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sw85
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If you want to understand natural law, you should read a book on the topic; we here can only give you a reductive treatment of it. I recommend Edward Feser’s “Aquinas,” specifically the first and fifth chapters.
- Status
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Fr_of_Jazz
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I think you may be responding to the wrong person here.
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LogisticsBranch
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If Fr of Jazz is a scientist then I must say that not all catholic scientists think alike.
There is no such thing as ‘a atheistic method of discovery’ in science. Basically, “science” has nothing to say about atheists or catholics. The National Academy of Sciences plainly states,“Science: The use of evidence to construct testable explanations and predictions of natural phenomena, as well as the knowledge generated through this process.” nationalacademies.org/evolution/Definitions.html
Thank you for your future consideration when thinking about SCIENCE.
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Serious
Guest
Thanks. I would have included also “Mymosh the Self-begottten” read it here But he Seventh Sally and Non Serviam are also my favorites (along with all the stories from “The Cyberiad”). As a matter of fact, Non Serviam is not really pertinent to AI (though it is pivotal to the story line), it is more of a thought experiment on the topic “how would God behave, if there were one”. But the Seventh Sally is right on the money: “is there a difference between the emulation and the real thing?”. And the result: there is none.
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Fr_of_Jazz
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Natural science is methodologically materialistic because it is the empirical, mechanistic, quantifiable investigation of physical reality; and it does not formally detect God’s action in that kind of investigation of secondary causes. Ergo, in his terms, the scientific method is “atheistic.” I was quick to add in my discussion with Serious that the scientific method as such cannot pronounce on the question of the existence of God since He is outside of its methodological purview.If Fr of Jazz is a scientist then I must say that not all catholic scientists think alike.
“Science: The use of evidence to construct testable explanations and predictions of natural phenomena, as well as the knowledge generated through this process.” nationalacademies.org/evolution/Definitions.html
Thank you for your future consideration when thinking about SCIENCE.
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Fr_of_Jazz
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Thanks. I’ll put them on my reading list.
I just seems rather odd to me to say there is no difference between the emulation and the real thing when the very assertion presupposes one.
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Serious
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Yes, it presupposes one. The trouble is that not all “presuppositions” are valid. There used to be a presuppostion that some entities are “waves” and others are composed of “matter”. There was a question: “is light a wave, or is it matter?”. This presupposition turned out be an invalid dichotomy. Reality is not under “obligation” to conform to our incorrect ideas about it.
Let’s take a hypothetical case. Someone creates a perfect copy machine. The machine uses a non-destructive method to “read” all the atoms in an object. Then it chooses the proper atoms, and places them into the proper place in a new object. At the end you will have two, completely identical objects. Suppose you used Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. We know that one of them was actually touched by Da Vinci’s hand, while the other one was not. One of them is the “original” and the other one is “just” a copy. But you have no way to find out which one is which! If there is no way to decide which is the original and which one is the copy, then the question: “but which one is the original?” loses its relevance. Why ask an unanswerable question?
The same kind of thought experiment could be used in another fashion. When the copy machine reads the atoms, it actually replaces each atom with an identical one from somewhere else. At the end of the process we shall have only one copy. Is it the “original” one or not? It does not contain the orignal atoms any more. Can one say that a certain point of the replacement process, the picture “lost” its originality? Of course, atoms are identical, one carbon atom is indistinguishable from another one.
The Turing-test and the Chinese-room experiment raises the same problem. You are only privy to the (name removed by moderator)ut and output of the “black box”. From the (name removed by moderator)ut and output you cannot decide what is within black box. It could be a human hiding there, or a very sophisticated electronics, which gives you all the correct responses. The human would have consciousness, we know that. The question: “but does the electronics have consciousness?” belongs to the same category as the “which one is the real Mona Lisa?”. Neither can be answered, and therefore they are not pertinent.
And this is why the Seventh Sally is so important. When one starts with an “imperfect” copying process, it is easy to distinguish the origial from the copy. As the “copy process” or the “emulation process” becomes more and more precise, the difference becomes smaller and smaller. Eventually it becomes irrelevant to speak of the difference.
What will undergo in the processes of the electronic “mind”, we shall probably not know. After all we do not know what processes occur in our mind when we look at a hazy picture and identify the person as our mother. If a computer - using some kind of algorithm - is able to identify the person in the picture, that is what matters. How did it do it? Who cares?
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Fr_of_Jazz
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As part of the AI project within logic, math and the SM to reach that level of performance (and emulation) and as a functional test to verify that level I find what you say to be unproblematic.
However if one asserts philosophically that given this level of performance one is now rationally compelled to abandon the philosophical conviction of the immateriality of the human mind, he or she in fact has not provided the evidence to back it up. Why?
(1) It assumes an answer to the question of how third person data becomes first person data. Yet is has not been provided by science.
(2) It assumes experimental verification that we in fact know how to create complex life-forms from the atomic ground up.
(3) It assumes philosophical (not just methodological) materialism and physicalism in general, for life, and in the brain-mind problem even though advocates have not demonstrated why one is rationally compelled to espouse it.
(4) The atomic structure scenario in which atomically identical inanimate objects are produced is not comparable to a functional duplication scenario where from duplicating observable, external, third-person, behavioral effects of consciousness one has thereby duplicated a first-person conscious mind. A pocket calculator can print out 2+2=4 just like I did in 1st grade. That does not make it conscious. It can outperform human calculating. That does not make it conscious.
Searle points out that if I want to know how a mechanical watch works and you offer a “Turing test” of a very precise hour glass you might get an external behavioral functional equivalence but not an answer to my question. Similarily if you build a machine that behaves as if it were conscious to a blind test, that does not rationally necessitate the philosophical position on the brain-mind problem you have espoused.
Also there seems to be a bit of an incongruity in your position here. Let’s say stage magicians and other experts in flimm-flammary emulate a miracle at Lourdes and one can only decide whether it actually was one based on what he or she is allowed see. It would seem, in order to be consistent, that you would then say that it was a real miracle.
Again, strictly within the SM (including scientific projects and hypotheses) and computer engineering what you say is unproblematic. However as a philosophical statement that would render false the conviction of the immateriality of the human mind, it has not met its burden.
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Serious
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OK.
We need to clarify the usage of “immaterial”. The mind is not a physical object. Just like “walking” is immaterial, so is the mind. Both walking and and thinking are activities. Activities are “immaterial”, but they rely on the underlying material “infrastructure”. However, I suspect that your usage of “immaterial” is different from mine. Would you clarify it for me? To me it seems that the “immaterial” is somehow tied to the concept of “supernatural”.
The mechanical watch and the hourglass are functinally equivalent. How do they achieve it, is different. But they both show the correct time.
On the very contrary: it would be an excellent reason to discard the claim of “miracle”. Are you familiar with Uri Geller and his claims? Uri Geller is an expert stage magician. But he claims that his acts are actually based upon some paranormal powers. He claims that he does not actually know how these powers “work”. And he does not perform when “skeptical” stage magicians are in the audience. Now, any competent magician can perform the same tricks, and never invoke the claims of paranormal powers. The other magicians do the same tricks, but very likely the mechanics of their version is different. Does the performace of the magicians invalidate Uri Geller’s claims of the paranormal? Of course not. For all we know, there might be some paranormal powers, and Uri Geller may really exploit those powers. What the magicians do, is make the claim that there was some paranormal power at work - superfluous, unnecessary.
Looks like that the questions we ask are different. I could not care less about the precise ways and means how our consciousness works. I am simply interested is showing that the claim of “immaterial” (as in supernatural) is an unnecessary assumption.
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Fr_of_Jazz
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Right, we do ask different questions and I do agree, w/i the parameters of your thinking, your assertions follow. Again, within the SM (including scientific projects and hypotheses) and computer engineering the immateriality of the mind [or existence of the soul] is not only an unnecessary assumption: more than that, it is non-existent, because the SM cannot pronounce upon it and did not evolve to investigate it.
So if this is all you’re trying to establish, we have reached agreement.
But as I’ve said many times before: PA challenges a preexisting philosophical (not scientific) conviction. If one is going to make the universal and philosophical assertion [PA], “due to the findings of science the mind is by any measure of understanding, in all actuality and in every way nothing but brain activity and consequently one is rationally compelled to deny the immateriality of the mind”, then they needs to do three things. (1) Show scientifically exactly how third person data becomes first person data and causality runs only in this direction; (2) show that the SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions. Propositions are statements that can be true or false; (3) show that one is rationally compelled to adopt philosophical (not just methodological) materialism and physicalism.
The problem for PA is that it has not been demonstrated by science and because it is beyond what the SM can pronounce upon anyway. And furthermore it is a problem because until it is shown scientifically how third person data becomes first person data and causality runs only in this direction, the available evidence (among which is neuroplasticity) comports the philosophical conviction of the immateriality of the mind or existence of the soul.
Now if you’re saying, as I believe you have several times, I don’t care about these issues: they’re irrelevant to my scientific and computer engineering concerns, again I agree. If that’s all you want to do or care about, it’s a free country.
To say the mind is the activity of the brain as walking is the activity of the legs as you did, is a fine scientific assertion. But to assert it philosophically is simply to rephrase PA and hence it doesn’t prove anything. It is to beg the question.
If as I believe you have said you are only interested in functional (not structural) equivalence (better yet, really) behavioral equivalence, and you stay with that, we are again in agreement that the watch and the hour glass are identical. And from duplicating observable, external, third-person, behavioral effects of consciousness one has thereby duplicated a first-person conscious mind and the existence of the soul is [pun alert] immaterial. Agreed.
So we have three areas of agreement. Where exactly are the problems?
Problems enter in when, if I understand you correctly, you go further to assert PA but have neither shown (1) nor how (2) and (3) are rationally necessitated to back it up.
Historically in western philosophical and theological terminology “immateriality” is not coextensive with “supernatural.” “Supernatural” refers to God in His relationship with us, a relationship that is given to us by God but beyond our natural abilities to attain or achieve. Immateriality in that terminology refers to any reality that in its nature, existence, and activity is intrinsically independent of matter; is not subject to the determinations of time and space; and is not composed of parts spatially distinct from one another.
Now if by “supernatural” you mean what ever is other than physical and material reality that is empirically observable, then we’re back to establishing (2) and (3) before it can have any philosophical relevance here.
The point I was making re the Turing Test and Lourdes is that the identity and actual operation of the object is hidden from the test subject so that judgment on identity and therefore operation is made solely on observed behavioral equivalence. Therefore just as a watch and an hour glass are thereby dubbed identical as are an AI program and a human intelligence, so too a staged “miracle” when the subject can only see the behavioral equivalence that they are permitted to see, would have to be dubbed a real miracle.
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Serious
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Most gratifying. We do have agreement, and that is a rare phenomenon.
A fine definition. Let’s keep on using it. Is there an example of it? Because I cannot think of one. What kind of “reality” is something that is fully independent of the physical universe? What does the word “reality” mean here? Furthermore, suppose that entity “X” is an example: just what does it mean that “X” exists? Suppose that “X” is an immaterial object, how would it interact with the material world? This sounds like a very pertinent question.
In my suggested terminology I consider “actions (walking or thinking)”, “properties (heavy or sweet or distant)” and “relationships (before or in front of)” immaterial, since they are not material objects, but, of course they do not exist apart from the material world. What would you name these? Is there a suggested terminology?
In a sense, yes, one can say that the mechanical watch is an emulation of the hourglass, and conversely we can say that the hourglass is the emulation of the watch. By the same token the AI program can be said to emulate human behavior, or that human behavior emulates the AI. And, of course, the staged “miracle” and the “geniune miracle” are the “same” from the performance point of view. Which one should one consider the null hypothesis?
Fortunately the concept of Occam’s razor comes to the rescue. The razor is not an epistemological “tool”, it cannot decide if hypothesis “A” or hypothesis “B” is true. It is just a useful method to decide, which hypothesis should be considered the null hypothesis. We know that the hourglass preceded the mechanical watch, and we know that human intelligence came first. In the case of the miracle the decision is simple: the assumption of “miracle” violates the principle of parsimony, so it is not going to be entertained even as a hypothesis. This does not mean that the miracle hypothesis is wrong. It is simply not considered. Someone may consider it seriously, and may bring forth actual evidence for it, though I am unsure how can someone get evidence for something which cannot be observed, measured, verified or falsified. But as soon as testable and verifyable evidence is presented, then the “miracle” will be accepted, though it will cease to be a “miracle”. It will be just one more of the observable and testable part of the physical reality.
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Serious
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There are some problems here.
(2) is not something that any self-respecting materialist / physicalist would hold true, if the SM is taken as a short description of “observe, hypothesize, experiment and verify or falsify”. Also to restrict propostions to a subset of “sentences” where one can assign a “true” or “false” value to them is too restrictive. Some propostions are neither true nor false (tomorrow there will be rain at a specific location at a specific time). Some are self-contradictory. But going back to propositions which can be either true or false, the SM is not always applicable. One example where it does not apply is the propositions within an axiomatic system (like mathematics). Another example would be a proposition about the past, which cannot be empirically verified. A third example would be a proposition: “this picture is beautiful” or “Wagner’s music is actually much better than it sounds”.
I have seen so many times a propostion of the short-lived logical positivist school (which is now abandoned): “only those propositions can be taken seriously, which can be empricially verified”. And then the triumphant exclamation: “but this proposition cannot be empirically verifed”, therefore it leads to an absurdity. This is NOT what the materialist / physicalist says. Let me make sure that we see eye-to-eye regarding this question.
As pertaining to (1). Even if one could show how the “first person view” would emerge in an AI environment, I doubt if that would be convincing to those who accept the “immaterial” hypothesis. They would just say that it is different from the “human” version, and its existence does not disprove the “immaterial” hypothesis. The human chessplayer’s method to find the “best” move is totally different from the method used by Deep Blue. First, the human player has no idea how he came to the conclusion about a move, since the process happens mostly in the subconscious (and that has been verified). Second, the computer’s process is superior (
) since it can beat the living … ahem daylight from the human player. Just because a human method and the AI’s method are different, it is not relevant. Two humans may use a different method in obtaining a result - and that is not relevant. As long as the result is there, it is irrelevant, how it was obtained. Let me repeat: a successful AI would not disprove the hypothesis that the human mind is “immaterial”. It would merely render the hypothesis unnecessary and superfluous.As for (3), what is rationally compelling is quite subjective.
When looking at the “immaterial hypothesis”, I ask a few questions: “what the heck is that immaterial ‘thing’?”. Also: “how does the immaterial ‘stuff’ communicate with the physical?”. And “how does the immaterial ‘affect’ the physical?”. There must be an interface between the physical and the “immaterial”. How does that interface operate? What kind of epistemology is there to separate true and false propositions about the immaterial?
So I am going to turn the tables on you: “unless you can answer these questions, your hypothesis of the immaterial cannot be taken rationally”. Obviously there are many things about the physical universe which are outside our knowledge and understanding. That is not a rational reason to adopt some kind of (God-of-the-gaps like) “immaterial hypothesis”, which cannot answer the problems either, and furthermore cannot answer the basic questions about the “immaterial reality” either. The “solution” of substituting one unknown with two unknowns sounds like a particularly irrational proposition to me.
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djeter
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http://payingattentiontothesky.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/transfiguration-rubens.jpg?w=450
N.T.Wright takes on your concerns (I think) here:
"The theme of new creation that bubbles up from these stories emerges in our third category: matter (Space and Time the other two). Reality. The physical world in all its complexity and glory. Here today’s readers of the New Testament have to take an even deeper breath than before. We have been schooled to believe, as a bedrock principle in our worldview, that the material world is relentlessly and reductively subject to the laws of physics, chemistry, and the more specific sciences of astronomy, biology, zoology, botany, and the rest. But as with geography (space, the temple) and chronology (time), so here also the Jewish worldview begs to differ.
The world of matter, no less than those of space and time, was made by the creator God. It was made not only to display his beauty and power, but also as a vessel for his glory. Again and again the prophets and psalms hint at what we might conceivably have guessed from the story of creation itself: the material world was made to be filled with God’s glory. “The earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of YHWH, as the waters cover the sea” (Habakkuk. 2:14). Suppose that isn’t just an extravagant way of speaking? Suppose it means what it says?
What prevents us from thinking in these terms, I believe, is the long and often unrecognized triumph of the movement called Deism — a modern version of the ancient philosophy called Epicureanism. As long as we are thinking in that way, with God or the gods a long way away and earth trundling on entirely by its own steam, we will never glimpse that vision. As long as we are still in awe of the great Scottish philosopher David Hume, who declared that miracles don’t happen because they can’t happen, we will not only find it difficult to believe in the ancient Jewish worldview. We will find it difficult even to understand what it was about.
The rest of the essay is here (along with companion pieces dealing with time and space). I think it ultimately explains the paradoxical views modern day Catholics hold as they struggle to understand the ancient Jewish worldview that underscores much of NT Scripture.
See if you don’t agree…
dj
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LogisticsBranch
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My point is you and Serious aren’t scientists.
You both had best review the website I earlier provided. Hopefully, you will learn something. Learn what the definitions mean, especially the one I earlier gave to you. I’ll stand by what I earlier pronounced in my earlier posting to this topic. Once again, the scientific method is not “atheistic” since atheists know the concept of God and reject it. Science isn’t based on concept(s) that reject God. I hope that helps you in the future. Bye the way, I’m a scientist. Foremost above all else, scientists and school teachers of science wouldn’t say what you have stated in a science classroom. Science isn’t biased toward religious and non-religious people. That’s the beauty of science. It’s for everyone. Thanks for confirming what I originally thought and thanks for taking the time to give me a clearer picture of your idea which needed to be modified. I’m sorry to not have gotten back to you sooner, but I am a very busy person plus I have a puppy that is a little over a year old now and she takes my breath away in respect to keeping her fit. This dog loves to keep me running. She is not only beautiful but smart! She’s 78 lbs. of pure muscle and I’m only 103 lbs. Sometimes it’s a tug of war and she wins. I love her dearly.
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Fr_of_Jazz
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Actually my undergraduate degree is in biology with a chemistry minor and I took graduate courses in both bio and chem as an undergraduate; and, as a perpetual student, an undergraduate degree in philosophy, graduate work in philosophy, and a graduate degree in history. I read the same material you recommended and others.My point is you and Serious aren’t scientists.
I clarified what I meant and I never said that science is based on a concept that rejects God. I said science is the empirical, mechanistic, quantitative investigation of physical reality often in view of technological application. As such God does not enter into the formal methodology of science. Serious himself said the method was “atheistic”–note the quotes. And I explained the rationale and qualifications behind my response to you already.
Actually these topics are covered in one way or another in the introductory material in many science text books. A biology textbook put it nicely: “Science is only one way of exploring the world around us; history, religion, and philosophy are others. Science deals only with things that can be experienced directly or indirectly through the senses (sight or hearing, for example). By definition, science has nothing to say about the supernatural.” [Karen Arms & Pamela S. Camp. *Biology. 3rd ed. Philadelphia: Saunders College Publishing, 1987, p. 6]
Congrats on the dog. We had an English Setter, hunting variety. Great pet.
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Fr_of_Jazz
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Indeed!
In the Western theistic tradition (the critiqued data) within which I live and think examples of immaterial realities are the human soul [or call it the immateriality of the mind/intellect], angels, and God. They interact with the material world in the way that my daily conscious mental acts and decisions interact with my body or in an analogous way. Examples would be choosing to run and running, practicing the guitar, solving a problem, philosophizing. Thinking itself is an act, but of the intellect; and it is not an empirically perceptible external object function such as those studied by science.
Typical philosophical terminology rooted in Aristotle would see “actions,” “relations,” and “properties” as accidents. “Properties” (with the exception of “distant” which would go under “relations”) are called “qualities.” Later Scholastics, Renaissance scientists, and Locke distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. The former are geometric characteristics such as extension, shape, number and the like; the latter are further attributes [that cause specific sensations] like sweetness, color, odor, heaviness, etc. An accident is a modification of an individual thing which is called a substance. One doesn’t see a “green” or a “sitting” or a “dressed” or a “moving” hanging around. If I say: a “green,” “sitting,” “dressed,” or “moving,” our minds want to know what? --a green what? The “what” is the substance. Material versus immaterial relates to substances or components of substances, but not directly to accidents.
The philosophical tradition starts with the data (from Rescher) I outlined rooted in experience in the everyday order of magnitude in which we live our lives–not the macroscopic or microscopic. Science looks at some accidents and even some substances as emergent properties as a way to get back to the level of sense perception from its atomistic and mechanistic analysis. Be that as it may, I see no conflict between the philosophical tradition under discussion and the results of science derived from the SM given the specific (and limited) purpose the SM historically evolved to achieve: the empirical, mechanistic, quantifiable investigation of physical reality often in view of technological application. I would also point out that the development of the SM as such and the Scientific Revolution occurred within the Western theistic tradition and is rooted in its worldview and institutions. The historians of science noted earlier state this and even Alfred North Whitehead acknowledges it.
The immateriality of the mind/soul is grasped by the mind/intellect. The soul as such is not perceptible to the senses, to empirical investigation. To get at this let me say w/i my experience David Hume was right: raw sense (name removed by moderator)ut considered in itself does nothing more than make impressions on individual sense organs which are retained in memory. So for causality, such data gives us no more than the brute impression series that one event often follows another. It is the intellect that grasps the operation and nature of causality. Or re the existence of something, the reception of raw sense impressions on sense organs of itself does not contain the judgment that a particular thing exists: it is an act of the intellect which judges that a thing or property exists. Ditto for truths like the Principle of Sufficient Reason which are grasped by the intellect.
Acts specific to the intellect in this view, while united to the body and having empirically observable bodily correlates (eye movements, brain processes), are beyond the power of matter alone to perform. To this extent they are said to be independent–but not necessarily apart from–matter. Such acts include concept formation and reflection (the mind thinking about its own acts) and they give me sufficient reason to maintain that the mind is immaterial. (See sub-post.) Also the established findings of science as of now have not demonstrated otherwise and in the case of neuroplasticity they comport with it.
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Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
Aquinas rooted in Aristotle notes that matter is the principle of division of individuals of the same species. All individual dogs, which are material things, share a common canine nature, which the human intellect can grasp in a universal concept. Now, physical objects can only receive (e.g., the imprint of) individual things. A given area of snow, for example, can only receive the paw print of a particular, individual dog; a camera, the image of a particular scene–not a concept or universal.
Thomas then concludes: “Therefore, it is only as individuated that a form is received into a body [physical thing]. If, then, the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intellect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect is a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 4]
Thomas also argues that no physical body can be self-conscious (as in self-aware), or as he puts it, “self-reflexive.” A stone, or for that matter a dog, would have to be able to explicitly think about itself and its own personal, inner, mental acts. This is clearly not the case. The human being, however, can do these things. In Aquinas’ words: “the action of no body is self-reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the mover and the other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not only as to a part, but as to the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 8]
Thomas then concludes: “Therefore, it is only as individuated that a form is received into a body [physical thing]. If, then, the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intellect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect is a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 4]
Thomas also argues that no physical body can be self-conscious (as in self-aware), or as he puts it, “self-reflexive.” A stone, or for that matter a dog, would have to be able to explicitly think about itself and its own personal, inner, mental acts. This is clearly not the case. The human being, however, can do these things. In Aquinas’ words: “the action of no body is self-reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the mover and the other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not only as to a part, but as to the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 8]
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Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
But that’s the point. Given what you have said previously about emulation and identity based solely on behavioral equivalence, the watch and the hour glass are identical to the Turing Test. The Turing Test–and perhaps I don’t understand it or its purpose properly–doesn’t go as far as making a hypothesis and testing it in multiple ways to discover whether the thing in question is what it purports to be: all you can go by is the external behavior that you are permitted to witness. And so if the thing in question (“behind the curtain” so to speak) exhibits certain external behaviors equivalent to “X,” it is “X.”
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Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
This does help to clarify your position. And I do get that you recognize the self-refuting character of the LP school. Some problems remain.(2) is not something that any self-respecting materialist / physicalist would hold true, if the SM is taken as a short description of “observe, hypothesize, experiment and verify or falsify”. Also to restrict propostions to a subset of “sentences” where one can assign a “true” or “false” value to them is too restrictive. Some propostions are neither true nor false (tomorrow there will be rain at a specific location at a specific time). Some are self-contradictory. But going back to propositions which can be either true or false, the SM is not always applicable. One example where it does not apply is the propositions within an axiomatic system (like mathematics). Another example would be a proposition about the past, which cannot be empirically verified. A third example would be a proposition: “this picture is beautiful” or “Wagner’s music is actually much better than it sounds”.
I have seen so many times a propostion of the short-lived logical positivist school (which is now abandoned): “only those propositions can be taken seriously, which can be empricially verified”. And then the triumphant exclamation: “but this proposition cannot be empirically verifed”, therefore it leads to an absurdity. This is NOT what the materialist / physicalist says. Let me make sure that we see eye-to-eye regarding this question.
(a) The definition I gave of a proposition is not too restrictive: it is the technical logical and philosophical definition. A proposition is a sentence that can be true or false. Check any logic text book. Your first prop. example is true. Your second seems to me to rule out the role of physical evidence in criminal investigation and proof–DNA, gunshot residue, autopsies, blood tests, etc. The third is not a proposition but a sentence expressing a subjective opinion.
(b) As I covered in my post (Mar 2, '12, 9:30 pm) the SM as used and defined today and as it evolved in history is an empirical, quantifiable investigation of physical reality giving a mechanistic, atomistic, and strictly physical accounting of its subject. On this basis two problems emerge:
(i) You argue that you are not claiming “The SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions” because it is self-refuting and besides you affirm that math propositions are clearly true and not scientific. This still leaves open the possibility that you maintain “Excluding math, the SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions about external reality.” Is that the case? You did say “The phrase ‘scientific method’ is just a misnomer. There is only one method.”
My point has been one still has to justify extending the scope of the SM beyond its defined object to philosophical/metaphysical propositions about external reality. Additionally, if you are going to limit the scope of reality to physical reality you need to justify that.
(ii) What is important for you to see is that to use an empirical method for investigating physical reality to check for what is by definition a nonphysical reality is a charade–it could not apprehend the thing even if it did exist. It would be as if I said “I’ll accept the existence of atoms only if I can see them with the naked eye because I only accept what I can see with the naked eye.” Even though atoms actually do exist I would have ruled them out a priori. No scientist would perform an experiment that is blind to the very object being investigated, i.e., could not detect it even if it did exist. Now if you prove (2) and (3), you’re good to go.
(c) In the prior post I discussed the traditional philosophical view re raw sense data versus the cognitive acts that alone apprehend certain intelligible objects, and I gave examples.
We already agree that, within the SM (including scientific projects and hypotheses) and computer engineering the immateriality of the mind [or existence of the soul] is not only an unnecessary assumption: more than that, it is non-existent, because the SM cannot pronounce upon it and did not evolve to investigate it.As pertaining to (1). Even if one could show how the “first person view” would emerge in an AI environment, I doubt if that would be convincing to those who accept the “immaterial” hypothesis. They would just say that it is different from the “human” version, and its existence does not disprove the “immaterial” hypothesis. The human chessplayer’s method to find the “best” move is totally different from the method used by Deep Blue. First, the human player has no idea how he came to the conclusion about a move, since the process happens mostly in the subconscious (and that has been verified). Second, the computer’s process is superior (
The philosophical assertion that the mind is immaterial is not a scientific hypothesis: it did not emerge that way in the history of philosophy and it is not maintained that way now. If you are going to handle a non-scientific proposition about reality with the SM you need to justify extending the scope of the SM as per (b)(i)-(ii) above.
My gripe also is with asserting PA, a philosophical assertion beyond the methodological limits of science, without the requisite proof.
F
Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
I don’t think proof is subjective. There is the data that I outlined: standards of correct reasoning; peer review and discussion.
Good questions. At least a start to covering them is provided in the prior post. The epistemology would by definition not be that of the SM as such, but would be philosophical.
(d)(i) All this language is from the SM. I noted we agree on it: an immaterial reality can’t be a hypothesis to the SM nor even exist, ergo, no God-of-the-gaps.
(ii) You made the claims “the mind is simply the activity of the brain, even though the evidence is overwhelming” and “It [successful AI] would merely render the hypothesis unnecessary and superfluous.” I already agreed with these assertions w/i the realm of the SM and computer engineering. What is left to discuss unless you wish to push for PA? If so, the burden of proof is on you. In this discussion for you to turn the tables would be to shift the burden of proof.
(e)(i) The conviction that the mind is immaterial is part of a cultural heritage that I evaluate critically but did not invent or formulate as a hypothesis. It is not as if I have been working in a lab and announced that I discovered the soul; or in engineering and claimed that I created a soul; or discovered evidence of my hypothesized “soul effect.” As far as I can tell I have sufficient reason to continue to hold to the conviction of the immateriality of the mind and the existence of the soul. In addition to the philosophical reasons I provided there is nothing in the scientific findings extant that proves otherwise–in fact neuroplasticity comports with it. It is you who have contested this.
(ii) There’s a deeper issue here. The set of convictions in the Western theistic tradition pre-exist modern materialism and physicalism. They are a response to that tradition: it is more reasonable to abandon the conviction that substantial immateriality is one feature of reality and limit ones view of reality to the physical and material and their properties and activities. The burden of proof in a dispute is on the historically newer claim and must be so by the very nature of advancement in human knowledge. If you’re interested, I defended this traditional rhetorical thesis here.
(f) Certainly if I came to you and said, “The soul exists and I’m going to prove it to you” I would have the burden of proof; and it is true that it would be a legit activity to marshal a thorough and coherent argument for the existence of the soul or immateriality of the mind. But neither of these is how this discussion evolved and I’ll have to do it in a separate thread when I have the time to put into it.
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