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Linusthe2nd
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If God did not exist, we would not exist, and, therefore, there would be no human psyche.
Linus2nd
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Linus2nd
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Linusthe2nd
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If you find Aristotle, Aquinas, Feser, and Kreeft inadequate, I don’t know what to suggest. Perhaps just reading and meditating on the New Testament, perhaps reading the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Kreeft has a new series of posts on Strange Notions explaining how Beauty can lead us to God. I have always found that approach my personal favorite, not so much because there is obvious Beauty and Order throughout the universe but because we are able to appreciate it. If the world was simply a " bald fact, " not only would Beauty be an unnecessary extravigance but our facility for appreciating that Beauty would be an even more extravigant and unnecessary fact.
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Entwhistler
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If I remember correctly (and of course there is always the possibility that I’m not), Aquinas said that there must be a God because a thing has to have a cause “here and now.” Thus, If I snapped my finger (which I just did by the way), that is change. And change denotes dependability (who made the change happen? Moving from potentiality to actuality?) So, that snap proves God. My fingers snapped because by fingers moved and my fingers moved because neurons fired and on and on. All the way to God who is the Unmoved Mover.
By the way, he could not be a flying spaghetti monster because flying denotes change.
I’m sure many of you know this argument, but I find it pretty cool.
By the way, he could not be a flying spaghetti monster because flying denotes change.
I’m sure many of you know this argument, but I find it pretty cool.
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Lion_IRC
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Don’t worry CompSciGuy. You ARE allowed to have a light discussion on this topic without the need to read tons of theology before raising the matter.
Good on you for honestly admitting that haven’t got the time to do so.
And it’s poor form on the part of others to accuse you of some sort of laziness.
Here’s my two cents.
Firstly, Russell is correct. If everything has/had a cause then everything has a cause. That’s a simple metaphysic which doesn’t need to be modified. Quibbling about what “everything” means isn’t very fair to Russell, (for much the same reason as when we protest about Lawrence Krauss et al equivocating on the meaning of the word “nothing” when they try to claim that some “thing” like a universe can come out of nothing.)
Next, the problem for Russell and atheists like Arif Ahmed whose metaphysic claims an infinity of past-eternal prior causes - perpetual motion - is that it doesn’t explain the timing of those events.
An intentional cause would ‘decide’ when and why. But for a spontaneous/accidental ‘cause’ there is no deliberation. So the event must have happened by either chance or prior necessity.
If by pure chance, then why did it take the universe/multiverse so long to eventually come into existence and if by necessity then it must have already happened an infinite number of times - Ground Hog Day.
Both of these non-theist alternatives to a personal, intentional, creative cause of events raise metaphysical absurdities which are not present in biblical monotheism.
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thinkandmull
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What do you mean “take so long to eventually come into existence”. If the series is infinite, then there always was the process. Arguing using any of the 5 Ways revolves around the contingency of the universe, which is not a scientific idea. It is philosophical and you either see it or you don’t. An atheist would say you the contingency idea is a fluck idea just like the God idea. We believe they are real ideas. But saying that you can show from science and physics that there MUST be a PERSONAL God, that depends on the premise that there cannot be an infinity of time and motion
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CompSciGuy
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Linus, not only have you not answered any of my questions, but you are being unnecessarily belligerent and unhelpful, and you are putting words into my mouth and twisting them.
I have studied the Catechism in the past and do occasionally now. I am at a busy time in my life and haven’t had a chance to look at the Summa. Linus, the whole point of this site is to converse and share with people who are knowledgeable about the faith and know the Catechism and other church teachings, and have positive discussions, which is the opposite of what you are doing. Since you have failed either to answer any of my questions and have failed to answer why it is you think my line of thinking is out of sync with church teaching, I am going to assume that you have no real objection to what I have said and no charitable intention for participating in this thread. I ought to flag your posts as inappropriate but have been lenient thus far, I may not be so lenient if you post like this again.
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CompSciGuy
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I’m having trouble with this statement. There had to be an uncaused cause, because without it, nothing could have been caused right? We can know that we live in a finite universe that has a beginning so all “caused” things definitely can’t come from an infinite series of causes. This is where we get the notion that God is “cause itself.”
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CompSciGuy
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The finite-ness of the universe implies this contingency. We can know the universe is finite from mathematics, philosophy and simple observation. We know that time is measurable, and we can observe change over time. It takes X units of time to change from state A to state B. So if the universe was infinite, it would have no beginning. So let’s say that we are currently at state B in the universe, and state A is the beginning of the universe. If the universe has no beginning, then it would take an infinite number of steps to reach state B, therefore state B would never be reached. So in the context of time we know that the universe cannot be infinite or have always existed.
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Linusthe2nd
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We seem to live in an age where everyone takes offense to everything. Lot’s of rash judging going on on this thread. Have a good day everyone…
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Linusthe2nd
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Lion_IRC
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Note that I stipulated…“If by pure chance” - rather than contingency.
I agree with you that, IF the series is infinite - always something ‘causing’ something, in a past-eternal, unbroken chain of prior causation - then you can argue that “the process” has always existed…and you would be arguing that it (the process) is just a brute fact requiring no further explanation. Hence there would be no question of WHY some thing in that series, (like a universe or multiverse for example,) took so long to eventually happen because the prior cause of anything and everything had its own prior cause which determined the timing.
But in such a system as above, spontaneous, pure chance, uncaused, unpredictable events don’t happen because literally everything has a contingent prior cause. (Perpetual motion determinism.)
But a past-eternal infinity of events, each with their own corresponding infinity of prior causes which made those events unavoidable/inevitable leads to metaphysical and logical absurdities.
Why can’t the cause/contingency of the universe be a scientific idea? I agree we need a type of philosophy of science to bridge the gap between pure scientific method and the interpretation of what we learn from that method. But I don’t think it is purely philosophical.
Interesting point. They don’t seem to be mutually exclusive in the strictest of terms.
A form of deistic pantheistic God could still be somehow be woven into the idea of a perpetual motion universe.
However I find that the personal volition - deliberate causal intent - of a Creator God has greater explanatory power and avoids the many logical paradoxes that arise from the idea of a past-eternal sequence of determinist cause/effect events going backwards into infinity.
Given an infinite past, history will inevitably, eventually, repeat itself over and over forever and ever an inifinite number of times.
How many times in the past has the Catholic Answers Forum previously existed?
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Thomas_White
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In symbolic logic, the error is apparent at the outset.
This is not a valid argument:
Ec > Gc
Implied: ~Gc
Therefore ~Ec (If God can be uncaused, then everything can be uncaused.)
This would be a valid argument:
Ec > Gc
~Ec
Therefore ~Gc (If everything can be uncaused, then God can be uncaused.)
Modus Tollens: If p implies q, not p implies not q. However, if p implies q, not q does not imply not p.
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Peter_Plato
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Well, no, that isn’t the way DavidM defined the terms. He said:
If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause."
(Ec > Gc)
Then implied:
~Gc
Therefore ~Ec
Therefore Su (some thing(s) can be uncaused)
~Ec does not mean, as you claim, “then everything can be uncaused,” DavidM was clear that ~Ec means “it is not the case that everything must have a cause.” In other words, “some things(s) can be uncaused,” which DOES INDEED follow because if God (granting that God is a thing within the class “everything”) does not have a cause, then God is an exception to Ec which entails ~Ec (It is not the case that everything has a cause.) If God need not have a cause, then some things are not caused which implies “everything must have a cause” cannot be true.
The negation of “everything must have a cause,” is NOT “everything can be uncaused.” It is simply that not everything must have a cause or some things can be uncaused.
Again, this is not a correct application of Modus Tollens.
The rule of logic that applies is “For all x if x is P then x is Q. There exists some x that is not Q. Therefore, there exists some x that is not P.”
In other words, “for everything that exists, if everything is caused, then God must be caused.” If God is not caused then there are some things in the set “everything” that are not caused, therefore, it is not true that everything must be caused. Some things, (i.e., God,) exist that is not caused. Therefore ~Ec.
Read how DavidM defines the terms Ec and Gc before assuming he is incorrect.
My objection to DavidM’s argument would be that God is not “a thing” and, therefore, does not belong to the class “everything,” so even if God does not need a cause, that would not entail that excepting God implies ~Ec precisely because God does not belong to the set E.
In Thomistic parlance, God is not a being among other beings (and, therefore, does not belong to the class “everything,”) but rather Being Itself, so even if all beings (everything) require a cause, Being Itself (not being a being in the class “everything”) need not. And because Being Itself does not need a cause does not, therefore, entail that some beings do not. God is not “some being,” but BEING.
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Peter_Plato
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The Modus Tollens rule that applies is the conditional form, explained here:
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens
en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens
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laircy
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This excellent book explains why there must be a first cause and also the properties of the first cause which lead us to say it is a god (though it does not deductively prove it is the God of the Bible, the god described does fit)-- not material, absolutely simple, pure actuality, unchanging, cause and sustains everything, supreme intelligence…
I just finished reading it a few days ago, and I think the argument at least that the first cause is intelligent is that nothing can give what it does not have (only in a perfect sense… a teacher might give imperfect knowledge to a student but that does not follow that the teacher has imperfect knowledge, but the teacher does have at least that correct knowledge the student has received, and possibly more), and since the first cause causes everything including intelligence, it has to have it. I can’t remember it fully and I myself was in a hurry while reading it so I did not entirely understand, but I highly recommend the book because it really lays everything out logically and makes the case for a god that matches Catholic theology (as far as you can get without revelation (the author is a Catholic)).
I just finished reading it a few days ago, and I think the argument at least that the first cause is intelligent is that nothing can give what it does not have (only in a perfect sense… a teacher might give imperfect knowledge to a student but that does not follow that the teacher has imperfect knowledge, but the teacher does have at least that correct knowledge the student has received, and possibly more), and since the first cause causes everything including intelligence, it has to have it. I can’t remember it fully and I myself was in a hurry while reading it so I did not entirely understand, but I highly recommend the book because it really lays everything out logically and makes the case for a god that matches Catholic theology (as far as you can get without revelation (the author is a Catholic)).
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Thomas_White
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Ec > Gc (E implies G)
~Ec (Not E)
Then implied:
~Gc
Therefore ~Ec
This is neither Modus Tollens nor a valid argument. ~Ec does not imply ~Gc. If it is not the case that God must have have a cause, it is not implied that it is the case that Everything must not have a cause.
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Thomas_White
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Modus Tollens is quite simple:
p > q (p implies q)
~p. (not p)
Therefore, ~q (Therefore, not q)
In the example:
p > q
~q
Therefore, ~p (Therefore, not p) This is not a valid argument. That’s all.
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Rhubarb
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If everything has a cause, then God has a cause.
It is not the case that God has a cause.
It is not the case that everything has a cause.This is a valid modus tollens argument. And I think it suits even people who believe in a first cause. (At least in the senses I’m thinking of for the words in the argument)
If God and only God is uncaused, the conclusion is still true.
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Linusthe2nd
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I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
No conditionals here. And symbolic logic not required. Not that anyone cares, just a reminder.Resort to mathematics always excludes something of the real, it abstracts from what is real, leaving behind something of the real.
Linus2nd
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
No conditionals here. And symbolic logic not required. Not that anyone cares, just a reminder.Resort to mathematics always excludes something of the real, it abstracts from what is real, leaving behind something of the real.
Linus2nd
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Peter_Plato
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Only if God is a “thing.” If God is not in the set of “everything” then it would still be true that every “thing” has a cause even if God, not being a thing, not A BEING, but BEING ITSELF, did not need a cause.
Another way of saying this is that everything that comes into existence needs a cause for coming into being, but Being Itself or Existence Itself does not come into existence because Being is the essential quality of “to be.” Does Being Itself require a cause? Why should it?
Even if you take the universe as the set of all things that do exist, Existence Itself is NOT just another thing in that set.
Furthermore, in the set of all things that do exist (the universe,) there is nothing about the set that requires that the set itself exists. Therefore, the universe (the set of all things that could or could not exist) does not subsist or exist of its own nature (a se.) If everything that could or could not exist went out of existence, there is not another entity called “the universe” that remains. The word “universe” merely names the set of things that “could or could not exist” and that is all.
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