Free agent is not contingent

[STT]

Very nice; it seems we are on the same page.

Cool.

This is an interesting thought… could you elaborate on this community of minds?

I am sure that material are sustained since they are subject to change (I have my own argument in here: An argument for mind - #2 by Vico. You are welcome to visit it. I like your critical thinking). I am sure that I can focus on a specific thought and hold it present with myself. I am sure that there are changes within my brain that I am not conscious of them so I could not be the one who sustains it. So there are other minds.

What do you mean by collective memory.

All our experience which is stored in a collective way.

I’m a little confusef as to what you mean here. Mind is an ability of mind?

Sorry, this is the right sentence: “I think mind does instruction if we accept intellect is an ability of mind.”

Great!

Cool.

 

[quaestio45]

I am sure that material are sustained since they are subject to change (I have my own argument in here: An argument for mind. You are welcome to visit it. I like your critical thinking). I am sure that I can focus on a specific thought and hold it present with myself. I am sure that there are changes within my brain that I am not conscious of them so I could not be the one who sustains it. So there are other minds.

Hmm, well, if this requires the context of the thread you linked too, then I’ll head there and see if everything is ultimately in alignment. As I’ve said before, I usually like waiting to see what general opinion holds of any post put up, but given that these two subjects are tightly connected, there would be no better time to jump to that next thread then now.

 

[STT]

Hmm, well, if this requires the context of the thread you linked too, then I’ll head there and see if everything is ultimately in alignment. As I’ve said before, I usually like waiting to see what general opinion holds of any post put up, but given that these two subjects are tightly connected, there would be no better time to jump to that next thread then now.

Cool. I will be waiting for your criticism.

 

[quaestio45]

So if I am not mistaken, we might agree for the sake of argument that to be an entity simple in substance does not necessitate you be simple in all forms, correct? If that be so, we also may agree that knowledge is fundamentally different from the substance a mind would have to take, yes? As such, it is possible for the mind to hold multiple of what knowledge and ideas are made from, which is forms, yes? That be so, this particular argument that because knowledge is composite that therefore its products must be composite fails because it does not take into account specific types of composition, correct? As such, a mind might be able to be created.

Furthermore, a point I missed is that composition does not necessarily need to lead to composition, I would think (as a lego building is composed of several “simple” parts, which as such, allows the composed lego creation to yield simple entities from itself). As such, the mind may still be created, it seems.

 

[STT]

So if I am not mistaken, we might agree for the sake of argument that to be an entity simple in substance does not necessitate you be simple in all forms, correct?

What do you mean with the bold part? I think we agree that mind is simple and can sustain thoughts.

If that be so, we also may agree that knowledge is fundamentally different from the substance a mind would have to take, yes?

Knowledge when it is experienced is another substance.

As such, it is possible for the mind to hold multiple of what knowledge and ideas are made from, which is forms, yes?

Yes. Mind has the ability to sustain forms. But they don’t become a part of mind.

That be so, this particular argument that because knowledge is composite that therefore its products must be composite fails because it does not take into account specific types of composition, correct?

I cannot see what you are asking in here.

As such, a mind might be able to be created.

Let’s wait for this.

Furthermore, a point I missed is that composition does not necessarily need to lead to composition, I would think (as a lego building is composed of several “simple” parts, which as such, allows the composed lego creation to yield simple entities from itself). As such, the mind may still be created, it seems.

I cannot follow you here either.

 

[quaestio45]

I think we agree that mind is simple and can sustain thoughts.

Thats basically what I meant to say, yes.

Yes. Mind has the ability to sustain forms. But they don’t become a part of mind.

I would say they are more in the mind then a part of the mind, but I think we might be on the same page on this, just saying it slightly differently.

I cannot see what you are asking in here.

Basically, just because knowledge is composite doesn’t mean that it can’t create something simple in substance, if you argue that composition must yield composition, for even if that were true the composition passed down would be the same as the initial composed entity, in this case, that would be in knowledge.

I cannot follow you here either.

So basically what is composed can make what is simple because the composed thing is itself an array of simple parts put together; as such, these entities aren’t impossible in the ability to create that which is simple, because they too are simple at their parts. The creation would just need to come from the material cause of the creator, I would think.

 

[STT]

Thats basically what I meant to say, yes.

Cool.

I would say they are more in the mind then a part of the mind, but I think we might be on the same page on this, just saying it slightly differently.

Glad to see that you agree.

Basically, just because knowledge is composite doesn’t mean that it can’t create something simple in substance, if you argue that composition must yield composition, for even if that were true the composition passed down would be the same as the initial composed entity, in this case, that would be in knowledge.

That is not possible. Because mind does not function when it freely decide.

So basically what is composed can make what is simple because the composed thing is itself an array of simple parts put together; as such, these entities aren’t impossible in the ability to create that which is simple, because they too are simple at their parts. The creation would just need to come from the material cause of the creator, I would think.

Material, being contingent, depending on mind cannot possibly create something non-contingent, mind. Mind persist to exist where thoughts come and go.

 

[quaestio45]

Because mind does not function when it freely decide.

I’m still in large disagreement here; I don’t think that for one to be totally free they need not have bias nor a final cause by which to operate by in some way.

Material, being contingent, depending on mind cannot possibly create something non-contingent

Yes, but I think this might be begging the question (as your presupposing that mind is noncontingent and thus arguing against its contigency on this ground). If mind could be created and thus contigent, then this might be a sufficient reason as to how it is possible (also, I still reject the idea that the mind is noncontingent, though I think its best we understand what is meant by noncontingent, as I’m sure my understanding of it is different then yours).

 

[STT]

I’m still in large disagreement here; I don’t think that for one to be totally free they need not have bias nor a final cause by which to operate by in some way.

The point is that you can of course make non-free decision to reach a final cause by giving up your freedom. You of course can freely decide and ignore the bias.

Yes, but I think this might be begging the question (as your presupposing that mind is noncontingent and thus arguing against its contigency on this ground). If mind could be created and thus contigent, then this might be a sufficient reason as to how it is possible (also, I still reject the idea that the mind is noncontingent, though I think its best we understand what is meant by noncontingent, as I’m sure my understanding of it is different then yours).

Well, there should be an ultimate thing which is not contingent since otherwise we are dealing with regress. This thing we call it mind.

 

[quaestio45]

The point is that you can of course make non-free decision to reach a final cause by giving up your freedom. You of course can freely decide and ignore the bias.

I’m not sure if I would constute that as giving up freedom. I have a question for you. What do you make of the scenario where all options are impossiblly equal in the mind of a being, and thus no action occurs? I forgot the name of this scenario, I thought it was something like Humes donkey but apparently its not.

Well, there should be an ultimate thing which is not contingent since otherwise we are dealing with regress. This thing we call it mind.

I’m not sure I would call it the mind. As I’ve said before, the mind seems to be contingent for it can move from state to state, which isn’t an attribute of a noncontingent being (who must be immutable).

 

[STT]

I’m not sure if I would constute that as giving up freedom. I have a question for you. What do you make of the scenario where all options are impossiblly equal in the mind of a being, and thus no action occurs? I forgot the name of this scenario, I thought it was something like Humes donkey but apparently its not.

I am not talking about the case that you like options equally. Think of a situation that you are offered two ice creams one which is chocolate that you love and another one which is vanilla which you hate. Couldn’t you pick up vanilla? Of course you can.

I’m not sure I would call it the mind.

What would you call that? That thing must be non-contingent. Here is another argument: Can you stop a chain of causality, chain of thought for example, whenever you wish and start doing something else by which I mean you create a new chain of causality? Of course you can do this freely. So if you are free do stop a chain of causality and create a new one without being subjected to any bias then you are uncaused cause. You are unchanging if you are uncaused cause. You are also non-contingent if you are uncaused cause.

As I’ve said before, the mind seems to be contingent for it can move from state to state, which isn’t an attribute of a noncontingent being (who must be immutable).

That is the person who is subject to change and not mind.

 

[quaestio45]

Think of a situation that you are offered two ice creams one which is chocolate that you love and another one which is vanilla which you hate. Couldn’t you pick up vanilla? Of course you can.

That be the case, I’m in agreement, though the way you phrased it between “free” and “non-free” I find slightly troublesome. But for the sake of continuing the line of thought, I’ll agree that there are sacrifices of total indifference (if thats what you would call freedom) sometimes to intervene in what is in bias (non-freedom, if I am correct). Though the question of what moves one from staying in utter indifference to intervention is perhaps an area I would ask your opinion on.

What would you call that? That thing must be non-contingent.

Yes, I do agree. Total regress doesn’t seem like an option much.

Here is another argument: Can you stop a chain of causality, chain of thought for example, whenever you wish and start doing something else by which I mean you create a new chain of causality?

Why yes, I suppose you could stop a chain of thought from occurring, and thus also initiate a chain of thought.

So if you are free do stop a chain of causality and create a new one without being subjected to any bias then you are uncaused cause.

Now this is oncemore where I must say that the problems arise. For I don’t think it so that the mind is not subjected to bias (and I do say the mind very specifically and not the person, as if the mind is the initiator of thoughts it must necessarily be in different states to cause different effects/ thoughts. We’ve discussed this part in length and if I’m not mistaken we’ve both agreed that this must be true if the mind is not working like a computer algorithm. I think we also agreed that the mind must also not be completely separate of thoughts like your initial hypothesis, but instead the thoughts must be embedded in it to some degree, lest it be as a camera, as my analogy went). For to think, which is an attribute of the mind, comes with extended attributes like judgment and consideration, to which as was agreed a final cause or principle is necessary for to refrence.

Now, perhaps you would call this an unfree state of mind, yes? If that be so, then we may ask what of the completely free and totally unbiased aspect of the mind is ever manifest in decisions? Or in any faculty of the mind? For I cannot think of many examples. This to say that the mind most certainly cannot be both a biased agent and unbiased (to which we have manifest evidence for the former and not the latter). I would think it must be of either one or the other, but not both. But that be so, then we are left with two options:
a) the mind is unbiased totally (which would require some explanation for the initiation of biased thoughts)
b) the mind is biased (which totally explains the bias in thoughts)
I don’t think I am convinced of a) so for the time being I must subscribe my belief in b).

 

[STT]

That be the case, I’m in agreement, though the way you phrased it between “free” and “non-free” I find slightly troublesome.

By non-free decision, I simply mean that the decision is based on a script whereas in the free decision there is no script that the decision is based on it. In the example of ice cream, you could decide to pick up chocolate ice cream because you like it. If someone asks you why you pick up this ice cream, you simply answer that because you like it. In this case, you act based on a script, you like therefore you pick up chocolate ice cream. Otherwise, your decision is free.

But for the sake of continuing the line of thought, I’ll agree that there are sacrifices of total indifference (if thats what you would call freedom) sometimes to intervene in what is in bias (non-freedom, if I am correct). Though the question of what moves one from staying in utter indifference to intervention is perhaps an area I would ask your opinion on.

Mind intervenes when for example there is no good option for a specific situation. Suppose you are in a jungle and don’t know which way to go. That is mind that kicks in and lets the agent freely decide which way to go. There are many other examples.

Yes, I do agree. Total regress doesn’t seem like an option much.

Glad to see that you agree.

Why yes, I suppose you could stop a chain of thought from occurring, and thus also initiate a chain of thought.

Glad to see that we agree on this too.

 

[STT]

Now this is oncemore where I must say that the problems arise. For I don’t think it so that the mind is not subjected to bias (and I do say the mind very specifically and not the person, as if the mind is the initiator of thoughts it must necessarily be in different states to cause different effects/ thoughts. We’ve discussed this part in length and if I’m not mistaken we’ve both agreed that this must be true if the mind is not working like a computer algorithm. I think we also agreed that the mind must also not be completely separate of thoughts like your initial hypothesis, but instead the thoughts must be embedded in it to some degree, lest it be as a camera, as my analogy went). For to think, which is an attribute of the mind, comes with extended attributes like judgment and consideration, to which as was agreed a final cause or principle is necessary for to refrence.

Now, perhaps you would call this an unfree state of mind, yes? If that be so, then we may ask what of the completely free and totally unbiased aspect of the mind is ever manifest in decisions? Or in any faculty of the mind? For I cannot think of many examples. This to say that the mind most certainly cannot be both a biased agent and unbiased (to which we have manifest evidence for the former and not the latter). I would think it must be of either one or the other, but not both. But that be so, then we are left with two options:
a) the mind is unbiased totally (which would require some explanation for the initiation of biased thoughts)
b) the mind is biased (which totally explains the bias in thoughts)
I don’t think I am convinced of a) so for the time being I must subscribe my belief in b).

I think mind can be an indifferent observer which means it accepts all biases but that does not mean that it is not uncaused cause since it can kick in and intervene whenever it wishes. So to me both (a) and (b) are correct at different times.

 

[quaestio45]

By non-free decision, I simply mean that the decision is based on a script whereas in the free decision there is no script that the decision is based on it. In the example of ice cream, you could decide to pick up chocolate ice cream because you like it. If someone asks you why you pick up this ice cream, you simply answer that because you like it. In this case, you act based on a script, you like therefore you pick up chocolate ice cream. Otherwise, your decision is free.

I see. So my understanding so far I believe is on point.

Mind intervenes when for example there is no good option for a specific situation. Suppose you are in a jungle and don’t know which way to go. That is mind that kicks in and lets the agent freely decide which way to go. There are many other examples.

Im not entirely sure though that the picking of a direction would be an exercise of pure freedom on the behalf of the mind, as one may say one of two things: either the man picked based off of what he believed was musy appropriate for his need or want (which you would call unfree) or he picked by randomness. Consider for a moment a time where you were stuck so deeply between two issues with utter indifference or at least equality in bias to the point in which you yearned that something may make a decision on your behalf, say like a coin. Are these also exercises of the free mind?

I think mind can be an indifferent observer which means it accepts all biases but that does not mean that it is not uncaused cause since it can kick in and intervene whenever it wishes. So to me both (a) and (b) are correct at different times.

Well that would mean that the mind can transition from state (a) to state (b). But such would mean that it undergoes change itself. I would argue that nothing which undergoes change in itself may be a noncontingent uncaused cause entity as that would require pure actuality to which necessitates no element of change. Further, who is to say that intervention of thoughts is “uncause”? I wouldn’t personally think so, though what I would say is that the effect of the cause is indeterminable.

 

[STT]

Im not entirely sure though that the picking of a direction would be an exercise of pure freedom on the behalf of the mind, as one may say one of two things: either the man picked based off of what he believed was musy appropriate for his need or want (which you would call unfree) or he picked by randomness. Consider for a moment a time where you were stuck so deeply between two issues with utter indifference or at least equality in bias to the point in which you yearned that something may make a decision on your behalf, say like a coin. Are these also exercises of the free mind?

Free decision looks random from third person perspective but there is an element of wanting from first person perspective.

Well that would mean that the mind can transition from state (a) to state (b). But such would mean that it undergoes change itself. I would argue that nothing which undergoes change in itself may be a noncontingent uncaused cause entity as that would require pure actuality to which necessitates no element of change. Further, who is to say that intervention of thoughts is “uncause”? I wouldn’t personally think so, though what I would say is that the effect of the cause is indeterminable.

I don’t think that mind’s substance is subject to change when it switch from (a) to (b) for two reasons, 1) One faces with the regress if one accepts otherwise and 2) We already agree that we have ability to cut and create a chain of causality whenever we wish which this means that we are uncaused cause (or non-contingent). So the question is what is changing when we go from (a) to (b). To me what is changing is mind’s awareness on the subject. By this I don’t mean that mind is not aware of what is happening but it is not in focal focus state which wants to control everything.

 

[quaestio45]

I don’t think that mind’s substance is subject to change when it switch from (a) to (b) for two reasons, 1) One faces with the regress if one accepts otherwise

Regress? How so?

1. We already agree that we have ability to cut and create a chain of causality whenever we wish which this means that we are uncaused cause (or non-contingent).

Well I’m not sure if the act of intervening in thought chains can be exactly “uncaused” as I’ve said. What I am willing to admit is that the effect may not be fully explained by the cause.

So the question is what is changing when we go from (a) to (b). To me what is changing is mind’s awareness on the subject.

Well awareness is an attribute of the mind, yes? Can we agree that me standing is a different state of being for me then if I sit? If so, then an attribute of a being changing is also in a sense the being itself changing (though not in what it is, of course, but only in how it is).

 

[STT]

Regress? How so?

Well, if X is subject to change then it is sustained (by sustained I mean it is experience and caused as I discuss it in another thread, an argument for mind) by Y. If Y changing then it is sustained by Z etc. This is a regress unless there is something unchanging.

Well I’m not sure if the act of intervening in thought chains can be exactly “uncaused” as I’ve said. What I am willing to admit is that the effect may not be fully explained by the cause.

What if you freely decide to cut a chain of thought? There is no cause when you decide freely. You are free of any cause when you decide freely, you cause, therefore you are uncaused cause.

Well awareness is an attribute of the mind, yes?

Yes. I call it ability to experience.

Can we agree that me standing is a different state of being for me then if I sit? If so, then an attribute of a being changing is also in a sense the being itself changing (though not in what it is, of course, but only in how it is).

You are talking about body in here. You could be in the same state of mind, happy or thinking or etc., while sitting or standing.

 

[Gorgias]

Why yes, I suppose you could stop a chain of thought from occurring, and thus also initiate a chain of thought.

As far as I understand STT’s argument, he takes this in a different direction (or to a different extent) than that to which you’re assenting.

 

[quaestio45]

Well, if X is subject to change then it is sustained… by Y

In the sense that it is caused? And Y is ontologically prior? Yes, I’ll agree to that.

If Y changing then it is sustained by Z etc. This is a regress unless there is something unchanging.

Oh, I see. So the age old argument from contingency, yes? Okay, I’m following you now. So your simply equating mind with noncontingency. Well as I said, I wouldn’t say that the mind is noncontingent because it is finite in attributes and changing.

What if you freely decide to cut a chain of thought?

Why must we assume this occurs without cause? Its possible that the thoughts were against your taste or bias, or perhaps they run contrary to your final cause and thus you decieded from a reason and thus cause that you broke the line of thought.

You are talking about body in here.

As a one for one analogy, yes.

You could be in the same state of mind, happy or thinking or etc., while sitting or standing.

I think you’re misunderstanding what I was trying to communicate. A change an a state or specific attribute in a being is nonetheless a change of the being. Consider a block of wood which is red. Now although the red of the wood isn’t exactly the wood itself, it nonetheless is a part of the being in front of me to which is wood. Now if I painted the wood blue there is undeniably a change. We would say that the wood changed in state from red wood to blue wood, although essentially it didn’t change. Now, take this principle and apply it to the mind and you’ll understand why I say that a change in thought necessitates that we say the mind changed as well, for thinking is a propery of the mind.

As far as I understand STT’s argument, he takes this in a different direction (or to a different extent) than that to which you’re assenting.

Thats definitely possible, but I try to be aware if when things cross my line of agreement and why there is a specific difference between the principal to which I agreed with and the principal being pushed (or at least its application).