Free Will, Determinism, Indetrminism, Moral Responsibility, and Salvation

[Counterpoint]

There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)

determinism : “a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws”

indeterminism : “a theory that the will is free and that deliberate choice and actions are not determined by or predictable from antecedent causes” and “a theory that holds that not every event has a cause”

(source: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary)

If determinism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take was predetermined and could not have been otherwise.

If indeterminism holds true, then every decision I make and action I take could only have been otherwise due to some element of pure randomness or chance.

There are only two types of free will: compatibilism and libertarianism. (If anyone here believes that there are any other types of free will, then please share it with us.)

“Compatibilist free will” presupposes determinism.

“Libertarian free will” presupposes indeterminism.

Why does this all matter? It matters, because it has implications for both moral responsibility and salvation.

What are the implications for moral responsibility? The implications for moral responsibility are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because I can be held no more responsible for a decision I make or an action I take that reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

What are the implications for salvation? The implications for salvation are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because the implications for salvation are the same as for moral responsibility. I can be held no more responsible for my salvation (or damnation) for a decision I make or an action I take that ultimately reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

Incidentally, “final causality” does not change anything. It is simply another determining factor.

 

[hicetnunc]

IWhy does this all matter? It matters, because it has implications for both moral responsibility and salvation.

What are the implications for moral responsibility? The implications for moral responsibility are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because I can be held no more responsible for a decision I make or an action I take that reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

What are the implications for salvation? The implications for salvation are the same regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. Why? Because the implications for salvation are the same as for moral responsibility. I can be held no more responsible for my salvation (or damnation) for a decision I make or an action I take that ultimately reduces to pure randomness or chance than I can for a decision I make or an action I take that was completely predetermined.

Thank you for those interesting thoughts, Counterpoint.

First of all, I could not agree that determinism and indeterminism of the variety you describe are the only options and that rather they represent a false dilemma.

This is because both your versions of determinism and indeterminism presuppose a limited metaphysical view of reality. For example, your description of non-determined free will seems to presuppose materialism, and implies randomness in the exercise of free will; namely, that in order for something to be authentically free, it must therefore be totally arbitrary. But if I presuppose theism, and that there is an objective moral order in the universe to which I will ultimately be held accountable, then being free does not include being totally arbitrary and there is a significant difference between determined behaviour and non-determined behaviour.

There is also an inherent contradiction, it seems, in the very nature of the question, because if there is truly no such thing as moral responsibility, and that our actions are nothing more than the product of either totally determined or arbitrary choices, then your question and proposed solution is either totally determined or arbitrarily free, and so therefore is also totally meaningless. But I don’t think you believe this: you’ve obviously made this post in the hope of convincing others that you are correct according to some rational standard that is neither simply determined nor totally arbitrary.

 

[Counterpoint]

First of all, I could not agree that determinism and indeterminism of the variety you describe are the only options and that rather they represent a false dilemma.

This is because both your versions of determinism and indeterminism presuppose a limited metaphysical view of reality. For example, your description of non-determined free will seems to presuppose materialism, and implies randomness in the exercise of free will; namely, that in order for something to be authentically free, it must therefore be totally arbitrary.

Indeterminism does not presuppose materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Indeterminism undermines materialism. Why? Because indetrminism holds that not every event has a cause while materialism holds that every event has a physical cause. Indeterminism presupposes dualism, not materialism. (Materialism itself presupposes determinism. This explains why many physicists are troubled by quantum events - which, according to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, are deemed to be truly random and therefore physically uncaused events.)

It is true that I have argued that llibertarian free will implies an element of randomness. (It must imply an element of randomness, because that is the only way we can explain how, given the same situation and circumstances, we could have chosen or acted otherwise, But I never argued that libertarian free will and/or indeterminism imply that all events are random and therefore uncaused; I only argued that they imply some events are random and therefore uncaused. (The difference between “all” and “some” is huge in this context.)

But if I presuppose theism, and that there is an objective moral order in the universe to which I will ultimately be held accountable, then being free does not include being totally arbitrary and there is a significant difference between determined behaviour and non-determined behaviour.

I fail to see what an objective moral order has to do with any of this. The significant difference between behavior that is determined and behavior that is not is that the latter implies that some behavior (or more specifically, some element of the behavior) is uncaused. If not, then I have no idea what you mean by the phraseology “not determined behavior.”

There is also an inherent contradiction, it seems, in the very nature of the question, because if there is truly no such thing as moral responsibility, and that our actions are nothing more than the product of either totally determined or arbitrary choices, then your question and proposed solution is either totally determined or arbitrarily free, and so therefore is also totally meaningless. But I don’t think you believe this: you’ve obviously made this post in the hope of convincing others that you are correct according to some rational standard that is neither simply determined nor totally arbitrary.

I never argued that there is no such thing as moral responsibility. What I argued is that libertarian free will does not make us any more responsible for our actions than compatibilist free will. We can exhibit purposeful (and therefore meaningful) behavior regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism holds true. (As I see it, final causality (teleology or purpose) is compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.)

 

[hicetnunc]

Thanks for your reply Counterpoint, and for the opportunity to discuss this with you.

Indeterminism does not presuppose materialism. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Indeterminism undermines materialism. Why? Because indetrminism holds that not every event has a cause while materialism holds that every event has a physical cause.

I think both indeterminism and materialism are a bit more involved than you are conceding. You speak as though there’s only one kind of indeterminism (or determinism). In fact, philosophers hold to many different kinds of these, based on various metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality itself. Aristotle, for example, holds to a qualitatively different kind of indeterminism than does Charles Sanders Pierce or Bertrand Russell. Materialism, furthermore, does not simply imply that every event has a physical cause. Many materialists in fact hold that for many events in the universe, there are no causes at all, and that random events are causeless. Such a view is held, for example, by Victor Stenger, and you can see him hold to this view in his debate with William Lane Craig here: youtube.com/watch?v=EjOs62PJciI

It is true that I have argued that llibertarian free will implies an element of randomness.

Could you explain what particular element of libertarian free will is random?

But I never argued that libertarian free will and/or indeterminism imply that all events are random and therefore uncaused; I only argued that they imply some events are random and therefore uncaused. (The difference between “all” and “some” is huge in this context.)

I agree that the difference between ‘all’ and ‘some’ is significant. Could you explain then which moral actions resulting from libertarian free will might be uncaused and which might not, and how both the caused and uncaused kind can still hold claim to being compatible with libertarian free will?

Many thanks!

 

[Counterpoint]

You speak as though there’s only one kind of indeterminism (or determinism).

I am speaking of determinism and indeterminism in the context of free will. And in the context of free will, determinsim and indeterminism are understood in causal terms. Because whether or not an agent exerts some kind of causal influence is what is at issue in the free will debate. (That the free will debate has historically been framed in terms of causal determinism is not controversial.)

Materialism, furthermore, does not simply imply that every event has a physical cause.

Merriam-Webter defines “materialism” as “a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter.”

There is no physical explanation for a physically uncaused event. So, if there are any truly physically uncaused events (e.g. quantum events), then materialism is invalid. (The fact is that the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics do not support materialism.)

Many materialists in fact hold that for many events in the universe, there are no causes at all, and that random events are causeless.

Then they are espousing a view that does not withstand rational scrutiny for reasons I have already stated. (I’m not about to allow atheistic materialists (e.g. Victor Stenger, Lawrence Krauss, Stephen Hawking and the rest of their ilk) argue that the universe just spontaneously (randomly) emerged ex nihilo. (“Spontaneous” in the this context is simply a euphemism for magic. And I don’t think that atheistic materialists should be allowed the luxury of invoking magic.)

Could you explain what particular element of libertarian free will is random?!

I am not arguing for or against free will. I am simply arguing that any version of free will must be compatible either with determinism or indeterminism (because there are no other options). Therefore, I am not obligated to give a rational account of libertarianism (or compatibilism). That being said, I believe I can give a rational account of libertarian free will. It’s called the “two-stage model of free will.” It basically operates by the same principles that Darwinian evolution does - namely, the principles of random variation and natural selection.

A two-stage model of free will separates the free stage from the will stage.

In the first stage, alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.
In the second stage, an adequately determined will evaluates the options that have been developed.

If, on deliberation, one option for action seems best, it is selected and chosen. If no option seems good enough, and time permitting, the process can return to the further generation of alternative possibilities (“second thoughts”) before a final decision.

A two-stage model can explain how an agent could choose to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances that preceded the first stage of the overall free will process.

(source: Wikipedia: Two-stage model of free will)

 

[hicetnunc]

(That the free will debate has historically been framed in terms of causal determinism is not controversial.)

We will have to disagree on this point. The nature of cause is highly debated in philosophy.

Merriam-Webter defines “materialism” as “a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter.”

I’m not sure what quoting the dictionary proves. Philosophers tend to go quite a bit beyond the limitations of dictionary definitions. Nor am I making a case for materialism; but simply pointing out that for many materialists, physical cause is not a necessary condition of all material events.

I am not obligated to give a rational account of libertarianism (or compatibilism).

Quite true.

That being said, I believe I can give a rational account of libertarian free will. It’s called the “two-stage model of free will.” It basically operates by the same principles that Darwinian evolution does - namely, the principles of random variation and natural selection.

Ah, I see. Thank you for sharing those ideas. I can’t say I fully see the point of it all, but such is the limitations of this kind of forum!

Pax

 

[Counterpoint]

We will have to disagree on this point. The nature of cause is highly debated in philosophy.

The point I made in my previous post was that the free will debate has historically been framed in terms of causal determinism, not that causality itself has never been debated in philosophy. And it is a point that I can back up (see the quote below). It seems to me that you’re proposing that there is another alternative to determinism or indeterminism - namely, that we dispense with causality itself. But if you dispense with causality (which seems to me to be not only an untenable position, but also a completely unintelligible one), then you will also be dispensing with free will.

“Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been determinism of some variety (such as logical, nomological, or theological), so the most prominent common positions are named for the relation they hold to exist between free will and determinism”

(source: Wikipedia: Free will)

I’m not sure what quoting the dictionary proves. Philosophers tend to go quite a bit beyond the limitations of dictionary definitions.

The dictionary definition of “materialism” does not support your contention that “materialism… does not simply imply that every event has a physical cause.” Also, referencing the dictionary provides for clarification of terms, which is indispensable in any philosophical debate. Because if we cannot agree on the meaning of words, then it will be very difficult to engage in any kind of verbal communication.

Nor am I making a case for materialism; but simply pointing out that for many materialists, physical cause is not a necessary condition of all material events.

The point I made in my previous post still stands. The view that materialism does not require physical determinism is a view of materialism that will not withstand rational scrutiny for reasons I have already stated. And since you are not making a case for materialism, then I will assume that you agree with that point.

Ah, I see. Thank you for sharing those ideas. I can’t say I fully see the point of it all, but such is the limitations of this kind of forum!

The point of it was to respond to your request. Previously, you asked: “Could you explain what particular element of libertarian free will is random?!”

The particular element of libertarian free will which is random (or at least, partially random) is the first stage (or “free stage”) of the two-stage model. This is where “alternative possibilities for thought and action are generated, in part indeterministically.”

 

[hicetnunc]

The dictionary definition of “materialism” does not support your contention that “materialism… does not simply imply that every event has a physical cause.”

That in fact is not my contention at all; you have misread me Counterpoint. I simply pointed out that to many materialists, not all physical events need a cause, along the lines of Victor Stenger. That there are numerous philosophers who hold differing views on the nature of cause and, by extension, free will and determinism is simply an observation on my part, and not a contention. I am not arguing for these views; I am simply pointing out to you that many people hold views that are different than yours. Whether or not these views agree with dictionary definitions is immaterial.

Also, referencing the dictionary provides for clarification of terms, which is indispensable in any philosophical debate. Because if we cannot agree on the meaning of words, then it will be very difficult to engage in any kind of verbal communication.

You may be interested in the article on the Stanford website which explains the different ways in which words are defined, and why dictionary definitions are not adequate to the tasks of philosophy: plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#DicDefOstDef. I draw your attention to the section in particular, “Definitions sought by philosophers are of neither of these kinds, dictionary or ostensive.” Philosophers make distinctions between many kinds of definitions, and I think you will be hard pressed to name any reputable philosopher who takes his/her starting point from the dictionary.

I agree that we need to agree on the meaning of words in order to have a discussion; but your insistence that Merriam Webster is to be the authority on the question of what philosophers must adhere to does not in fact constitute an agreement on our part, but simply an assertion on yours. The whole point of philosophy is to discuss definitions, to test and refine them, and not simply try to silence debate by dubious appeals to authority.

I am trying to understand your argument Counterpoint and want to give it a fair hearing; but you too must be willing to consider the possibility that you have something to learn too, and that perhaps your starting point is not as water-tight as you think it to be. It is a fascinating area of philosophy, and I am happy to explore it with you, but there needs to be a little give and take here.

 

[Counterpoint]

I simply pointed out that to many materialists, not all physical events need a cause, along the lines of Victor Stenger. That there are numerous philosophers who hold differing views on the nature of cause and, by extension, free will and determinism is simply an observation on my part, and not a contention. I am not arguing for these views; I am simply pointing out to you that many people hold views that are different than yours. Whether or not these views agree with dictionary definitions is immaterial.

How materialists define materialism is completely irrelevant to this thread. Materialists, by and large, deny free will. They typically consider all mental activity to be a causally-inert by-product of an underlying physical process. Moreover, they are atheists. This thread is written in a Catholic forum to believers who subscribe to free will. So what an atheistic materialist thinks or doesn’t think has no bearing here. Thomistic metaphysics definitely upholds causality. And it definitely upholds free will. So, that’s the only thing that really matters here.

I am trying to understand your argument Counterpoint and want to give it a fair hearing; but you too must be willing to consider the possibility that you have something to learn too, and that perhaps your starting point is not as water-tight as you think it to be. It is a fascinating area of philosophy, and I am happy to explore it with you, but there needs to be a little give and take here.

As far as I can see, you have said absolutely nothing to counter the argument that I have put forth in the OP. And the fact that you are trying to lecture me on the definitions I have provided suggests to me that you have never seriously studied the subject of free will.

 

[hicetnunc]

As far as I can see, you have said absolutely nothing to counter the argument that I have put forth in the OP. And the fact that you are trying to lecture me on the definitions I have provided suggests to me that you have never seriously studied the subject of free will.

I wasn’t trying to lecture you, I was simply making a point about the nature of definitions in philosophy. What a shame that you have decided to adopt such a combative quite frankly a rather puerile approach to the discussion. It could have been a rewarding journey.

I wish you all the best on your own journey.

Pax

 

[tonyrey]

There are only two options: determinism or indeterminism (If anyone here believes that there are any other options, then please share it with us.)

Self-determinism! Otherwise we are impotent spectators…

 

[Counterpoint]

Self-determinism! Otherwise we are impotent spectators…

Self-determinism, which is just another term for free will, must be compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.

 

[davidv]

Self-determinism, which is just another term for free will, must be compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.

Why?

 

[Counterpoint]

Why?

Read the OP of this thread. That’s where you will find my explanation.

 

[davidv]

Read the OP of this thread. That’s where you will find my explanation.

I did. All I saw was what I believe to be a false dicotomy. There was no rational basis given to justify that the two choices presented are the only choices.

 

[Counterpoint]

I did. All I saw was what I believe to be a false dicotomy. There was no rational basis given to justify that the two choices presented are the only choices.

Well, as I stated in the OP, if you believe there is any other type of free will (besides compatibilism and libertarianism) that doesn’t entail either determinism or indeterminism, then please share it with us. Thus far, no other type of free will has been put forth by you. So, your assertion that my argument involves a false dichotomy would appear to be groundless.

 

[davidv]

Well, as I stated in the OP, if you believe there is any other type of free will (besides compatibilism and libertarianism) that doesn’t entail either determinism or indeterminism, then please share it with us. Thus far, no other type of free will has been put forth by you. So, your assertion that my argument involves a false dichotomy would appear to be groundless.

See post #2.

 

[tonyrey]

Self-determinism, which is just another term for free will, must be compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.

Why?

 

[Counterpoint]

See post #2.

See post #3. It is my response to post #2.

 

[Counterpoint]

Why?

Read the OP of this thread. That’s where you will find my explanation