Free agent is not contingent

[Gorgias]

We would say that the wood changed in state from red wood to blue wood, although essentially it didn’t change.

Attribute, not state. I think that’s why it doesn’t apply to your assertion about “mind” and “states”.

 

[quaestio45]

Attribute , not state . I think that’s why it doesn’t apply to your assertion about “mind” and “states”.

Well, call it what we will, but we could at least acknowledge that the wood did in fact change, yes?

 

[STT]

In the sense that it is caused? And Y is ontologically prior? Yes, I’ll agree to that.

Cool.

Oh, I see. So the age old argument from contingency, yes? Okay, I’m following you now. So your simply equating mind with noncontingency. Well as I said, I wouldn’t say that the mind is noncontingent because it is finite in attributes and changing.

Change in attribute does not mean that the mind is contingent. That is true since the attribute was subject to change even if that attribute is infinite. So we can argue that for any value of the attribute you could have change. Change means (as you claim that change in the attribute is change in mind) that you cannot find anything non-contingent. This leads to a regress. Regress is not acceptable. Therefore, the change in the attribute is not a change in mind.

Why must we assume this occurs without cause? Its possible that the thoughts were against your taste or bias, or perhaps they run contrary to your final cause and thus you decieded from a reason and thus cause that you broke the line of thought.

I didn’t ask for an un-free decision but a free decision. You can make a free decision whenever you want in spite of any bias to stop a chain of causality or to start a chain of causality.

I think you’re misunderstanding what I was trying to communicate. A change an a state or specific attribute in a being is nonetheless a change of the being. Consider a block of wood which is red. Now although the red of the wood isn’t exactly the wood itself, it nonetheless is a part of the being in front of me to which is wood. Now if I painted the wood blue there is undeniably a change. We would say that the wood changed in state from red wood to blue wood, although essentially it didn’t change. Now, take this principle and apply it to the mind and you’ll understand why I say that a change in thought necessitates that we say the mind changed as well, for thinking is a propery of the mind.

I understand what are you saying but the mind’s substance is not subject to change. Its attribute is subject to change. But the change in the attribute is different from the change in substance. Change in attribute does not mean that the mind is contingent as I discussed in the second comment.

 

[quaestio45]

Change in attribute does not mean that the mind is contingent. That is true since the attribute was subject to change even if that attribute is infinite. So we can argue that for any value of the attribute you could have change. Change means (as you claim that change in the attribute is change in mind) that you cannot find anything non-contingent. This leads to a regress. Regress is not acceptable. Therefore, the change in the attribute is not a change in mind.

So, a couple of things that I’d like to say in response: first, I don’t think it is possible to say that an attribute in a being does not constitute a change of the being as those two things are intimately bound to one another. Lets consider losing an attribute, perhaps sight. Could we not say that this is a change in the being of a man? What if he lost the attribute of walking? Would that neither qualify as a change in the being of the man? Surely, he is still a man, and the same man, but not exactly the same man. His existence between him being able to walk and him not being able to walk is not entirely equivalent. Thus, I would defend the idea that a change in attribute of a being is also equally a change in the being itself.

Second, were we to find an impasse on my first point, I think we may at least still find our agreement in thinking that the mind does need to have a distinction in states of existence in order to cause distinct thoughts, as I’ve argued before. If the mind is purely unchanging, then we would only ever see the exact same result, which does not seem like a freedom to me in the sense of what you are looking for.

Third, on the topic of regress I think its appropriate that I say it only follows if there is no noncontingent being whatsoever in the causal equation. But the theist would claim that there is a noncontingent element with in chain, its just not found in the human mind, but rather at the very start of existence. As such, there is no infinte regress of contingency with no explanation as to why there is contingency. As such, they would say that the proposition that the mind is noncontingent is an unnecessary false one.

You can make a free decision whenever you want in spite of any bias to stop a chain of causality or to start a chain of causality.

But I think that it may still have an initiator to act. A mind may act against bias, yes, but not against what it most highly values, I’d say, unless other factors convince it different on what should be most highly valued.

 

[STT]

So, a couple of things that I’d like to say in response: first, I don’t think it is possible to say that an attribute in a being does not constitute a change of the being as those two things are intimately bound to one another. Lets consider losing an attribute, perhaps sight. Could we not say that this is a change in the being of a man? What if he lost the attribute of walking? Would that neither qualify as a change in the being of the man? Surely, he is still a man, and the same man, but not exactly the same man. His existence between him being able to walk and him not being able to walk is not entirely equivalent. Thus, I would defend the idea that a change in attribute of a being is also equally a change in the being itself.

Mind’s substance does not change.

Second, were we to find an impasse on my first point, I think we may at least still find our agreement in thinking that the mind does need to have a distinction in states of existence in order to cause distinct thoughts, as I’ve argued before. If the mind is purely unchanging, then we would only ever see the exact same result, which does not seem like a freedom to me in the sense of what you are looking for.

I think that is the content of mind (what mind sustains) which allows mind to judge in different circumstances. Again, mind’s substance is not subject to change.

Third, on the topic of regress I think its appropriate that I say it only follows if there is no noncontingent being whatsoever in the causal equation. But the theist would claim that there is a noncontingent element with in chain, its just not found in the human mind, but rather at the very start of existence. As such, there is no infinte regress of contingency with no explanation as to why there is contingency. As such, they would say that the proposition that the mind is noncontingent is an unnecessary false one.

And what makes this God different than a mind? His attribute is infinite?

But I think that it may still have an initiator to act. A mind may act against bias, yes, but not against what it most highly values, I’d say, unless other factors convince it different on what should be most highly valued.

The initiator is mind with the ability to freely decide. Otherwise, the initiator would be other things which this make the decision non-free.

 

[quaestio45]

Mind’s substance does not change.

Well, one, if it is contingent then it does change (from nonbeing to being), two, even if the substance doesn’t undergo change that doesn’t mean the rest of its being doesn’t undergo change, and three, I don’t think I have sufficient reason to believe that any substance is immutable, unless of course you say that the mind substance is mutable but the moment it changes it loses the essence of mind (which might need some substantiation for me to be convinced of, but its certainly possible).

I think that is the content of mind (what mind sustains) which allows mind to judge in different circumstances.

But if it sustains and thus causes these thoughts and these thoughts are diverse then we still run into the same problem. Your solution only pushes back the question of diverse effect, I’m afraid.

And what makes this God different than a mind? His attribute is infinite?

I would thus say so. He is infinite and thus being unto itself, and as such is unchanging, all powerful, all knowing, etc. These are substantial differences between my mind and him, I might say.

The initiator is mind with the ability to freely decide. Otherwise, the initiator would be other things which this make the decision non-free.

I think that might be exactly what I’m getting atz actually. I don’t think that the idea of freedom your propose is possible, honestly. Not only would I argue that there are metaphysical issues at hand, but also practical issues too. For every example you give a man as to the supposed supreme freedom of the mind, he may somehow say it is just based off some cause, and I don’t think thats a misplaced retort, as there is an epistemological issue of verification here. As such, we both need to discover whether or not the claim of mindly uncaused cause is first self consistent and then metaphysically consistent.

 

[STT]

Well, one, if it is contingent then it does change (from nonbeing to being), two, even if the substance doesn’t undergo change that doesn’t mean the rest of its being doesn’t undergo change, and three, I don’t think I have sufficient reason to believe that any substance is immutable, unless of course you say that the mind substance is mutable but the moment it changes it loses the essence of mind (which might need some substantiation for me to be convinced of, but its certainly possible).

I think we have to focus on the fact that whether what you are doing now, writing me, is yours or someone else doing. The second thing that we have to focus is that whether you are a free agent or not. If the answers to both questions are yes then you are a mind in control of your body and act. Otherwise, you are a part of chain of causality and are not responsible for your act.

But if it sustains and thus causes these thoughts and these thoughts are diverse then we still run into the same problem. Your solution only pushes back the question of diverse effect, I’m afraid.

What do you mean with diverse effect?

I would thus say so. He is infinite and thus being unto itself, and as such is unchanging, all powerful, all knowing, etc. These are substantial differences between my mind and him, I might say.

This we already discussed. There are number bigger than infinity so striving to the concept infinity cannot resolve the issue of contingency. There can be all knowing if knowledge is finite but that is subject of discussion whether knowledge is finite or infinite. So at the end there is a mind similar to yours but different in content which sustain things even if we accept that the knowledge is finite and there is such a thing as God. Moreover such a God is similar to you in substance and cannot sustain a free agent.

I think that might be exactly what I’m getting atz actually. I don’t think that the idea of freedom your propose is possible, honestly. Not only would I argue that there are metaphysical issues at hand, but also practical issues too. For every example you give a man as to the supposed supreme freedom of the mind, he may somehow say it is just based off some cause, and I don’t think thats a misplaced retort, as there is an epistemological issue of verification here. As such, we both need to discover whether or not the claim of mindly uncaused cause is first self consistent and then metaphysically consistent.

I think we have to focus if you are whether free or not. Being uncaused cause simply follows from it. I think that the idea of free will is necessary since otherwise for example you get stuck in a jungle when you do know which way you get you to safety. The situation like this is very common in life when an intelligent agent cannot know what would be the outcome of the options.

 

[quaestio45]

I think we have to focus on the fact that whether what you are doing now, writing me, is yours or someone else doing.

Well, I have no reason to doubt what I do is of my own volition rather than another being’s, so yes, I will say it is I who write.

The second thing that we have to focus is that whether you are a free agent or not.

Given our many weeks of discussion, I now have a large degree of confidence as to your meaning of free agent and I must say that my position on it has remained in some fasions and have been moved in others. One supreme constant, however, is that I can’t say that the free agent you describe can possibly be our mind. If you were to alter the definition to mean “that whose effects are self determined (as opposed to naturally or casually determined like the determinist would argue)” then I would whole heartedly agree. However, you take an extra step and say “the free agent is he who commands effects without itself being caused”; I don’t think this definition is tenable for a number of reasons, though the three are:

1. we cannot verify its truth by example
2. it is metaphysically contridictive
3. it leads to impossiblly grand implications

Otherwise, you are a part of chain of causality and are not responsible for your act.

There are two positions to the mind traditionally; there is the determinist who believes causality necessarily shows the mind is not free, and there is the hard libertarian who believes that the mind is ultimately free because it lies beyond the causal nexus. I reject both camps for they lie on a faulty premise, that being that being within a causal nexus necessarily means that you are without agency. On the contrary, you may have much agency over your effects as a free agent, but that doesn’t mean you are outside any causal chain, but rather that you are a special participant in it.

What do you mean with diverse effect?

The mind can produce a unique and diverse range of thoughts. As we’ve discussed, that requires either a change in the cause or in the surrounding conditions.

 

[quaestio45]

There are number bigger than infinity so striving to the concept infinity cannot resolve the issue of contingency

I looked into this problem and thought about, especially after a bit of research, and I don’t think I can call this a valid argument against God. This is because it lies in the idea (if I am not mistaken, which I could very much be) that the infinity of God can be categorized as a set, and that the number of higher infinites can go on indefinitely (which can’t be true for this inevitably reaches contridiction), both of which I believe are necessary to fall into the refutation on the basis of paradox. As I’ve said, perhaps this isn’t a good counter argument. If it isn’t, I’m happy to be corrected.

There can be all knowing if knowledge is finite but that is subject of discussion whether knowledge is finite or infinite.

Knowledge must be infinte. To demonstrate this, think of thing x. Now recognize that you are thinking of thing x. Now recognize that you are recognizing thing x. This process can be replicated infinitely, meaning that truth, and therefore knowledge, is infinite.

So at the end there is a mind similar to yours but different in content which sustain things even if we accept that the knowledge is finite and there is such a thing as God.

Similar, yes, and different yes. Although, that difference very much is an uncrossable chasm by which no other creature may find itself on the other side.

Moreover such a God is similar to you in substance and cannot sustain a free agent.

I think most theist do not believe God has substance. Further, the sustaining of the free agent is possible if it is contingent. That, however, is still the topic of debate.

I think we have to focus if you are whether free or not. Being uncaused cause simply follows from it.

I think we should focus on both for a things result may tell you much about the thing itself. For example, if I add 2+2 and get 5 you could understand that I am a fool based off of my production. In the same sense, if we argue x but x implies y which is incompatible with reality then we should be able to attain more important information as to the validity of x.

I think that the idea of free will is necessary since otherwise for example you get stuck in a jungle when you do know which way you get you to safety. The situation like this is very common in life when an intelligent agent cannot know what would be the outcome of the options.

I’d say free will as I defined is important, but I have trouble with yours for the reasons stated above. Now, as for your example, I’m not entirely sure if that demonstrates that a free will outside of causal chains is the necessary solution to this problem rather than a mere flip of an imaganary mental coin to choose an area to progress through.

 

[STT]

Well, I have no reason to doubt what I do is of my own volition rather than another being’s, so yes, I will say it is I who write.

Great. Can we agree that you could also decide to not write me in spite that you feel it is very important to do it? If the answer to this question is yes then it means that you have free will by free will I mean the ability to freely stop a chain of causality. By free I mean that you are not biased by thinking that it is important to write to me and can decide to do not write to me. That would be great if we can agree on these points and definitions. If yes, then it follows that you are simple in substance, you are the uncaused cause, and you are unchanging.

Given our many weeks of discussion, I now have a large degree of confidence as to your meaning of free agent and I must say that my position on it has remained in some fasions and have been moved in others. One supreme constant, however, is that I can’t say that the free agent you describe can possibly be our mind. If you were to alter the definition to mean “that whose effects are self determined (as opposed to naturally or casually determined like the determinist would argue)” then I would whole heartedly agree. However, you take an extra step and say “the free agent is he who commands effects without itself being caused”; I don’t think this definition is tenable for a number of reasons, though the three are:

1. we cannot verify its truth by example
2. it is metaphysically contridictive
3. it leads to impossiblly grand implications

By uncaused cause I mean the very act of causation comes from you and not a bias.

There are two positions to the mind traditionally; there is the determinist who believes causality necessarily shows the mind is not free, and there is the hard libertarian who believes that the mind is ultimately free because it lies beyond the causal nexus. I reject both camps for they lie on a faulty premise, that being that being within a causal nexus necessarily means that you are without agency. On the contrary, you may have much agency over your effects as a free agent, but that doesn’t mean you are outside any causal chain, but rather that you are a special participant in it.

What do you mean with special participant? Do you have ability to stop a chain of causality and not participate in it anymore?

 

[STT]

I looked into this problem and thought about, especially after a bit of research, and I don’t think I can call this a valid argument against God. This is because it lies in the idea (if I am not mistaken, which I could very much be) that the infinity of God can be categorized as a set, and that the number of higher infinites can go on indefinitely (which can’t be true for this inevitably reaches contridiction), both of which I believe are necessary to fall into the refutation on the basis of paradox. As I’ve said, perhaps this isn’t a good counter argument. If it isn’t, I’m happy to be corrected.

So what is your objection on Cantor’s proof?

Knowledge must be infinte. To demonstrate this, think of thing x. Now recognize that you are thinking of thing x. Now recognize that you are recognizing thing x. This process can be replicated infinitely, meaning that truth, and therefore knowledge, is infinite.

By knowledge I mean the set of correct propositions.

Similar, yes, and different yes. Although, that difference very much is an uncrossable chasm by which no other creature may find itself on the other side.

Difference in what? Even God, if there is any, experiences and causes.

I think most theist do not believe God has substance. Further, the sustaining of the free agent is possible if it is contingent. That, however, is still the topic of debate.

Something which exist has substance. And sustaining a free agent is not possible since it can always do what is not in God’s foreknowledge.

I think we should focus on both for a things result may tell you much about the thing itself. For example, if I add 2+2 and get 5 you could understand that I am a fool based off of my production. In the same sense, if we argue x but x implies y which is incompatible with reality then we should be able to attain more important information as to the validity of x.

Are you free?

I’d say free will as I defined is important, but I have trouble with yours for the reasons stated above. Now, as for your example, I’m not entirely sure if that demonstrates that a free will outside of causal chains is the necessary solution to this problem rather than a mere flip of an imaganary mental coin to choose an area to progress through.

That I already discuss. Free decision is random from third point of view. There is an element of wanting in first point of view.

 

[quaestio45]

Can we agree that you could also decide to not write me in spite that you feel it is very important to do it?

Of course, but a caveat I’d add to my agreement is that that although importance may not be the factor of decision in a being, what he values most highly in a given moment is. Were my highest value at the moment to write to you then it would be done (and as you can see, I am writing to you right now, thus it is at the moment my highest value, as I haven’t any priority of value ahead of it). This is not to say that the values are immutable by any sense, for they most certainly are shifting, but I would say that whatever the mind finds itself in occupation at any given time is done because the mind has perceived that endeavor as the highest to value and thus enact.

by free will I mean the ability to freely stop a chain of causality.

Yes, as I’ve come to learn. What I would say to this is that even if this were true (which it might be, but not universally, but rather at least most evidently in thought chains) there’s no reason to believe that there wasn’t some sort of cause for the elimination or interruption of a causal chain. To deny such would be the equivalent of denying a man was murdered because they were both men; to think such is an unnecessary elimination of a very plausible hypothesis, especially if the alternative is tremendous in implication. I shall say once more that inspite of this I am very much not a determinist, as simply on the basis of causation does not eliminate agency over the effect, which I believe to be the only requirement for a free agent.

By free I mean that you are not biased by thinking that it is important to write to me and can decide to do not write to me.

I agree you can act against bias, but not against the highest value of a given moment (to which I will admit is decided itself by the mind) nor can its actions be without some sort of cause.

By uncaused cause I mean the very act of causation comes from you and not a bias.

If it is true that you simply mean to say by ‘uncaused cause’ that you can act against a bias rather than be, quite literally, uncaused in mental exercises then sure, I agree. I would suggest we call something else other than “uncaused cause” however, for equivocation on the term would be quite easy otherwise.

 

[quaestio45]

What do you mean with special participant? Do you have ability to stop a chain of causality and not participate in it anymore?

A special participant in that its effects are undetermined by any cause through itself. We see this as special because we know the universe more or less operates very deterministically like a clock (if we ignore the quantum level phenomena); that is to say, each effect can be perfectly and immediately determined by a full understanding of a given cause. The causes of a phenomena are therefore the ultimate determiners of the complete nature of a phenomena. But, the mind is different. The mind doesn’t operate deterministically by cause but rather by its own thoughts, suppositions, biases, and values as well. As such, it has agency over the effect, rather than solely the cause. As such, the mind is a special participant in the causal nexus.
[/quote]

Different in that his attributes are pure actuality and thus supremely simple and infinite, whilst our are not fully actuality, nor are we supremely simple, and even less are we infinite. Though, I admit with the similarities you described.

Something which exist has substance.

If we are using the same definition of substance, which is the make up of a being (or material, one may say), then I cannot say God would have substance, for he is made up of nothing, but instead soley is himself. But if you simply mean that he has being which can be distinguished to others, then yes.

So what is your objection on Cantor’s proof?

I am not objecting even slightly to Cantor’s proof. In fact, I one hundred percent believe it, implications included. What I am objecting to is the premise which lies at the core of the infinite being refutation on the basis of mathematical paradox, that being that an infinite being can be mathematically represented as an ordinal set. But most theist would deny that entirely, and would say that the conclusion of the Burali-Forti’s paradox is actually very much correct, as God is an infinite not mathematically able to be put into a complete, semi- comprehensive set. They would, instead, say that God is of such a magnitude that one could not possibly contain him in even this format. I would add on to this that his infinity isn’t one of many mathematical infinities, which have distinctions in them because of the nature of cardinal and ordinal numbers, but rather that he just is endless, never ceasing, and uncontainable/ incomprehensible being.

A similar objection to this can be made on the basis of infinite knowledge (to which I showed you in the last post), where the question is how can God be all knowing if you can go infinitely in regress recognizing your own recognition of a given body of truth. The solution simply is that we are thinking of the infinity of God too much as a closed set to which may be rationally represented (like in mathematics) rather than a seemingly endless and, seemingly continual, and seemingly grand ultimate that does not find these issues due to sheer grandeur in being.

 

[quaestio45]

And sustaining a free agent is not possible since it can always do what is not in God’s foreknowledge.

Many would strongly disagree with this idea, including myself. Unlike many others, I like to stay intellectually honest, so I will admit that the solution to this problem is that you must do what is known to be done. But ultimately, and ontologically, the knowledge of God is contingent upon what he knows, and if the subject of knowledge is our act then it is safe to say that we aren’t therefore necessary in acting a particular way, for our actions to come are what dictate the knowledge of God, and not the other way around.

That I already discuss. Free decision is random from third point of view. There is an element of wanting in first point of view.

And my point to this is that this in and of itself is not a sufficient explanation enough to replace the idea of these decisions being merely random. Its an explanation, sure, and if it is shown that the mind need be free in this respect then what you say would indeed be an explanation for this phenomena, but as for evidence in and of itself, it falls flat (and I’m sure you recognize this. This isn’t a tear down of the uncaused cause mind idea, but only an objection to this idea being supported in this way).

By knowledge I mean the set of correct propositions.

Yes, and that set must be infinite in size, if it can even be called a set. The argument I gave you is nothing but correct propositions. There is knowledge of x, and knowledge of the recognition of x, and knowledge of the recognition of the recognition of x, etc.

Difference in what? Even God, if there is any, experiences and causes.

Different in that his attributes are pure actuality and thus supremely simple and infinite, whilst our are not fully actuality, nor are we supremely simple, and even less are we infinite. Though, I admit with the similarities you described.

 

[Gorgias]

Well, call it what we will, but we could at least acknowledge that the wood did in fact change, yes?

The wood certainly participated in a change, yes.

If yes, then it follows that you are simple in substance, you are the uncaused cause, and you are unchanging.

This is where I think you go off the rails. Having the ability to make a choice, and then actualize that choice, does not make a person “simple in substance”, “an uncaused cause”, or immutable. Sorry.

By uncaused cause I mean the very act of causation comes from you and not a bias.

Except that humans have the power of secondary causation; God is the primary causal agent.

 

[STT]

Of course, but a caveat I’d add to my agreement is that that although importance may not be the factor of decision in a being, what he values most highly in a given moment is.

Then you are biased by what has most value for you. Therefore you are not free.

Were my highest value at the moment to write to you then it would be done (and as you can see, I am writing to you right now, thus it is at the moment my highest value, as I haven’t any priority of value ahead of it). This is not to say that the values are immutable by any sense, for they most certainly are shifting, but I would say that whatever the mind finds itself in occupation at any given time is done because the mind has perceived that endeavor as the highest to value and thus enact.

But that is a functional way of doing things.

Yes, as I’ve come to learn. What I would say to this is that even if this were true (which it might be, but not universally, but rather at least most evidently in thought chains) there’s no reason to believe that there wasn’t some sort of cause for the elimination or interruption of a causal chain.

If there was another cause for elimination of a chain of causality then that cause was a bias.

I agree you can act against bias, but not against the highest value of a given moment (to which I will admit is decided itself by the mind) nor can its actions be without some sort of cause.

Highest value is a bias if you cannot go against it therefore you are not free.

 

[STT]

A special participant in that its effects are undetermined by any cause through itself. We see this as special because we know the universe more or less operates very deterministically like a clock (if we ignore the quantum level phenomena); that is to say, each effect can be perfectly and immediately determined by a full understanding of a given cause. The causes of a phenomena are therefore the ultimate determiners of the complete nature of a phenomena. But, the mind is different. The mind doesn’t operate deterministically by cause but rather by its own thoughts, suppositions, biases, and values as well. As such, it has agency over the effect, rather than solely the cause. As such, the mind is a special participant in the causal nexus.

If mind only works based on thoughts, suppositions, biases and value then mind works functionally and deterministically.

If we are using the same definition of substance, which is the make up of a being (or material, one may say), then I cannot say God would have substance, for he is made up of nothing, but instead soley is himself. But if you simply mean that he has being which can be distinguished to others, then yes.

If God does not have substance then He does not exist.

I am not objecting even slightly to Cantor’s proof. In fact, I one hundred percent believe it, implications included. What I am objecting to is the premise which lies at the core of the infinite being refutation on the basis of mathematical paradox, that being that an infinite being can be mathematically represented as an ordinal set. But most theist would deny that entirely, and would say that the conclusion of the Burali-Forti’s paradox is actually very much correct, as God is an infinite not mathematically able to be put into a complete, semi- comprehensive set. They would, instead, say that God is of such a magnitude that one could not possibly contain him in even this format. I would add on to this that his infinity isn’t one of many mathematical infinities, which have distinctions in them because of the nature of cardinal and ordinal numbers, but rather that he just is endless, never ceasing, and uncontainable/ incomprehensible being.

Endless refer to a value that cannot be reached. Never ceasing is a temporal property. I don’t believe that any thing is incomprehensible.

 

[STT]

Many would strongly disagree with this idea, including myself. Unlike many others, I like to stay intellectually honest, so I will admit that the solution to this problem is that you must do what is known to be done. But ultimately, and ontologically, the knowledge of God is contingent upon what he knows, and if the subject of knowledge is our act then it is safe to say that we aren’t therefore necessary in acting a particular way, for our actions to come are what dictate the knowledge of God, and not the other way around.

This we already discuss it to depth. If I know foreknowledge that I would do X then I would do Y to show that I am free.

And my point to this is that this in and of itself is not a sufficient explanation enough to replace the idea of these decisions being merely random. Its an explanation, sure, and if it is shown that the mind need be free in this respect then what you say would indeed be an explanation for this phenomena, but as for evidence in and of itself, it falls flat (and I’m sure you recognize this. This isn’t a tear down of the uncaused cause mind idea, but only an objection to this idea being supported in this way).

I already argue in favor of it. There are many situation in life that you don’t know the consequence of options. A deterministic entity simply fail to proceed in this type of situation. You choose X and find out that that was a wrong choice so you learn from your mistake. That is how we learn thing, through trial and error.

Yes, and that set must be infinite in size, if it can even be called a set. The argument I gave you is nothing but correct propositions. There is knowledge of x, and knowledge of the recognition of x, and knowledge of the recognition of the recognition of x, etc.

And what is x?

Different in that his attributes are pure actuality and thus supremely simple and infinite, whilst our are not fully actuality, nor are we supremely simple, and even less are we infinite. Though, I admit with the similarities you described.

I think that was you who argue against simplicity of God in An argument against God. You also agreed that God cannot be knowledge.

 

[STT]

This is where I think you go off the rails. Having the ability to make a choice, and then actualize that choice, does not make a person “simple in substance”, “an uncaused cause”, or immutable. Sorry.

They all follow. You are simple since otherwise you were made of parts and could not decide. You are obviously uncaused cause since you can cause a chain of causality whenever you like. You are unchanging since you are free to go against any cause.

 

[Gorgias]

You are simple since otherwise you were made of parts and could not decide.

It does not follow that, since we are composite (you have eyes? Ears? Hands? You’re composite, then), we are unable to decide.

You are obviously uncaused cause since you can cause a chain of causality whenever you like.

Are you the source of your own existence? Do you have parents? Then… you’re not “uncaused”.

You are unchanging since you are free to go against any cause.

“Free to go against any cause” is not the definition of “immutable.” Are you physical? Were you a baby, and then a teen, and then an adult? Then your body changes; you’re not immutable.

In other words: none of your assertions holds up to scrutiny. QED.