Explain, please

[Serious]

In the Western theistic tradition (the critiqued data) within which I live and think examples of immaterial realities are the human soul [or call it the immateriality of the mind/intellect], angels, and God.

Well, the few seconds of agreement are gone now (not that they were not precious while they lasted). I am sure you know that these examples are unacceptable to an atheist. Besides, you forgot to mention the “demons”, the “devils”, and the “poltergeists”. So, for the record, there are no immaterial entities that I can recognize as such. They are all bogus.

They interact with the material world in the way that my daily conscious mental acts and decisions interact with my body or in an analogous way. Examples would be choosing to run and running, practicing the guitar, solving a problem, philosophizing. Thinking itself is an act, but of the intellect; and it is not an empirically perceptible external object function such as those studied by science.

You cannot be serious, if you thought that you can get away with this. You demanded me to give a precise method of how the “first person view” emerges in an electronic environment, while you did not explain how the first person view happens in the soul. And now you say that the “immaterial” world interacts with the body as your thoughts and decisions interact with the body, either literally or analogously. Are your thoughts and decisions now part of the “material world” or part of the “immaterial”? What I am demanding now is the precise method to describe how the immaterial is influenced by the material and how the immaterial acts upon the material. How does a decision of the “soul” to take a walk translate into moving the muscles in the leg. No “analogous” stuff, please. The devil is in the details. If you thought it proper to demand the precise ways and means, I am sure you will be happy to keep yourself to the same standard.

Typical philosophical terminology rooted in Aristotle would see “actions,” “relations,” and “properties” as accidents.

Aristotele was a genius of his time, but he is totally irrelevant of today. Accidents happen when someone is run over by a street car. The brain is no longer perceived as an organ to cool the blood. What I propose is simple: physical objects have certain “properties”, they have “relationships” with other objects and they can perform “actions” in certain ways. All this kind of terminology is simple, we all understand what they mean. It is unacceptable to use ancient, outdated, convoluted terminology to describe simple things.

None of these properties, relationships and actions are physical objects per se, so in a very good sense they are immaterial. Also there are concepts (like good, just, etc…) which are not physical objects themselves. But that is as far I am able to recognize immateriality. Concepts, attributes, relationships and actions. All are “immaterial” since they are not “physical objects”, but they are all dependent of the physical infrastructure, and sometimes also the intellect (mind) which perceives them. Angels, demons, gods, poltergeists, souls are ill-defined figments of imagination - at least for the time being.

Unless you can explain precisely, in detail, how the allegedly immaterial mind (as you understand immaterial) acts upon the physical reality, I cannot take your concepts seriously. If you will do that, the picture might change.

It is late now… I will continue tomorrow.

 

[Serious]

Aquinas rooted in Aristotle notes that matter is the principle of division of individuals of the same species. All individual dogs, which are material things, share a common canine nature, which the human intellect can grasp in a universal concept.

I only see an arbtirary gouping based upon some arbitrary criterion. Of course the concept of grouping or generalizing is an extreley useful method from moving from the particular to the general, but it does not lead to a “canine essence”. The whole concept of “essence” is bogus, which is obvious if one asks what is the “essence” of “doghood”? And the answer will be “huh?”.

Thomas then concludes: “Therefore, it is only as individuated that a form is received into a body [physical thing]. If, then, the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intellect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect is a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 4]

Intellect is not a “body”, (or more precisely it is not a physical object). Just like “walking” is not a physical object. But no one of a sound mind would hypothesize that “walking” comes from “immaterial” origin.

But that’s the point. Given what you have said previously about emulation and identity based solely on behavioral equivalence, the watch and the hour glass are identical to the Turing Test. The Turing Test–and perhaps I don’t understand it or its purpose properly–doesn’t go as far as making a hypothesis and testing it in multiple ways to discover whether the thing in question is what it purports to be: all you can go by is the external behavior that you are permitted to witness. And so if the thing in question (“behind the curtain” so to speak) exhibits certain external behaviors equivalent to “X,” it is “X.”

Yes, we already agreed to that. We have two entities, and we are concentrating on one particular functionality of them. If they perform identically, then in this particular respect they are “equivalent” (but only in this particular respect). Now the actual proposed Turing test attempts to decide if the “black box” performs identically to a human being in one respect - can it perform a lengty conversation with a human so that the human partner is “fooled” that he was talking to another human.

The Turing test is not a hypothesis, in and by itself. It is a method to decide if the “soul” hypothesis should be entertained or not. Suppose the human experimenter is convinced that he was talking to another human, and it is revealed that he was really talking to a bunch of semi-conductors. Obviously the “machine” has no soul. Yet it can converse and reason and generalize just jike a human can - that is it can perform all the high level functions of the human mind. Observe, it does not try to emulate all the human bodily functions.

Now the only rational conclustion in this hypothetic scenario will be: “the assumption that the high level functions of the human mind are of immaterial origin is not necessary”.

 

[Serious]

(a) The definition I gave of a proposition is not too restrictive: it is the technical logical and philosophical definition. A proposition is a sentence that can be true or false.

In this case you will have to face the fact that you cannot decide if a sentence is a propostion or not. I cannot see how is this situation is better than to accept the fact that some propositions cannot be resolved. I am going to use the word “proposition” in this respect. A proposition is a sentence which “proposes” something, whether it can be decided or not.

(i) You argue that you are not claiming “The SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions” because it is self-refuting and besides you affirm that math propositions are clearly true and not scientific. This still leaves open the possibility that you maintain “Excluding math, the SM alone can determine the veracity of propositions about external reality.” Is that the case? You did say “The phrase ‘scientific method’ is just a misnomer. There is only one method.”

This is not what I am asserting either. The SM is the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality. In the deductive or axiomatic systems we can prove if a propostion is true or false. In an inductive system we can “only” substantiate a hypothesis. And to do that we need to either “verify” or “falsify” the result predicted by a hypothesis. Only predictions matter. You will always be asked to put your money where your mouth is. When I say that the “S” is superfluous in the “SM”, I mean that if one makes an utterance (or prediction) and it cannot be decided, then it was an empty utterance, and as such it does not merit consideration. People make all sorts of predictions about God. For example I was told (far too many times): “Ask and you shall receive”. When I asked back: “when?”, the answer was “whenever God decides”. What kind of “prediction” is that? Empty, meaningless prediction. Don’t you agree?

My point has been one still has to justify extending the scope of the SM beyond its defined object to philosophical/metaphysical propositions about external reality. Additionally, if you are going to limit the scope of reality to physical reality you need to justify that.

I justify that by observing that the “non-physical reality” is merely a hypothesis. I am open to the suggestion that there is a “non-physical” reality “out there”, but I need the characteristics (attributes, properties, relationships, etc…) about this so-called reality. So far I only heard about this “non-physical reality”, but none of the details. True, you mentioned God, angels and souls, but merely mentioning them is not sufficient.

What is important for you to see is that to use an empirical method for investigating physical reality to check for what is by definition a nonphysical reality is a charade–it could not apprehend the thing even if it did exist.

No, you are mistaken here. It would be impossible, if that “non-physical reality” would never interact with the physical reality. But the theist assertion is that there is an interaction. If there is an interaction, then there is an interface. And one can “tap” into the interface - since it is at least partially physical. Of course one could assert that the interface is pure, undetectable “magic”, but that kind of assertion will not be entertained. The conclusion is that as long as the non-physical reality interacts with the physical one, it is subject to the observation, verification or falsification.

We already agree that, within the SM (including scientific projects and hypotheses) and computer engineering the immateriality of the mind [or existence of the soul] is not only an unnecessary assumption: more than that, it is non-existent, because the SM cannot pronounce upon it and did not evolve to investigate it.

I do not accept this on two grounds. One, you could justly point out that I claim “omniscience” (which I don’t have) and two, I do not wish to be accused of having a “closed” mind. For the time being, I treat the supposed “non-physical reality” exactly as I treat claim about the paranormal. I think that they are both bogus claims, but I stay open to the possibility that I am mistaken, and IF sufficient evidence would show that I am indeed mistaken, then I will happily “eat humble pie”. However, the burden of proof is strictly upon the proponents. I am under no obligation to refute or even answer some counter-claims. You are under obligation to substantiate them.

The philosophical assertion that the mind is immaterial is not a scientific hypothesis: it did not emerge that way in the history of philosophy and it is not maintained that way now.

And a successful instance of the Turing test will invalidate that assertion. If a philosophical claim is contradicted by a scientific claim, then philosophy must yield. Also, if a philosophical claim says the same as a scientific claim, then what use is the philosophical claim? The only time a philosophical claim has a valid existence, if the question is open. And as soon the question is answered, the philosophical claim loses its relevance. And as long as the question is open, the philosophical claim is simply a hypothesis, which needs to be examined, just like any other hypothesis.

My gripe also is with asserting PA, a philosophical assertion beyond the methodological limits of science, without the requisite proof.

Since here we are outside the axiomatic systems, there can be no talk about “proof”. It is incorrect of you to ask for a “proof”. There can be talk about evidence, and the evidence is called the evidence of the pudding.

 

[Serious]

I don’t think proof is subjective. There is the data that I outlined: standards of correct reasoning; peer review and discussion.

I said that the “sufficiency” of the evidence is subjective. There is data out there, all right. And that is not the problem. The problem is the conclusion drawn from the data. Again, an example: millions of people utter millions of intercessory, supplicative (not merely meditative) prayers every day. There is no evidence that those are granted. The conclusion drawn by the atheist: either there is no God there, or God does not care. The conclusion drawn by the theist: the payers were not in line with what God has “in store” for us. Even if those prayers are fully in line with God’s alleged wishes of love, good will, caring, help, etc… When someone aks for real evidence for God’s existence (and points out that “whatever you ask in my name will be granted, because I will go to the Father”), one of the usual evasions is: “Blessed are the ones who have not seen, yet believe”. Indeed there is data out there. But the conclusion stays subjective.

Good questions. At least a start to covering them is provided in the prior post. The epistemology would by definition not be that of the SM as such, but would be philosophical.

The devil is in the details. Let me hear the details of the suggested epistemology.

(d)(i) All this language is from the SM. I noted we agree on it: an immaterial reality can’t be a hypothesis to the SM nor even exist, ergo, no God-of-the-gaps.

I answered this in the previous post: "yes it is subject to the “M(ethod)”.

(ii) You made the claims “the mind is simply the activity of the brain, even though the evidence is overwhelming” and “It [successful AI] would merely render the hypothesis unnecessary and superfluous.” I already agreed with these assertions w/i the realm of the SM and computer engineering. What is left to discuss unless you wish to push for PA? If so, the burden of proof is on you.

And the successful AI test is the evidence (not proof!),

In this discussion for you to turn the tables would be to shift the burden of proof.

Do you really say that I am not allowed to make questions, only you have that privilage? You made some pretty specific claims yourself. I am asking for the same thing as you did.

(e)(i) The conviction that the mind is immaterial is part of a cultural heritage…

Sorry to sound harsh here… I am not interested where the concept came from.

(ii) There’s a deeper issue here. The set of convictions in the Western theistic tradition pre-exist modern materialism and physicalism. They are a response to that tradition: it is more reasonable to abandon the conviction that substantial immateriality is one feature of reality and limit ones view of reality to the physical and material and their properties and activities. The burden of proof in a dispute is on the historically newer claim and must be so by the very nature of advancement in human knowledge.

Again, tradition does not matter. The suggested immateriality hypothesis never showed how the immaterial exists without the material, it never showed how the immaterial interacts with the material. It remained a pure, unsubstantiated hypothesis - in other words, speculation.

If you’re interested, I defended this traditional rhetorical thesis here.

Yes, I remember it.

(f) Certainly if I came to you and said, “The soul exists and I’m going to prove it to you” I would have the burden of proof; and it is true that it would be a legit activity to marshal a thorough and coherent argument for the existence of the soul or immateriality of the mind. But neither of these is how this discussion evolved and I’ll have to do it in a separate thread when I have the time to put into it.

That is fine.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Well, the few seconds of agreement are gone now (not that they were not precious while they lasted). I am sure you know that these examples are unacceptable to an atheist. Besides, you forgot to mention the “demons”, the “devils”, and the “poltergeists”. So, for the record, there are no immaterial entities that I can recognize as such. They are all bogus.

You seem to forget the course of the discussion, who asserted what, and then who must back up their assertions.

I responded to your OP to correct your understanding of a point of RC doctrine–primary and secondary causality and Catholic scientists. You asserted to a Catholic whose theistic convictions and philosophy you are aware of that: “the mind is simply the activity of the brain, even though the evidence is overwhelming” and later “It [successful AI] would merely render the hypothesis unnecessary and superfluous.” You made this assertion in this conversation. It is up to you to back it up. That is what I am holding you to.

If instead I came up to you and said atheism, materialism, and physicalism are false, then I would have to meet the same standards I am hold you to and marshal the most cogent arguments I can. But you said below at the end “That is fine” to this. . . then apply it to yourself.

So, in taking issue with my convictions in a tradition both of which are known to you, you asked me for examples of immaterial realities. It is indisputable that I correctly answered. Now tell me: they are false and it is more reasonable for one to drop them because . . .

I am not challenging your assertion “there are no immaterial entities that I can recognize as such” here. I am asking you to back up the assertion you made to me about the mind.

You cannot be serious, if you thought that you can get away with this. You demanded me to give a precise method of how the “first person view” emerges in an electronic environment, while you did not explain how the first person view happens in the soul. And now you say that the “immaterial” world interacts with the body as your thoughts and decisions interact with the body, either literally or analogously. Are your thoughts and decisions now part of the “material world” or part of the “immaterial”? What I am demanding now is the precise method to describe how the immaterial is influenced by the material and how the immaterial acts upon the material. How does a decision of the “soul” to take a walk translate into moving the muscles in the leg. No “analogous” stuff, please. The devil is in the details. If you thought it proper to demand the precise ways and means, I am sure you will be happy to keep yourself to the same standard.

Nice try! But I direct you back to the burden you have to meet in this discussion–to back up your claims. The first person view is data we all start with: consciousness, experiences, concepts, assertions, judging, reasoning, insight, forming hypotheses, theories; willing, choosing, deciding to and moving my body, etc. Western theism for eons has held that these are acts of the soul/mind which is immaterial. You are aware of (not agree with) this pre-existing set of convictions including that immateriality is a feature among others of reality. In the face of this you made your assertion–even, apparently, with the fond hope as with the AI project that this would “invalidate [my] whole worldview” even though it is “hard to give up the[se] ingrained ideas.”

I never claimed to know how scientifically first person mental acts “become” third person brain acts. As you well know the theistic conviction is metaphysical: the soul is the human substantial form. What you don’t seem to understand is that because you made the claim that first person mental acts are nothing but third person brain acts and that the evidence is overwhelming, you have to explain the relation between the two or you have not made your case.

You made the assertions, so I demanded that you back them up. I will be happy to meet the demands for rigor you rightly expect if and when I begin a conversation asserting that your atheistic, materialistic, physicalist convictions are false. But I didn’t.

The traditional convictions are that God created the universe, sustains everything in it as I described earlier. The soul is viewed as I described. etc. Now tell me: they are false and it is more reasonable for one to abandon them because . . .

. . . because I should adopt physicalism and the attendant view that “The SM is the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality?” Show me why it is more reasonable to do so.

Now if you would like to start with the traditional theistic convictions I correctly reported to you and lead me out of the error of my ways to see why it is more reasonable to abandon them and adopt your position, I’m all ears.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Aristotele was a genius of his time, but he is totally irrelevant of today. Accidents happen when someone is run over by a street car. The brain is no longer perceived as an organ to cool the blood. What I propose is simple: physical objects have certain “properties”, they have “relationships” with other objects and they can perform “actions” in certain ways. All this kind of terminology is simple, we all understand what they mean. It is unacceptable to use ancient, outdated, convoluted terminology to describe simple things.

None of these properties, relationships and actions are physical objects per se, so in a very good sense they are immaterial. Also there are concepts (like good, just, etc…) which are not physical objects themselves. But that is as far I am able to recognize immateriality. Concepts, attributes, relationships and actions. All are “immaterial” since they are not “physical objects”, but they are all dependent of the physical infrastructure, and sometimes also the intellect (mind) which perceives them. Angels, demons, gods, poltergeists, souls are ill-defined figments of imagination - at least for the time being.

Unless you can explain precisely, in detail, how the allegedly immaterial mind (as you understand immaterial) acts upon the physical reality, I cannot take your concepts seriously. If you will do that, the picture might change.

It’s irrelevant whether you take the “concepts” in question seriously. I didn’t assert them in a conversation with you. You denied known theistic convictions in a conversation with me. So go for it: why is it rationally required that I abandon the notion that the soul or mind is immaterial and adopt physicalism?

I only see an arbtirary gouping based upon some arbitrary criterion. Of course the concept of grouping or generalizing is an extreley useful method from moving from the particular to the general, but it does not lead to a “canine essence”. The whole concept of “essence” is bogus, which is obvious if one asks what is the “essence” of “doghood”? And the answer will be “huh?”.

You forgot the section on what reason can grasp.

The essence of doghood is that it is a concept . . . like manhood . . . or it could be a doggie ghetto. Next question. Honestly, that objection is inane.

Are you saying that you are unaware that you have concepts in your mind like dog, truth, animal, machine, weapon, artificial, intelligence? You can honestly say you don’t know what a dog is? or conceive of a machine?

Anyway, you ‘re digging yourself into a hole. If the character of generality belonging to our concepts is solely and wholly in the mind, there is nothing that answers to it in the nature of things themselves. We then have no knowledge of reality. But no one lives or does science thinking that. Science has many generalities that purport to be of reality–not just arbitrary groupings. The only thing that makes any sense is that if the human mind is able to apply a single concept to two different objects, there must be something in these objects that makes us able to conceive of them as one. It seems far more reasonable that the generality must in some way be found in things.

Intellect is not a “body”, (or more precisely it is not a physical object). Just like “walking” is not a physical object. But no one of a sound mind would hypothesize that “walking” comes from “immaterial” origin.

Mind and intellect are nouns, substantives, not verbs. Thinking is an act of the mind, as walking is an act of the legs. This is indisputable data from conscious experience. To assert that thinking is an act of the brain as walking is an act of the legs is to assume what it to be proven by rephrasing your claim that the mind is simply the activity of the brain.

You forgot reflection as evidence comporting with immateriality.

Yes, we already agreed to that. We have two entities, and we are concentrating on one particular functionality of them. If they perform identically, then in this particular respect they are “equivalent” (but only in this particular respect). Now the actual proposed Turing test attempts to decide if the “black box” performs identically to a human being in one respect - can it perform a lengty conversation with a human so that the human partner is “fooled” that he was talking to another human.

The Turing test is not a hypothesis, in and by itself. It is a method to decide if the “soul” hypothesis should be entertained or not. Suppose the human experimenter is convinced that he was talking to another human, and it is revealed that he was really talking to a bunch of semi-conductors. Obviously the “machine” has no soul. Yet it can converse and reason and generalize just jike a human can - that is it can perform all the high level functions of the human mind. Observe, it does not try to emulate all the human bodily functions.

Now the only rational conclustion in this hypothetic scenario will be: “the assumption that the high level functions of the human mind are of immaterial origin is not necessary”.

I agree further that’s the goal of the Turing test among some hard AI proponents. I draw your attention to the material by Searle who also holds a purely naturalistic world view and whom I asked you to read. Incidentally you’ll discover in reading his work that the Chinese Room Argument, which is his, is against interpreting the Turing Test as you do. There is no agreement even among pure naturalists on the specifics of the test itself or the interpretation of the results.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

In this case you will have to face the fact that you cannot decide if a sentence is a propostion or not. I cannot see how is this situation is better than to accept the fact that some propositions cannot be resolved. I am going to use the word “proposition” in this respect. A proposition is a sentence which “proposes” something, whether it can be decided or not.

I’m not a physicalist. I don’t have the problem you seem to have. I don’t have to decide if a sentence can be tested by the SM which alone can resolve truth questions before I can call it a proposition. If it makes a truth claim, it is a proposition as every logic text book says. Propositions are then evaluated by various means.

It’s a free country. You can invent your own terminology if you want. I am going by traditional philosophical and logical terminology.

This is not what I am asserting either. The SM is the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality. In the deductive or axiomatic systems we can prove if a propostion is true or false. In an inductive system we can “only” substantiate a hypothesis. And to do that we need to either “verify” or “falsify” the result predicted by a hypothesis. Only predictions matter. You will always be asked to put your money where your mouth is. When I say that the “S” is superfluous in the “SM”, I mean that if one makes an utterance (or prediction) and it cannot be decided, then it was an empty utterance, and as such it does not merit consideration. People make all sorts of predictions about God. For example I was told (far too many times): “Ask and you shall receive”. When I asked back: “when?”, the answer was “whenever God decides”. What kind of “prediction” is that? Empty, meaningless prediction. Don’t you agree?

The SM which evolved to gain empirical, mechanistic, atomistic objective true propositions about physical reality is now being used by you as the only method to arrive at true and false statements about (not just physical but all) external reality. You have morphed a method developed to deal with physical reality into the only method to arrive at objective true propositions about all external reality.

Now this makes perfect sense for someone who has already adopted physicalism, materialism, and atheism as does your handling of the issues above. It also makes perfect sense that someone who holds “The SM is the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality” will predictably arrive at physicalism and materialism–being open of course to divine intrusions if they can be tested by the SM.

But if you’re going to back up the claims you made against immateriality vis-a-vis the western theistic tradition, you can’t assume exclusively a physicalist epistemology and method and then critique a philosophy that by definition is not physicalist without showing in the first place why it is more reasonable to adopt physicalism and rely exclusively on the only method that makes sense in it.

If you want to say that physicalism is postulate for you and everything flows from that, I can respect that. But I can’t see how you can present physicalism as more reasonable to me when you won’t defend it philosophically.

I justify that by observing that the “non-physical reality” is merely a hypothesis. I am open to the suggestion that there is a “non-physical” reality “out there”, but I need the characteristics (attributes, properties, relationships, etc…) about this so-called reality. So far I only heard about this “non-physical reality”, but none of the details. True, you mentioned God, angels and souls, but merely mentioning them is not sufficient.

Again shifting the burden of proof. I never claimed in this discussion to prove that there is a non-physical reality out there. And how you evaluate the truth claims of that theistic tradition for yourself (as a hypothesis that you need to test, etc.) based on your adherence physicalism and the SM as the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality is irrelevant here. You claimed that view of which you are aware that the soul is immateriality is false. You have to backing it up.

Why is one rationally required to adopt physicalism as a philosophy? No answer.
Why is it more reasonable to adopt the SM as you do as opposed to a traditional philosophical method that includes metaphysics? No answer.
Has neuroscience really proven PA? No.
The Turing Test as you want to use it is disputed even by advocates of a strictly scientific worldview. Where is this overwhelming evidence behind your assertion?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

No, you are mistaken here. It would be impossible, if that “non-physical reality” would never interact with the physical reality. But the theist assertion is that there is an interaction. If there is an interaction, then there is an interface. And one can “tap” into the interface - since it is at least partially physical. Of course one could assert that the interface is pure, undetectable “magic”, but that kind of assertion will not be entertained. The conclusion is that as long as the non-physical reality interacts with the physical one, it is subject to the observation, verification or falsification.

IOW subject to the SM, the only method to arrive at objective true and false statements about the external reality. The interaction must be apprehensible by an empirical, mechanistic, atomistic method to investigate physical reality. Again if one has already adopted physicalism and materialism, this makes perfect sense.

The theistic view is that the interaction is apprehensible by the intellect. This brings me to that very point I made to set the stage for the traditional evidence for immateriality of the soul which you haven’t discussed. In the welter of words perhaps you missed it. I’ll repeat.

The immateriality of the mind/soul is grasped by the mind/intellect. The soul as such is not perceptible to the senses, to empirical investigation. To get at this let me say w/i my experience David Hume was right: raw sense (name removed by moderator)ut considered in itself does nothing more than make impressions on individual sense organs which are retained in memory. So for causality, such data gives us no more than the brute impression series that one event often follows another. It is the intellect that grasps the operation and nature of causality. Or re the existence of something, the reception of raw sense impressions on sense organs of itself does not contain the judgment that a particular thing exists: it is an act of the intellect which judges that a thing or property exists. Ditto for truths like the Principle of Sufficient Reason which are grasped by the intellect.

I do not accept this on two grounds. One, you could justly point out that I claim “omniscience” (which I don’t have) and two, I do not wish to be accused of having a “closed” mind. For the time being, I treat the supposed “non-physical reality” exactly as I treat claim about the paranormal. I think that they are both bogus claims, but I stay open to the possibility that I am mistaken, and IF sufficient evidence would show that I am indeed mistaken, then I will happily “eat humble pie”. However, the burden of proof is strictly upon the proponents. I am under no obligation to refute or even answer some counter-claims. You are under obligation to substantiate them.

Again I never claimed in this discussion to prove that there is a non-physical reality out there. And how you treat and process, based upon physicalism, the traditional view of immateriality is irrelevant here unless you show why I should adopt physicalism in the first place. In this discussion you made the claim and the burden is on you to back it up.

As far as the broader issue of the burden of proof of atheism as a public movement vis-a-vis the prevailing western theistic view given that modern atheism is newer, I covered that in the thread on the burden of proof I already mentioned.

And a successful instance of the Turing test will invalidate that assertion. If a philosophical claim is contradicted by a scientific claim, then philosophy must yield. Also, if a philosophical claim says the same as a scientific claim, then what use is the philosophical claim? The only time a philosophical claim has a valid existence, if the question is open. And as soon the question is answered, the philosophical claim loses its relevance. And as long as the question is open, the philosophical claim is simply a hypothesis, which needs to be examined, just like any other hypothesis.

True, if one has already adopted physicalism, materialism, and atheism and attendant strict reliance on the SM you advocate. But you’ve given me no reason to do so. The Turing Test is disputed even by strict naturalists which makes the Turing Test open. Get back to me on Searle.
Fr of Jazz:

My gripe also is with asserting PA, a philosophical assertion beyond the methodological limits of science, without the requisite proof.

Since here we are outside the axiomatic systems, there can be no talk about “proof”. It is incorrect of you to ask for a “proof”. There can be talk about evidence, and the evidence is called the evidence of the pudding.

Alright, then, my gripe is with asserting PA, a philosophical assertion beyond the methodological limits of science, without the requisite philosophical arguments and reasoning showing why one should make that leap.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I said that the “sufficiency” of the evidence is subjective. There is data out there, all right. And that is not the problem. The problem is the conclusion drawn from the data. Again, an example: millions of people utter millions of intercessory, supplicative (not merely meditative) prayers every day. There is no evidence that those are granted. The conclusion drawn by the atheist: either there is no God there, or God does not care. The conclusion drawn by the theist: the payers were not in line with what God has “in store” for us. Even if those prayers are fully in line with God’s alleged wishes of love, good will, caring, help, etc… When someone aks for real evidence for God’s existence (and points out that “whatever you ask in my name will be granted, because I will go to the Father”), one of the usual evasions is: “Blessed are the ones who have not seen, yet believe”. Indeed there is data out there. But the conclusion stays subjective.

Again your whole method of evaluating the experiential data on this subject is the SM, which makes sense for one who is already a physicalist and materialist and/or relies exclusively on the SM as you outline. So I can see how this thinking follows from your–so far–postulates. But so far you’ve provided no reason to adopt them and drop mine. The pre-existing Christian method and approach of which you are aware is much different.

The devil is in the details. Let me hear the details of the suggested epistemology.

Yes, and so far the details as to why I should adopt physicalism and its reliance on the SM as my epistemology; and how neurobiology has given overwhelming evidence that the mind is simply the brain are all lacking.

I answered this in the previous post: "yes it is subject to the “M(ethod)”.

True, if one has already adopted physicalism, materialism, and atheism. But you’ve given me no reason to do so.

Do you really say that I am not allowed to make questions, only you have that privilage? You made some pretty specific claims yourself. I am asking for the same thing as you did.

I reported correctly upon your request claims in the tradition I am a part of. You know that they are such and assert they are false. So start backing it up. If and when I assert to you in a conversation that physicalism, materialism, and atheism are false OR that I will prove that there are immaterial entities, then the burden of proof is on me.

Sorry to sound harsh here… I am not interested where the concept came from.

Again, tradition does not matter. The suggested immateriality hypothesis never showed how the immaterial exists without the material, it never showed how the immaterial interacts with the material. It remained a pure, unsubstantiated hypothesis - in other words, speculation.

It does matter if one is not already a physicalist, because it is not treated as a scientific hypothesis unless one is already a physicalist. But you haven’t shown me why I should be. I received it as part of my cultural heritage and investigated it philosophically. I never suggested an immateriality hypothesis. You asserted that a known pre-existing conviction that the mind is immaterial is false.

Yes, I remember it.
That is fine.

Oh, I thought you joined Feb 18 of this year. Was I talking to you in it?

This is turning into a philosophy of everything discussion . . . which is cool. But let me summarize where I am now so there is no misunderstanding.

In this discussion:
I have NOT advanced the proposition that physicalism, materialism, and atheism are false.
I have NOT advanced the proposition that there are immaterial entities.

You advanced the proposition that “the mind is simply the activity of the brain, even though the evidence is overwhelming” and later “It [successful AI] would merely render the hypothesis unnecessary and superfluous.”

I have asked you to produce the overwhelming evidence.
But the results of neurological research have not even come close to confirming it.
So I wonder maybe this assertion of yours is a goal or project based on the physicalism you espouse and/or the attendant use of the SM you propose. So I ask that you show me why it is more reasonable to adopt these and drop the traditional metaphysics and epistemology in philosophy. Again you have not shown me why it is more reasonable to do so.

If you hold physicalism and the proposition defining your use of the SM as postulates, I acknowledge that your methods of treating claims, procedures to solve problems, and results consistently follow. In this discussion I am not contesting either of these contentions nor your consistency in thinking.

 

[Serious]

I have a question, because I think we still talk past each other. I wonder what would you call the activity of the brain? I hope you do not deny that there is an electro-chemical activity going on in the brain. There are thoughts, decisions, there is conceptualizing going on - somewhere. I argued that all those activities (which I call: the mind) happen in the brain. It seems to me that you deny this. So, what does the brain do, in your opinion?

 

[Serious]

I have a question, because I think we still talk past each other. I wonder what would you call the activity of the brain? I hope you do not deny that there is an electro-chemical activity going on in the brain. There are thoughts, decisions, there is conceptualizing going on - somewhere. I argued that all those activities (which I call: the mind) happen in the brain. It seems to me that you deny this. So, what does the brain do, in your opinion?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

I have a question, because I think we still talk past each other. I wonder what would you call the activity of the brain? I hope you do not deny that there is an electro-chemical activity going on in the brain. There are thoughts, decisions, there is conceptualizing going on - somewhere. I argued that all those activities (which I call: the mind) happen in the brain. It seems to me that you deny this. So, what does the brain do, in your opinion?

Fair question. Perhaps we are talking past each other. Let me try to lay out the traditional historically- and philosophically-minded RCs understanding of things in relation to your assertion in question. Maybe this can clear up some things about the traditional RC view.

The short answer is the RC view does not deny any legitimate results of the SM which constitute the established findings of science, but sees them in a broader context of naturally knowable truth ascertainable in most rigorous form in philosophy but also in the other humanities. Divine revelation is an even broader context, but we are prescinding from it here.

(1) Metaphysically, the human person is a composite being, i.e. composed of two distinct but united correlative principles; matter and substantial form (i.e. soul). The soul is the immaterial animating and informing principle that determines the kind of being we are in the matter of which all things are made.

(2) The soul has vegetative, animal and cogitative actions. Cogitative acts would include anything human beings do in the sciences, technology, liberal arts and humanities. Curiously the German word for humanities–and it’s a mouth full–is Die Geisteswissenschaften, sciences of the human spirit, or soul.

(3) I’ve detailed the evolution of the SM and its historical purpose and present application; and that this method and purpose are totally legit.

(4) In the RC view the brain-mind problem going back to Descartes is not as great a problem as it is for others. The inner conscious life of man known in personal experience and in the humanities and sciences are the fundamental first-person data. Neurobiological findings about the structure and function of the brain constitute third-person data.

(5) Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional. This comports with the findings of science.

(6) So brain activity correlates with conscious experience in the direction of brain-to-conscious-mind causality as science says it does, and likewise in the direction of mind-to-brain causality.

(7) Existentially, I also side with Edmund Husserl that the life-world is the often forgotten meaning fundament of natural science. The life-world is the world as immediately or directly experienced in the everyday life and pursuits as one might find in literature and poetry. Because:
(a) Neurobiological study of the brain ultimate has to be correlated with first person experience detailed in (2) for it to have any meaning or relevance. Otherwise it is just a quirky, complex machine whose changes are very often random.
(b) Inner, first-person, conscious experience individually or collectively (empirical evidence) together with conscious interpersonal discussion (peer review) is the ultimate foundation in natural science necessary to verifying its claims. If one could, as a thought experiment, imagine a single neuroscientist acquiring through research all there is to know about brain structure and function down to the neuronal or even molecular level, still it all rests for validation on his personal, conscious experience of these external objects.

 

[Serious]

Fair question. Perhaps we are talking past each other. Let me try to lay out the traditional historically- and philosophically-minded RCs understanding of things in relation to your assertion in question. Maybe this can clear up some things about the traditional RC view.

The short answer is the RC view does not deny any legitimate results of the SM which constitute the established findings of science, but sees them in a broader context of naturally knowable truth ascertainable in most rigorous form in philosophy but also in the other humanities. Divine revelation is an even broader context, but we are prescinding from it here.

(1) Metaphysically, the human person is a composite being, i.e. composed of two distinct but united correlative principles; matter and substantial form (i.e. soul). The soul is the immaterial animating and informing principle that determines the kind of being we are in the matter of which all things are made.

(2) The soul has vegetative, animal and cogitative actions. Cogitative acts would include anything human beings do in the sciences, technology, liberal arts and humanities. Curiously the German word for humanities–and it’s a mouth full–is Die Geisteswissenschaften, sciences of the human spirit, or soul.

(3) I’ve detailed the evolution of the SM and its historical purpose and present application; and that this method and purpose are totally legit.

(4) In the RC view the brain-mind problem going back to Descartes is not as great a problem as it is for others. The inner conscious life of man known in personal experience and in the humanities and sciences are the fundamental first-person data. Neurobiological findings about the structure and function of the brain constitute third-person data.

(5) Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional. This comports with the findings of science.

(6) So brain activity correlates with conscious experience in the direction of brain-to-conscious-mind causality as science says it does, and likewise in the direction of mind-to-brain causality.

(7) Existentially, I also side with Edmund Husserl that the life-world is the often forgotten meaning fundament of natural science. The life-world is the world as immediately or directly experienced in the everyday life and pursuits as one might find in literature and poetry. Because:
(a) Neurobiological study of the brain ultimate has to be correlated with first person experience detailed in (2) for it to have any meaning or relevance. Otherwise it is just a quirky, complex machine whose changes are very often random.
(b) Inner, first-person, conscious experience individually or collectively (empirical evidence) together with conscious interpersonal discussion (peer review) is the ultimate foundation in natural science necessary to verifying its claims. If one could, as a thought experiment, imagine a single neuroscientist acquiring through research all there is to know about brain structure and function down to the neuronal or even molecular level, still it all rests for validation on his personal, conscious experience of these external objects.

Sorry, this is not as helpful as I was hoping it would be.

1. You seem to use the words “mind” and “soul” interchangably. Are these identical? If they are not, what is the difference between them? Precisely, please. If they are the same, why use the confusing terminology of having two words? In everyday parlance, the mind means the thinking process. Soul is an poorly-defined “form” of the body.
2. You still did not tell me, what is the “terminology for the brain activity”?
3. What is the function of the brain?
4. Where does the “thinking” happen? Obviously, there is an electro-chemical interaction of the neurons. What does this activity do?
5. You say that there is a correlation between the brain activity and conscious experience. Is there a causation there somewhere? Correlation implies the lack of causation.
6. How does your view account for the sub-conscious?
7. Where does the memory reside?
8. You said: “Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional.” Now apart from the fact the “fact” you refer to is simply the RC’s opinion, this sentence is much too vague. “In certain ways bi-directional”? In what ways? How does the “material” part influence the immaterial"? And conversely, how does the immaterial part “influence” the material? I am getting tired of such generalities. Get down to the nitty-gritty details.

Also a humble request. Imitate Hemingway. He used short, simple sentences. He did not use ancient, confusing terminology. When he was asked what is the secret of his beautiful, simple prose, he answered: “I write standing up”.

 

[Serious]

Fair question. Perhaps we are talking past each other. Let me try to lay out the traditional historically- and philosophically-minded RCs understanding of things in relation to your assertion in question. Maybe this can clear up some things about the traditional RC view.

The short answer is the RC view does not deny any legitimate results of the SM which constitute the established findings of science, but sees them in a broader context of naturally knowable truth ascertainable in most rigorous form in philosophy but also in the other humanities. Divine revelation is an even broader context, but we are prescinding from it here.

(1) Metaphysically, the human person is a composite being, i.e. composed of two distinct but united correlative principles; matter and substantial form (i.e. soul). The soul is the immaterial animating and informing principle that determines the kind of being we are in the matter of which all things are made.

(2) The soul has vegetative, animal and cogitative actions. Cogitative acts would include anything human beings do in the sciences, technology, liberal arts and humanities. Curiously the German word for humanities–and it’s a mouth full–is Die Geisteswissenschaften, sciences of the human spirit, or soul.

(3) I’ve detailed the evolution of the SM and its historical purpose and present application; and that this method and purpose are totally legit.

(4) In the RC view the brain-mind problem going back to Descartes is not as great a problem as it is for others. The inner conscious life of man known in personal experience and in the humanities and sciences are the fundamental first-person data. Neurobiological findings about the structure and function of the brain constitute third-person data.

(5) Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional. This comports with the findings of science.

(6) So brain activity correlates with conscious experience in the direction of brain-to-conscious-mind causality as science says it does, and likewise in the direction of mind-to-brain causality.

(7) Existentially, I also side with Edmund Husserl that the life-world is the often forgotten meaning fundament of natural science. The life-world is the world as immediately or directly experienced in the everyday life and pursuits as one might find in literature and poetry. Because:
(a) Neurobiological study of the brain ultimate has to be correlated with first person experience detailed in (2) for it to have any meaning or relevance. Otherwise it is just a quirky, complex machine whose changes are very often random.
(b) Inner, first-person, conscious experience individually or collectively (empirical evidence) together with conscious interpersonal discussion (peer review) is the ultimate foundation in natural science necessary to verifying its claims. If one could, as a thought experiment, imagine a single neuroscientist acquiring through research all there is to know about brain structure and function down to the neuronal or even molecular level, still it all rests for validation on his personal, conscious experience of these external objects.

Sorry, this is not as helpful as I was hoping it would be. First, you spent time and effort on explaining your metaphysics. This was a waste, because I am familiar with it, and also reject it. I am interested in the specifics, not some general remarks.

1. You use the words “mind” and “soul” interchangably. Are these identical? If they are not, what is the difference between them?
2. What is the “functionality” of the brain?
3. What is the “functionality” of the mind?
4. What is the “functionality” of the soul?
5. You said: “Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional.” Now apart from the fact the “fact” you refer to is simply the RC’s opinion, this sentence is much too vague. “In certain ways bi-directional”? In what ways? How does the “material” part influence the immaterial"? And conversely, how does the immaterial part “influence” the material? Drop the generalities, please and get specific.

We have more than overwhelming evidence that the brain has a “pain” and a “pleasure” center. We know about the area of the brain which is responsible for associating “names” and “visual information” (if you see it, you can tell its name). It is different from the area which connects the tactile information with the “names”. We know that the personality resides in the frontal lobe (lobotomy will turn the person into a vegetable). Influencing the brain with chemicals or electrodes will temporarily change the person’s behavior. Do you deny these “mappings”?

Now, I heard before that the brain is just like an electric cord to a TV set, if the power line is cut, the TV will not operate. Do you agree with this analogy?

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Sorry, this is not as helpful as I was hoping it would be.

Ditto. But I remain optimistic.

First, you spent time and effort on explaining your metaphysics. This was a waste, because I am familiar with it, and also reject it. I am interested in the specifics, not some general remarks.

Well, I’m familiar with physicalism and I reject it. But I didn’t make the assertion in this discussion. You did.

If I were making an assertion to you like “There is overwhelming evidence: --that physicalism, materialism, and atheism are false. OR --that there are immaterial entities.” I couldn’t just say “Sorry, I reject physicalism. Now then, since physicalism is out of the picture, let’s process things like one who already accepts immateriality and see where it leads us.” I would have to take into account and rationally address your physicalist and materialist world view to show why it is more reasonable to abandon it, and then provide the evidence for the immaterial entities I affirm.

How you treat and process the traditional view of immateriality as a physicalist is irrelevant unless you first show why I should adopt physicalism as well as the use of the SM you urge.

I’ll have no philosophical indolence here when many of the very things at issue are grasped by the human intellect philosophically. Everything I took time to write is important if you are really going to think about the problems your assertion raises.

I’ll answer your questions as thoroughly as I can, but it won’t be like a physicalist employing the SM as you urge since you haven’t shown me why it is more reasonable that I should. I believe it will clarify things significantly. Whether it is more “helpful” to you depends.

1. You use the words “mind” and “soul” interchangably. Are these identical? If they are not, what is the difference between them?

The “soul” understood metaphysically, that is as an extramental object, is the substantial form of the human composite of matter and form. “Soul” understood existentially and experientially (first person) is, w/o denying the metaphysical truths about it, largely coextensive with “mind” as I defined it: the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality.

1. What is the “functionality” of the brain?

The structure and function of the brain as a physical object studied by the SM is as the state-of-the-art primary research and researchers in neurobiology report on it. But it must be and is correlated to first-person data to make much sense.

1. What is the “functionality” of the mind?

One who is not already a physicalist doesn’t speak about the “functionality” of the mind, since they don’t process everything according to the structure-and-function-of-physical-objects model of science. The mind, or soul considered existentially, exercises perceptual, emotional, volitional, and cognitional acts. The cognitive acts given in (2) in prior post are included in first-person data.

1. What is the “functionality” of the soul?

Metaphysically understood, the soul is as I stated already.

1. You said: “Given the fact that metaphysically there are a material and formal principle in the human person, it is a foregone conclusion that there is (a) an indissoluble unity of brain and mind/soul and (b) that causality between the two in certain ways is bi-directional.” Now apart from the fact the “fact” you refer to is simply the RC’s opinion, this sentence is much too vague. “In certain ways bi-directional”? In what ways? How does the “material” part influence the immaterial"? And conversely, how does the immaterial part “influence” the material? Drop the generalities, please and get specific.

I’m not going to drop philosophy (“generalities”) and think like a physicalist unless you show me why I should.

It is a fact that metaphysics (not RC doctrine) maintains as a philosophical conviction that there are a material and formal principle in the human person. I have found no evidence gained from the employment of the SM as it developed in history and is presently used in research that contradicts these philosophical insights into the nature of reality.

The sentence is summary (not vague or general) because I already explained brain-mind bi-directional causality and discussed the state of the scientific research (Post Feb 24, '12, 3:02 pm.)

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

We have more than overwhelming evidence that the brain has a “pain” and a “pleasure” center. We know about the area of the brain which is responsible for associating “names” and “visual information” (if you see it, you can tell its name). It is different from the area which connects the tactile information with the “names”. We know that the personality resides in the frontal lobe (lobotomy will turn the person into a vegetable). Influencing the brain with chemicals or electrodes will temporarily change the person’s behavior. Do you deny these “mappings”?

I do not deny mapping efforts and results (as they are actually characterized by researchers and not in popularized versions) as should be obvious from what I have said in multiple ways in our conversation and in response to your #2) above. I hope you don’t deny neuroplasticity.

However one must distinguish popularizations and news reports from the technical and precisely formulated statements of researchers to see what really is overwhelming evidence and what is not.

As far as the present state of the research, I refer you to all the material in my post (Mar 6, '12, 9:36 pm.). As an example “Third, the modular approach may exaggerate the extent to which cognitive functions are localized within the brain (Farah, 1994). As Banich (1997, p. 52) noted: ‘the brain is comprised of about 50 million interconnected neurons. Therefore, even complex cognitive functions for which a modular description seems apt rely on a number of interconnected brain regions or systems.’”
Michael W. Eysenck, Principles of Cognitive Psychology, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2001) p. 6-7.

On the subject of modularity I also recommend that you read Joaquín M. Fuster, MD, PhD, Cortex and Mind. (Oxford University Press, 2003). He is a prominent neurological researcher. To your description he notes that the modular paradigm correlates for patterns of sensation but it is “inadequate to clarify the central substrates of perception and memory.” “It is becoming increasingly evident that cognitive information transcends any of the traditional subdivisions of the cortex by structural and functional criteria (e.g., column, cytoarchitectonic area, thalamic projection, or receptive field).” (p., ix) He goes on to note: “The result of that encounter between unproven assumption [modularity] and partial evidence [from sensation] is the notion that there is a cortical region, or module, for every cognitive function. This notion has caused endless confusion. It is a serious impediment to the study of the brain mechanisms of cognition.” (x) He proposes and has found some success in a far more complicated multilevel network model as he reports in his book.

Given this and the actual data, your generalization about frontal lobotomies is off the mark. The effects of the procedure are various in the extreme. Although victims (aka patients) can become vegetative, there are other effects as well including uninhibited behavior, restlessness, cessation of certain severe psychotic symptoms w/o loss of personality. Sense of self and self-initiated conscious functioning is not always lost as in the famous case of Howard Dully who had a transorbital lobotomy by Walter Freeman (one of his “ice pick” lobotomies) at the age of 12. He has written a book on it.

Now, I heard before that the brain is just like an electric cord to a TV set, if the power line is cut, the TV will not operate. Do you agree with this analogy?

How else could natural science (and fairly enough, given the SM and its purpose) characterize it?
And what more could a physicalist using only the structure-and-function-of-physical-objects model of science say but PA?

But to back up PA and/or your assertion you have show first why I should adopt physicalism as well as the use of the SM you urge.

 

[LogisticsBranch]

Aquinas rooted in Aristotle notes that matter is the principle of division of individuals of the same species. All individual dogs, which are material things, share a common canine nature, which the human intellect can grasp in a universal concept. Now, physical objects can only receive (e.g., the imprint of) individual things. A given area of snow, for example, can only receive the paw print of a particular, individual dog; a camera, the image of a particular scene–not a concept or universal.
Thomas then concludes: “Therefore, it is only as individuated that a form is received into a body [physical thing]. If, then, the intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individuated. But the intellect understands things by those forms of theirs which it has in its possession. So, if it were a body, it would not be cognizant of universals but only of particulars. But this is patently false. Therefore, no intellect is a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 4]

Thomas also argues that no physical body can be self-conscious (as in self-aware), or as he puts it, “self-reflexive.” A stone, or for that matter a dog, would have to be able to explicitly think about itself and its own personal, inner, mental acts. This is clearly not the case. The human being, however, can do these things. In Aquinas’ words: “the action of no body is self-reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the mover and the other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not only as to a part, but as to the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body.” Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49, 8]

Though I may not agree with everything you and Serious have to say, I would like to address this comment as noted above by you. I have a dog (a social animal) and this does apply to her and us. PubMed is a highly reputable website:

Annu Rev Psychol. 2012 Jan 10;63:287-313. Epub 2011 Aug 11.
Mechanisms of social cognition.
Frith CD, Frith U.
SourceWellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK. c.frith@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract
Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others’ changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21838544

I do think my dog does reflect since I’ve studied her behavior for over a year now. She was only two weeks old when I first got her

My own personal experience is the majority of Brits (atheists and some religious) hate Americans. They will find any excuse to toss us out as though we were lacking intelligence. Like I said previously on this topic, I’m a scientist and I surely don’t regret it. I was even ignored by an atheist scientist (hecd2) here twice who didn’t want to be my friend. I found out he lives in the UK. Amazing since I have quite a few atheist friends that are Americans or have moved to America. My dog’s Vet moved from Cambridge, UK to get away from that island and so did his whole family. He is a great vet with a lovely family. There are a lot of people I know that now don’t want to go to the 2012 Olympics there in the UK.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Though I may not agree with everything you and Serious have to say, I would like to address this comment as noted above by you. I have a dog (a social animal) and this does apply to her and us. PubMed is a highly reputable website:

Annu Rev Psychol. 2012 Jan 10;63:287-313. Epub 2011 Aug 11.
Mechanisms of social cognition.
Frith CD, Frith U.
SourceWellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK. c.frith@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract
Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others’ changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21838544

I do think my dog does reflect since I’ve studied her behavior for over a year now. She was only two weeks old when I first got her

My own personal experience is the majority of Brits (atheists and some religious) hate Americans. They will find any excuse to toss us out as though we were lacking intelligence. Like I said previously on this topic, I’m a scientist and I surely don’t regret it. I was even ignored by an atheist scientist (hecd2) here twice who didn’t want to be my friend. I found out he lives in the UK. Amazing since I have quite a few atheist friends that are Americans or have moved to America. My dog’s Vet moved from Cambridge, UK to get away from that island and so did his whole family. He is a great vet with a lovely family. There are a lot of people I know that now don’t want to go to the 2012 Olympics there in the UK.

Aquinas’ point is that reflection is not a capability inherent in the powers of matter alone. He makes no mention of animals in this regard. However “reflection” for Aquinas is consciously, explicitly thinking about your own thought processes : being self-aware and knowing you are self-aware and being able to express it in a grammatical language. While it is clear that animals posses intelligence and can distinguish between themselves and what is not themselves, I don’t see the evidence that they can reflect as Aquinas defines it.

The article abstract itself even says “Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. . . .”

Another interesting article on the subject reaching a similar conclusion can be found here.

 

[LogisticsBranch]

Aquinas’ point is that reflection is not a capability inherent in the powers of matter alone. He makes no mention of animals in this regard. However “reflection” for Aquinas is consciously, explicitly thinking about your own thought processes : being self-aware and knowing you are self-aware and being able to express it in a grammatical language. While it is clear that animals posses intelligence and can distinguish between themselves and what is not themselves, I don’t see the evidence that they can reflect as Aquinas defines it.

I THINK you are ignoring my earlier response. I have have seen the evidence. You did state, “Thomas also argues that no physical body can be self-conscious (as in self-aware), or as he puts it, “self-reflexive.” A stone, or for that matter a dog, would have to be able to explicitly think about itself and its own personal, inner, mental acts. This is clearly not the case. The human being, however, can do these things.” My point is why would you use Aquinas in a scientific issue. It’s plain silly. You are basically teaching psuedoscience by doing so and you are ignoring my own study. Here is one example of reflection by my dog. She is in the house sleeping then wakes and yawns then walks slowly over to the heater to warm up. About 10 minutes later she dashes to the sliding window and groans (small little whimpers) and looks back at me with those big droopy eyes as I stand at the kitchen sink. She sees me walking towards her and starts to wag her tail. I open the slider and she rushes outside turns the bend and I peek out another window and see her in the dog house. (Custom built 5’ x 10’ x 7’) She picks up her stuffed baby puppy inside the dog house. Runs back through the open slider with her stuffed baby puppy. I have repeatedly told her since she was born, “Don’t you love your baby? Take care of your baby!” She remembered her baby was outside. Memory is an aspect of reflection.

The article abstract itself even says “Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. . . .”

The word used was may be “uniquely human” which isn’t necessarily the case as I have noted. Also, remember scientifically speaking we are social animals that is what was meant by “social animals including humans.”

Another interesting article on the subject reaching a similar conclusion can be found here.

Yes, I first read the article that Premack wrote way back in 2007. He is a psychologist. The article that I presented is from 2012 (Mechanisms of social cognition. Frith CD, Frith U.
SourceWellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK). I hope you noticed the word neuroimaging. If you would like to read the entire paper you can find it here:
annualreviews.org/journal/psych

 

[LogisticsBranch]

I have repeatedly told her since she was born, “Don’t you love your baby? Take care of your baby!” She remembered her baby was outside. Memory is an aspect of reflection.

Pardon me, reflecting back on this particular statement I made as noted above, it should be amended, “I have repeatedly told her since she was around two weeks old, “Don’t you love your baby? Take care of your baby!” She remembered her baby was outside. Memory is an aspect of reflection.”

I need a lot of energy to keep up with my Gracie girl. I have to admit she can wear me out.:yawn: