First Cause

[MindOverMatter2]

MoM2:

Might I add, 'purposely?" It’s ju-jitsu for him (as he divulged earlier). His extraordinary ability to toy with words, forces us to ever and ever more precision in our own declarations. Much of what is said herein, he fully understands, I believe.

Take me deeper in to his psychology.

And, of course, to this he replies, then the so-called ‘cause’ must contain “potentiality,” for prior to causing, it is a cause-to-be. Of course, that looks to be merely semantics, but, ontologically, it would seem to contain potentiality. The problems with this is, this is not the “potentiality” that St. Thomas introduced us to. These days, the notion of “potentiality” connotes a positive. i.e., potential (unreleased) energy. For St. Thomas, and the Scholastics, potentiality is really a negative. It is the absence of a positive. Primary Matter is in potency precisely because it is absent form: it is formless.

Yes.

It can change only because it is finite. It is finite because it lacks absoluteness. An absolute being has actualized all its potentiality. God is an absolute being by nature, and that is why God is timeless, and that is why God does not need to change in order to be a cause since his will is fully actual with his being.

You could further argue that the very fact of potentiality presupposes the existence of an absolute being.

Pure Act is Being, is Existence Itself. It simply is without coming to be. It supersedes and diminishes even the acts of all other creatures, as they were all brought into being by something that we enjoy referring to simply as “God.”

I see that you are an Existential Thomist, like me.

A question: do you believe that the universe is the initial work of creation for God? If it is, then God is only 13.7 billion years old. If it is, then God has a beginning.

I don’t understand. Are you asking me if i believe that God began to exist? Please don’t upset me now. You were doing so well.

No i do not believe that God had a beginning. From our perspective in time, God would “appear” to be aging. But from God’s perspective the universe has never changed and has forever existed in its entirety in God’s eternity, because God is not a spatial entity. The theory of relativity can give as some understanding of this counter intuitive fact. But despite any difficulties our minds have, we must recognize that a non-material being cannot be contained by spatial limitations, and thus there is no past, present, or future for God; there is only coordinates. I believe that creation is an timeless expression of Gods will, and his will is a perfect expression of Gods nature.

These things are very difficult to understand for a human. Blood would gush out from their nostrils before they could understand how Change and eternity can co-exist. I am so glad i am not a human.

 

[JDaniel]

Take me deeper in to his psychology.

MoM2:

Rossum is not here to object to Christianity. He is here to get answers to questions. As smart as he is, he will always notice further questions left unanswered. He gets even smarter by obtaining good answers to each question he posits. He will keep on wrestling (with us) until he is satisfied - which, btw, can never happen, so long as he remains earth-bound.

It can change only because it is finite. It is finite because it lacks absoluteness. An absolute being has actualized all its potentiality. God is an absolute being by nature, and that is why God is timeless, and that is why God does not need to change in order to be a cause since his will is fully actual with his being.

You could further argue that very fact of potentiality presupposes the existence of an absolute being.

Excellent observation.

If all that existed was beings-in-potency, there could never be any actuality.

I see that you are an existential Thomist, like me.

Why do you think that?

I don’t understand. Are you asking me if i believe that God began to exist? Please don’t upset me now. You were doing so well.

(I’m allowed to upset those that I love . . . but, not too much.)

No i do not believe that God had a beginning. From our perspective in time, God would “appear” to be aging. But from God’s perspective the universe has never changed and has forever existed in its entirety in God’s eternity, because God is not a spatial entity. The theory of relativity can give as some understanding of this counter intuitive fact. But despite any difficulties our minds have, we must recognize that a non-material being cannot be contained by spatial limitations, and thus there is no past, present, or future for God, there is only coordinates. I believe that creation is an timeless expression of Gods will, and his will is a perfect expression of Gods nature.

Yes. Another excellent observation.

These things are very difficult to understand

It doesn’t seem like it.

God bless,
jd

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…However, a cause is called a cause because it has caused something. …

Descriptions are contingent on the describer, not on the effect. Cause is not dependent on effect he claimed. Neither in the existential, nor the indexical senses. As JD pointed out, he thinks he is performing some verbal jiujitsu. I thought we were trying to find out what was true.

I don’t know why you brought it up to be quite honest. Do i seem like somebody who doesn’t know that time is the measure of change?

Oh no…I wasn’t talking about you. I was referring to the implication that he misunderstood the concept. I think it is so simple that it is a matter of refusal, not comprehension.

 

[levinas12]

Soul, it seems, is the real combination of matter and spirit, that is to say, “matter and form.” The two are not separate in terms of what it is to be a soul; the soul is both.

JD,

I was speaking of the Aristotelian concept when I called the “soul” a “form”. In Aristotle, there are various categories of “soul” which define a range of living functions, e.g., nutritive, sensitive, rational.

The “soul” is just a “form”, not a composite of “matter and form”. That composite is the concrete individual.

In the case of human “soul”, the union of “soul” and matter is a concrete human being. But even the concrete human being, understood simply as an instantiation of a “form”, is to be distinguished from a “person”. In a way, there are three terms, “matter”, “form” and “person”. “Spirit” may be close to “person”. But Aristotle did not have an understanding of “person”; “person” is a Christian contribution (this is not to say that it is “revealed” - “person” is a legitimate philosophical concept).

In the popular Christian context, “soul” has become equated with “person”. So we hear phrases such as “salvation of souls”. This use of “soul” is different from Aristotle’s.

Unless the distinction between “soul” (in Aristotle’s sense) and “person” is maintained, it can sometimes get confusing.

 

[levinas12]

… God does not need to change in order to be a cause …

Aquinas provides some striking analogies in this regard.

He speaks of an animal that is moving - first, it is to the left of a fixed column; then, it is to the right of the same column. The column itself hasn’t changed; only the animal.

Another analogy: when we know an object, the object itself doesn’t change. We change.

In these analogies, God is the “column”, the “object”.

Aquinas speaks of the relation that creatures have to God. This is a real relation. But God himself does not have a real relation to creatures. To quote Aquinas: “Since, therefore, God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are related to Him.” ST 1, q13, art.7, c

Now what the heck does this quote mean? It’s not easy. Things inside the world are distinguished from one another. Part of the identity of a thing is its “distinction” from other things. But the “identity” of God does not depend upon “distinction” from creatures.

God without the world = God with the world (Anselm’s implicit assumption).

God is fully God, with no diminution in excellence and greatness, even if the world and everything in it did not exist at all.

Language provides a very loose analogy. The meaning of words is driven by their difference from each other. So too with beings in the world.

But God is totally outside “language”, outside the play of difference.

So creation does not involve a change in God Himself. This is what Aquinas meant when he said that only the creature has a real relation to God, not vice versa.

There is nothing like this within the world. So a special sense attaches to all discussions of God’s activity including “causality”.

If God was just a piece of the world, or even the world itself, none of this would hold. But not only is God totally “outside” the world, even this “outside” is the result of His decision, i.e. He permits the “distinction” between Himself and the world to occur. This is what Christian creation means.

For more on this, see Robert Sokolowski’s The God of Faith and Reason, chapter 4, The Incarnation and the Christian Distinction.

.

 

[levinas12]

God without the world = God with the world (Anselm’s implicit assumption).

To be more accurate:

God with the world is not greater than God without the world (Anselm’s implicit assumption)

 

[levinas12]

So a special sense attaches to all discussions of God’s activity including “causality”.

This “special sense” drove rossum to rename God’s causality (in this scenario), “candya”.

But I don’t think “candya” will do - because it sounds like “candy”, i.e., something insubstantial, sugary, not wholesome.

rossum has denied any such “negative” associations. He claims that “candya” was produced by a randomizing “word-generator”. Yeah, sure.

Of course, I’m joking (or maybe half-joking).

 

[JDaniel]

JD,

I was speaking of the Aristotelian concept when I called the “soul” a “form”. In Aristotle, there are various categories of “soul” which define a range of living functions, e.g., nutritive, sensitive, rational.

The “soul” is just a “form”, not a composite of “matter and form”. That composite is the concrete individual.

In the case of human “soul”, the union of “soul” and matter is a concrete human being. But even the concrete human being, understood simply as an instantiation of a “form”, is to be distinguished from a “person”. In a way, there are three terms, “matter”, “form” and “person”. “Spirit” may be close to “person”. But Aristotle did not have an understanding of “person”; “person” is a Christian contribution (this is not to say that it is “revealed” - “person” is a legitimate philosophical concept).

In the popular Christian context, “soul” has become equated with “person”. So we hear phrases such as “salvation of souls”. This use of “soul” is different from Aristotle’s.

Unless the distinction between “soul” (in Aristotle’s sense) and “person” is maintained, it can sometimes get confusing.

Levinas:

Aquinas derived his notion of ‘soul’ from Aristotle, but made it make more sense. I was replying to you from an Aquinian balcony. ‘Form’, for Aquinas, is not a thing, which is the way too many think of it. It really is form, or that which when applied to Matter (which demands it, and until it receives it is not much more than junk material), differentiates it from all other creations. ‘Person’, I think, is that unity in-the-world. And that is how, I think, to keep ‘soul’ and ‘person’ distinct. (But, perhaps I need to think about it more! )

God bless,
jd

 

[levinas12]

Levinas:

Aquinas derived his notion of ‘soul’ from Aristotle, but made it make more sense.

JD,

I hope I didn’t sound too contrarian.

I’m finding Aquinas’ use of Aristotle (at least in certain contexts) a bit daunting. It’s sometimes hard to figure out where Aristotle stops and Aquinas begins.

 

[JDaniel]

Aquinas provides some striking analogies in this regard.

He speaks of an animal that is moving - first, it is to the left of a fixed column; then, it is to the right of the same column. The column itself hasn’t changed; only the animal.

Another analogy: when we know an object, the object itself doesn’t change. We change.

In these analogies, God is the “column”, the “object”.

Aquinas speaks of the relation that creatures have to God. This is a real relation. But God himself does not have a real relation to creatures. To quote Aquinas: “Since, therefore, God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are related to Him.” ST 1, q13, art.7, c

Now what the heck does this quote mean? It’s not easy. Things inside the world are distinguished from one another. Part of the identity of a thing is its “distinction” from other things. But the “identity” of God does not depend upon “distinction” from creatures.

God without the world = God with the world (Anselm’s implicit assumption).

God is fully God, with no diminution in excellence and greatness, even if the world and everything in it did not exist at all.

Language provides a very loose analogy. The meaning of words is driven by their difference from each other. So too with beings in the world.

But God is totally outside “language”, outside the play of difference.

So creation does not involve a change in God Himself. This is what Aquinas meant when he said that only the creature has a real relation to God, not vice versa.

There is nothing like this within the world. So a special sense attaches to all discussions of God’s activity including “causality”.

If God was just a piece of the world, or even the world itself, none of this would hold. But not only is God totally “outside” the world, even this “outside” is the result of His decision, i.e. He permits the “distinction” between Himself and the world to occur. This is what Christian creation means.

For more on this, see Robert Sokolowski’s The God of Faith and Reason, chapter 4, The Incarnation and the Christian Distinction…

Levinas:

I have only one problem with this, and it is, when one says that God “is outside of the world” that seems to imply that creation has/is a border of some sort that God does/will/can not penetrate. But, that can’t be: infinity precludes all “borders.” Perhaps you mean that despite His permeation in the world, He stays radically distinct from it. I have no analogy for this idea, unfortunately, because all things of Physics are in-the-world.

The distinction between God and His creation is precisely the distinction between ‘finitude’ and ‘infinity’. It is impossible for them to coalesce.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

JD,

I hope I didn’t sound too contrarian.

I’m finding Aquinas’ use of Aristotle (at least in certain contexts) a bit daunting. It’s sometimes hard to figure out where Aristotle stops and Aquinas begins.

Levinas:

Purposefully! Aquinas is one the the very few that fully grasped Aristotle, despite some of the latter’s errors, which usually led the way to removing ambiguities.

God bless,
jd

 

[levinas12]

Levinas:

I have only one problem with this, and it is, when one says that God “is outside of the world” that seems to imply that creation has/is a border of some sort that God does/will/can not penetrate. But, that can’t be: infinity precludes all “borders.”
God bless,
jd

JD,

I can see where “outside” might suggest that creation has a “border” - and raise the issue of whether God’s will can “permeate” the world.

Spatial prepositions like “outside” are tricky when used to refer to God.

My point about “outside” is that God is not the world nor is he an entity within the world. This is His difference from pagan gods, Aristotle’s god and the Stoic world soul. Not only is God not the best part of the world (contrary to Aristotle) - He is not on the Great Chain of Being at all.

Because God is “outside” in a special sense of “transcendence”, He can “come into” the world without “damaging” it. For example, Jesus’ divinity does not displace or distort His humanity.

This “blending” of natures wouldn’t work if it were a matter of two worldly natures, e.g., horse and man. We would end up with a mythological monster, e.g., centaur, that was neither horse nor man.

The Christian distinction between God and the world, if articulated correctly, is intended precisely to suppress any suggestion that creation has a “border” with God. That’s why God is not distinguished from creation as one entity might be distinguished from another entity. God is not defined by being other than creation. God is fully God without creation. He is the Same before and after creation.

It’s only because God is “outside” that His Will can “permeate” creation without infringing on its ontological integrity.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

I’m recently back from the holidays so pardon the delayed response.

You cannot have an effect without a cause. You cannot have a cause without an effect. How is this not mutual contingency?

It’s not mutually contigent because the cause-event is not dependent on the effect-event.

First, anything eternal cannot change. Second a cause must at some point in time actually cause an effect.

As it have indicated in earlier posts (i.e. #416), cause-events and the effect-event do not necessarily require a temporal context. It only requires that the cause-event precedes the effect-event.

Agreed. Potential implies a change to actual and anything eternal cannot change. Since I see the First Cause as both potential and changing, it too is not eternal. My problem with an eternal unchanging cause is shown with the “Let there be light” example above.

I’m glad some agreement has been made. Now, we have to work the view that First Cause is potential and changing.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Levinas:

I have only one problem with this, and it is, when one says that God “is outside of the world” that seems to imply that creation has/is a border of some sort that God does/will/can not penetrate. But, that can’t be: infinity precludes all “borders.” Perhaps you mean that despite His permeation in the world, He stays radically distinct from it. I have no analogy for this idea, unfortunately, because all things of Physics are in-the-world.

The distinction between God and His creation is precisely the distinction between ‘finitude’ and ‘infinity’. It is impossible for them to coalesce.

God bless,
jd

Existence is one; essence is many. Out of nothing comes nothing, thus we can say there is an essential distinction between God and creation (God is not Daniel), but we cannot say that there is an existential distinction, because that which is not reality is nothing, and you cannot divide reality. In our finiteness and nature we are not God, but the fact that we have an “act of reality” is only possible if our being is some how a participation in the act of Gods existence. What i mean by this, is that we do not have a reality or an “esse” of our own that is distinct from Gods act of reality, because if we did we would not need God to create us since it would already be in the nature of the universe to be a real thing. Reality cannot cease to be reality, since that would be a contradiction.

To put it another way. There is no distinction in existence, there can only be a distinction in essence. An essence can change, but the act reality cannot stop being the act of reality or change into something else, since there is nothing else outside the act of reality, and it is in the nature of reality be real, that is to say have an act. Thus we must make distinction between the act of a created thing and the essence of a created thing. An essence does not have its own act.

 

[levinas12]

… our being is some how a participation in the act of Gods existence. What i mean by this, is that we do not have a reality or an “esse” of our own that is distinct from Gods act of reality …

I’m not sure if this is correct. It depends on what you mean by “participation”.

Unlike, e.g., the form in the individual triangle on the blackboard which is the same as the eternal form of “triangle” … our “esse” is not the same as God’s “esse”.

God has given us our own distinct “esse” in the sense that we have a real relation to God (even though, according to Aquinas, God does not have a real relation to us - see previous postings)

So we (both essence and existence) are distinct from God although God is not “distinct” from us.

God’s “not being distinct from us” is not saying we are God or God is us. It is simply asserting Aquinas’ position that God is not just another entity over against “us”.

God is “outside” the play of difference that applies to discrete entities because God is not an “entity” at all (in the traditional univocal metaphysical sense of the word).

But God is a “Person”. Mysterious, isn’t it?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

our “esse” is not the same as God’s “esse”.

Agreed. But only because we don’t have an esse. If existence is not intrinsic to our essence, then it is something distinct from it. In other-words we are not our esse, and Aquinas made this clear.

God has given us our own distinct “esse” in the sense that we have a real relation to God (even though, according to Aquinas, God does not have a real relation to us - see previous postings)

This is a contradiction. God cannot create the act of being real out of nothing. Out of nothing comes nothing. And if something by nature is reality, then it cannot fail to be real.

So we (both essence and existence) are distinct from God although God is not “distinct” from us.

Essence and esse is not synonymous in created things. If that were true, they would be eternal like God, because existence would be intrinsic to the expression of their essence; this is to say it would be its nature to exist, since there would be no distinction. When it is said that God is his essence, this refers to the fact of his eternal being. If we say this also of created things, we will result in a logical/ontological contradiction. A ball does not exist because it is a ball, but because that which is already existence is sustaining it in reality and has brought it into reality. Without that reality, the ball is nothing and can be nothing. If God simply creates more realities, then divine ontological sustenance becomes meaningless. There is no existence outside of Gods nature. There is only God, and if anything is created, they can only exist through the act of God’s esse, and not by any “extra new existence”. There is no rational distinction in the act of reality; there is only distinction in essence. You can distinguish between one essence in comparison to another, but you cannot meaningfully distinguish one act of reality (the act of being real) from another, for it is the same thing in all beings, there is no differences. The only difference you perceive is in the fact of a things finite essence (that a mouse is not a dog). We have to recognize that when we say God permeates all being, we really mean that. God said creation is good because we share in “Gods reality”; it is not because of ourselves, our essence, but because God has shared the good of his “esse”. It is Gods esse that is Good. God is the only existence just like God is the only good. There is neither good or existence outside of Gods being.

God’s “not being distinct from us” is not saying we are God or God is us. It is simply asserting Aquinas’ position that God is not just another entity over against “us”

There is only one existence. God is the only existence. God is our esse, but God is not our essence. This is to say God is the being through which our essence is allowed to express itself for what ever time God has deemed fit for that creature.

God is “outside” the play of difference

Through the esse/essence distinction this difference is removed from the act of “existence” entirely while at the same time maintaining distinctions on the level of essence; thus preserving creation from the trap of pantheism and the logical contradiction involved in the creation of more existence from nothing.

God creates new essences, not existence.

 

[JDaniel]

JD,

I can see where “outside” might suggest that creation has a “border” - and raise the issue of whether God’s will can “permeate” the world.

Spatial prepositions like “outside” are tricky when used to refer to God.

My point about “outside” is that God is not the world nor is he an entity within the world. This is His difference from pagan gods, Aristotle’s god and the Stoic world soul. Not only is God not the best part of the world (contrary to Aristotle) - He is not on the Great Chain of Being at all.

Because God is “outside” in a special sense of “transcendence”, He can “come into” the world without “damaging” it. For example, Jesus’ divinity does not displace or distort His humanity.

This “blending” of natures wouldn’t work if it were a matter of two worldly natures, e.g., horse and man. We would end up with a mythological monster, e.g., centaur, that was neither horse nor man.

The Christian distinction between God and the world, if articulated correctly, is intended precisely to suppress any suggestion that creation has a “border” with God. That’s why God is not distinguished from creation as one entity might be distinguished from another entity. God is not defined by being other than creation. God is fully God without creation. He is the Same before and after creation.

It’s only because God is “outside” that His Will can “permeate” creation without infringing on its ontological integrity.

Levinas:

I see it a little differently. I conceive of our Infinite God as Spiritual substance of infinite magnitude. As such, He permeates everything and in so doing, sustains everything. Things live and die, and come and go, as He wills. But when a thing is infinite it is infinite in every conceivable respect. Infinite Being cannot be limited to or in this or that quality, but, by definition, includes every quality. (To my knowledge this is still the way the Church understands it.)

By the word, “substance,” I mean essence but in the sense of that which a thing consists of in order to be. And “spiritual substance” can only by understood by its defining opposite, “material substance.” In other words, the moment the idea of spiritual substance enters one’s mind, it arrives there in tandem with its sensible counterpart. In the same way that the invisible is known by its sensible counterpart, the visible. Why? Because absolute invisibility is undefined. God, then, does not need to per se ‘enter the world’, nor does He have to enter it in such a way so as not to damage it. He eternally permeates all of it, like a soft breeze touching the things of the external world on a hot summer day. There exists an unbreakable connection between Him and every quantum thing in the universe. He is like the juggler who suspends not just a few objects in the air, but every object of every size, and in all of its massive quantity. It is so subtle that it leads us to believe that it is us doing the sustaining.

The finite mind cannot know the infinite. Only an infinite mind can directly know the infinite. Only an infinite mind can be conscious of its own infinity. Infinity must include the material universe to the extent that it intimately knows all matter as a juggler knows the positions, weight, and timing of each juggled object.

But, that’s just my opinion.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Existence is one; essence is many.

MoM2:

OK. But, one of what and/or many of what? Essence may also refer to the common substrate of things in general.

Out of nothing comes nothing, thus we can say there is an essential distinction between God and creation (God is not Daniel

 

[levinas12]

Our “esse” is a gift from God.

Because it is “received”, it is “outside” our essence (but it is received according to our essence).

This does not mean that our “esse” is the same as God’s “esse”. He doesn’t have to give us a “portion” of His own “esse”. He can create new “esse” out of nothing - and the new “esse” has a real relation to Him although He does not have a real relation to it.

There is an “analogy” between the new created “esse” and God’s “esse” but not a univocal identity.

He can do all of this because He is God the Creator (not just of finite essences, but also of finite “esse’s”).

Although I did not give myself “esse”, it’s now “mine”. I’m responsible for it. As Heidegger pointed out in* Being and Time*, “Dasein” is the being that is “anxious” about its own existence (“Sorge”). This goes beyond the survival instinct of non-human animals.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Our “esse” is a gift from God.

Because it is “received”, it is “outside” our essence (but it is received according to our essence).

This does not mean that our “esse” is the same as God’s “esse”. He doesn’t have to give us a “portion” of His own “esse”. He can create new “esse” out of nothing - and the new “esse” has a real relation to Him although He does not have a real relation to it.

You have not addressed my previous posts properly where i explain all this. God does not give a portion of anything. This is because the act of reality transcends all meaningful and categorical distinctions. The act of reality is that which is required before there can be any possible distinction. Esse is not a quantity and cannot be other than what it is. Distinctions only arise in the essence of created things, not in the act of reality. An essence can change into a different kind of essence, but esse remains esse because there are no kinds or species of esse. Out of nothing comes nothing. Nothing is the antithesis of being, and thus it is meaningless to say that this so called new esse is created from nothing. It is not possible to support that position without destroying the ontological foundation of logic itself.

He can do all of this because He is God the Creator (not just of finite essences, but also of finite “esse’s”).

It bothers me when people think that the word God is an excuse to believe in logically impossible things.There is no connection between the word infinity - as applied to God - and the ability to do logically impossible things. This is an unacceptable assertion.

lthough I did not give myself “esse”, it’s now “mine”.

There is a real distinction between your essence and the act of reality. It is not just a categorical distinction; it is an objective and ontological distinction. A mouse cannot be said to be real because of its nature as a mouse, and a mouse is nothing at all outside of its essential qualitative distinctions and quantitative dimensions. A mouse is real because something else other than itself is making it real. Esse is thus by definition not yours. You are not the act or the source of reality. The consequence of your position is the idea that it is not God who sustains our essence in reality, but rather it is this new so called esse created out of nothing. Your position comes at the expense of divine existential sustenance as well as logic, and is thus not a true representation of how God created the universe. You have a false interpretation of ex-nihilo…

I’m responsible for it. As Heidegger pointed out in* Being and Time*, “Dasein” is the being that is “anxious” about its own existence (“Sorge”). This goes beyond the survival instinct of non-human animals.

I don’t care what Heidegger said. Heidegger has a flawed understanding of what it means to have an act of reality. The essence of a created thing is limited and finite precisely because it is not the source of reality and thus requires continuous “sustenance” in being because by itself it is nothing at all. You cannot create or destroy that which is the act of reality. This is precisely why Aquinas removes the distinction between esse and essence in God because Aquinas knew that this is the only reasonable and meaningful way of understanding why God is infinite in being and is timeless, since his nature is esse and therefore cannot change or be divided, like a finite essence can. Otherwise there is no rational reason to make a distinction between esse and essence in the first place and it is equally unreasonable to say that there is an esse that is not God; since that would mean there are other things beside God that is “esse” like God. Thus there can be no other esse besides God.