Yes, this is exactly the point.
I am myself confused about the bishops intention regarding the purpose of this document.
Is the dispute between the bishops political or not? Is it morally possible to prefer a pro-abortion candidate over an anti-abortion one because of other issues? If so, I need help understanding the moral calculations: does a “better” position on raising the minimum wage offset a certain number of abortions? Can I then add up those offsets and when I get to 1.3 million consider the two candidates morally equal? Put a number of the size of the offset you would give someone who supports pulling out of Iraq. Does that equal 200,000 abortions? Half a million? The bishops have really provided no help at all in resolving this dilemma.
Ender
I don’t think it is as grim as that. For example, the doucment states:
Yet a candidate’s position on a single issue that involves an intrinsic evil, such as support for legal abortion or the promotion of racism, may legitimately lead a voter to disqualify a candidate from receiving support.
It is equating support for legal abortion (note it says
support - the classis “pro-choice” position of “I am not pro-abortion, I am
for women having choice”.) with
support of racism (not the more popular characterization of not doing enough to wipe out racism). While candidates might disagree on
how to erradicate racism or on how much legislation is enough, it would be hard to find a candidate for a major office that actually supports racism in the same way that candidates support keeping abortion legal.
(all emphasis mine)
There may be times when a Catholic who rejects a candidate’s unacceptable position may decide to vote for that candidate for other morally grave reasons. Voting in this way would
be permissible only for truly grave moral reasons, not to advance narrow interests or partisan preferences or to ignore a fundamental moral evil.
This is MUCH better than the previous USCCB statements that led many Catholics to believe that they could vote for anyone, even those with unacceptable positions on a fundamental moral evil just as long as they weren’t voting for the candidate BECAUSE of that position.
In your minimum wage example, people have all kinds of opinons on when, how and by how much the minimum wage should be raised. None of those differences are “truly grave moral reasons”. Now if you had a candidate that said he/she wanted to wipe out the minimum wage and allow indentured servitude or slavery, you might be much closer to a truly grave moral reason.
It isn’t a matter of offsets unless:
When **all candidates hold a position in favor of **an intrinsic evil, the conscientious voter faces a dilemma.
This could be the case when you look at our current crop of candidates for some offices. It seems like they all either support legalized abortion or the death penalty (which according to the USCCB is an intrinsic evil, regardless of what the CCC says

).
So then you could, it seems, look at offsets. Hmmmm a couple of hundred convicted criminals per year vs. 1000 babies per day. This would certainly be a dilema.
I am not in any way, shape or form lessening the value of each
individual life. I am only saying that, according to the USCCB’s new document, weighing the impact could be an acceptable use of prudential judgement in such a dilema.