Existence and evidence

[CatsAndDogs]

Quote:
Supernatural, Supernatural

Neither of those links provide any definitions that I can find, for ‘exists’ in the ‘supernatural order’.

Maybe I missed it, and you can point it out? What it is that separates the ‘supernaturally existent’ from the ‘supernaturally non-existent’. It seems I can talk about things that supernaturally don’t exist, and they are perfectly indistinguishable from those that are supposed to exist. If I present claims of X, Y, and Z, as ‘supernaturally existent’, what principle would you use to determine which, if any, were true claims?

Simply put, a “thing” exists in the supernatural order if it has anything to do with personal free will and morality, which is the power to choose and the choices to choose, which gives man the capability and the means to “rise above” the animal. “The animal” is the non-supernatural.

The test of a thing’s “supernatural existence” is that it concerns free will and morality.

Materialists confuse “the supernatural” with “the impossible”, because free will and morality ARE in fact impossible to them as realities. Both free will and morality are both “jokes”, imaginings, arbitrary manipulations, to so-called atheistic materialists.

From New Advent:

The theories denying or belittling the supernatural order may be classified from the standpoint of both their historical appearance and logical sequence, into three groups according as they view the supernatural;

1. 
   *]In our present de facto condition,
   *]In the original status of man,
   *]In its possibility and evidences.
   
   To the first group belong Pelagianism and Semipelagianism. Influenced, no doubt, by the Stoic ideal and their own ascetic performances, the Pelagians of the fifth century so magnified the capacity of human nature as to pronounce natural to it both the beatific vision and the human acts by which it is merited. They were condemned by the Councils of Mileve and Carthage, 418. Less daring, the Semipelagians, censured by the Council of Orange (529), subtracted from the supernatural only certain phases of man’s life as the beginning of faith and final perseverance. To this group belong also, in a manner, the false mystics of the fourteenth century, the Beghards condemned by the Council of Vienne (1312), for claiming that the rational creature possesses beatitude in itself without the help of the lumen gloriœ and Eckhart, whose identification of the Creator and the creature in the act of contemplation was censured by John XXII in 1329.
   
   To the second group belong the early Reformers and the Jansenist School, though in different degrees. Misinterpreting the still imperfect terminology of the Fathers who called natural, in the sense of original, the elevation of our first parents, the early Reformers held that, according to Patristic teaching and contrarily to the Schoolmen, that elevation was not supernatural. Their error, rejected by the Council of Trent (Sess. V, decretum de peccato originali, can. 1), was taken up again, but in a more refined form, by Baius who, indeed, designated as supernatural man’s original condition but nullified the meaning of the word by stating that our first parent’s elevation was demanded by and due to the normal condition of humanity. In spite of his condemnation by Pius V (Denzinger, 9th ed., nn. 901, 903, 906, 922) he was followed by the Jansenist Quesnel and the pseudo-Synod of Pistoia, the former censured by Clement XI (Denzinger, nn. 1249, 1250) and the latter by Pius VI (Denzinger, nn. 1379, 1380, 1383). A confusion between the moral and the supernatural order, frequently found in the Baianist and Jansenist writings, was reproduced more or less consciously by some German theologians like Stattler, Hermes, Gunther, Hirsh, Kuhn, etc., who admitted the supernatural character of the other gifts but contended that the adoption to eternal life and the partaking of the Divine nature, being a moral necessity, could not be supernatural. That revival of an old error found a strong and successful opponent in Kleutgen in the second volume of his theology on the supernatural.
   
   To the third group belongs the Rationalist School from Socinus to the present Modernists. While the foregoing errors proceeded less from a direct denial than from a confusion of the supernatural with the natural order, the Rationalist error rejects it in its entirety, on the plea of philosophical impossibility or critical non-existence. The Syllabus of Pius IX and the Vatican Constitution “De fide catholica” (Denzinger, n. 1655) checked for a while that radical Naturalism which, however, has reappeared lately in a still more virulent form with Modernism. While there is nothing common between Rosmini and the present Modernists, he may, all unwittingly, have paved the way for them in the following vaguely Subjectivist proposition: “The supernatural order consists in the manifestation of Being in the plenitude of its reality, and the effect of that manifestation is a God-like sentiment, inchoate in this life through the light of faith and grace, consummate in the next through the light of glory” (36th Rosminian proposition condemned by the Holy Office, 14 Dec., 1887). Preserving the dogmatic formulæ while voiding them of their contents, the Modernists constantly speak of the supernatural, but they understand thereby the advanced stages of an evolutive process of the religious sentiment. There is no room in their system for the objective and revealed supernatural: their Agnosticism declares it unknowable, their Immanentism derives it from our own vitality, their symbolism explains it in term of subjective experience and their criticism declares non-authentic the documents used to prove it. “There is no question now,” says Pius X, in his Encyclical “Pascendi” of 8 Sept., 1907, “of the old error by which a sort of right to the supernatural was claimed for human nature. We have gone far beyond that. We have reached the point where it is affirmed that our most holy religion, in the man Christ as in us, emanated from nature spontaneously and entirely. Than this, there is surely nothing more destructive of the whole supernatural order.”

 

[Touchstone]

Yes, I’ve noticed you need an awful lot of repeating to get things clear. And last time I asked you to provide me with a program where you “had a square circle” or along those lines, you hemmed a bit, then balked and went on about how that happened, but they’re just symbols. I received no program.

I’m not in the habit of writing software upon request for forum posters, but just because it was a short program (~250 lines) and my godlessness calls for generosity, here’s the source for a little virtual environment that allows the admin (the ‘supernatural’ admin) to create triangles, circles and squares, and then test for types, specifically with the goal of realizing the answer that a triangle is a square is a circle is a triangle; inquiring if an object is of a given type makes it an object of that given type in this world, and there is no “natural” test for type that doesn’t conform it to that type.

#######BEGIN FILE main.cpp ##############
#include
#include
#include
#include
using namespace std ;

static int next_id = 1;

class Object {
int vertices[4][2];
int usedVertices;
int size;
int id;
void toTriangle() {
usedVertices = 3;
vertices[0][0] = rand() % 100;
vertices[0][1] = rand() % 100;
vertices[1][0] = rand() % 100;
vertices[1][1] = rand() % 100;
vertices[2][0] = rand() % 100;
vertices[2][1] = rand() % 100;
};

void toCircle() {
    usedVertices = 1;
    vertices[0][0] = rand() % 100;
    vertices[0][1] = rand() % 100;    
};

void toSquare() {
    usedVertices = 4;
    vertices[0][0] = rand() % 100;
    vertices[0][1] = rand() % 100;
    vertices[1][0] = rand() % 100;
    vertices[1][1] = rand() % 100;
    size = rand()  % 100;
    vertices[2][0] = vertices[0][0] + size;
    vertices[2][1] = vertices[0][1];
    vertices[3][0] = vertices[1][0] + size;
    vertices[3][1] = vertices[1][1];
};

public:
Object(int numVirtices = 1) {
size = rand() % 100;
id = next_id++;
switch(numVirtices){
case 3:
toTriangle();
break;
case 4:
toSquare();
break;
default:
toCircle();
}
};

bool isTriangle() {
    switch (usedVertices)
    {
        case 1:
        case 4:
            toTriangle();
            return true;
            break;
        case 3:
            return true;

    }
    return true;
}

bool isCircle() {
    switch (usedVertices)
    {
        case 1:
            return true;
            break;
        case 3:
        case 4:
            toCircle();
            return true;
    }
    return true;
}

bool isSquare() {
    switch (usedVertices)
    {
        case 1:
        case 3:
            toSquare();
            return true;
            break;
        case 4:
            return true;

    }
    return true;
}

bool isA(const string& typeName)
{
    if(typeName == string("Circle"))
    {
        return isCircle();
    }
    else if (typeName == string("Triangle"))
    {
        return isTriangle();
    }
    else if(typeName == string("Square")){
        return isSquare();        
    }

    return false;
}

int getId() { return id;}
friend ostream& operator <<(ostream &os,const Object &obj);

};

ostream& operator <<(ostream &os,const Object &obj)
{
switch (obj.usedVertices)
{
case 1:
os << “circle id=” << obj.id << " at " << obj.vertices[0][0] << “,” << obj.vertices[0][1] << “] size:” << obj.size << endl;
break;
case 3:
os << “triangle id=” << obj.id << " at " << obj.vertices[0][0] << “,” << obj.vertices[0][1] << "], " ;
os << obj.vertices[1][0] << “,” << obj.vertices[1][1] << "], " ;
os << obj.vertices[2][0] << “,” << obj.vertices[2][1] << “]” << endl ;
break;

    case 4:
        os << "square id=" << obj.id << " at " << obj.vertices[0][0] << "," << obj.vertices[0][1] << "], " ;
        os << obj.vertices[1][0] << "," << obj.vertices[1][1] << "], " ;
        os << obj.vertices[2][0] << "," << obj.vertices[2][1] << "], " ;            
        os << obj.vertices[3][0] << "," << obj.vertices[3][1] << "]" << endl ;            
        break;
}
return os;

}

int main (int argc, char * const argv]) {
bool done = false;

vector<Object*> objects;
while(!done)
{
    string command;
    std::cout << "enter command:  ";
    getline (std::cin,command);
    if(command == string("exit")){
        done = true;
    }
    else if(command == string("new triangle"))
    {
        Object* newObj = new Object(3);
        objects.push_back(newObj);
        std::cout << endl << "### new Triangle #" << newObj->getId() << " created!" << endl << endl;

    }
    else if(command == string("new circle"))
    {
        Object* newObj = new Object(1);
        objects.push_back(newObj);
        std::cout << endl << "### new Circle #" << newObj->getId() << " created!" << endl << endl;

    }
    else if(command == string("new square"))
    {
        Object* newObj = new Object(4);
        objects.push_back(newObj);
        std::cout << endl << "### new Square #" << newObj->getId() << " created!" << endl << endl;

    }
    else if(command == string("list"))
    {
        std::cout << endl << "Listing all objects in universe:" << endl;
        std::cout<< "================================" << endl;
        int ii;
       for(ii=0; ii < objects.size(); ii++)
       {
          const Object& obj = *objects[ii];
          cout << obj << endl;
       }
        std::cout << "found " <<  objects.size() <<  " objects" << endl << endl;
    }
    else if(command == string("clear"))
    {
        int ii;
       for(ii=0; ii < objects.size(); ii++)
       {
            delete objects[ii];
       }
        objects.clear();
        std::cout << endl << "### universe cleared, no more objects. " << endl << endl;

    }
    else if(command == string("help"))
    {
        std::cout << endl << "### Available Commands" << endl;
        std::cout<< "================================" << endl;
        std::cout<< "new circle" << endl;
        std::cout<< "new square" << endl;
        std::cout<< "new triangle" << endl;
        std::cout<< "list" << endl;
        std::cout<< "clear" << endl;
        std::cout<< "help" << endl;
        std::cout<< "exit" << endl << endl;

    }
    else if(command == string("test"))
    {
        std::cout <<"Enter an object type to test for ('Triangle', 'Circle', 'Square'): ";

        string typeName;
        getline (std::cin,typeName);

        std::cout <<"Enter ID of object to test: ";
        int testId;
        cin >> testId ;
        cin.ignore(255,'

‘);
int ii;
bool found = false;
for(ii=0; ii < objects.size(); ii++)
{
if (objects[ii]->getId() == testId){
found = true;
bool answer = objects[ii]->isA(typeName);
std::cout << "isA(’"<< typeName <<"’) for object #" << testId << " returned " << string(answer ? “TRUE” : “FALSE”) << endl << endl;
}
}
if(!found)
std::cout << “### could not find object with ID=” << testId << endl;
}
else
{
std::cout << “### Sorry didn’t understand that. Please try again.” << endl << endl;
std::cout << “### Available Commands” << endl;
std::cout<< “================================” << endl;
std::cout<< “new circle” << endl;
std::cout<< “new square” << endl;
std::cout<< “new triangle” << endl;
std::cout<< “list” << endl;
std::cout<< “clear” << endl;
std::cout<< “help” << endl;
std::cout<< “exit” << endl << endl;
}

}

// not even worrying about de-init/de-alloc, just die
return 0;

}

#######END FILE main.cpp ##############

The tabs don’t indent correctly on this forum’s display, but if you want to email me, I can send to any who request the source file with proper formatting, as well as the compiled executable for Intel Mac. I’d attach them here, but don’t see the feature with this config of vBulletin. I’ll put up a transcript of a session with the app in a follow-up post in just a minute, along with a little discussion.

-Touchstone

 

[Touchstone]

. I’ll put up a transcript of a session with the app in a follow-up post in just a minute, along with a little discussion.

-Touchstone

Here’s a bit of the shell transcript I generated in using the program:
Here is a transcript from my shell using the virtual environment:

! ./tricircle
enter command: new triangle

new Triangle #1 created!​

enter command: new circle

new Circle #2 created!​

enter command: new square

new Square #3 created!​

enter command: list

Listing all objects in universe:​

triangle id=1 at [49,73], [58,30], [72,44]
circle id=2 at [23,9] size:78
square id=3 at [65,92], [42,87], [68,92], [45,87]
found 3 objects

enter command: test
Enter an object type to test for (‘Triangle’, ‘Circle’, ‘Square’): Circle
Enter ID of object to test: 3
isA(‘Circle’) for object #3 returned TRUE

enter command: list

Listing all objects in universe:​

triangle id=1 at [49,73], [58,30], [72,44]
circle id=2 at [23,9] size:78
circle id=3 at [27,29] size:3
found 3 objects

enter command: test
Enter an object type to test for (‘Triangle’, ‘Circle’, ‘Square’): Square
Enter ID of object to test: 2
isA(‘Square’) for object #2 returned TRUE

enter command: exit

The operator can create an object of a specific type (e.g. “Triangle”), but the ‘physics’ of this virtual environment are such that any test for a test conforms the tested object to that type, meaning that in this environment a “circle” is a “square” and vice versa to non-supernatural observers/users of the system. A “square” in the system will find that what he understands to be a “circle” is actually a square when it investigates, and is back to being a “circle” when it checks that a moment later.

This is just a simple implementation of a kind of subjectivism, where objects and reality conform to inquiries and tests. This is quite at odds with what we see in our surrounding P=existence, but that’s a salient insight for anyone working with virtual systems – they are not bound by the same semantics or constraints as P-existence. Saying “a circle cannot be a square” is parochial ontology, forcing the (observerd) logical and existential constraints of our P-existence on a system that has no such necessary constraints. “Is” is a malleable concept in virtual environments, as this little program should show. There is no case in the program, for example, where a shape would fail to find that itself or any other object is not also a square, and a circle.

So, there’s a small program, going out of my way to demonstrate the idea. I still don’t have a definition of what ‘exist’ means in terms of the supernatural, after repeated requests here. I don’t require anyone write C++ code and build running software, as I’ve done. Just the courtesy of a working definition would be great!

-Touchstone

*ETA: if anyone can point me to a method for attaching a binary executable here, happy to supply the actual program here. It’s a simple single file C++ build command on your platform of choice for any who want to build it and try for themselves. Or, email me and I’ll send you the binary (Intel Mac is the only target I’ve built at this point).

 

[Touchstone]

You’re adding another entity just as I am - brute force, inexplicable, quite possibly eternal luck.

No, there’s no “force” proposed here, and “luck” is just conceptualization of probabilities and outcomes, it has no existence outside of the brain-states of holders of that concept. “wetness” isn’t a separate entity from water, or hydrogen or oxygen, it’s an emergent property of the combination of hydrogen and oxygen. By ‘entity’ comes the distinction between things that have existence and properties in of themselves, as opposed to properties and feature that simply inhere to something else. Materialist cosmogony, at least as I’m advancing it, has mind (and life itself to host the mind) as an emergent property of the natural universe. No other forces or entities needed beyond the natural ones we can identify empirically needed.

And you’re so enamored with the principle of parsimony that you’re having a hard time coping with the fact that I disagree with your metric. You said yourself that it isn’t all that important. Wait, I guess that’s part of that old toolset being used again.

Parsimony doesn’t make something true. It’s a rational preference with a solid history of performance with respect to knowledge building (which is why it’s preferred).

Ah, more mindreading. No, I don’t ‘know’ it - I’ve given reasons why I don’t count it the way you do. You want to see some violations of the principle of parsimony? Watch the excuses Many World Interpretation advocates give when they’re called on it. ‘Well, it’s just one wavefunction! Sure, there’s countless, possibly infinite universes, but by my count its one!’ I mean, you just admitted it yourself: You can count the number of entities in the universe however you want. But, by George, we better count it in a way such that mind is always an entity, mindlessness isn’t, and therefore the theist always has more than one!

What do you suppose the “less” in “mindless” points at, conceptually? Many Worlds may well be less parsimonious than theism, but not obviously so (copies of something we can see all around us seem less a stretch than a Cosmic Mind, something we’ve zero empirical support for). But in any case it doesn’t matter to me if we suppose that many worlds is less parsimonious than even theism. That doesn’t change the fact that God + creation is heavier in terms of entities than just one natural universe, self existent, with galaxies, solar systems life and minds as innate emergent properties of it.

So what? I’m not trying to defend any doctrine here - I repeatedly (notice how many times I have to repeat myself with you) said that doctrine doesn’t matter in this discussion, because as you’ve ceded, the atheist isn’t arguing against any particular doctrine.

I’m not sure how you distinguish “doctrine” from “teaching” or “belief”. That just semantic play, so far as I can see. The “doctrines” at the heart of this thread (I think) are a) “God exists” and b) “God created the universe”. I don’t care about denominational labels so far as a) and b) are concerned. They are positive claims with plenty particularity for discussion. What is meant by “God”, for example, and what is meant by “exists”? The first order of business is to provide some semantic freight for these terms to carry. So far, “exists” is just an empty vessel, devoid of any meaning apart from the materialist definition, and “God” isn’t much better. Catholicism, for example, does give some measure of meaning to the term, which is to its credit, but this you disavow in this discussion, in favor of “God” as an unidientified, featureless, untestable, nature-shifting-as-needed something-or-other. I suspect if I got out the book I was reading on Jefferson with respect to his Deism (which is decidedly of a view that God and nature are distinct entities), you’d tell me I’m really supposed to be addressing some OTHER form of deism, which isn’t yours or Jefferson’s or anyone else’s you could name, but just this set of ideas, floating unattached and enumerated in the ether.

They’re arguing against God in any form - whether it’s the Catholic God, Shiva, the Deist God, Mormon Elohim, or whatever Frank Tipler’s actually articulating.

It’s impossible to even assess, let alone respond to “God in any form”. Not only can specific views of God not be disproven, you aren’t even committing to any form or features. As an atheist, if someone tells me the impersonal universe “is God”, and that’s the “form” of “any form” he wants to defend as a theist, I just say “ho hum”, and carry on. Some “forms” are no problem, others are quite problematic.

One more time: The universe exists wherever God is, whether or not creation is in play.

God has necessary conditions He depends on for existence, you’re saying? Hmmm. Or is this just word games – we just devise the term “universe” as a “God-holder”, because it’s semantically convenient?

I haven’t bothered with a defense of doctrine here - I’ve made a reference to panentheism and immanence out of utility, in a faith I’m not enrolled in. I know you haven’t missed the fact that I’m defending deism and basic theism here; for some reason, that just riles you up. You’ll have to deal with it or walk, though; based on how you’re conducting yourself, I don’t feel the need to extend the conversation on to such a topic.

Suit yourself. All I’d like to see are the definitions and terms you are defending, even if you don’t “enroll in them”. As it is, you’ve gone “supernatural” on me, with nothing to attach to as a coherent concept to discuss in terms of the beliefs or doctrines that overcome atheist doubts about supernatural existence.

What nonsense. Mormons regard God as the creator of the world, despite believing that God has eternally pre-existed alongside matter.

I’ve not disputed that. That is not to confuse God with that matter, however. Their are ontologically distinct per the CoJCoLdS.

For many pantheists, God being the universe is no bar to God being creator - God is capable of orchestrating changes over time, order that did not exist originally or at least in the past. I’m afraid all the refutations will remain your problem here.

I don’t think pantheism is a problem in terms of parsimony – I’ll readily grant the unity of creator and creation to pantheists. If you are ready to enroll in pantheism, I’ll salute your improved parsimonious position. As a Catholic, that’s not available to you.

I ask one direct question, and you fudge it. My question stands: Do simulations count as entities, or do they not? If you won’t answer, well, that’s that. This whole exchange is deteriorating anyway.

I didn’t fudge it, I deferred to your wishes. It doesn’t matter either way to me, so I’m happy to let you choose, and assent to that. If you want me to decide, fine. We can stipulate that all software programs are distinct ontological entities. Now what?

I already distinguished between the universe and creation for my purposes. And I don’t have much of a problem with your definition, save for a few questions. If Chalmers and other philosophers are right about consciousness, does that mean consciousness doesn’t exist?

It would not existence in the way materialists suppose, in that case, just like God would not exist if atheists and other philosophers are right.

They take it to be a non-physical property. What about emergent properties? Some materialists argue emergence a real phenomenon, that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Other materialists accuse them of succumbing to dualism and magic.

On second thought, ‘everything that physically exists’ isn’t good enough. I’d say ‘Everything that exists’. Why stipulate?

I don’t think that’s a stipulation, but a qualification. It stresses physicality as the basis for existence, the minimal conceptual requirements that are necessary to give meaning to ‘exist’. We might say “pink unicorns exist”, and indeed, we can say as a concept – the idea of a horse-like thing with a single horn and pink in color – pink unicorns do exist. But they do not exist as pink unicorns, so far as we can tell. We depend on “physically” to give meaning to “exist”. That’s the salient distinction of this whole discussion: without the discriminating test of ‘extended in space/time’, “exist” is just a nonsense word. Without that qualification, we can reasonably say anything and everything exists.

Are you asking me what exists in a universe where only God exists? As for incoherence of supernatural, you asked me for an explanation, I provided it. And then you completely ignored it.

I just read back, and still have not seen where you tell us what principle is used to determine “exists supernaturally” and “not-exists supernaturally”. Please point me to it, if I missed it. If I say “X exists as a supernatural entity”, what principles or methods do you bring to bear to say “true” or “false” to that claim?

-Touchstone

 

[Touchstone]

Despite what Dawkins tells you, pantheism is not ‘sexed up atheism’ - in case you haven’t noticed, he’s rather known for being theologically (and philosophically) ignorant, and admits to being such in the former sense. And you are aware that deists are rather… not bound by doctrine, as a rule? I’m sure some deists may view the world as distinct from the creator, but there is no such doctrinal rule.

I’m just inquiring what beliefs and definitions you are willing to defend here, but “not-atheism” is about as good a hold as you’re giving me. If that’s all you’ve got, you’re right, this is a waste of discussion time and resources. Pick any particular deist framework you’d like, but name it so we can put some stress on it. All you’re doing here is playing hide-and-seek at this point.

Either way, I reject your characterization of eastern orthodox doctrine. God is immanent throughout creation, God sustains it, it could not physically exist without this immanence. But there comes those semantics again; materialists who buy MWI agree there is a single creation, even though there are separate worlds. Multiverse proponents believe there’s just one multiverse which they view as a singular entity. And considering you’ve already said you’re willing to count entities by whatever standard, it’s hard to see why you’re so frantic about parsimony anyway.

You’re just imagining frantic. I’ve repeatedly said parsimony doesn’t decided the matter, it just works against you here, that’s all. There are cases where less parsimonious hypotheses turned out to be the correct ones.
It’s too bad I haven’t defended any particular doctrine in this entire exchange then, did I? And again, God exists apart from creation by orthodox christianity, but is utterly immanent.
Being utterly immanent does nothing to conflate God with the universe, ontologically. Nothing at all, and it’s just an irrelevant observation. I can happily stipulate that your view of God has Him as “utterly immanent” in the universe He created, and it changes nothing here, with respect to parsimony, or anything else.

I’ll take ‘mind’, which I’m certain exists, rather than ‘brute luck and possibly eternity too’, which is more ‘magical’ by leaps and bounds.

But you aren’t even certain that mind exists apart from being an emergent property of an impersonal, self-existent universe. That’s just a beg to the question you have there. You observe minds, and suppose they exist apart from their physical infrastructure (blood supply, oxygen, electrical wiring, etc), when you’ve absolutely zero cases of this to point at. Every mind you’ve ever observed in action was chained to its physical plant. If that physical infrastructure is itself just the outworking of self-existent, impersonal, physical law, then by your own logic here, the minds you observe would suggest self-existent, impersonal law as the ultimate creator.

How can you have been “taking that as a given” when in your immediate previous post, you demanded that I defend Catholicism rather than deism since you thought (correctly) I’m Catholic? Did you lie this much when you were a theist?

I don’t know what you see as a lie here. I do expect that people will defend and represent what they believe as such, and understand that ideas they aren’t even enrolled in – deism, for example, can’t be considered compelling to others if they aren’t even enrolled in them, themselves. It’s the kind of sophistry your philo 101 prof covered in the first quarter.

Read what I said again - ‘Material reality we know’. Back to my simulation question: Is a simulation another entity, or isn’t it?

My argument works either way, but you apparent need me to decide, so, flipping a coin, per above, we’ll say it is.

Yes, I’ve noticed you need an awful lot of repeating to get things clear. And last time I asked you to provide me with a program where you “had a square circle” or along those lines, you hemmed a bit, then balked and went on about how that happened, but they’re just symbols. I received no program.

You have now. I note that I still have no workable definition of “supernaturally exists” from you.

Anyway. First, of course you’d have no idea what I’m talking about if you’re taking an utterly materialist viewpoint.

Maybe you could humor me by supplying a definition you claim to understand, even if you don’t think I’d be able. That way we can at least take a look. It would also possibly dispel firming suspicions that you’ve got no more idea what “supernaturally exists” means than I do.

All that exists to you is physical - you apparently won’t even entertain the possibility of PRG, much less claims of the non-material. (I’ll assume you’re one of those materialists who looks at wave-particle duality and other aspects of QM and asserts ‘I’m not sure how, but damnit, that’s all material!’) Second, read again: Then ask yourself, if we’re living in what amounts to a simulation, aren’t we both within a certain material reality, yet there can be something outside of said reality - and while both the programmer and the simulated are in a single universe, they don’t both occupy the same material reality?

Possibly, but that’s just as powerful as saying that if we are just the daydream of a cat sleeping on some cosmic sofa, then we’re just living in what amounts to a dream…

As for ‘single universe’, I have no idea what you mean by “universe” anymore, so I can’t even assess that.

-Touchstone

 

[Touchstone]

I distinguish the “supernatural” from “the imaginary” by the weakest of all “proofs”, which is “authority”.

That’s pretty weak, indeed. It’s a glaring fallacy as a matter of reasoning, unless you show that authority is is credible as an authority. That’s a big problem in this case, as your authority is supernatural, meaning that you have a vicious circle, with your authority needed to establish the ‘supernaturally real’, while ‘supernatural reality’ you need to establish the chops of your authority!

In any case, I appreciate the candor of this response. Would that we could get as clear an expansion on this from others.

The authority of the Church tells me what is not only supernatural, but what is supernaturally GOOD as well a what is supernaturally EVIL.

OK, well that would be going beyond what I have been asking about, here. If God exists and the RCC is the vessel of God’s authority on earth, then indeed, the Church would be a remarkably valuable source of what God things is evil and what what is good.

Without an authority to delineate revelation from elsewhat, it is impossible to have certainty of either the existence or the quality of the supernatural. It’s ALL just “imagination”, INCLUDING normal everyday, and otherwise, seemingly materialistic reality!

Yes, prior to practical necessities. A human cannot live or function without making the “leap of faith” that reality is real – that everyday observations and experiences reflect a unified, objective reality external to the mind. That is a ‘leap of faith’, but a necessary one if we want to live.

Belief in the supernatural, some unspecified notion of ‘reality beyond reality’ – some kind of existence or ontology beyond the ‘everyday’, natural reality we deal with in our perceptions and experiences – isn’t necessary for man to live and survive. That ‘leap of faith’ is performed as a matter of preference, rather than necessity.

That means that the ‘everyday reality’ affirmer may be wrong, but she is justified in embracing the reality of everyday-reality; it is necessary, a survival imperative. But the ‘supernaturality reality’ affirmer has no such justification. He may be wrong as well, but he’s not adopting such beliefs because he must do so or die. He is wrong because what he preferred to believe, as a matter of preference, wasn’t correct.

Both parties may be wrong, but if so, they are wrong for different reasons.

Whether it (the seeming perception of the supernatural) is in-line with the Church’s description of the supernatural, or not.

Once again, for the scientistic materialist, no supernatural is necessary, so no explanation of the supernatural is possible.

That does not follow, I think. But you are very close to the major point. If no supernatural is necessary, that doesn’t mean supernatural explanations are not possible to give, or possibly true. It just means those supernatural explanations are not necessary, superfluous, unneeded. And you are right that the scientific approach does indeed value economy: explanations that are minimal and efficient are preferred, and by experience have performed the best.

We are simply “slaves” in the same way as every mathematician is a “slave” to the fact that “2+2=4”.

I think Christianity demands something more than assent to knowledge, synthetic or no. Even demons understand that God is sovereign, in the Christian view. But this is not what Paul meant by “bondservant”, is it?

The materialist’s supposition is that doing the experiment IS capitulating to the desired result. That is not accurate.

The question is how one validates the results of the test. Even if you get a “God exists” sensation after prayer, how would one validate that experience? If there’s not way to falsify the idea that one is simply imagining God’s existence or interaction, there’s similarly no basis to think that it’s veridical. Both ‘actual’ and ‘imagined/desired’ account for the positive results of the test. If that’s the case, of what use is the test?

Love confirms itself. God confirms Himself. You refuse to allow God to confirm Himself. He allows you to do so, which allows you to be anxious at not having a love that all persons need.

Having been an atheist for about a year now, that doesn’t match my experience. I think the loving relationships I’ve had have continued, and have taken on new depth, if anything, in light of some clarity of my previous self-deceptions and indulgences. It may be that God is allowing me to continue to love and beloved in sacrificial, profound ways, as an atheist, I guess. Or maybe He’s just providing me the illusion of such.

You wouldn’t be here if you weren’t somehow “anxious” about God-stuff.

Aww, that’s to easy. That’s like saying your talking about God just confirms your inner atheism, and is evidence of your efforts to just obscure and deny your deepest convictions that God is a made up construct.

Why!? That is utterly unsupportable on purely materialistic grounds.

Why would you say that? Jesus himself allowed that heathens loved their own, right? Sacrificial love is the highest love just because it has the most persuasive and transformative power. A godless commie infantryman in the Russian Army who throws himself upon a Nazi grenade thrown into his foxhole to protect his buddies in that foxhole demonstrates through his sacrifice the depth and reality of his love and care for his buddies. He’s not trying to provide a statistical advantage to the Russian Army. He’s lived and suffered and laughed with these men, and has become intimately connected with them. Self-sacrifice for their good, dying by jumping on that inbound grenade provides the strongest, most compelling proof of that love, that desire to realize the good and best interests of another, even at great (ultimate) cost to the self.

With no gods in view, that is the kind of world and connections many people naturally want to promote, a world where the one would be willing to die to save the many he loved. If such a world is preferred, it won’t work to depend on everyone else to be the one to sacrifice; for such a world to become a practical reality, even in part, one must be willing to be the sacrificer, if that’s what the situation warrants.

That which “drove” you from the obvious benefit of God’s love to reliance on not being hurt by being “deluded” or “self-deluded” was your “being harmed/hurt”.

If God does not exist, then the benefits of that love are hard to substantiate, although I do understand that for some there is benefit for them in feeling “loved by God” even if there is no God. And I don’t feel particularly harmed or hurt for the illusions I entertained as a Christian – they suited me comfortably as long as I had them. Really, the motivation wasn’t ‘avoidance of pain’ – if anything that’s more a problem now than it was for me as a Christiant – but rather just the simple drive to seek maximally honesty and discipline in thinking about what is good and true in the world, and acting on it.

-Touchstone