First cause argument and God

[Peter_Plato]

Ec > Gc (E implies G)

~Ec (Not E)

Then implied:
~Gc

Therefore ~Ec

This is neither Modus Tollens nor a valid argument. ~Ec does not imply ~Gc. If it is not the case that God must have have a cause, it is not implied that it is the case that Everything must not have a cause.

That isn’t the argument.

The argument is…

If it is true that Everything has a cause (Ec) then in must be true that every specific thing (for example, God, must have a cause (Gc).
If (Ec > Gc) is true, then ~Gc means ~Ec.
The reason is if G is included in the set E, then Ec can only be true if Gc. There is a logical dependency set up in the first conditional because “everything” includes God. And because everything includes God, what is true about everything must be true about God.

My objection (again) is that God is not one being in the set “everything” and, therefore, the argument that whatever applies to everything applies to all things need not fit or apply to God and still be true.

If I claim…
Every mammal is born live Ma, that means any particular mammal such as a platypus is included in the set “mammal.” The claim that “all” mammals are born live allows no exception, therefore to find one that is born live nullifies the claim Ma (ALL mammals are born live.) If ~Pa, (it is not the case that platypuses are born live) then ~Ma (it is not the case that all mammals are if platypuses belong to the set mammals) precisely because there exists at least one mammal (the platypus) that is not born live.

Notice, I cannot point to the fact that a robin is not born live as a defeater for Ma because robins are not part of the class “mammalia.” Likewise, if God is not part of the set “everything,” then ~Gc is irrelevant to the claim Ec.

This is clearly true and not the least bit controversial. I am not sure why you are even contesting it. Go to the Wiki link I provided, where it is clearly explained.

 

[Bahman]

I agree with Russel on the fact that all fallacies that we observe is because of the lack of imagination and believing on casualty. How we could be sure that a physical observation, existence of causality in our universe, can be true metaphysically?

 

[Peter_Plato]

I agree with Russel on the fact that all fallacies that we observe is because of the lack of imagination and believing on casualty. How we could be sure that a physical observation, existence of causality in our universe, can be true metaphysically?

This may help…

maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/05/five-grades-of-self-referential-inconsistency-towards-a-taxonomy.html

The short answer is that if there is no metaphysical truth then it doesn’t matter what we think and THAT becomes the metaphysical truth. Unfortunately, the claim itself - that the metaphysical truth to be accepted is that there is no metaphysical truth - is a self-refuting one. Hello irrationality.

You could accept irrationality and nonsense as your fundamental option in terms of how you wish to view existence, but that seems tantamount to willingly adopting insanity in preference to sanity for its own sake. You could still be very wrong, but you’d simply not know it.

Now the question becomes, “Do you want to know the truth, or merely fiddle about with nonsense?”

Denying “physical observation, existence of causality in our universe,” or that things “can be true metaphysically” is to abandon the question of truth before adequately or fully exploring it. That is the problem.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Modus Tollens is quite simple:

p > q (p implies q)
~p. (not p)
Therefore, ~q (Therefore, not q)

In the example:

p > q
~q
Therefore, ~p (Therefore, not p) This is not a valid argument. That’s all.

Put another way…

If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates would have to be mortal because all men are.

If Socrates is a man, but not mortal, then those two facts, together, would be sufficient to disprove that all men are mortal.

If (all Mmo ^ S is part of set M > must be Smo). ~Smo is sufficient to disprove all Mmo. ~Smo entails ~Mmo.

If Socrates not mortal then it is not the case that all men are mortal, precisely because one example of a man (Socrates) exists who isn’t mortal. Ergo, ALL men cannot be mortal.

 

[Bahman]

This may help…

maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/05/five-grades-of-self-referential-inconsistency-towards-a-taxonomy.html

I don’t understand how that like could help?

The short answer is that if there is no metaphysical truth then it doesn’t matter what we think and THAT becomes the metaphysical truth. Unfortunately, the claim itself - that the metaphysical truth to be accepted is that there is no metaphysical truth - is a self-refuting one. Hello irrationality.

I didn’t claim that there is no metaphysical truth instead claim that what we observe, so called physical, is manifestation of metaphysical truth hence it might be very wrong to accept causality as a metaphysical truth because we physically observe it. In another word there is no need for metaphysic if we accept that all constructed concepts based on physical observation, such as causality are metaphysical concepts.

You could accept irrationality and nonsense as your fundamental option in terms of how you wish to view existence, but that seems tantamount to willingly adopting insanity in preference to sanity for its own sake. You could still be very wrong, but you’d simply not know it.

I think you got me completely wrong.

Now the question becomes, “Do you want to know the truth, or merely fiddle about with nonsense?”

I want to know the truth but I believe that we cannot know the truth by considering causality as metaphysical truth hence it is wrong to argue about the existence of God based on causality. It is very simple to show that the concept of beginning cannot be resolved based on the concept of God and causality.

Denying “physical observation, existence of causality in our universe,” or that things “can be true metaphysically” is to abandon the question of truth before adequately or fully exploring it. That is the problem.

You got me wrong again. What I am arguing is that we cannot directly extract the metaphysical knowledge from physical observation hence a physical concept like causality might not be metaphysical concept as all sign indicates so we have to be very careful in using physical concept when we are dealing with question like beginning since we don’t know whether we construct our metaphysics correctly.

 

[Thomas_White]

Put another way…

If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates would have to be mortal because all men are.

If Socrates is a man, but not mortal, then those two facts, together, would be sufficient to disprove that all men are mortal.

If (all Mmo ^ S is part of set M > must be Smo). ~Smo is sufficient to disprove all Mmo. ~Smo entails ~Mmo.

If Socrates not mortal then it is not the case that all men are mortal, precisely because one example of a man (Socrates) exists who isn’t mortal. Ergo, ALL men cannot be mortal.

You are correct, and I concede. I don’t know what I was thinking except in haste I tried to remember Modus Tollens forty-some years later. I apologize.

 

[Peter_Plato]

You are correct, and I concede. I don’t know what I was thinking except in haste I tried to remember Modus Tollens forty-some years later. I apologize.

No need to concede or apologize about anything. The question isn’t really about who is correct, but, rather, what is the truth of the matter.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I didn’t claim that there is no metaphysical truth instead claim that what we observe, so called physical, is manifestation of metaphysical truth hence it might be very wrong to accept causality as a metaphysical truth because we physically observe it. In another word there is no need for metaphysic if we accept that all constructed concepts based on physical observation, such as causality are metaphysical concepts.

You got me wrong again. What I am arguing is that we cannot directly extract the metaphysical knowledge from physical observation hence a physical concept like causality might not be metaphysical concept as all sign indicates so we have to be very careful in using physical concept when we are dealing with question like beginning since we don’t know whether we construct our metaphysics correctly.

The idea of causality isn’t a metaphysical truth, it is a set of assumptions based upon observable phenomena. When we say X “causes” Y, what is meant is that consistently when X happens, Y follows as an observable and apparently connected sequence of events. That X “causes” or “brings about” Y is a presumption about the relationship between X and Y.

That is quite different from the metaphysical requirement to have event Y explained as a result of X. In metaphysics, X has to account for Y in a way that X is, logically speaking, the necessary and sufficient reason for Y.

That is quite different from what, in common language, is considered “causality.” Causes do not necessarily “account for” effects unless the further work of theorizing why they would or should is accomplished. The “theoretical” frameworks of science then merge into metaphysics.

The physical doesn’t “explain” the metaphysical and I certainly haven’t claimed that it does. The physical can be used, however, to “test” metaphysical claims to see if they bear out in cold, hard reality.

To claim, as Hume does, that merely observing two events following one another does not imply metaphysical truth, is fine, as far as that goes. But the story doesn’t end there and no good metaphysics should make such a claim. The claims of metaphysics are about the necessary and sufficient reasons for things to occur, which is why the PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason) goes far beyond mere speaking of causation into the logical or necessary relationships which can be proved to exist between aspects of reality. This is where Hume’s critique is simply inadequate and doesn’t hold up beyond being simply a bald assertion.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Just reading a simple sentence is a lot easier .

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

The finite-ness of the universe implies this contingency. We can know the universe is finite from mathematics, philosophy and simple observation. We know that time is measurable, and we can observe change over time. It takes X units of time to change from state A to state B. So if the universe was infinite, it would have no beginning. So let’s say that we are currently at state B in the universe, and state A is the beginning of the universe. If the universe has no beginning, then it would take an infinite number of steps to reach state B, therefore state B would never be reached. So in the context of time we know that the universe cannot be infinite or have always existed.

That is the Kalam cosmological argument that Aquinas rejects

 

[thinkandmull]

Note that I stipulated…“If by pure chance” - rather than contingency.

I agree with you that, IF the series is infinite - always something ‘causing’ something, in a past-eternal, unbroken chain of prior causation - then you can argue that “the process” has always existed…and you would be arguing that it (the process) is just a brute fact requiring no further explanation. Hence there would be no question of WHY some thing in that series, (like a universe or multiverse for example,) took so long to eventually happen because the prior cause of anything and everything had its own prior cause which determined the timing.

But in such a system as above, spontaneous, pure chance, uncaused, unpredictable events don’t happen because literally everything has a contingent prior cause. (Perpetual motion determinism.)

But a past-eternal infinity of events, each with their own corresponding infinity of prior causes which made those events unavoidable/inevitable leads to metaphysical and logical absurdities.

Why can’t the cause/contingency of the universe be a scientific idea? I agree we need a type of philosophy of science to bridge the gap between pure scientific method and the interpretation of what we learn from that method. But I don’t think it is purely philosophical.

Interesting point. They don’t seem to be mutually exclusive in the strictest of terms.
A form of deistic pantheistic God could still be somehow be woven into the idea of a perpetual motion universe.
However I find that the personal volition - deliberate causal intent - of a Creator God has greater explanatory power and avoids the many logical paradoxes that arise from the idea of a past-eternal sequence of determinist cause/effect events going backwards into infinity.

Given an infinite past, history will inevitably, eventually, repeat itself over and over forever and ever an inifinite number of times.

How many times in the past has the Catholic Answers Forum previously existed?

Ye, but if one accepts that the world could be eternal, he gives us any argument from physics that there is a God

 

[thinkandmull]

This excellent book explains why there must be a first cause and also the properties of the first cause which lead us to say it is a god (though it does not deductively prove it is the God of the Bible, the god described does fit)-- not material, absolutely simple, pure actuality, unchanging, cause and sustains everything, supreme intelligence…

I just finished reading it a few days ago, and I think the argument at least that the first cause is intelligent is that nothing can give what it does not have (only in a perfect sense… a teacher might give imperfect knowledge to a student but that does not follow that the teacher has imperfect knowledge, but the teacher does have at least that correct knowledge the student has received, and possibly more), and since the first cause causes everything including intelligence, it has to have it. I can’t remember it fully and I myself was in a hurry while reading it so I did not entirely understand, but I highly recommend the book because it really lays everything out logically and makes the case for a god that matches Catholic theology (as far as you can get without revelation (the author is a Catholic)).

I answered the argument about “something can’t give what it doesn’t have” in post 3. Proving God using the Kalam cosmological argument is one thing. Proving He is immaterial, absolutely simple, pure actuality, absolutely unchanging, and sustains everything can’t be proven, at least from the arguments I’ve seen

 

[Triflelfirt]

There are different ways to identify the first cause with what we call God:

1. The obvious way: it’s an immaterial, transcendent, eternal, immovable, powerful (has the power to cause things) being that creates and conserves the universe in existence. Many would argue it’s just “obvious” that the first cause is what we call God;
2. The way from immateriality: considering that the first cause must be immaterial, we might wonder what “kind” (in a loose sense, since I’m a thomist, but whatever) of being it can be. What sorts of immaterial beings exist? It’s plausible that the only alternatives we have are abstract objects (like numbers, propositions, or what have you) and minds (it’s plausible that minds can at least be immaterial, as materialism has notable difficulties explaining consciousness, for example). But abstract objects are causally inert. Therefore, the cause of the universe must be something analogous to a mind, and this we call God;
3. The way from possible explanations: This one is especially useful if paired up with a principle of explanation or sufficient reason. What sort of explanation (for the existence of the universe) can this first cause be? It can’t be a scientific explanation, for scientific explanations are based on laws, but laws are descriptions of physical events, and we’re trying to explain the very existence of physical events. Other kinds of explanations are also rejected. The only explanation left is a personal explanation – something rooted in the actions of a personal being, something that is analogous to what we are (agents);
4. The way from the difference between necessity and contingency, temporality and atemporality: The only way a necessary being can explain a contingent being is if it is something like a person endowed with free will (same for an atemporal cause causing a temporal effect, in the Kalam argument, for instance);
5. The YE OLDE METAPHYSICAL WAY (I hope it sounds cool): since the cause/explanation of the universe (or moved things, or any feature X that is explained in a cosmological argument) is a necessary being (or pure act, or a being whose essence is existence, etc), it follows that this being is existence. But if that’s the case, then that being is also Goodness, Truth and Beauty. Why/warum? Because such things (goodness, truth and beauty) are what we call “transcendentals”, and they’re all convertible into being. Since the first cause of the universe just is being or existence, it follows that it must be Goodness, Truth, Beauty. Now, what do we call a being who causes the universe, and is also Goodness, Truth and Beauty? Not a demiurge, I guarantee.

Of course, number 5 may seem absolutely bananas or unintelligible for anyone who’s not familiar with aristotelean-thomistic metaphysics. But it makes sense when you study it (the transcendentals, being, etc).

I think all those 5 ways are perfectly good in defending the conclusion that the first cause is God.

 

[thinkandmull]

I read an excerpt from Hume’s Enquiry in an old philosophy textbook my brother had in junior college. He denied that we can know what causes what, but not that cause itself it not real. He spoke of the laws of the universe being mysterious, and its causes unknowable. Modern atheists take this further and say there is no need for cause at all for matter!

 

[thinkandmull]

Peter Kreeft says here peterkreeft.com/topics/design.htm that there are few atheist astrophysicists. I’m thinking he is wrong on that. Right?