very least, STEM + Mind. The alternative is “STEM + Beats me, we just got lucky”.
The error goes away when you realize that positioning ‘No God’ as the null hypothesis is a tremendous mistake.
Have a great time! Will be good to have you back.I will be gone at camp for all of next week but after I will return to this thread.
I’m not the originator of the idea. Nick Bostrom has popularized a version of simulation theory which has in part inspired me, as has Charles Babbage’s takes on the matter. I go in a different direction with it, but it’s not purely my own.Obviously I misunderstood what you said before. So you speak of virtual reality (sim-worlds) which are present in some computer games (in a very rudimentary form), but bring it several steps further. Very good idea. There are only the simulated beings who do not even know that there is an “outside world”, though they may speculate about it.
But calling PRG-existence “P-existence” means to make “P-existence” meaningless as a descriptor. You can just as easily say that X-existence is “God’s P-existence” at that point.Like in the “Matrix”?Sure I can imagine that. Where we disagree that for the beings in the sim-existence it would be their P-existence. They could observe the laws governing their universe, and they would be bound by them.
It’s entirely relevant. We’re talking about the practicality and justification of assuming X-existence, and this thought experiment lends a whole lot of credence not only to logically grounding such a point, but pointing out its strength against alternatives.Yes, you are right. For the beings residing in that world it is like the X-existence. True, the “laws of nature” are totally different in the two layers of existence. But that is not relevant. The programmer is indeed “God” of the simulated world. He can change the parameters of this world, he can effect them from the outside.
Based on what we know about ourselves as beings, there will always be an element of faith even if said programmer (or God) really and truly does exist - unless the programmer brute-force included certainty in our minds. Merely existing and actively making appearances / revealing self would not do the trick.Can the beings discover that? Not if the programmer made it impossible for them to discover it.
It can’t ever be decisively proven one way or the other. Science has its limits, and so does certainty in philosophy.That does not follow. From this it only follows that the P-existence of the programmer is different from the P-existence on the simulated beings. The programmer is indeed extremely powerful compared to the beings inside the computer’s world. But it does not follow that the programmer is immaterial, or is not bound by the laws of nature, space, time, matter and energy in his world.
Depends on who you talk to, even among the physicists. There’s a reason the materialists by and large call themselves ‘physicalists’ nowadays - it’s because the discoveries of QM called into question whether materialism as conceived was utterly undermined.What does follow is that P-existence may have many layers to it, and the laws governing each layer may be different. But that is no surprise again, the laws governing the subatomic world are different from the laws of the macro-world. That does not make the macro world “immaterial”.
You’re saying the programmer, who exists in a reality superior to our own and which our P is subject to, has a P-existence. Sorry, but that’s rallying a whole lot of assumption right out of the gates, and threatens to reduce P to meaninglessness. ‘Whatever the existence the programmer inhabits, is P, even though P can mean just about everything including a world where our physics don’t apply and fundamental laws either are not present or are vastly different’.No, this does not follow either. What follows is that the P-existence of the programmer is distinct and different from the P-existence of the artificial world inside the computer.
Why are you surprised? You say this as if it were somehow improper and dishonest.
I find it squirrely to say the least. I’m not talking about science here, but philosophers. Prior to QM, materialism depended on a conception of matter that was entirely macro-like. Obviously determinist, closed, ‘solid’. This changed, but materialism just chugged right along. ‘I’m a materialist, in that I’m going to call whatever actually exists material.’Scientific concepts change and …
That’s an oversimplification which leaves out some essential questions - are the operations entirely ‘macro-level’ or do they extend down into the quantum level? Are there emergent properties? Is consciousness itself reducible to the physical? Some philosophers (naturalists, even atheists as they are) don’t think it can be.Mind is a function or activity of matter (brain) as far as we can determine.
OK, well it always helps to define terms clearly. You’ve defined “concept”, a “recognized” regularity, tautologically, as non-existent without some intelligent entity capable of recognizing it. However, assuming a world with physical regularities but without intelligent entities, you then say that the laws of nature nevertheless exist. Are you saying the laws of nature have p-existence?I agree that the laws of nature “exist” in a possible world without intelligent entites - if there are laws of nature in a hypothetical world. The word “exist” means here that the physical regularities are there to be discovered (if there are regularities at all, which is far from being obvious!).
I use the word “concept” as a recognized regularity. One hydrogen atom plus another hydrogen atom would make two hydrogen atoms - as ontological entites. But the concept of “two” hydrogen atoms would not exist without some intelligent entity who can recognize the “abstraction” of “two”.
As I said in the opening post, some concepts refer to actual regularities of nature but others refer to totally imaginary entities. The first kind we formulate based upon discovering the regularities, the second kind we “make up”.
Only because you’ve defined concepts that way. I can just as well define concept to refer to the regularities of nature, which as you admit exist even without intelligent minds.This is the reason that I consider the existence of “concepts” apart from the intelligent minds an incorrect proposition.
And I can posit a statement: “This statement is false.” Or a series of statements: “The following statement is true. The previous statement is false.” These are, indeed, meaningless. Their truth value is not true or false - it is null. But to posit a hypothesis the hypothetical statement must have a true or false truth value. Now you said x-existence could be posited as a hypothesis. That implies “there is at least one entity who exists via x-existence” has a truth value of true or false, not null.I wonder. I can posit a definition: “the smallest positive integer which cannot be stated using less than a 100 letters”. It is a clear mathematical definiton of a number. The trouble is that it contains less than 100 letters (82 letters, counting the spaces). It is a simple proposition, still meaningless.
I could just as well ask whether you really have a “meaningful” definition of “existence” for physical ontological objects.But we may have a miscommunication here: I meant that the word “existence” may not be meaningful when we start to speak of x-existence. So far we defined “existence” for physical ontological objects and for concepts - and they are quite different. How can the word “existence” be defined in a meaningful fashion for x-existence? That is the pertinent question.
But, as every physics major knows, an electron bound to a hydrogen atom does not “exist” at any particular “point” in space. In fact when you get right down to it you can’t prove existence of physical objects as ontological entities even at the macro-level - these may be mere human classifications. Just like the law of non-contradiction, the concept of existence must be assumed, axiomatically, for grand philosophical discussions about metaphysics to even get off the ground.We are all familiar with physical existence, let’s call it P-existence. It imples space, time, energy and matter. When we speak of physical existence, we talk about objects, composed of matter and energy, existing in some point in space. Physical objects can interact, they can exert “influence” on other objects.
Quantum physics has been around for about 100 years. And the best evidence we have to this point is that they are genuinely random. The possibility of local hidden variables has been disproven. Global hidden variables are possible (e.g. Bohm’s pilot wave theory), but it seems to me contrived.They may be genuinely random. The truth is that quantum physics is a very new science and I think we have barely scratched the surface of it.
As I said, assigning likelihoods and priors is not always easy.The fact that you are not optimistic (I am) is unfortunately not a deciding factor. It happened time and again that previously unexplained and seemingly unexplainable events became clear and easy to explain as science progressed. Of course it is not true that prior successes will “ensure” further successes, but it looks highly probable that they will.
I didn’t eliminate it. However I disagree that it is the “most likely one” for two reasons. Why don’t you ask a few physicists and see whether they think determinism will ever return to physics. It’s not just an argument from incredulity. There is positive evidence supporitng the irreducible randomness of quantum events. More importantly, the likelihood of observing quantum events if they are caused by an immaterial entity or uncaused is one - it’s less than one if they are due to as yet unknown physical processes (which may not exist).I don’t think that we can eliminate the first possibility just yet. After all that is the most likely one.
Sure. Saying “God did it” is in itself just as unfalsifiable, and ad hoc as saying “it just happened uncaused”. The reason is that hypothesis can explain any data at all. It’s like fitting 10 points to a function with 10 parameters - you are guaranteed a perfect fit every time, but you get no information at all about whether your 10-parameter function is an accurate representation of reality. But if constraints are placed upon God’s (or some other immaterial entity’s) actions now you reduce the hypothesis space and you get more explanatory power.I would like to hear more.
How so? All you still have are physical observations. How are you saying anything different than what I am saying, which is that the relevant evidence is seemingly uncaused physical events?There is one observation I would like to inject here. The hypothesis of a non-material entity effecting material existence has a serious stumbling block: at the “time and place” of intervention there is an “interface” between the two types of exisitence. At this point we can “catch” the non-material entity “red-handed”.![]()
The reason for this is that a non-material entity causing a material change is either really “magic”, or the non-material entity must assume some material properties in order to cause a change - that is it must cease to be “fully” immaterial. After all we can agree that the only known non-material entites (concepts) are “inert”, they cannot effect a material change.
Well that of course nullifies free will, something I thought you posited earlier in saying our actions are the start of separate causal chains. If we have no free will then our actions are determined from without (formation of the brain, how the brain functions according to the things that lead up to its formation and still effect it, etc.). In other words, there can be no breaking form the chain without a free will. You become a completely submissive slave to the primary causal chain with not even the ability to freely will to be outside of it, let alone actually be outside it.Mind is a function or activity of matter (brain) as far as we can determine. The operation of the mind is akin to the operating system of the computer.
This is not compatible with libertarian free will, but it is consonant with compatibilist free will (soft determinism).Well that of course nullifies free will, something I thought you posited earlier in saying our actions are the start of separate causal chains. If we have no free will then our actions are determined from without (formation of the brain, how the brain functions according to the things that lead up to its formation and still effect it, etc.). In other words, there can be no breaking form the chain without a free will. You become a completely submissive slave to the primary causal chain with not even the ability to freely will to be outside of it, let alone actually be outside it.
More devastating is that this theory also destroys reason. If we posit a truth, that ‘truth’ does not have an objective foundation since it is dependent on whatever the causal chain has me thinking on the moment. There can be no real ‘measuring’ against a real standard since the standard would not be considered a real thing. furthermore, there would be no standard for truth that is anymore than the result of what I ate a few days ago, and the events that forced my brain to act a certain way. So in more than one way does it destroy reason (and there are even more than just these) In other words, if your hypothesis is true (note also the idea is not physical in itself, I cannot point to truth pieces sitting around), we have no reason to believe its true, just that we think that way because we are being forced to (we even have no reason to believe that for the same reasons).
Yes, that is my conclusion. But that does not make it meaningless.But calling PRG-existence “P-existence” means to make “P-existence” meaningless as a descriptor. You can just as easily say that X-existence is “God’s P-existence” at that point.
Let me ask you this: does “walking” have p-existence? It is the activity of the p-existing “legs”. The laws of nature are the physical interactions of physical particles. But the interaction itself is just as “physical” as “walking”.OK, well it always helps to define terms clearly. You’ve defined “concept”, a “recognized” regularity, tautologically, as non-existent without some intelligent entity capable of recognizing it. However, assuming a world with physical regularities but without intelligent entities, you then say that the laws of nature nevertheless exist. Are you saying the laws of nature have p-existence?
Yes, you could. Why should you? In my eyes the distinction is valuable. It is clearer.Only because you’ve defined concepts that way. I can just as well define concept to refer to the regularities of nature, which as you admit exist even without intelligent minds.
Yes.And I can posit a statement: “This statement is false.” Or a series of statements: “The following statement is true. The previous statement is false.” These are, indeed, meaningless. Their truth value is not true or false - it is null. But to posit a hypothesis the hypothetical statement must have a true or false truth value. Now you said x-existence could be posited as a hypothesis. That implies “there is at least one entity who exists via x-existence” has a truth value of true or false, not null.
Yes, you can do that. My answer is that we directly experience the physical reality through our senses.I could just as well ask whether you really have a “meaningful” definition of “existence” for physical ontological objects.
Ok. We are familiar with our own existence. We do not subscribe to solipsism, therefore we accept external reality. We experience matter, energy, space and time through our senses.But, as every physics major knows, an electron bound to a hydrogen atom does not “exist” at any particular “point” in space. In fact when you get right down to it you can’t prove existence of physical objects as ontological entities even at the macro-level - these may be mere human classifications. Just like the law of non-contradiction, the concept of existence must be assumed, axiomatically, for grand philosophical discussions about metaphysics to even get off the ground.
No it does not. First, we do not “know” if free will exists or not. We either accept it axiomatically, or reject it. It cannot be proven or falsified.Well that of course nullifies free will, something I thought you posited earlier in saying our actions are the start of separate causal chains…
Not what I’m saying, and sim-worlds are not brains-in-a-vat. You’re confusing two different thought experiments.Let’s ponder what you say: It seems possible to build “brains in a vat”. Because that is what the sim-worlds are. I agree.
BecauseWhere I am lost is: “why does this scenario make it ‘likely’ that the deistic / theistic positon is correct”?
Sorry, but no. We can create a sim-world where sim-sim-worlds are not possible. We can create sim-worlds that operate according to physics and laws that are utterly foreign to us. We can infer nothing about the physical properties (or lack thereof) in PRG-world, just as a denizen of sim-world could not reasonably deduce any present/lacking physical properties of P-world based on the properties of sim-world. We could create a sim-world where gravity did not exist - sim-citizen deducing that P-world therefore had no gravity would be making an obvious mistake. PRG-existence could well and truly be X-existence.On the very contrary. It makes the concept of “immaterial existence” - less likely. We, the programmers are not immaterial. We exist in our time, even if this time is independent of the time inside the sim-world. The beings inside the sim-world can build their own “sim-world” - compared to which they are “gods”. And so on… In the other direction the “beings” who created our “sim-world” are also just brains in the vats… and so on.
There’s plenty to support such a hypothesis. Simulations exist - we can mess around with them as we please, both in the form of computer simulations as well as mental simulations. Design exists as an utter certainty - ‘unguided chance that just broke in a lucky way for humans’ is the stuff of pure philosophical speculation. And the bar you’re trying to set for “immaterial” is irrelevant - you’re admitting to the validity of a PRG world while insisting that, despite being completely unable to be aware of PRG world’s physics or lack thereof, it simply -must- be P or P-like. My response is to point out that your conclusion doesn’t follow, and even if it did, it’d hardly matter.There is nothing to support such a hypothesis. It is a fun mental exercise. And the conclusion is not an “immaterial” existence.
I guess what I’m really trying to ask here is how in your framework “c-existence” isn’t really just a subset of p-existence, if p-existence is a necessary condition for c-existence. I would argue the reverse; namely, the laws of nature do not only describe actual physical interactions, but also potential physical interactions between only hypothetically existing particles. Thus, it would seem to be that p-existence is actually a subset of c-existence.Let me ask you this: does “walking” have p-existence? It is the activity of the p-existing “legs”. The laws of nature are the physical interactions of physical particles. But the interaction itself is just as “physical” as “walking”.
Ok. We are familiar with our own existence. We do not subscribe to solipsism, therefore we accept external reality. We experience matter, energy, space and time through our senses.
No, not per se. However my point is that it isn’t easy (in fact, it’s impossible) to sort out objective ontological existence of various entities from mere human classifications.Your posts are excellent questions about the properties or attributes of physical existence. They do not question physical existence per se.
Whether physical existence is intrinsically random or not - it so far it seems to be random on the quantum level.
But you don’t know whether it’s in reality uncaused or caused by an x-existing entity. Neither do I, which is why Bayesian methodologies need to be brought into the mix.I do not see why should you equate / compare randomness (uncaused behavior) with “being caused by an x-existing entity” - if you do it, of course. Maybe I misunderstood your position.
Yes, and you asked for what kind of evidence could be shown in favor of such a type of existence. My answer is that that kind of evidence would be apparently (physically) uncaused physical events. That increases the posterior probability of its existence compared with the prior, based on the background assumption that all physical events have a physical cause. Admittedly I do not see the point of your last question - whether or not such an existence is affected by interaction with our physical existence is irrelevant to the question of whether such existence actually is the case or not.The possibility of non-matter, non-energy, non-spatial and timeless existence is the problem we are trying to explore - with the added question: “can such existence interact with our physical existence and yet be unaffected by it?”.
I am not talking about a proof of free will, though I have seen a discussion saying that its rejection (even in non-materialistic systems) destroys reason. I want to focus on what happens when one speaks of materialism and its compatibility with free will and reason. Let me present a minor argument and you refute what you disagree with:No it does not. First, we do not “know” if free will exists or not. We either accept it axiomatically, or reject it. It cannot be proven or falsified.
Of course I disagreeI believe (and you may disagree) that the free will is an inherent property of a system which exceeds a certain level of complexity.
What do you mean by ‘compatibilist free will’? Is there still room for actual freedom? I have heard various renderings of compatibilism, and all seem to fail at having a ‘free’ will or fail at being rational. However, I have not studied the issue of compatibilism much, so perhaps I am wrong?This is not compatible with libertarian free will, but it is consonant with compatibilist free will (soft determinism).
Omniscience is a subsidiary characteristic of omnipotence. Since the god of the sim can “stop time”, and “step” time forward or backward in any increment, and change any variable within the sim, the only “unknowable” activity in the sim for the god is that which he allows to happen by a grant of free will to entities in the sim.Let’s ponder … : It seems possible to build “brains in a vat”. Because that is what the sim-worlds are. I agree.
A totally artifical envirnment, where the sensory (name removed by moderator)uts for its inhabitants are provided via the electroninc impulses in the computer. The world itself is based upon the mathematical decisions made by the programmer (or programmers). The programmers are “Gods” to this world. They created it, they can monitor it, they can change it. They are omnipotent. (They are not omnisicent, but let’s not get there. The usual understanding of omniscience is nonsensical - just like the naive concept of omnipotence - being able to do “everything”.)
They are not fooled. They are sims. Their “world laws” limit what they can sense, but not what the god can tell them.Now the beings in this world cannot know all that. For them the world is physical and real. We, on the outside know that they are “fooled”. But for them it looks real.
Well, are we just brains in a vat, or not?Where is the difference? We also may be just brains in a vat. For us the sensory (name removed by moderator)ut may be the same: the impulses which reach us may be just electronic impulses which we “interpret” as light, sound, heat, touch, taste etc.
It (a purposefully designed universe) is LIKELY because entropic order creation requires firm underlying “rules” to “coalesce around”, and those “rules” are so delicate that the likelyhood of their being arbitrary is tiny compared to their being “purposefully set”.So far I agree. Where I am lost is: “why does this scenario make it ‘likely’ that the deistic / theistic positon is correct”?
We are ENTIRELY immaterial to the sims! Our “materialness” is the very definition of the sims immateriality, because it is “NOT THEIR MATERIAL”, which is what “immaterial” means.On the very contrary. It makes the concept of “immaterial existence” - less likely. We, the programmers are not immaterial.
YOU are proposing that we are “brains in vats”.We exist in our time, even if this time is independent of the time inside the sim-world. The beings inside the sim-world can build their own “sim-world” - compared to which they are “gods”. And so on… In the other direction the “beings” who created our “sim-world” are also just brains in the vats… and so on.
So, are you proposing that we AREN’T brains in vats?There is nothing to support such a hypothesis. It is a fun mental exercise. And the conclusion is not an “immaterial” existence.
Our energy is a “derivational” form of REAL energy.The possibility of non-matter, non-energy, non-spatial and timeless existence is the problem we are trying to explore - with the added question: “can such existence interact with our physical existence and yet be unaffected by it?”.
I fail to see the difference.Not what I’m saying, and sim-worlds are not brains-in-a-vat. You’re confusing two different thought experiments.
Because
Therefore, the favor falls in the direction of deism/theism. It doesn’t prove theism/deism to be true. But it does make it the most reasonable conclusion compared to atheism, or even agnosticism.
- We’re certain that design exists. It’s inextricably linked to our mental reality.
- We recognize that design (and thus a designer), through the simulation example, is entirely capable of explaining our reality as a whole.
- ‘Fundamentally unguided stuff that just happen to have the right laws and material to give rise to our universe’, meanwhile, is merely postulated to exist. We have direct and certain evidence of design by our subjective life, but no equivalent evidence for such primal chaos - nor could we ever.
Yes, we could. But we could do them otherwise, where “sim-sim-worlds” are possible. We should not restrict the parameters of this thought experiment, just so we can “force” a desired result.Sorry, but no. We can create a sim-world where sim-sim-worlds are not possible.
Not in the sense that it is “immaterial, spaceless and timeless - and yet active”. Its space, time and material attributes may be very different from ours, but some kind of matter, space and time are necessary for “action”.We can create sim-worlds that operate according to physics and laws that are utterly foreign to us. We can infer nothing about the physical properties (or lack thereof) in PRG-world, just as a denizen of sim-world could not reasonably deduce any present/lacking physical properties of P-world based on the properties of sim-world. We could create a sim-world where gravity did not exist - sim-citizen deducing that P-world therefore had no gravity would be making an obvious mistake. PRG-existence could well and truly be X-existence.
Actually, not “unacceptable”, rather unbelieved. And it should matter for the deist / theist. If there are constraints on the programmer - by the reality of his existence, then it is not X-existence.But you know what? For fun, I could even grant that PRG-existence may have, in however loose a fashion, something analogous to P-existence. For the theist/deist, it doesn’t really matter. As you said, from the perspective of P-existence, PRG-existence is X-existence. The designer in PRG is not bound by P - he’s “outside” of that. It illustrates a situation acceptable to the theist/deist, unacceptable for the atheist.
Not “faith” rather some basic axioms and principles.Yes, you can never be certain PRG is the ‘absolute reality’. But you’re never going to be certain of anything with regards to such a philosophical question. Faith will always come into play.
Only if this world is a sim-world. And not just a sim-world, but the programmer of this sim-world does not dwell in a sim-world.Just, the theist/deist is in a much better basic position compared to the atheist. The atheist needs a proposed philosophical construct of fundamentality that has essentially all the creative powers of God and none of the mental properties.
The immaterial, and timeless matter. Without it you have a material “God”, subject to limitations.There’s plenty to support such a hypothesis. Simulations exist - we can mess around with them as we please, both in the form of computer simulations as well as mental simulations. Design exists as an utter certainty - ‘unguided chance that just broke in a lucky way for humans’ is the stuff of pure philosophical speculation. And the bar you’re trying to set for “immaterial” is irrelevant - you’re admitting to the validity of a PRG world while insisting that, despite being completely unable to be aware of PRG world’s physics or lack thereof, it simply -must- be P or P-like. My response is to point out that your conclusion doesn’t follow, and even if it did, it’d hardly matter.
There’s a number. But for my purposes, the difference is that a brain-in-a-vat originally only affirmed the single mind, while a simulation addresses the nature of reality without denying it as an illusion.I fail to see the difference.
- Yes, we know that “design” exists.
Never said it did. But since we know design exists, and we know design can explain our world, we have no need to start postulating other less justifiable entities to explain our world like “infinity and/or chaos that just happened to be formed the right way”.
- Not exactly. Yes, our world “could be” designed. But the existence of a “sim-world” does not make it necessary that it “must be” designed.
Of course it can “look” designed. Even Dawkins admits to the appearance of design in our world. Plenty of other scientists, even atheists, cop to as much. And there’s certainly no reason that a sim-world can’t “look” designed - a simulation isn’t automatically concerned with fooling its inhabitants.Even if a world is a sim-world, it can never “look” designed, because it would be a dead give-away to its inhabitants. Indeed it only exhibits order, and order is not the same as design.
‘Totally undirected STEM that just happens to have attributes capable of spontaneously producing life, intelligence, and order.’What do you mean by “primal chaos”? There is no chaos, only properties of the physical universe.
Never forced a thing - I’m saying what’s entirely possible with what we know about design, and certainly design in our world. As I said repeatedly, this doesn’t ‘prove’ anything. It just shows that theism/deism is intellectually the more satisfying option to go with as opposed to atheism when it comes to existence questions.Yes, we could. But we could do them otherwise, where “sim-sim-worlds” are possible. We should not restrict the parameters of this thought experiment, just so we can “force” a desired result.![]()
You’re asking me if it could be, but I’m not denying that it couldn’t be. The world “could have” begun only five minutes ago. I’m saying which is the easier explanation to go with. “Sure, we know that design can be responsible for all we see, including subjective experience and nowadays even simulation evidence. And sure, we have no idea that chaos could be responsible for all we see, and we have no comparable evidence of it. But, I can imagine it all being undesigned!” Sure, you can imagine it. It’s just far less parsimonious.So we can postulate that there is one natural world, undesigned. Why should that world be not ours? Nothing indicates the contrary. Why should the “top-level” world be immaterial?
All you can do is assert this groundlessly, or by appealing to P. But appealing to P to explain PRG is hopeless - you’ve already ceded it can be utterly unlike what we know, certainly unlike P. If you plan on defeating the theist/deist claim by arguing that whoever would be in the position of deity just has to have some kind of material limitations, you’re sunk. It’s like ceding that it’s reasonable God exists, but certainly He gets tired now and then.Not in the sense that it is “immaterial, spaceless and timeless - and yet active”. Its space, time and material attributes may be very different from ours, but some kind of matter, space and time are necessary for “action”.
For the theist/deist, it’s enough to have a simulation and a designer with regards to the universe. There’s a reason I said theist/deist - because this thought experiment doesn’t bring us anywhere near where we need to be for doctrinal specifics. Maybe the mormons are right, and God has eternally pre-existed alongside matter. Maybe other christians are right, and God created the universe ex nihilo (even our own simulations can come close to such a description.) Maybe panentheist belief is right, and God is both the simulation and something else beyond it.Actually, not “unacceptable”, rather unbelieved. And it should matter for the deist / theist. If there are constraints on the programmer - by the reality of his existence, then it is not X-existence.
You said it was damn close to X-existence before - now you’re changing your mind on this. Yes, I said outright - we don’t have X-existence (or at least not a pure X-existence.) But sim-existence can be coded in such a way as to be utterly unlike P-existence. And our ‘constraints’ are hardly applicable to sim-existence. In there, there are no constraints. Aside from, perhaps, logical ones. No making a circle a triangle.Also, from the thought-experiment it does not follow that the human programmers who create the sim-world have X-existence. It may be incomprehensible to the inhabitants of the sim-world, but that is all. The programmers are also material, they are constrained. That is not X-existence.
Always faith. Forever faith. That which can never be decisively proven, even if it’s true, requires faith.Not “faith” rather some basic axioms and principles.
No, the reality of the situation doesn’t even come into play here. It’s a question of where reason is most easily employed. Otherwise you’d be saying ‘The theist only has justification to believe in God if God exists.’ Nonsense.Only if this world is a sim-world. And not just a sim-world, but the programmer of this sim-world does not dwell in a sim-world.
Immaterial and timeless can matter, to the theist. But it doesn’t matter to the atheist if you end up with an actual God and an altered doctrine. You’re groundlessly asserting that PRG is not only akin to P, but that the programmer in PRG is limited by physical rules you can’t possibly know. PRG could be timeless. PRG could be eternal and FAPP immaterial. It also could not be, but again, it’s a question of justification of considering God in this context.The immaterial, and timeless matter. Without it you have a material “God”, subject to limitations.
If we create a sim-world, it MUST be designed.
- Not exactly. Yes, our world “could be” designed. But the existence of a “sim-world” does not make it necessary that it “must be” designed.
There is never any “dead give-away” to an inhabitant of a sim-world that it’s world is designed. The world of the sim is “THE world”, to the sim, and only by being given specific instructions that “order is indicative of a designing power (hand)” would they even consider the possibility.Even if a world is a sim-world, it can never “look” designed, because it would be a dead give-away to its inhabitants. Indeed it only exhibits order, and order is not the same as design.
I agree with you here. What the atheist proposes, though, is either that there was never a beginning to “world order”, or that order erupted uncaused from some “pre-order” CHAOS.What do you mean by “primal chaos”? There is no chaos, only properties of the physical universe.