First Cause

  • Thread starter Thread starter Abyssinia
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Wouldn’t a statement such as “that which has no definable attributes” suffice for no-thing?
I think you would just be refering to a thing with the attribute of no attributes, which seems to hit the same logical contradiction as an existent nothing because I am not sure how something can be without any attributes.
 
I think you would just be refering to a thing with the attribute of no attributes, which seems to hit the same logical contradiction as an existent nothing.
It would be phrased as “no-thing is that which has no definable attributes.” When you are defining concepts, such definition mandates that you would be referring to it. I do not believe there is an attribute of “no attributes.”
 
The meaning that we apply to sounds and words are things. Concepts are things. Thus language is a thing, its just not a physical thing.
Technically, concepts are thoughts, which exist physically as signals (or energy, or whatever the technical term is) within the brains of us humans, and they can be transmitted and shared by speech (also physical, soundwaves) or writing (clearly physical.)

[edit: lol]
 
… “no-thing is that which has no definable attributes.” …
That reduces to Nothing=Nothing.
I do not believe there is an attribute of “no attributes.”
Neither do I, that’s my point, its not possible to have a set of no sets, or an attribute of no attributes. Its contradictory.
 
Technically, concepts are thoughts, which exist physically as signals.
Technically concepts exist in correlation with physical signals. Nobody has ever found a physical elephant in somebodies brain, but rather they have found physical patterns that correspond to the fact that somebody is thinking. The idea that the mind is synonymous to the brain is not a provable hypothesis, its just a widely believed dogma in the scientific community.
(or energy, or whatever the technical term is) within the brains of us humans, and they can be transmitted and shared by speech (also physical, soundwaves) or writing (clearly physical.)

[edit: lol]
I do not deny that we express our concepts through physical mediums, so long as we understand that they are just mediums and are not synonymous in nature to the concepts they help to express.
 
That reduces to Nothing=Nothing.
Isn’t this the point of a defintion? To provide a statement that clarifies a matter. I could define a cat is a cat or say a cat is a small, domesticated carnivore part of the family of Felidae. Both statements are absolutely true but one attempts to provide clarity.
Neither do I, that’s my point, its not possible to have a set of no sets, or an attribute of no attributes. Its contradictory.
It’s merely being used to describe a condition. Black is not a color but one can use it to help describe the colouration of something, even if it’s ontologically untrue. This allows people to understand what it is you are speaking to.
 
Anything can be a thing. It is dependent on the context on how the word is used…Period!:cool: Now let us proceed on more important issues…Like do you posters have jobs???
 
Anything can be a thing. It is dependent on the context on how the word is used…Period!:cool: Now let us proceed on more important issues…Like do you posters have jobs???
Yes, I do. Do you? 😛
 
Yes, thanks for asking…What is it that you do?
It’s pretty boring. I train people to configure and setup our OSS network software. It’s software that is designed to interoperate with network telecommunications equipment such as Broadsoft IP switches and Cisco BACCs. What about you?
 
…This allows people to understand what it is you are speaking to.
Oh…I thought you were attempting to assert the a logical contradiction as valid by word play, sorry, I misunderstood. lol. The only time I open my mouth is to change feet.
 
That takes an expert. Who do you suggest? A theologian or scientist?
I suggest a philosopher …and, of course, you may already guessed … Heidegger … and, more specifically, his book: What is a Thing.

Also, for the notion of the world as a “no-thing”, see Heidegger’s Being and Time, Part One, Division One, Part III, Section 19 (The definition of the ‘world’ as res extensa), pp. 123-125, in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation. I know postings are for arguments. But sometimes they can also provide information.

Generally, scientists do not ask such questions.

Theologians, if philosophically trained, might.

For the most part, only philosophy majors get excited about this stuff.
 
Nothing your saying here leads me to believe that an existent nothing is anything less than a logical contradiction. In fact, I only see you asserting A=notA. I don’t know what kind of clarification can change that state of affairs.
So, you’re saying that God is a thing?
 
This is an assertion without an explanation.What do you mean by “things”. We mean things in the sense of having an act of reality; being real as opposed to being absolutely nothing.
Most people think of things as a “this” or a “that” - something you can point at - something that can occupy a specific spatial location/specific temporal moment - something that belongs to a class of similar things.

But you expand the meaning of thing so much (“having an act of reality”) that God Himself is a thing, a “res”.

But how can that be? God is not just one “thing” among other things. He is not limited spatially or temporally. He is not a member of a class.

Maybe there’s more to “reality” than just things.
 
Also, for the notion of the world as a “no-thing”, see Heidegger’s Being and Time, Part One, Division One, Part III, Section 19 (The definition of the ‘world’ as res extensa), pp. 123-125, in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation.
Actually, don’t just look at Section 19 but at the entirety of Part III, pp. 91-145. Section 19, while interesting in its own right, is limited to a specific explication of Descartes.

What Heidegger is criticizing throughout Part III is the “reification” of the meaning of “being”.
 
Most people think of things as a “this” or a “that” - something you can point at - something that can occupy a specific spatial location/specific temporal moment - something that belongs to a class of similar things.

But you expand the meaning of thing so much (“having an act of reality”) that God Himself is a thing, a “res”.

But how can that be? God is not just one “thing” among other things. He is not limited spatially or temporally. He is not a member of a class.

Maybe there’s more to “reality” than just things.
This is purely semantics posing as an argument. You are using the word “things” here to make a categorical distinction between physical beings and the being of God, and then saying that my argument fails on the strength of your definition. However this is not the context in which i am using the word. All reality is some-thing or a thing insofar as it is not nothing. An act of reality cannot be the produce of an absence of reality. You are saying that the word thing cannot include God. Well, that depends on the context in which you express the word. I am certainly a thing if by that i mean simply that i am not absent from the act of reality. Its evident to me at least that this was made clear. You cannot use the idea that God is not included in the class of physical beings to argue that a thing can come from nothing. Nothing is an absence of reality. God is not an absence of reality, but rather the fullness of reality. This can only make sense if God is esse; God is the act of reality. Thus it is necessary to make a distinction between the act reality and the creation of a new essence. To create a new esse is to create another God. This is impossible.
 
Oh…I thought you were attempting to assert the a logical contradiction as valid by word play, sorry, I misunderstood. lol. The only time I open my mouth is to change feet.
It was not my intent and I can appreciate it wasn’t particularly clear. In a similar manner, saying “there are no absolutes”, which is technically self-contradicting in an aspect, allows the speaker to articulate a position we can understand without complex semantics.
 
Consider an oak tree. There is a distinction between what the tree is and that it is. Moreover, “that it is” is not necessary. It is contingent.

In this sense, its existence is “outside” its essence. But "“outside” does not mean separable so that the existential act could “hang around” without the essence (like the smile on the Cheshire cat). You cannot have the tree’s existential act without the tree’s essence.

The distinction between existence and essence here is not like the distinction between the oak tree and, let’s say, the maple tree a hundred feet away.

No, the existential act of the oak tree “vanishes” when the oak tree is “gone”. That why we say that the existential act is an ontological component of the oak tree. It’s the oak tree’s act.

Of course, there is a sense that God maintains the oak tree’s act.

But the tree’s act of “to be” is not God’s act of “to be”. I believe this is standard Thomism. But I’m willing to be persuaded otherwise if you can give me the cites from Thomas.
 
This is purely semantics posing as an argument. You are using the word “things” here to make a categorical distinction between physical beings and the being of God, and then saying that my argument fails on the strength of your definition. However this is not the context in which i am using the word. All reality is some-thing or a thing insofar as it is not nothing.
You have presented a good summary of the history of philosophy. From Aristotle’s tode ti (a “this” or “that”) through Kant’s etwas, or x, or “some-thing … a thing insofar as it is not nothing.”

Of course, then we have to deal with “thing-for-us” and “thing-in-itself”. Is the thing that “appears” the same as the “thing-in-itself”?

Even Aristotle’s “tode ti” involves a “here” and a “now” with some connection to “us” - every demonstrative like “this” or “that” pertains to an immediate “neighborhood” surrounding an “I” or a “we”… who would have thought that “pointing” is so complicated?

So isn’t “thing” a marvelous philosophical topic that spawns some great questions?
 
I just thought of another question.

What is the first object of the intellect? Is it the act of “to be” or the what, the essence?

If it is the act of “to be”, then, if every act of “to be” is really God’s act of “to be”, then the first object of the intellect is God.

But this is a rather strange “thing” to say (no pun intended).
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top