Free Will, Determinism, Indetrminism, Moral Responsibility, and Salvation

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tonyrey said:
I have already pointed out that self-determinism does not entail determinism or indeterminism because a person is a not a set of particles but an indivisible entity, a fact recognised throughout the world in every court of law and in daily life by every reasonable person - except theoreticians in an ivory tower all of whose conclusions are based on the belief that their conclusions are theirs, not by accident or compulsion but by voluntary design! :whacky:
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The free will debate has a long history - not only in philosophy, but also in theology. In fact, it is one of the central issues in theology. (See “free will in theology.”) So, any attempt on your part to downplay this fact will not change it.

The bottom line is that “determinism” and “indeterminism” are mutually exclusive positions. One is true and the other is not. And one of these positions must necessarily hold true. Hence, any version of free will must be compatible with one or the other. To argue otherwise is to violate the “law of noncontradiction” - one of the three classic laws of thought. And if you are not willing to acknowledge this, then we cannot continue this debate Because it is not possible to have a logical debate if either one of us refuses to abide by the laws of logic.
 
Counterpoint said:
The free will debate has a long history - not only in philosophy, but also in theology. In fact, it is one of the central issues in theology. (See “free will in theology.”) So, any attempt on your part to downplay this fact will not change it.

The bottom line is that “determinism” and “indeterminism” are mutually exclusive positions. One is true and the other is not.
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But that does not guarantee the one of them true. We have physical evidence, ourselves, that indicate both are false with respect to the human person.
And one of these positions must necessarily hold true. Hence, any version of free will must be compatible with one or the other. To argue otherwise is to violate the “law of noncontradiction” - one of the three classic laws of thought. And if you are not willing to acknowledge this, then we cannot continue this debate Because it is not possible to have a logical debate if either one of us refuses to abide by the laws of logic.
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Counterpoint said:
The free will debate has a long history - not only in philosophy, but also in theology. In fact, it is one of the central issues in theology. (See “free will in theology.”) So, any attempt on your part to downplay this fact will not change it.

The bottom line is that “determinism” and “indeterminism” are mutually exclusive positions. One is true and the other is not. And one of these positions must necessarily hold true. Hence, any version of free will must be compatible with one or the other. To argue otherwise is to violate the “law of noncontradiction” - one of the three classic laws of thought. And if you are not willing to acknowledge this, then we cannot continue this debate Because it is not possible to have a logical debate if either one of us refuses to abide by the laws of logic.
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Determinism and indeterminism are mutually exclusive positions but it does not follow that they are the only positions - unless you are a materialist who denies the existence of persons who transcend the laws of nature. In other words it is a false dilemma. We are not biological machines - as you would rapidly discover in any court of law…
 
Counterpoint said:
A couple of points:
  1. This is a philosophical forum; therefore, my employment of philosophical terms is more than appropriate.
  2. My argument assumes the validity of the theistic worldview.
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How can you assume the validity of the theistic worldview when you reject our responsibility for our choices and decisions? :confused:
 
tonyrey said:
How can you assume the validity of the theistic worldview when you reject our responsibility for our choices and decisions? :confused:
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I never argued that we are not responsible for our choices. I simply argued that libertarian free will does not grant us any more responsibility than compatibilist free will. (By the way, there are supporters of both forms of free will in the Christian tradition.)
 
Counterpoint said:
I never argued that we are not responsible for our choices. I simply argued that libertarian free will does not grant us any more responsibility than compatibilist free will. (By the way, there are supporters of both forms of free will in the Christian tradition.)
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I which case this is a distinction without a difference and neither model is helpful in describing human capacity for good and evil.
 
Counterpoint said:
I never argued that we are not responsible for our choices. I simply argued that libertarian free will does not grant us any more responsibility than compatibilist free will. (By the way, there are supporters of both forms of free will in the Christian tradition.)
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The existence of supporters of compatibilism does not imply that it is true nor exclude the need for justification. Why machines should be held responsible for what they do is the unanswered question. 🤷
 
Thank you, counterpoint, for those further points. I just want to make clear that I wasn’t claiming that your discussion is not welcome here, I was only making the point that the terminology used in academic philosophical settings, which you seem to have set forth, do not sufficiently exhaust the possibilities. This topic is very welcome!

However, I will raise the issue further. If natural determinism (all events are nothing more than the result of material interactions, including our choices) is true, not only is morality in deep trouble, but even our intellectual integrity. If my beliefs are nothing more than the result of random interactions of atoms, then I have no reason for believing them to be true. Therefore, this type of determinism is false.

Not only this, but it is obvious to me and the rest of the human race that we have free will, that our intellectual beliefs can penetrate reality and that our moral decisions do come with responsibility. We can choose otherwise.

However, since God creates from outside of time, and every moment is “now” to Him, there is a kind of determinism (I call it theological determinism) that is true. Every event has a specific outcome. Could it have been otherwise? Yes. Is it otherwise? No.

So, this definite outcome (it turns out the way it does) and our free will (we can choose otherwise), is a mystery for which I find no accurate descriptor in philosophy. As Hamlet said, “There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophies.”
 
Counterpoint said:
There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)

What are the implications for salvation? The implications for salvation are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because the implications for salvation are the same as for moral responsibility. I can be held no more responsible for my salvation (or damnation) for a decision I make or an action I take that ultimately reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

Incidentally, “final causality” does not change anything. It is simply another determining factor.
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I agree that both determinism and randomness seem to rule out moral responsibility. However, I think it’s not impossible that the human will contains an ineffable supernatural element that mimics, to a small degree, God’s own nature and may thus somehow allow us to make choices that are neither determined nor random. I realize that we’re now engaging in pure speculation. Anyway I agree that unless our will is a far more esoteric faculty than we give it credit for, we’re left with nothing at all that we can really call freedom.
 
Counterpoint said:
There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)
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Counterpoint said:
If determinism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take was predetermined and could not have been otherwise.If indeterminism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take could only have been otherwise due to some element of pure randomness or chance.
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Determinism and indeterminism could benefit from disambiguation since there are different ways of defining those words. Determinism could mean:

1-“An action determined by things antecedent and outside the agent.”
2-“An action determined by the agent himself.” notice that number two is compatible with “libertarian” free-will.

You could also spell indeterminism as, “a chance event caused by the agent.” Again, this is not obviously incompatible with libertarian free-will.
Counterpoint said:
Incidentally, “final causality” does not change anything. It is simply another determining factor.
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I fail to see why final causation does not change anything, in fact, it seems essential for moral responsibility. Here are other words for final causality: intention, goal, end, purpose. Can you make a morally noble or a reprehensible action without an intention, a purpose or end in mind? How so?

Suppose a man has the intention of murdering a person through poison and the poison does not work. Was his action morally neutral? of course not; he intended to murder a person.
 
DanAl said:
I fail to see why final causation does not change anything, in fact, it seems essential for moral responsibility. Here are other words for final causality: intention, goal, end, purpose. Can you make a morally noble or a reprehensible action without an intention, a purpose or end in mind? How so?

Suppose a man has the intention of murdering a person through poison and the poison does not work. Was his action morally neutral? of course not; he intended to murder a person.
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It does make a difference in the sense that you have stated. But it doesn’t make a difference to the argument I have made in the OP. In fact, my argument assumes the reality of final causation because my argument assumes the reality of theism.
 
Dryden77 said:
I agree that both determinism and randomness seem to rule out moral responsibility. However, I think it’s not impossible that the human will contains an ineffable supernatural element that mimics, to a small degree, God’s own nature and may thus somehow allow us to make choices that are neither determined nor random. I realize that we’re now engaging in pure speculation. Anyway I agree that unless our will is a far more esoteric faculty than we give it credit for, we’re left with nothing at all that we can really call freedom.
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God either has compatibilist free will or libertarian free will because those are the only options. And if God has libertarian free will, then the divine will involves an element of pure randomness. Logic dictates this much.
 
Counterpoint said:
God either has compatibilist free will or libertarian free will because those are the only options. And if God has libertarian free will, then the divine will involves an element of pure randomness. Logic dictates this much.
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Are we sure we haven’t created a false dilemma here? I think that in God’s case we may need to add a third option. Here’s why: Theologians are generally unanimous in acknowledging aseity as a divine attribute. Aseity makes God the sufficient reason and source of his own existence. Under some interpretations of aseity, God is the source not only of his existence but also of his nature.

So here we have the possibility (and perhaps the necessity) of a third option, a kind of modified compatibilism. Under this option, God would act merely as a free agent (his will would be a prisoner of his nature), but his will would have functioned as the source of his nature in the first place.

This is different from normal compatibilism, in which a person’s nature is assigned to him by external forces (parents, deity, advanced alien beings, etc).

I realize that this third option sounds like it suffers from a fatal circularity, but any attempt to explain God’s existence (or his essential characteristics) requires circularity. Aseity itself is a circular principle, and indeed one could say that as a concept it’s barely coherent. And anyway that’s probably what we’d expect in an attempt, however limited, to explain God’s existence. The dissolution of coherence, the circularity, are probably signs that we’re on the right track.

Point of all this is that if God’s will determines his nature, perhaps God allows humans, on certain occasions, and for certain reasons, to participate, in a small way, in this experience of divinity. And if so, then there may be a real possibility of free will.
 
Dryden77 said:
I think that in God’s case we may need to add a third option. Here’s why: Theologians are generally unanimous in acknowledging aseity as a divine attribute. Aseity makes God the sufficient reason and source of his own existence. Under some interpretations of aseity, God is the source not only of his existence but also of his nature.
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But on the Thomistic view, God’s “essence” (nature) and “existence” are the same. In fact, God is being itself.

“God is the only being whose essence is existence itself.” - St. Thomas Aquinas
Dryden77 said:
So here we have the possibility (and perhaps the necessity) of a third option, a kind of modified compatibilism. Under this option, God would act merely as a free agent (his will would be a prisoner of his nature), but his will would have functioned as the source of his nature in the first place.

This is different from normal compatibilism, in which a person’s nature is assigned to him by external forces (parents, deity, advanced alien beings, etc).

I realize that this third option sounds like it suffers from a fatal circularity, but any attempt to explain God’s existence (or his essential characteristics) requires circularity. Aseity itself is a circular principle, and indeed one could say that as a concept it’s barely coherent. And anyway that’s probably what we’d expect in an attempt, however limited, to explain God’s existence. The dissolution of coherence, the circularity, are probably signs that we’re on the right track.
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You have identified the problem with your argument; it suffers from a fatal circularity (to use your words). Also, I don’t believe the doctrine of “aseity” is incoherent. Aseity means “simplicity.” What is incoherent about God’s simplicity? It simply means that God is not composed of parts.
Dryden77 said:
Point of all this is that if God’s will determines his nature, perhaps God allows humans, on certain occasions, and for certain reasons, to participate, in a small way, in this experience of divinity. And if so, then there may be a real possibility of free will.
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I believe God has self-determination. But I do not understand this to mean that he determines his “nature” or essence. That being said, Whiteheadian metaphysics (which is becoming increasingly popular in theology) holds that the God’s “consequent nature” is determined both by God and his creatures.
 
Aseity involves far more than simplicity. (By the way my understanding of the word’s latin meaning is that it’s something more like “from itself” than “simple or “simplicity.”) Critical to aseity as a theological term is its near-total unintelligibility – that is to say that any understanding of the term that claims to be more than superficial is necessarily wrong. This doesn’t mean that God lacks aseity; it just means that we can talk about this quality of God’s only in the broadest of outlines. Aseity is coherent only in that the sense that a) as a proposition it can’t be disproven and b) it solves several intellectual problems. In all other respects it is nearly (though not quite) meaningless. We can talk about God being self-existent, but we can explain what we mean only by saying the same thing in different words (God doesn’t depend on anything for his existence, etc).

If God possesses aseity (and he apparently must) then the existence of a truly free will, which would have properties very much like aseity, can’t be ruled out. The problem with current theories of free will (as you mentioned) is that we end up either with compatibilism, which makes us prisoners of a nature we never asked for, or we end up with libertarian free will, which makes us prisoners of randomness. You can’t will what you will, someone once said – to do so would involve the infinite regress problem (it would require a super will, and then a super super will, etc). But it’s this very type of problem that aseity solves. (Aseity does away with the necessity of a god beyond God, and another god beyond that one, etc. Without aseity, God – who actually wouldn’t technically be God in such a case but rather merely an advanced being – would face his own infinite-regress problem.)

It could be argued that aseity couldn’t apply to any of our own qualities, as we exist in time, and aseity can be possible only for beings that exist outside of time. But here we can point out that a) it’s not an absolute logical contradiction for a being that exists in time to possess aseity (in fact much of modern cosmology makes the assumption that certain properties of the natural world are self-existent); or b) our will can be conceived of as a non-natural object that is partially timeless. We could add, finally, that whatever limitations we face as time-trapped and natural beings, God may be able to let us share, even if only to a small degree, in his own self-existence.

I realize that the actual existence of a self-determined will is purely speculative, but I think that aseity, or something like it, shows us how such a third option could be possible.
 
Dryden77 said:
Aseity involves far more than simplicity. (By the way my understanding of the word’s latin meaning is that it’s something more like “from itself” than “simple or “simplicity.”) Critical to aseity as a theological term is its near-total unintelligibility – that is to say that any understanding of the term that claims to be more than superficial is necessarily wrong. This doesn’t mean that God lacks aseity; it just means that we can talk about this quality of God’s only in the broadest of outlines. Aseity is coherent only in that the sense that a) as a proposition it can’t be disproven and b) it solves several intellectual problems. In all other respects it is nearly (though not quite) meaningless. We can talk about God being self-existent, but we can explain what we mean only by saying the same thing in different words (God doesn’t depend on anything for his existence, etc)
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If you really believe that the doctrine of aseity is incoherent, then you must believe the doctrine of God is incoherent. Because the doctrine of God is predicated on it. (Philosophical theology is based on divine simplicity.)
“The doctrine of divine simplicity teaches that (1) God is identical with his existence and his essence and (2) that each of his attributes is ontologically identical with his existence and with every other one of his attributes.” (source: pg. 2, “God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness” by James E. Dolezal)
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Dryden77 said:
If God possesses aseity (and he apparently must) then the existence of a truly free will, which would have properties very much like aseity, can’t be ruled out. The problem with current theories of free will (as you mentioned) is that we end up either with compatibilism, which makes us prisoners of a nature we never asked for, or we end up with libertarian free will, which makes us prisoners of randomness. You can’t will what you will, someone once said – to do so would involve the infinite regress problem (it would require a super will, and then a super super will, etc). But it’s this very type of problem that aseity solves. (Aseity does away with the necessity of a god beyond God, and another god beyond that one, etc. Without aseity, God – who actually wouldn’t technically be God in such a case but rather merely an advanced being – would face his own infinite-regress problem.)
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God is timeless. Therefore, God is the willer, the willing, and the willed - all three are one There is nothing incoherent in that statement.

By the way, I believe you are referring to the following quote:

“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills”. - Arthur Schopenhauer
 
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